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2022-06-22crypto: memneq - move into lib/Jason A. Donenfeld3-169/+2
commit abfed87e2a12bd246047d78c01d81eb9529f1d06 upstream. This is used by code that doesn't need CONFIG_CRYPTO, so move this into lib/ with a Kconfig option so that it can be selected by whatever needs it. This fixes a linker error Zheng pointed out when CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS!=y and CRYPTO=m: lib/crypto/curve25519-selftest.o: In function `curve25519_selftest': curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x60): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq' curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0xec): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq' curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x114): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq' curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x154): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq' Reported-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: aa127963f1ca ("crypto: lib/curve25519 - re-add selftests") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-09crypto: cryptd - Protect per-CPU resource by disabling BH.Sebastian Andrzej Siewior1-12/+11
[ Upstream commit 91e8bcd7b4da182e09ea19a2c73167345fe14c98 ] The access to cryptd_queue::cpu_queue is synchronized by disabling preemption in cryptd_enqueue_request() and disabling BH in cryptd_queue_worker(). This implies that access is allowed from BH. If cryptd_enqueue_request() is invoked from preemptible context _and_ soft interrupt then this can lead to list corruption since cryptd_enqueue_request() is not protected against access from soft interrupt. Replace get_cpu() in cryptd_enqueue_request() with local_bh_disable() to ensure BH is always disabled. Remove preempt_disable() from cryptd_queue_worker() since it is not needed because local_bh_disable() ensures synchronisation. Fixes: 254eff771441 ("crypto: cryptd - Per-CPU thread implementation...") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-06crypto: ecrdsa - Fix incorrect use of vli_cmpVitaly Chikunov1-4/+4
commit 7cc7ab73f83ee6d50dc9536bc3355495d8600fad upstream. Correctly compare values that shall be greater-or-equal and not just greater. Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-06crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronousNicolai Stange1-50/+11
commit 074bcd4000e0d812bc253f86fedc40f81ed59ccc upstream. get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has sufficient entropy available. For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is: commit 16b369a91d0d ("random: Blocking API for accessing nonblocking_pool") commit 4c7879907edd ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation") commit 205a525c3342 ("random: Add callback API for random pool readiness") commit 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") commit c2719503f5e1 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API") However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes() has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit 9a47249d444d ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial seeding has completed, if desired. The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL. All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so. Make this move: - rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to "drbg_seed_from_random()", - change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from "void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers, - make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and - prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based mechanism. As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to drbg_generate(). Don't do it then. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-06crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed()Nicolai Stange1-9/+21
commit 262d83a4290c331cd4f617a457408bdb82fbb738 upstream. Since commit 42ea507fae1a ("crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is degraded"), the maximum seed lifetime represented by ->reseed_threshold gets temporarily lowered if the get_random_bytes() source cannot provide sufficient entropy yet, as is common during boot, and restored back to the original value again once that has changed. More specifically, if the add_random_ready_callback() invoked from drbg_prepare_hrng() in the course of DRBG instantiation does not return -EALREADY, that is, if get_random_bytes() has not been fully initialized at this point yet, drbg_prepare_hrng() will lower ->reseed_threshold to a value of 50. The drbg_async_seed() scheduled from said random_ready_callback will eventually restore the original value. A future patch will replace the random_ready_callback based notification mechanism and thus, there will be no add_random_ready_callback() return value anymore which could get compared to -EALREADY. However, there's __drbg_seed() which gets invoked in the course of both, the DRBG instantiation as well as the eventual reseeding from get_random_bytes() in aforementioned drbg_async_seed(), if any. Moreover, it knows about the get_random_bytes() initialization state by the time the seed data had been obtained from it: the new_seed_state argument introduced with the previous patch would get set to DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL in case get_random_bytes() had not been fully initialized yet and to DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL otherwise. Thus, __drbg_seed() provides a convenient alternative for managing that ->reseed_threshold lowering and restoring at a central place. Move all ->reseed_threshold adjustment code from drbg_prepare_hrng() and drbg_async_seed() respectively to __drbg_seed(). Make __drbg_seed() lower the ->reseed_threshold to 50 in case its new_seed_state argument equals DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL and let it restore the original value otherwise. There is no change in behaviour. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-06crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized()Nicolai Stange1-4/+8
commit 2bcd25443868aa8863779a6ebc6c9319633025d2 upstream. Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available. However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate() once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true. Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false. As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a !->pr DRBG variant. Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state implies that - the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy source (if enabled) - and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes() *only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true. Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's ->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead. Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller, drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized() is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new argument to __drbg_seed(). There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-06crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding stateNicolai Stange1-9/+10
commit ce8ce31b2c5c8b18667784b8c515650c65d57b4e upstream. There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes(). At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered during their lifetime. Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full (estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes() once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself. With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related logic already present in drbg_generate(). However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes() would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded member must become a tristate value. Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type. For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch. There is no change in behaviour at this point. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-06lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto librariesJustin M. Forbes1-2/+0
commit e56e18985596617ae426ed5997fb2e737cffb58b upstream. Commit 6048fdcc5f269 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in") took away a number of prompt texts from other crypto libraries. This makes values flip from built-in to module when oldconfig runs, and causes problems when these crypto libs need to be built in for thingslike BIG_KEYS. Fixes: 6048fdcc5f269 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in") Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> [Jason: - moved menu into submenu of lib/ instead of root menu - fixed chacha sub-dependencies for CONFIG_CRYPTO] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30random: replace custom notifier chain with standard oneJason A. Donenfeld1-9/+8
commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream. We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the simplification we receive here. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> [Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30lib/crypto: blake2s: avoid indirect calls to compression function for Clang CFIJason A. Donenfeld1-2/+2
commit d2a02e3c8bb6b347818518edff5a4b40ff52d6d8 upstream. blake2s_compress_generic is weakly aliased by blake2s_compress. The current harness for function selection uses a function pointer, which is ordinarily inlined and resolved at compile time. But when Clang's CFI is enabled, CFI still triggers when making an indirect call via a weak symbol. This seems like a bug in Clang's CFI, as though it's bucketing weak symbols and strong symbols differently. It also only seems to trigger when "full LTO" mode is used, rather than "thin LTO". [ 0.000000][ T0] Kernel panic - not syncing: CFI failure (target: blake2s_compress_generic+0x0/0x1444) [ 0.000000][ T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.16.0-mainline-06981-g076c855b846e #1 [ 0.000000][ T0] Hardware name: MT6873 (DT) [ 0.000000][ T0] Call trace: [ 0.000000][ T0] dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x1dc [ 0.000000][ T0] dump_stack_lvl+0xa8/0x11c [ 0.000000][ T0] panic+0x194/0x464 [ 0.000000][ T0] __cfi_check_fail+0x54/0x58 [ 0.000000][ T0] __cfi_slowpath_diag+0x354/0x4b0 [ 0.000000][ T0] blake2s_update+0x14c/0x178 [ 0.000000][ T0] _extract_entropy+0xf4/0x29c [ 0.000000][ T0] crng_initialize_primary+0x24/0x94 [ 0.000000][ T0] rand_initialize+0x2c/0x6c [ 0.000000][ T0] start_kernel+0x2f8/0x65c [ 0.000000][ T0] __primary_switched+0xc4/0x7be4 [ 0.000000][ T0] Rebooting in 5 seconds.. Nonetheless, the function pointer method isn't so terrific anyway, so this patch replaces it with a simple boolean, which also gets inlined away. This successfully works around the Clang bug. In general, I'm not too keen on all of the indirection involved here; it clearly does more harm than good. Hopefully the whole thing can get cleaned up down the road when lib/crypto is overhauled more comprehensively. But for now, we go with a simple bandaid. Fixes: 6048fdcc5f26 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in") Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1567 Reported-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Tested-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-inJason A. Donenfeld1-1/+2
commit 6048fdcc5f269c7f31d774c295ce59081b36e6f9 upstream. In preparation for using blake2s in the RNG, we change the way that it is wired-in to the build system. Instead of using ifdefs to select the right symbol, we use weak symbols. And because ARM doesn't need the generic implementation, we make the generic one default only if an arch library doesn't need it already, and then have arch libraries that do need it opt-in. So that the arch libraries can remain tristate rather than bool, we then split the shash part from the glue code. Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30crypto: blake2s - share the "shash" API boilerplate codeEric Biggers1-67/+9
commit 8c4a93a1270ddffc7660ae43fa8030ecfe9c06d9 upstream. Add helper functions for shash implementations of BLAKE2s to include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h, taking advantage of __blake2s_update() and __blake2s_final() that were added by the previous patch to share more code between the library and shash implementations. crypto_blake2s_setkey() and crypto_blake2s_init() are usable as shash_alg::setkey and shash_alg::init directly, while crypto_blake2s_update() and crypto_blake2s_final() take an extra 'blake2s_compress_t' function pointer parameter. This allows the implementation of the compression function to be overridden, which is the only part that optimized implementations really care about. The new functions are inline functions (similar to those in sha1_base.h, sha256_base.h, and sm3_base.h) because this avoids needing to add a new module blake2s_helpers.ko, they aren't *too* long, and this avoids indirect calls which are expensive these days. Note that they can't go in blake2s_generic.ko, as that would require selecting CRYPTO_BLAKE2S from CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86, which would cause a recursive dependency. Finally, use these new helper functions in the x86 implementation of BLAKE2s. (This part should be a separate patch, but unfortunately the x86 implementation used the exact same function names like "crypto_blake2s_update()", so it had to be updated at the same time.) Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30crypto: blake2s - remove unneeded includesEric Biggers1-2/+0
commit df412e7efda1e2c5b5fcb06701bba77434cbd1e8 upstream. It doesn't make sense for the generic implementation of BLAKE2s to include <crypto/internal/simd.h> and <linux/jump_label.h>, as these are things that would only be useful in an architecture-specific implementation. Remove these unnecessary includes. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30crypto: blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macrosEric Biggers1-61/+27
commit 0d396058f92ae7e5ac62839fed54bc2bba630ab5 upstream. The shash_alg structs for the four variants of BLAKE2s are identical except for the algorithm name, driver name, and digest size. So, avoid code duplication by using a macro to define these structs. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08crypto: authenc - Fix sleep in atomic context in decrypt_tailHerbert Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893 ] The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags argument and always relies on the flags from the original request when starting its sub-request. This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be set when it shouldn't. Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-08crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete()Eric Biggers1-0/+2
commit a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd upstream. Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length checkEric Biggers1-1/+1
commit d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e upstream. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlistEric Biggers1-1/+1
commit e316f7179be22912281ce6331d96d7c121fb2b17 upstream. Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist. Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*. (Note, the case of a signature longer than the RSA key size should not be allowed in the first place; a separate patch will fix that.) It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties. Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist. Fixes: c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+ Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsaEric Biggers1-0/+5
commit 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 upstream. The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-11crypto: api - Move cryptomgr soft dependency into algapiHerbert Xu2-1/+1
commit c6ce9c5831cae515d375a01b97ae1778689acf19 upstream. The soft dependency on cryptomgr is only needed in algapi because if algapi isn't present then no algorithms can be loaded. This also fixes the case where api is built-in but algapi is built as a module as the soft dependency would otherwise get lost. Fixes: 8ab23d547f65 ("crypto: api - Add softdep on cryptomgr") Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-01-27crypto: jitter - consider 32 LSB for APTStephan Müller1-2/+1
[ Upstream commit 552d03a223eda3df84526ab2c1f4d82e15eaee7a ] The APT compares the current time stamp with a pre-set value. The current code only considered the 4 LSB only. Yet, after reviews by mathematicians of the user space Jitter RNG version >= 3.1.0, it was concluded that the APT can be calculated on the 32 LSB of the time delta. Thi change is applied to the kernel. This fixes a bug where an AMD EPYC fails this test as its RDTSC value contains zeros in the LSB. The most appropriate fix would have been to apply a GCD calculation and divide the time stamp by the GCD. Yet, this is a significant code change that will be considered for a future update. Note, tests showed that constantly the GCD always was 32 on these systems, i.e. the 5 LSB were always zero (thus failing the APT since it only considered the 4 LSB for its calculation). Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18crypto: pcrypt - Delay write to padata->infoDaniel Jordan1-4/+8
[ Upstream commit 68b6dea802cea0dbdd8bd7ccc60716b5a32a5d8a ] These three events can race when pcrypt is used multiple times in a template ("pcrypt(pcrypt(...))"): 1. [taskA] The caller makes the crypto request via crypto_aead_encrypt() 2. [kworkerB] padata serializes the inner pcrypt request 3. [kworkerC] padata serializes the outer pcrypt request 3 might finish before the call to crypto_aead_encrypt() returns in 1, resulting in two possible issues. First, a use-after-free of the crypto request's memory when, for example, taskA writes to the outer pcrypt request's padata->info in pcrypt_aead_enc() after kworkerC completes the request. Second, the outer pcrypt request overwrites the inner pcrypt request's return code with -EINPROGRESS, making a successful request appear to fail. For instance, kworkerB writes the outer pcrypt request's padata->info in pcrypt_aead_done() and then taskA overwrites it in pcrypt_aead_enc(). Avoid both situations by delaying the write of padata->info until after the inner crypto request's return code is checked. This prevents the use-after-free by not touching the crypto request's memory after the next-inner crypto request is made, and stops padata->info from being overwritten. Fixes: 5068c7a883d16 ("crypto: pcrypt - Add pcrypt crypto parallelization wrapper") Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18crypto: ecc - fix CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG dependencyArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 38aa192a05f22f9778f9420e630f0322525ef12e ] The ecc.c file started out as part of the ECDH algorithm but got moved out into a standalone module later. It does not build without CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG, so now that other modules are using it as well we can run into this link error: aarch64-linux-ld: ecc.c:(.text+0xfc8): undefined reference to `crypto_default_rng' aarch64-linux-ld: ecc.c:(.text+0xff4): undefined reference to `crypto_put_default_rng' Move the 'select CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG' statement into the correct symbol. Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Fixes: 4e6602916bc6 ("crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-14crypto: sm2 - fix a memory leak in sm2Hongbo Li1-14/+10
[ Upstream commit 5cd259ca5d466f65ffd21e2e2fa00fb648a8c555 ] SM2 module alloc ec->Q in sm2_set_pub_key(), when doing alg test in test_akcipher_one(), it will set public key for every test vector, and don't free ec->Q. This will cause a memory leak. This patch alloc ec->Q in sm2_ec_ctx_init(). Fixes: ea7ecb66440b ("crypto: sm2 - introduce OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm") Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-14crypto: sm2 - remove unnecessary reset operationsTianjia Zhang1-46/+29
[ Upstream commit 1bc608b4655b8b1491fb100f4cf4f15ae64a8698 ] This is an algorithm optimization. The reset operation when setting the public key is repeated and redundant, so remove it. At the same time, `sm2_ecc_os2ec()` is optimized to make the function more simpler and more in line with the Linux code style. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-14crypto: shash - avoid comparing pointers to exported functions under CFIArd Biesheuvel1-3/+15
[ Upstream commit 22ca9f4aaf431a9413dcc115dd590123307f274f ] crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is implemented by testing whether the .setkey() member of a struct shash_alg points to the default version, called shash_no_setkey(). As crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is a static inline, this requires shash_no_setkey() to be exported to modules. Unfortunately, when building with CFI, function pointers are routed via CFI stubs which are private to each module (or to the kernel proper) and so this function pointer comparison may fail spuriously. Let's fix this by turning crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() into an out of line function. Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-16async_xor: check src_offs is not NULL before updating itXiao Ni1-1/+2
commit 9be148e408df7d361ec5afd6299b7736ff3928b0 upstream. When PAGE_SIZE is greater than 4kB, multiple stripes may share the same page. Thus, src_offs is added to async_xor_offs() with array of offsets. However, async_xor() passes NULL src_offs to async_xor_offs(). In such case, src_offs should not be updated. Add a check before the update. Fixes: ceaf2966ab08(async_xor: increase src_offs when dropping destination page) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Reported-by: Oleksandr Shchirskyi <oleksandr.shchirskyi@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Shchirskyi <oleksandr.shchirskyi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-14async_xor: increase src_offs when dropping destination pageXiao Ni1-0/+1
commit ceaf2966ab082bbc4d26516f97b3ca8a676e2af8 upstream. Now we support sharing one page if PAGE_SIZE is not equal stripe size. To support this, it needs to support calculating xor value with different offsets for each r5dev. One offset array is used to record those offsets. In RMW mode, parity page is used as a source page. It sets ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DST before calculating xor value in ops_run_prexor5. So it needs to add src_list and src_offs at the same time. Now it only needs src_list. So the xor value which is calculated is wrong. It can cause data corruption problem. I can reproduce this problem 100% on a POWER8 machine. The steps are: mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l5 -n3 /dev/sdb1 /dev/sdc1 /dev/sdd1 --size=3G mkfs.xfs /dev/md0 mount /dev/md0 /mnt/test mount: /mnt/test: mount(2) system call failed: Structure needs cleaning. Fixes: 29bcff787a25 ("md/raid5: add new xor function to support different page offset") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-11crypto: rng - fix crypto_rng_reset() refcounting when !CRYPTO_STATSEric Biggers1-7/+3
commit 30d0f6a956fc74bb2e948398daf3278c6b08c7e9 upstream. crypto_stats_get() is a no-op when the kernel is compiled without CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS, so pairing it with crypto_alg_put() unconditionally (as crypto_rng_reset() does) is wrong. Fix this by moving the call to crypto_stats_get() to just before the actual algorithm operation which might need it. This makes it always paired with crypto_stats_rng_seed(). Fixes: eed74b3eba9e ("crypto: rng - Fix a refcounting bug in crypto_rng_reset()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-11crypto: api - check for ERR pointers in crypto_destroy_tfm()Ard Biesheuvel1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 83681f2bebb34dbb3f03fecd8f570308ab8b7c2c ] Given that crypto_alloc_tfm() may return ERR pointers, and to avoid crashes on obscure error paths where such pointers are presented to crypto_destroy_tfm() (such as [0]), add an ERR_PTR check there before dereferencing the second argument as a struct crypto_tfm pointer. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/000000000000de949705bc59e0f6@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-17crypto: mips/poly1305 - enable for all MIPS processorsMaciej W. Rozycki1-1/+1
commit 6c810cf20feef0d4338e9b424ab7f2644a8b353e upstream. The MIPS Poly1305 implementation is generic MIPS code written such as to support down to the original MIPS I and MIPS III ISA for the 32-bit and 64-bit variant respectively. Lift the current limitation then to enable code for MIPSr1 ISA or newer processors only and have it available for all MIPS processors. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk> Fixes: a11d055e7a64 ("crypto: mips/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS optimized implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+ Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-07crypto: tcrypt - avoid signed overflow in byte countArd Biesheuvel1-10/+10
[ Upstream commit 303fd3e1c771077e32e96e5788817f025f0067e2 ] The signed long type used for printing the number of bytes processed in tcrypt benchmarks limits the range to -/+ 2 GiB, which is not sufficient to cover the performance of common accelerated ciphers such as AES-NI when benchmarked with sec=1. So switch to u64 instead. While at it, fix up a missing printk->pr_cont conversion in the AEAD benchmark. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04crypto: michael_mic - fix broken misalignment handlingArd Biesheuvel1-19/+12
commit e1b2d980f03b833442768c1987d5ad0b9a58cfe7 upstream. The Michael MIC driver uses the cra_alignmask to ensure that pointers presented to its update and finup/final methods are 32-bit aligned. However, due to the way the shash API works, this is no guarantee that the 32-bit reads occurring in the update method are also aligned, as the size of the buffer presented to update may be of uneven length. For instance, an update() of 3 bytes followed by a misaligned update() of 4 or more bytes will result in a misaligned access using an accessor that is not suitable for this. On most architectures, this does not matter, and so setting the cra_alignmask is pointless. On architectures where this does matter, setting the cra_alignmask does not actually solve the problem. So let's get rid of the cra_alignmask, and use unaligned accessors instead, where appropriate. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure 'len >= secret.len' in decode_key()Daniele Alessandrelli1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ] The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf' parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed length is less than the encoded length. Add a check to prevent that. Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c7 ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-01-27crypto: xor - Fix divide error in do_xor_speed()Kirill Tkhai1-0/+2
commit 3c02e04fd4f57130e4fa75fab6f528f7a52db9b5 upstream. crypto: Fix divide error in do_xor_speed() From: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Latest (but not only latest) linux-next panics with divide error on my QEMU setup. The patch at the bottom of this message fixes the problem. xor: measuring software checksum speed divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-next-20201223+ #2177 RIP: 0010:do_xor_speed+0xbb/0xf3 Code: 41 ff cc 75 b5 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 3d 23 8b fe 65 8b 05 f6 49 83 7d 85 c0 75 05 e8 84 70 81 fe b8 00 00 50 c3 31 d2 48 8d 7b 10 <f7> f5 41 89 c4 e8 58 07 a2 fe 44 89 63 10 48 8d 7b 08 e8 cb 07 a2 RSP: 0000:ffff888100137dc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000c3500000 RBX: ffffffff823f0160 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000808 RDI: ffffffff823f0170 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8109c50f R09: ffffffff824bb6f7 R10: fffffbfff04976de R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888101997000 R14: ffff888101994000 R15: ffffffff823f0178 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000000220e000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 Call Trace: calibrate_xor_blocks+0x13c/0x1c4 ? do_xor_speed+0xf3/0xf3 do_one_initcall+0xc1/0x1b7 ? start_kernel+0x373/0x373 ? unpoison_range+0x3a/0x60 kernel_init_freeable+0x1dd/0x238 ? rest_init+0xc6/0xc6 kernel_init+0x8/0x10a ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 ---[ end trace 5bd3c1d0b77772da ]--- Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-23X.509: Fix crash caused by NULL pointerTianjia Zhang1-1/+2
commit 7178a107f5ea7bdb1cc23073234f0ded0ef90ec7 upstream. On the following call path, `sig->pkey_algo` is not assigned in asymmetric_key_verify_signature(), which causes runtime crash in public_key_verify_signature(). keyctl_pkey_verify asymmetric_key_verify_signature verify_signature public_key_verify_signature This patch simply check this situation and fixes the crash caused by NULL pointer. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Reported-by: Tobias Markus <tobias@markus-regensburg.de> Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Tested-by: João Fonseca <jpedrofonseca@ua.pt> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-12crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secretsGreg Kroah-Hartman1-1/+1
commit f93274ef0fe972c120c96b3207f8fce376231a60 upstream. The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit() instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory anymore. Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com> Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X8ns4AfwjKudpyfe@kroah.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-12crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()Ard Biesheuvel1-1/+2
commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream. Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another: the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of intentional tampering. So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer before validating the key further. Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-12-30crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()Ard Biesheuvel1-4/+5
commit 17858b140bf49961b71d4e73f1c3ea9bc8e7dda0 upstream. ecdh_set_secret() casts a void* pointer to a const u64* in order to feed it into ecc_is_key_valid(). This is not generally permitted by the C standard, and leads to actual misalignment faults on ARMv6 cores. In some cases, these are fixed up in software, but this still leads to performance hits that are entirely avoidable. So let's copy the key into the ctx buffer first, which we will do anyway in the common case, and which guarantees correct alignment. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-12-30crypto: Kconfig - CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS requires the managerJason A. Donenfeld1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 6569e3097f1c4a490bdf2b23d326855e04942dfd ] The extra tests in the manager actually require the manager to be selected too. Otherwise the linker gives errors like: ld: arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.o: in function `chacha_simd_stream_xor': chacha_glue.c:(.text+0x422): undefined reference to `crypto_simd_disabled_for_test' Fixes: 2343d1529aff ("crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when manager is disabled") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-12-26crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_nameEric Biggers1-3/+7
commit 92eb6c3060ebe3adf381fd9899451c5b047bb14d upstream. Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names in sockaddr_alg. However, the actual length of the salg_name field stayed at the original 64 bytes. This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name, which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length (either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1). We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'. One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names. Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel. Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind(). This addresses the syzbot report "UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind" (https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=92ead4eb8e26a26d465e). Reported-by: syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-13Merge tag 'drivers-5.10-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds4-92/+287
Pull block driver updates from Jens Axboe: "Here are the driver updates for 5.10. A few SCSI updates in here too, in coordination with Martin as they depend on core block changes for the shared tag bitmap. This contains: - NVMe pull requests via Christoph: - fix keep alive timer modification (Amit Engel) - order the PCI ID list more sensibly (Andy Shevchenko) - cleanup the open by controller helper (Chaitanya Kulkarni) - use an xarray for the CSE log lookup (Chaitanya Kulkarni) - support ZNS in nvmet passthrough mode (Chaitanya Kulkarni) - fix nvme_ns_report_zones (Christoph Hellwig) - add a sanity check to nvmet-fc (James Smart) - fix interrupt allocation when too many polled queues are specified (Jeffle Xu) - small nvmet-tcp optimization (Mark Wunderlich) - fix a controller refcount leak on init failure (Chaitanya Kulkarni) - misc cleanups (Chaitanya Kulkarni) - major refactoring of the scanning code (Christoph Hellwig) - MD updates via Song: - Bug fixes in bitmap code, from Zhao Heming - Fix a work queue check, from Guoqing Jiang - Fix raid5 oops with reshape, from Song Liu - Clean up unused code, from Jason Yan - Discard improvements, from Xiao Ni - raid5/6 page offset support, from Yufen Yu - Shared tag bitmap for SCSI/hisi_sas/null_blk (John, Kashyap, Hannes) - null_blk open/active zone limit support (Niklas) - Set of bcache updates (Coly, Dongsheng, Qinglang)" * tag 'drivers-5.10-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (78 commits) md/raid5: fix oops during stripe resizing md/bitmap: fix memory leak of temporary bitmap md: fix the checking of wrong work queue md/bitmap: md_bitmap_get_counter returns wrong blocks md/bitmap: md_bitmap_read_sb uses wrong bitmap blocks md/raid0: remove unused function is_io_in_chunk_boundary() nvme-core: remove extra condition for vwc nvme-core: remove extra variable nvme: remove nvme_identify_ns_list nvme: refactor nvme_validate_ns nvme: move nvme_validate_ns nvme: query namespace identifiers before adding the namespace nvme: revalidate zone bitmaps in nvme_update_ns_info nvme: remove nvme_update_formats nvme: update the known admin effects nvme: set the queue limits in nvme_update_ns_info nvme: remove the 0 lba_shift check in nvme_update_ns_info nvme: clean up the check for too large logic block sizes nvme: freeze the queue over ->lba_shift updates nvme: factor out a nvme_configure_metadata helper ...
2020-10-13Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds28-153/+1122
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Allow DRBG testing through user-space af_alg - Add tcrypt speed testing support for keyed hashes - Add type-safe init/exit hooks for ahash Algorithms: - Mark arc4 as obsolete and pending for future removal - Mark anubis, khazad, sead and tea as obsolete - Improve boot-time xor benchmark - Add OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm and use it for integrity Drivers: - Fixes and enhancement for XTS in caam - Add support for XIP8001B hwrng in xiphera-trng - Add RNG and hash support in sun8i-ce/sun8i-ss - Allow imx-rngc to be used by kernel entropy pool - Use crypto engine in omap-sham - Add support for Ingenic X1830 with ingenic" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (205 commits) X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2 crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speed X.509: fix error return value on the failed path crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey crypto: qat - drop input parameter from adf_enable_aer() crypto: qat - fix function parameters descriptions crypto: atmel-tdes - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements crypto: drivers - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements hwrng: mxc-rnga - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements hwrng: iproc-rng200 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements hwrng: stm32 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later time crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uninitalized 'curr_qm_qp_num' crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the return value when device is busy crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix zero length input in GZIP decompress crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uncleared debug registers lib/mpi: Fix unused variable warnings crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect hwrng: npcm - modify readl to readb ...
2020-10-08X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2Herbert Xu3-64/+57
The sm2 code was split out of public_key.c in a way that breaks modular builds. This patch moves the code back into the same file as the original motivation was to minimise ifdefs and that has nothing to do with splitting the code out. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3...") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-08crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speedNathan Chancellor1-3/+1
Clang warns: crypto/xor.c:101:4: warning: variable 'count' is uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized] count++; ^~~~~ crypto/xor.c:86:17: note: initialize the variable 'count' to silence this warning int i, j, count; ^ = 0 1 warning generated. After the refactoring to use ktime that happened in this function, count is only assigned, never read. Just remove the variable to get rid of the warning. Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1171 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-08X.509: fix error return value on the failed pathTianjia Zhang1-1/+3
When memory allocation fails, an appropriate return value should be set. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarkingArd Biesheuvel1-22/+16
Currently, we use the jiffies counter as a time source, by staring at it until a HZ period elapses, and then staring at it again and perform as many XOR operations as we can at the same time until another HZ period elapses, so that we can calculate the throughput. This takes longer than necessary, and depends on HZ, which is undesirable, since HZ is system dependent. Let's use the ktime interface instead, and use it to time a fixed number of XOR operations, which can be done much faster, and makes the time spent depend on the performance level of the system itself, which is much more reasonable. To ensure that we have the resolution we need even on systems with 32 kHz time sources, while not spending too much time in the benchmark on a slow CPU, let's switch to 3 attempts of 800 repetitions each: that way, we will only misidentify algorithms that perform within 10% of each other as the fastest if they are faster than 10 GB/s to begin with, which is not expected to occur on systems with such coarse clocks. On ThunderX2, I get the following results: Before: [72625.956765] xor: measuring software checksum speed [72625.993104] 8regs : 10169.000 MB/sec [72626.033099] 32regs : 12050.000 MB/sec [72626.073095] arm64_neon: 11100.000 MB/sec [72626.073097] xor: using function: 32regs (12050.000 MB/sec) After: [72599.650216] xor: measuring software checksum speed [72599.651188] 8regs : 10491 MB/sec [72599.652006] 32regs : 12345 MB/sec [72599.652871] arm64_neon : 11402 MB/sec [72599.652873] xor: using function: 32regs (12345 MB/sec) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200923182230.22715-3-ardb@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later timeArd Biesheuvel1-1/+28
Currently, the XOR module performs its boot time benchmark at core initcall time when it is built-in, to ensure that the RAID code can make use of it when it is built-in as well. Let's defer this to a later stage during the boot, to avoid impacting the overall boot time of the system. Instead, just pick an arbitrary implementation from the list, and use that as the preliminary default. Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verificationTianjia Zhang4-0/+71
The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China. The method of generating Other User Information is defined as ZA=H256(ENTLA || IDA || a || b || xG || yG || xA || yA), it also specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02. The x509 certificate supports SM2-with-SM3 type certificate verification. Because certificate verification requires ZA in addition to tbs data, ZA also depends on elliptic curve parameters and public key data, so you need to access tbs in sig and calculate ZA. Finally calculate the digest of the signature and complete the verification work. The calculation process of ZA is declared in specifications GM/T 0009-2012 and GM/T 0003.2-2012. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25X.509: support OSCCA certificate parseTianjia Zhang1-5/+22
The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China. This patch adds the OID object identifier defined by OSCCA. The x509 certificate supports SM2-with-SM3 type certificate parsing. It uses the standard elliptic curve public key, and the sm2 algorithm signs the hash generated by sm3. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>