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MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING
commit 151f66bb618d1fd0eeb84acb61b4a9fa5d8bb0fa upstream.
Xiao reported that lvm2 test lvconvert-raid-takeover.sh can hang with
small possibility, the root cause is exactly the same as commit
bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
However, Dan reported another hang after that, and junxiao investigated
the problem and found out that this is caused by plugged bio can't issue
from raid5d().
Current implementation in raid5d() has a weird dependence:
1) md_check_recovery() from raid5d() must hold 'reconfig_mutex' to clear
MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING;
2) raid5d() handles IO in a deadloop, until all IO are issued;
3) IO from raid5d() must wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING to be cleared;
This behaviour is introduce before v2.6, and for consequence, if other
context hold 'reconfig_mutex', and md_check_recovery() can't update
super_block, then raid5d() will waste one cpu 100% by the deadloop, until
'reconfig_mutex' is released.
Refer to the implementation from raid1 and raid10, fix this problem by
skipping issue IO if MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING is still set after
md_check_recovery(), daemon thread will be woken up when 'reconfig_mutex'
is released. Meanwhile, the hang problem will be fixed as well.
Fixes: 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Reported-and-tested-by: Dan Moulding <dan@danm.net>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240123005700.9302-1-dan@danm.net/
Investigated-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322081005.1112401-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3a861560ccb35f2a4f0a4b8207fa7c2a35fc7f31 upstream.
btree_iter is used in two ways: either allocated on the stack with a
fixed size MAX_BSETS, or from a mempool with a dynamic size based on the
specific cache set. Previously, the struct had a fixed-length array of
size MAX_BSETS which was indexed out-of-bounds for the dynamically-sized
iterators, which causes UBSAN to complain.
This patch uses the same approach as in bcachefs's sort_iter and splits
the iterator into a btree_iter with a flexible array member and a
btree_iter_stack which embeds a btree_iter as well as a fixed-length
data array.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2039368
Signed-off-by: Matthew Mirvish <matthew@mm12.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509011117.2697-3-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f0e729af2eb6bee9eb58c4df1087f14ebaefe26b ]
Is is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will
trigger following softlockup:
kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976]
CPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
Call Trace:
<TASK>
md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0
raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10]
md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020
md_thread+0xa7/0x170
kthread+0xcf/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
And the detailed process is as follows:
md_do_sync
j = mddev->resync_min
while (j < max_sectors)
sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, &skipped)
if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., &sync_blocks))
// md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0
return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe;
// sectors = 0;
j += sectors;
// j never change
Root cause is that commit 301867b1c168 ("md/raid10: check
slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter") return early from
md_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks.
Fix this problem by always set returned blocks from
md_bitmap_get_counter"(), as it used to be.
Noted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the
case that bitmap size doesn't match array size still need to be fixed.
Fixes: 301867b1c168 ("md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter")
Reported-and-tested-by: Nigel Croxon <ncroxon@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/71ba5272-ab07-43ba-8232-d2da642acb4e@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422065824.2516-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 6cf350658736681b9d6b0b6e58c5c76b235bb4c4 upstream.
If kobject_add() is fail in bind_rdev_to_array(), 'rdev->serial' will be
alloc not be freed, and kmemleak occurs.
unreferenced object 0xffff88815a350000 (size 49152):
comm "mdadm", pid 789, jiffies 4294716910
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc f773277a):
[<0000000058b0a453>] kmemleak_alloc+0x61/0xe0
[<00000000366adf14>] __kmalloc_large_node+0x15e/0x270
[<000000002e82961b>] __kmalloc_node.cold+0x11/0x7f
[<00000000f206d60a>] kvmalloc_node+0x74/0x150
[<0000000034bf3363>] rdev_init_serial+0x67/0x170
[<0000000010e08fe9>] mddev_create_serial_pool+0x62/0x220
[<00000000c3837bf0>] bind_rdev_to_array+0x2af/0x630
[<0000000073c28560>] md_add_new_disk+0x400/0x9f0
[<00000000770e30ff>] md_ioctl+0x15bf/0x1c10
[<000000006cfab718>] blkdev_ioctl+0x191/0x3f0
[<0000000085086a11>] vfs_ioctl+0x22/0x60
[<0000000018b656fe>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xba/0xe0
[<00000000e54e675e>] do_syscall_64+0x71/0x150
[<000000008b0ad622>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
Fixes: 963c555e75b0 ("md: introduce mddev_create/destroy_wb_pool for the change of member device")
Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240208085556.2412922-1-linan666@huaweicloud.com
[ mddev_destroy_serial_pool third parameter was removed in mainline,
where there is no need to suspend within this function anymore. ]
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Bongio <jbongio@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8e91c2342351e0f5ef6c0a704384a7f6fc70c3b2 ]
Depending on the value of CONFIG_HZ, clang complains about a pointless
comparison:
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:4085:12: error: result of comparison of
constant 42949672950 with expression of type
'unsigned int' is always false
[-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
if (val >= (uint64_t)UINT_MAX * 1000 / HZ) {
As the check remains useful for other configurations, shut up the
warning by adding a second type cast to uint64_t.
Fixes: 468dfca38b1a ("dm integrity: add a bitmap mode")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e7132ed3c07bd8a6ce3db4bb307ef2852b322dc ]
There was reported lockup when we exit a snapshot with many exceptions.
Fix this by adding "cond_resched" to the loop that frees the exceptions.
Reported-by: John Pittman <jpittman@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 95009ae904b1e9dca8db6f649f2d7c18a6e42c75 ]
The lockdep assert is added by commit a448af25becf ("md/raid10: remove
rcu protection to access rdev from conf") in print_conf(). And I didn't
notice that dm-raid is calling "pers->hot_add_disk" without holding
'reconfig_mutex'.
"pers->hot_add_disk" read and write many fields that is protected by
'reconfig_mutex', and raid_resume() already grab the lock in other
contex. Hence fix this problem by protecting "pers->host_add_disk"
with the lock.
Fixes: 9092c02d9435 ("DM RAID: Add ability to restore transiently failed devices on resume")
Fixes: a448af25becf ("md/raid10: remove rcu protection to access rdev from conf")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.7+
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305072306.2562024-10-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit dfd2bf436709b2bccb78c2dda550dde93700efa7 ]
In raid5_cache_count():
if (conf->max_nr_stripes < conf->min_nr_stripes)
return 0;
return conf->max_nr_stripes - conf->min_nr_stripes;
The current check is ineffective, as the values could change immediately
after being checked.
In raid5_set_cache_size():
...
conf->min_nr_stripes = size;
...
while (size > conf->max_nr_stripes)
conf->min_nr_stripes = conf->max_nr_stripes;
...
Due to intermediate value updates in raid5_set_cache_size(), concurrent
execution of raid5_cache_count() and raid5_set_cache_size() may lead to
inconsistent reads of conf->max_nr_stripes and conf->min_nr_stripes.
The current checks are ineffective as values could change immediately
after being checked, raising the risk of conf->min_nr_stripes exceeding
conf->max_nr_stripes and potentially causing an integer overflow.
This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool
developed by our team. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract
function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the
instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs
including data races and atomicity violations. The above possible bug is
reported when our tool analyzes the source code of Linux 6.2.
To resolve this issue, it is suggested to introduce local variables
'min_stripes' and 'max_stripes' in raid5_cache_count() to ensure the
values remain stable throughout the check. Adding locks in
raid5_cache_count() fails to resolve atomicity violations, as
raid5_set_cache_size() may hold intermediate values of
conf->min_nr_stripes while unlocked. With this patch applied, our tool no
longer reports the bug, with the kernel configuration allyesconfig for
x86_64. Due to the lack of associated hardware, we cannot test the patch
in runtime testing, and just verify it according to the code logic.
Fixes: edbe83ab4c27 ("md/raid5: allow the stripe_cache to grow and shrink.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240112071017.16313-1-2045gemini@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b4d78cfeb30476239cf08f4f40afc095c173d6e3 ]
It is possible to set up dm-integrity with smaller sector size than
the logical sector size of the underlying device. In this situation,
dm-integrity guarantees that the outgoing bios have the same alignment as
incoming bios (so, if you create a filesystem with 4k block size,
dm-integrity would send 4k-aligned bios to the underlying device).
This guarantee was broken when integrity_recheck was implemented.
integrity_recheck sends bio that is aligned to ic->sectors_per_block. So
if we set up integrity with 512-byte sector size on a device with logical
block size 4k, we would be sending unaligned bio. This triggered a bug in
one of our internal tests.
This commit fixes it by determining the actual alignment of the
incoming bio and then makes sure that the outgoing bio in
integrity_recheck has the same alignment.
Fixes: c88f5e553fe3 ("dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e5f0f6383b4896c7e9b943d84b136149d0f45e9 ]
Some IO will dispatch from kworker with different io_context settings
than the submitting task, we may need to specify a priority to avoid
losing priority.
Add IO priority parameter to dm_io() and update all callers.
Co-developed-by: Yibin Ding <yibin.ding@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Yibin Ding <yibin.ding@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Hongyu Jin <hongyu.jin@unisoc.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: b4d78cfeb304 ("dm-integrity: align the outgoing bio in integrity_recheck")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 255e2646496fcbf836a3dfe1b535692f09f11b45 ]
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: b4d78cfeb304 ("dm-integrity: align the outgoing bio in integrity_recheck")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 55e565c42dce81a4e49c13262d5bc4eb4c2e588a ]
Memory for the "checksums" pointer will leak if the data is rechecked
after checksum failure (because the associated kfree won't happen due
to 'goto skip_io').
Fix this by freeing the checksums memory before recheck, and just use
the "checksum_onstack" memory for storing checksum during recheck.
Fixes: c88f5e553fe3 ("dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 65e8fbde64520001abf1c8d0e573561b4746ef38 ]
There is this reported crash when experimenting with the lvm2 testsuite.
The list corruption is caused by the fact that the postsuspend and resume
methods were not paired correctly; there were two consecutive calls to the
origin_postsuspend function. The second call attempts to remove the
"hash_list" entry from a list, while it was already removed by the first
call.
Fix __dm_internal_resume so that it calls the preresume and resume
methods of the table's targets.
If a preresume method of some target fails, we are in a tricky situation.
We can't return an error because dm_internal_resume isn't supposed to
return errors. We can't return success, because then the "resume" and
"postsuspend" methods would not be paired correctly. So, we set the
DMF_SUSPENDED flag and we fake normal suspend - it may confuse userspace
tools, but it won't cause a kernel crash.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 8343 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6 #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
<snip>
RSP: 0018:ffff8881b831bcc0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff888143b6eb80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff819053d0 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff8881b83a3400 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: 0000000000000058
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff81a24080 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff88814538e000 R14: ffff888143bc6dc0 R15: ffffffffa02e4bb0
FS: 00000000f7c0f780(0000) GS:ffff8893f0a40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000057fb5000 CR3: 0000000143474000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die+0x2d/0x80
? do_trap+0xeb/0xf0
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
? do_error_trap+0x60/0x80
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
? exc_invalid_op+0x49/0x60
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod]
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
origin_postsuspend+0x1a/0x50 [dm_snapshot]
dm_table_postsuspend_targets+0x34/0x50 [dm_mod]
dm_suspend+0xd8/0xf0 [dm_mod]
dev_suspend+0x1f2/0x2f0 [dm_mod]
? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod]
ctl_ioctl+0x300/0x5f0 [dm_mod]
dm_compat_ctl_ioctl+0x7/0x10 [dm_mod]
__x64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x104/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x184/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
RIP: 0033:0xf7e6aead
<snip>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: ffcc39364160 ("dm: enhance internal suspend and resume interface")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b25b8f4b8ecef0f48c05f0c3572daeabefe16526 ]
An empty flush doesn't have a payload, so it should never be looked at
when considering to possibly requeue a bio for the case when a reshape
is in progress.
Fixes: 9dbd1aa3a81c ("dm raid: add reshaping support to the target")
Reported-by: Patrick Plenefisch <simonpatp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9674f54e41fffaf06f6a60202e1fa4cc13de3cf5 ]
The raid should not be opened anymore when it is about to be stopped.
However, other processes can open it again if the flag MD_CLOSING is
cleared before exiting. From now on, this flag will not be cleared when
the raid will be stopped.
Fixes: 065e519e71b2 ("md: MD_CLOSING needs to be cleared after called md_set_readonly or do_md_stop")
Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240226031444.3606764-6-linan666@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 787f1b2800464aa277236a66eb3c279535edd460 ]
"struct bvec_iter" is defined with the __packed attribute, so it is
aligned on a single byte. On X86 (and on other architectures that support
unaligned addresses in hardware), "struct bvec_iter" is accessed using the
8-byte and 4-byte memory instructions, however these instructions are less
efficient if they operate on unaligned addresses.
(on RISC machines that don't have unaligned access in hardware, GCC
generates byte-by-byte accesses that are very inefficient - see [1])
This commit reorders the entries in "struct dm_verity_io" and "struct
convert_context", so that "struct bvec_iter" is aligned on 8 bytes.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZcLuWUNRZadJr0tQ@fedora/T/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 010444623e7f4da6b4a4dd603a7da7469981e293 ]
Currently, there is no limit for raid1/raid10 plugged bio. While flushing
writes, raid1 has cond_resched() while raid10 doesn't, and too many
writes can cause soft lockup.
Follow up soft lockup can be triggered easily with writeback test for
raid10 with ramdisks:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#10 stuck for 27s! [md0_raid10:1293]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
call_rcu+0x16/0x20
put_object+0x41/0x80
__delete_object+0x50/0x90
delete_object_full+0x2b/0x40
kmemleak_free+0x46/0xa0
slab_free_freelist_hook.constprop.0+0xed/0x1a0
kmem_cache_free+0xfd/0x300
mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30
mempool_free+0x3a/0x100
bio_free+0x59/0x80
bio_put+0xcf/0x2c0
free_r10bio+0xbf/0xf0
raid_end_bio_io+0x78/0xb0
one_write_done+0x8a/0xa0
raid10_end_write_request+0x1b4/0x430
bio_endio+0x175/0x320
brd_submit_bio+0x3b9/0x9b7 [brd]
__submit_bio+0x69/0xe0
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e6/0x5a0
submit_bio_noacct+0x38c/0x7e0
flush_pending_writes+0xf0/0x240
raid10d+0xac/0x1ed0
Fix the problem by adding cond_resched() to raid10 like what raid1 did.
Note that unlimited plugged bio still need to be optimized, for example,
in the case of lots of dirty pages writeback, this will take lots of
memory and io will spend a long time in plug, hence io latency is bad.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230529131106.2123367-2-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 873f50ece41aad5c4f788a340960c53774b5526e ]
Currently, if reshape is interrupted, echo "reshape" to sync_action will
restart reshape from scratch, for example:
echo frozen > sync_action
echo reshape > sync_action
This will corrupt data before reshape_position if the array is growing,
fix the problem by continue reshape from reshape_position.
Reported-by: Peter Neuwirth <reddunur@online.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/e2f96772-bfbc-f43b-6da1-f520e5164536@online.de/
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512015610.821290-3-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 66ad2fbcdbeab0edfd40c5d94f32f053b98c2320 upstream.
The newly added integrity_recheck() function has another larger stack
allocation, just like its caller integrity_metadata(). When it gets
inlined, the combination of the two exceeds the warning limit for 32-bit
architectures and possibly risks an overflow when this is called from
a deep call chain through a file system:
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:1767:13: error: stack frame size (1048) exceeds limit (1024) in 'integrity_metadata' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than]
1767 | static void integrity_metadata(struct work_struct *w)
Since the caller at this point is done using its checksum buffer,
just reuse the same buffer in the new function to avoid the double
allocation.
[Mikulas: add "noinline" to integrity_recheck and verity_recheck.
These functions are only called on error, so they shouldn't bloat the
stack frame or code size of the caller.]
Fixes: c88f5e553fe3 ("dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure")
Fixes: 9177f3c0dea6 ("dm-verity: recheck the hash after a failure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 855678ed8534518e2b428bcbcec695de9ba248e8 upstream.
submit_flushes
atomic_set(&mddev->flush_pending, 1);
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev)
atomic_inc(&mddev->flush_pending);
bi->bi_end_io = md_end_flush
submit_bio(bi);
/* flush io is done first */
md_end_flush
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending))
percpu_ref_put(&mddev->active_io)
-> active_io is not released
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending))
-> missing release of active_io
For consequence, mddev_suspend() will wait for 'active_io' to be zero
forever.
Fix this problem by releasing 'active_io' in submit_flushes() if
'flush_pending' is decreased to zero.
Fixes: fa2bbff7b0b4 ("md: synchronize flush io with array reconfiguration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Reported-by: Blazej Kucman <blazej.kucman@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130172524.0000417b@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201092559.910982-7-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9177f3c0dea6143d05cac1bbd28668fd0e216d11 upstream.
If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-verity reports an error [1].
This commit fixes dm-verity, so that if hash verification fails, the data
is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify it) and
the hash is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the content of the kernel
buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the recheck fails, an error is
reported.
[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 50c70240097ce41fe6bce6478b80478281e4d0f7 upstream.
It was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when
the data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by
copying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the
clone bio.
This may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from
corrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at
the same time.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c88f5e553fe38b2ffc4c33d08654e5281b297677 upstream.
If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-integrity reports an error [1]. The error is reported in a log
and it may cause RAID leg being kicked out of the array.
This commit fixes dm-integrity, so that if integrity verification fails,
the data is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify
it) and the integrity tag is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the
content of the kernel buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the
recheck fails, an integrity error is reported.
[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 42e15d12070b4ff9af2b980f1b65774c2dab0507 upstream.
If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-crypt reports an authentication error [1]. The error is
reported in a log and it may cause RAID leg being kicked out of the
array.
This commit fixes dm-crypt, so that if integrity verification fails, the
data is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify it)
and the integrity tag is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the content
of the kernel buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the recheck fails,
an integrity error is reported.
[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bd504bcfec41a503b32054da5472904b404341a4 upstream.
The kvmalloc function fails with a warning if the size is larger than
INT_MAX. The warning was triggered by a syscall testing robot.
In order to avoid the warning, this commit limits the number of targets to
1048576 and the size of the parameter area to 1073741824.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d6e035aad6c09991da1c667fb83419329a3baed8 ]
commit 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
introduced a hung bug and will be reverted in next patch, since the issue
that commit is fixing is due to md superblock write is throttled by wbt,
to fix it, we can have superblock write bypass block layer throttle.
Fixes: 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Suggested-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231108182216.73611-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 0a9bab391e336489169b95cb0d4553d921302189 upstream.
Tasklets have an inherent problem with memory corruption. The function
tasklet_action_common calls tasklet_trylock, then it calls the tasklet
callback and then it calls tasklet_unlock. If the tasklet callback frees
the structure that contains the tasklet or if it calls some code that may
free it, tasklet_unlock will write into free memory.
The commits 8e14f610159d and d9a02e016aaf try to fix it for dm-crypt, but
it is not a sufficient fix and the data corruption can still happen [1].
There is no fix for dm-verity and dm-verity will write into free memory
with every tasklet-processed bio.
There will be atomic workqueues implemented in the kernel 6.9 [2]. They
will have better interface and they will not suffer from the memory
corruption problem.
But we need something that stops the memory corruption now and that can be
backported to the stable kernels. So, I'm proposing this commit that
disables tasklets in both dm-crypt and dm-verity. This commit doesn't
remove the tasklet support, because the tasklet code will be reused when
atomic workqueues will be implemented.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/d390d7ee-f142-44d3-822a-87949e14608b@suse.de/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130091300.2968534-1-tj@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 39d42fa96ba1b ("dm crypt: add flags to optionally bypass kcryptd workqueues")
Fixes: 5721d4e5a9cdb ("dm verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dc1cc22ed58f11d58d8553c5ec5f11cbfc3e3039 ]
Upon assembling the array, both kernel and mdadm allow the devices to have event
counter difference of 1, and still consider them as up-to-date.
However, a device whose event count is behind by 1, may in fact not be up-to-date,
and array resync with such a device may cause data corruption.
To avoid this, consult the superblock of the freshest device about the status
of a device, whose event counter is behind by 1.
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex.lyakas@zadara.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1702470271-16073-1-git-send-email-alex.lyakas@zadara.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit bed9e27baf52a09b7ba2a3714f1e24e17ced386d.
The original set [1][2] was expected to undo a suboptimal fix in [2], and
replace it with a better fix [1]. However, as reported by Dan Moulding [2]
causes an issue with raid5 with journal device.
Revert [2] for now to close the issue. We will follow up on another issue
reported by Juxiao Bi, as [2] is expected to fix it. We believe this is a
good trade-off, because the latter issue happens less freqently.
In the meanwhile, we will NOT revert [1], as it contains the right logic.
[1] commit d6e035aad6c0 ("md: bypass block throttle for superblock update")
[2] commit bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
Reported-by: Dan Moulding <dan@danm.net>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/20240123005700.9302-1-dan@danm.net/
Fixes: bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7dab24554dedd4e6f408af8eb2d25c89997a6a1f upstream.
Use the type blk_opf_t for read and write operations instead of int. This
patch does not affect the generated code but fixes the following sparse
warning:
drivers/md/raid1.c:1993:60: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 5 (different base types)
expected restricted blk_opf_t [usertype] opf
got int rw
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Fixes: 3c5e514db58f ("md/raid1: Use the new blk_opf_t type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202401080657.UjFnvQgX-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108001223.23835-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fa2bbff7b0b4e211fec5e5686ef96350690597b5 ]
Currently rcu is used to protect iterating rdev from submit_flushes():
submit_flushes remove_and_add_spares
synchronize_rcu
pers->hot_remove_disk()
rcu_read_lock()
rdev_for_each_rcu
if (rdev->raid_disk >= 0)
rdev->radi_disk = -1;
atomic_inc(&rdev->nr_pending)
rcu_read_unlock()
bi = bio_alloc_bioset()
bi->bi_end_io = md_end_flush
bi->private = rdev
submit_bio
// issue io for removed rdev
Fix this problem by grabbing 'acive_io' before iterating rdev, make sure
that remove_and_add_spares() won't concurrent with submit_flushes().
Fixes: a2826aa92e2e ("md: support barrier requests on all personalities.")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129020234.1586910-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit bed9e27baf52a09b7ba2a3714f1e24e17ced386d upstream.
This reverts commit 5e2cf333b7bd5d3e62595a44d598a254c697cd74.
That commit introduced the following race and can cause system hung.
md_write_start: raid5d:
// mddev->in_sync == 1
set "MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING"
// running before md_write_start wakeup it
waiting "MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING" cleared
>>>>>>>>> hung
wakeup mddev->thread
...
waiting "MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING" cleared
>>>> hung, raid5d should clear this flag
but get hung by same flag.
The issue reverted commit fixing is fixed by last patch in a new way.
Fixes: 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231108182216.73611-2-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6849302fdff126997765d16df355b73231f130d4 ]
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit b86f4b790c998afdbc88fe1aa55cfe89c4068726 upstream.
__bio_for_each_segment assumes that the first struct bio_vec argument
doesn't change - it calls "bio_advance_iter_single((bio), &(iter),
(bvl).bv_len)" to advance the iterator. Unfortunately, the dm-integrity
code changes the bio_vec with "bv.bv_len -= pos". When this code path
is taken, the iterator would be out of sync and dm-integrity would
report errors. This happens if the machine is out of memory and
"kmalloc" fails.
Fix this bug by making a copy of "bv" and changing the copy instead.
Fixes: 7eada909bfd7 ("dm: add integrity target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d48300120627a1cb98914738fff38b424625b8ad ]
As described in commit 8111964f1b85 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between
shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata"), ABBA deadlocks will be
triggered because shrinker_rwsem currently needs to held by
dm_pool_abort_metadata() as a side-effect of thin-pool metadata
operation failure.
The following three problem scenarios have been noticed:
1) Described by commit 8111964f1b85 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between
shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata")
2) shrinker_rwsem and throttle->lock
P1(drop cache) P2(kworker)
drop_caches_sysctl_handler
drop_slab
shrink_slab
down_read(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A
do_shrink_slab
super_cache_scan
prune_icache_sb
dispose_list
evict
ext4_evict_inode
ext4_clear_inode
ext4_discard_preallocations
ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp
ext4_mb_init_cache
ext4_wait_block_bitmap
__ext4_error
ext4_handle_error
ext4_commit_super
...
dm_submit_bio
do_worker
throttle_work_update
down_write(&t->lock) -- LOCK B
process_deferred_bios
commit
metadata_operation_failed
dm_pool_abort_metadata
dm_block_manager_create
dm_bufio_client_create
register_shrinker
down_write(&shrinker_rwsem)
-- LOCK A
thin_map
thin_bio_map
thin_defer_bio_with_throttle
throttle_lock
down_read(&t->lock) - LOCK B
3) shrinker_rwsem and wait_on_buffer
P1(drop cache) P2(kworker)
drop_caches_sysctl_handler
drop_slab
shrink_slab
down_read(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A
do_shrink_slab
...
ext4_wait_block_bitmap
__ext4_error
ext4_handle_error
jbd2_journal_abort
jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno
jbd2_write_superblock
submit_bh
// LOCK B
// RELEASE B
do_worker
throttle_work_update
down_write(&t->lock) - LOCK B
process_deferred_bios
process_bio
commit
metadata_operation_failed
dm_pool_abort_metadata
dm_block_manager_create
dm_bufio_client_create
register_shrinker
register_shrinker_prepared
down_write(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A
bio_endio
wait_on_buffer
__wait_on_buffer
Fix these by resetting dm_bufio_client without holding shrinker_rwsem.
Fixes: 8111964f1b85 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3eba5e0b2422aec3c9e79822029599961fdcab97 ]
In run_cache_set() after c->root returned from bch_btree_node_get(), it
is checked by IS_ERR_OR_NULL(). Indeed it is unncessary to check NULL
because bch_btree_node_get() will not return NULL pointer to caller.
This patch replaces IS_ERR_OR_NULL() by IS_ERR() for the above reason.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-11-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 31f5b956a197d4ec25c8a07cb3a2ab69d0c0b82f ]
This patch adds code comments to bch_btree_node_get() and
__bch_btree_node_alloc() that NULL pointer will not be returned and it
is unnecessary to check NULL pointer by the callers of these routines.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-10-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit be93825f0e6428c2d3f03a6e4d447dc48d33d7ff ]
Variable cur_idx is being initialized with a value that is never read,
it is being re-assigned later in a while-loop. Remove the redundant
assignment. Cleans up clang scan build warning:
drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c:916:2: warning: Value stored to 'cur_idx'
is never read [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-4-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit baf8fb7e0e5ec54ea0839f0c534f2cdcd79bea9c ]
Arraies bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and bcache->full_dirty_stripes are
used for dirty data writeback, their sizes are decided by backing device
capacity and stripe size. Larger backing device capacity or smaller
stripe size make these two arraies occupies more dynamic memory space.
Currently bcache->stripe_size is directly inherited from
queue->limits.io_opt of underlying storage device. For normal hard
drives, its limits.io_opt is 0, and bcache sets the corresponding
stripe_size to 1TB (1<<31 sectors), it works fine 10+ years. But for
devices do declare value for queue->limits.io_opt, small stripe_size
(comparing to 1TB) becomes an issue for oversize memory allocations of
bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and bcache->full_dirty_stripes, while the
capacity of hard drives gets much larger in recent decade.
For example a raid5 array assembled by three 20TB hardrives, the raid
device capacity is 40TB with typical 512KB limits.io_opt. After the math
calculation in bcache code, these two arraies will occupy 400MB dynamic
memory. Even worse Andrea Tomassetti reports that a 4KB limits.io_opt is
declared on a new 2TB hard drive, then these two arraies request 2GB and
512MB dynamic memory from kzalloc(). The result is that bcache device
always fails to initialize on his system.
To avoid the oversize memory allocation, bcache->stripe_size should not
directly inherited by queue->limits.io_opt from the underlying device.
This patch defines BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ (4MB) as minimal bcache stripe size
and set bcache device's stripe size against the declared limits.io_opt
value from the underlying storage device,
- If the declared limits.io_opt > BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ, bcache device will
set its stripe size directly by this limits.io_opt value.
- If the declared limits.io_opt < BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ, bcache device will
set its stripe size by a value multiplying limits.io_opt and euqal or
large than BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ.
Then the minimal stripe size of a bcache device will always be >= 4MB.
For a 40TB raid5 device with 512KB limits.io_opt, memory occupied by
bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and bcache->full_dirty_stripes will be 50MB
in total. For a 2TB hard drive with 4KB limits.io_opt, memory occupied
by these two arraies will be 2.5MB in total.
Such mount of memory allocated for bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and
bcache->full_dirty_stripes is reasonable for most of storage devices.
Reported-by: Andrea Tomassetti <andrea.tomassetti-opensource@devo.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Wheeler <bcache@lists.ewheeler.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-2-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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reshape
commit c467e97f079f0019870c314996fae952cc768e82 upstream.
During a reshape or a RAID6 array such as expanding by adding an additional
disk, I/Os to the region of the array which have not yet been reshaped can
stall indefinitely. This is from errors in the stripe_ahead_of_reshape
function causing md to think the I/O is to a region in the actively
undergoing the reshape.
stripe_ahead_of_reshape fails to account for the q disk having a sector
value of 0. By not excluding the q disk from the for loop, raid6 will always
generate a min_sector value of 0, causing a return value which stalls.
The function's max_sector calculation also uses min() when it should use
max(), causing the max_sector value to always be 0. During a backwards
rebuild this can cause the opposite problem where it allows I/O to advance
when it should wait.
Fixing these errors will allow safe I/O to advance in a timely manner and
delay only I/O which is unsafe due to stripes in the middle of undergoing
the reshape.
Fixes: 486f60558607 ("md/raid5: Check all disks in a stripe_head for reshape progress")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128181233.6187-1-djeffery@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c9f7cb5b2bc968adcdc686c197ed108f47fd8eb0 ]
If md_set_readonly() failed, the array could still be read-write, however
'MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN' could still be set, which leave the array in an
abnormal state that sync or recovery can't continue anymore.
Hence make sure the flag is cleared after md_set_readonly() returns.
Fixes: 88724bfa68be ("md: wait for pending superblock updates before switching to read-only")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205094215.1824240-3-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f97a5528b21eb175d90dce2df9960c8d08e1be82 ]
Introduce md_ro_state for mddev->ro, so it is easy to understand.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: c9f7cb5b2bc9 ("md: don't leave 'MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN' in error path of md_set_readonly()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit bb6cc253861bd5a7cf8439e2118659696df9619f upstream.
Commit 028ddcac477b ("bcache: Remove unnecessary NULL point check in
node allocations") replaced IS_ERR_OR_NULL by IS_ERR. This leads to a
NULL pointer dereference.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
Call Trace:
? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f
? page_fault_oops+0xd2/0x2b0
? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? btree_node_free+0xf/0x160 [bcache]
? up_write+0x32/0x60
btree_gc_coalesce+0x2aa/0x890 [bcache]
? bch_extent_bad+0x70/0x170 [bcache]
btree_gc_recurse+0x130/0x390 [bcache]
? btree_gc_mark_node+0x72/0x230 [bcache]
bch_btree_gc+0x5da/0x600 [bcache]
? cpuusage_read+0x10/0x10
? bch_btree_gc+0x600/0x600 [bcache]
bch_gc_thread+0x135/0x180 [bcache]
The relevant code starts with:
new_nodes[0] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nodes; i++) {
if (__bch_keylist_realloc(&keylist, bkey_u64s(&r[i].b->key)))
goto out_nocoalesce;
// ...
out_nocoalesce:
// ...
for (i = 0; i < nodes; i++)
if (!IS_ERR(new_nodes[i])) { // IS_ERR_OR_NULL before
028ddcac477b
btree_node_free(new_nodes[i]); // new_nodes[0] is NULL
rw_unlock(true, new_nodes[i]);
}
This patch replaces IS_ERR() by IS_ERR_OR_NULL() to fix this.
Fixes: 028ddcac477b ("bcache: Remove unnecessary NULL point check in node allocations")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3DF4A87A-2AC1-4893-AE5F-E921478419A9@suse.de/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Zheng Wang <zyytlz.wz@163.com>
Cc: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Markus Weippert <markus@gekmihesg.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0193e3966ceeeef69e235975918b287ab093082b upstream.
We found an issue under Android OTA scenario that many BIOs have to do
FEC where the data under dm-verity is 100% complete and no corruption.
Android OTA has many dm-block layers, from upper to lower:
dm-verity
dm-snapshot
dm-origin & dm-cow
dm-linear
ufs
DM tables have to change 2 times during Android OTA merging process.
When doing table change, the dm-snapshot will be suspended for a while.
During this interval, many readahead IOs are submitted to dm_verity
from filesystem. Then the kverity works are busy doing FEC process
which cost too much time to finish dm-verity IO. This causes needless
delay which feels like system is hung.
After adding debugging it was found that each readahead IO needed
around 10s to finish when this situation occurred. This is due to IO
amplification:
dm-snapshot suspend
erofs_readahead // 300+ io is submitted
dm_submit_bio (dm_verity)
dm_submit_bio (dm_snapshot)
bio return EIO
bio got nothing, it's empty
verity_end_io
verity_verify_io
forloop range(0, io->n_blocks) // each io->nblocks ~= 20
verity_fec_decode
fec_decode_rsb
fec_read_bufs
forloop range(0, v->fec->rsn) // v->fec->rsn = 253
new_read
submit_bio (dm_snapshot)
end loop
end loop
dm-snapshot resume
Readahead BIOs get nothing while dm-snapshot is suspended, so all of
them will cause verity's FEC.
Each readahead BIO needs to verify ~20 (io->nblocks) blocks.
Each block needs to do FEC, and every block needs to do 253
(v->fec->rsn) reads.
So during the suspend interval(~200ms), 300 readahead BIOs trigger
~1518000 (300*20*253) IOs to dm-snapshot.
As readahead IO is not required by userspace, and to fix this issue,
it is best to pass readahead errors to upper layer to handle it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a739ff3f543a ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <bo.wu@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7be05bdfb4efc1396f7692562c7161e2b9f595f1 upstream.
If BIO error, verity_end_io() can call verity_finish_io() before
verity_fec_init_io(). Therefore, fec_io->rs is not initialized and
may crash when doing memory freeing in verity_fec_finish_io().
Crash call stack:
die+0x90/0x2b8
__do_kernel_fault+0x260/0x298
do_bad_area+0x2c/0xdc
do_translation_fault+0x3c/0x54
do_mem_abort+0x54/0x118
el1_abort+0x38/0x5c
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x50/0x90
el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c
free_rs+0x18/0xac
fec_rs_free+0x10/0x24
mempool_free+0x58/0x148
verity_fec_finish_io+0x4c/0xb0
verity_end_io+0xb8/0x150
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Fixes: 5721d4e5a9cd ("dm verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature")
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <bo.wu@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 38bc1ab135db87577695816b190e7d6d8ec75879 upstream.
dm_verity_fec_io is placed after the end of two hash digests. If the hash
digest has unaligned length, struct dm_verity_fec_io could be unaligned.
This commit fixes the placement of struct dm_verity_fec_io, so that it's
aligned.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a739ff3f543a ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e34820f984512b433ee1fc291417e60c47d56727 upstream.
We had a problem with io hung because it was waiting for c->root to
release the lock.
crash> cache_set.root -l cache_set.list ffffa03fde4c0050
root = 0xffff802ef454c800
crash> btree -o 0xffff802ef454c800 | grep rw_semaphore
[ffff802ef454c858] struct rw_semaphore lock;
crash> struct rw_semaphore ffff802ef454c858
struct rw_semaphore {
count = {
counter = -4294967297
},
wait_list = {
next = 0xffff00006786fc28,
prev = 0xffff00005d0efac8
},
wait_lock = {
raw_lock = {
{
val = {
counter = 0
},
{
locked = 0 '\000',
pending = 0 '\000'
},
{
locked_pending = 0,
tail = 0
}
}
}
},
osq = {
tail = {
counter = 0
}
},
owner = 0xffffa03fdc586603
}
The "counter = -4294967297" means that lock count is -1 and a write lock
is being attempted. Then, we found that there is a btree with a counter
of 1 in btree_cache_freeable.
crash> cache_set -l cache_set.list ffffa03fde4c0050 -o|grep btree_cache
[ffffa03fde4c1140] struct list_head btree_cache;
[ffffa03fde4c1150] struct list_head btree_cache_freeable;
[ffffa03fde4c1160] struct list_head btree_cache_freed;
[ffffa03fde4c1170] unsigned int btree_cache_used;
[ffffa03fde4c1178] wait_queue_head_t btree_cache_wait;
[ffffa03fde4c1190] struct task_struct *btree_cache_alloc_lock;
crash> list -H ffffa03fde4c1140|wc -l
973
crash> list -H ffffa03fde4c1150|wc -l
1123
crash> cache_set.btree_cache_used -l cache_set.list ffffa03fde4c0050
btree_cache_used = 2097
crash> list -s btree -l btree.list -H ffffa03fde4c1140|grep -E -A2 "^ lock = {" > btree_cache.txt
crash> list -s btree -l btree.list -H ffffa03fde4c1150|grep -E -A2 "^ lock = {" > btree_cache_freeable.txt
[root@node-3 127.0.0.1-2023-08-04-16:40:28]# pwd
/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2023-08-04-16:40:28
[root@node-3 127.0.0.1-2023-08-04-16:40:28]# cat btree_cache.txt|grep counter|grep -v "counter = 0"
[root@node-3 127.0.0.1-2023-08-04-16:40:28]# cat btree_cache_freeable.txt|grep counter|grep -v "counter = 0"
counter = 1
We found that this is a bug in bch_sectors_dirty_init() when locking c->root:
(1). Thread X has locked c->root(A) write.
(2). Thread Y failed to lock c->root(A), waiting for the lock(c->root A).
(3). Thread X bch_btree_set_root() changes c->root from A to B.
(4). Thread X releases the lock(c->root A).
(5). Thread Y successfully locks c->root(A).
(6). Thread Y releases the lock(c->root B).
down_write locked ---(1)----------------------┐
| |
| down_read waiting ---(2)----┐ |
| | ┌-------------┐ ┌-------------┐
bch_btree_set_root ===(3)========>> | c->root A | | c->root B |
| | └-------------┘ └-------------┘
up_write ---(4)---------------------┘ | |
| | |
down_read locked ---(5)-----------┘ |
| |
up_read ---(6)-----------------------------┘
Since c->root may change, the correct steps to lock c->root should be
the same as bch_root_usage(), compare after locking.
static unsigned int bch_root_usage(struct cache_set *c)
{
unsigned int bytes = 0;
struct bkey *k;
struct btree *b;
struct btree_iter iter;
goto lock_root;
do {
rw_unlock(false, b);
lock_root:
b = c->root;
rw_lock(false, b, b->level);
} while (b != c->root);
for_each_key_filter(&b->keys, k, &iter, bch_ptr_bad)
bytes += bkey_bytes(k);
rw_unlock(false, b);
return (bytes * 100) / btree_bytes(c);
}
Fixes: b144e45fc576 ("bcache: make bch_sectors_dirty_init() to be multithreaded")
Signed-off-by: Mingzhe Zou <mingzhe.zou@easystack.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-7-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7cc47e64d3d69786a2711a4767e26b26ba63d7ed upstream.
We found that after long run, the dirty_data of the bcache device
will have errors. This error cannot be eliminated unless re-register.
We also found that reattach after detach, this error can accumulate.
In bch_sectors_dirty_init(), all inode <= d->id keys will be recounted
again. This is wrong, we only need to count the keys of the current
device.
Fixes: b144e45fc576 ("bcache: make bch_sectors_dirty_init() to be multithreaded")
Signed-off-by: Mingzhe Zou <mingzhe.zou@easystack.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-6-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2c7f497ac274a14330208b18f6f734000868ebf9 upstream.
In SHOW(), the variable 'n' is of type 'size_t.' While there is a
conditional check to verify that 'n' is not equal to zero before
executing the 'do_div' macro, concerns arise regarding potential
division by zero error in 64-bit environments.
The concern arises when 'n' is 64 bits in size, greater than zero, and
the lower 32 bits of it are zeros. In such cases, the conditional check
passes because 'n' is non-zero, but the 'do_div' macro casts 'n' to
'uint32_t,' effectively truncating it to its lower 32 bits.
Consequently, the 'n' value becomes zero.
To fix this potential division by zero error and ensure precise
division handling, this commit replaces the 'do_div' macro with
div64_u64(). div64_u64() is designed to work with 64-bit operands,
guaranteeing that division is performed correctly.
This change enhances the robustness of the code, ensuring that division
operations yield accurate results in all scenarios, eliminating the
possibility of division by zero, and improving compatibility across
different 64-bit environments.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <rand.sec96@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-5-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 777967e7e9f6f5f3e153abffb562bffaf4430d26 upstream.
In btree_gc_rewrite_node(), pointer 'n' is not checked after it returns
from btree_gc_rewrite_node(). There is potential possibility that 'n' is
a non NULL ERR_PTR(), referencing such error code is not permitted in
following code. Therefore a return value checking is necessary after 'n'
is back from btree_node_alloc_replacement().
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-3-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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