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path: root/fs/internal.h
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2010-08-18fs: brlock vfsmount_lockNick Piggin1-1/+4
fs: brlock vfsmount_lock Use a brlock for the vfsmount lock. It must be taken for write whenever modifying the mount hash or associated fields, and may be taken for read when performing mount hash lookups. A new lock is added for the mnt-id allocator, so it doesn't need to take the heavy vfsmount write-lock. The number of atomics should remain the same for fastpath rlock cases, though code would be slightly slower due to per-cpu access. Scalability is not not be much improved in common cases yet, due to other locks (ie. dcache_lock) getting in the way. However path lookups crossing mountpoints should be one case where scalability is improved (currently requiring the global lock). The slowpath is slower due to use of brlock. On a 64 core, 64 socket, 32 node Altix system (high latency to remote nodes), a simple umount microbenchmark (mount --bind mnt mnt2 ; umount mnt2 loop 1000 times), before this patch it took 6.8s, afterwards took 7.1s, about 5% slower. Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-08-18tty: fix fu_list abuseNick Piggin1-0/+2
tty: fix fu_list abuse tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling. If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose). This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean". Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug. The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors. This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers. [ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether that will ever be worth implementing. ] Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-22Bury __put_super_and_need_restart()Al Viro1-0/+2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-03-03Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.hAl Viro1-0/+2
no more users left outside of fs/*.c (and very few outside of fs/namespace.c, actually) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-22Fix f_flags/f_mode in case of lookup_instantiate_filp() from open(pathname, 3)Al Viro1-0/+7
Just set f_flags when shoving struct file into nameidata; don't postpone that until __dentry_open(). do_filp_open() has correct value; lookup_instantiate_filp() doesn't - we lose the difference between O_RDWR and 3 by that point. We still set .intent.open.flags, so no fs code needs to be changed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16fs: move get_empty_filp() deffinition to internal.hEric Paris1-0/+1
All users outside of fs/ of get_empty_filp() have been removed. This patch moves the definition from the include/ directory to internal.h so no new users crop up and removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL. I'd love to see open intents stop using it too, but that's a problem for another day and a smarter developer! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-09-24fs: fix overflow in sys_mount() for in-kernel callsVegard Nossum1-0/+1
sys_mount() reads/copies a whole page for its "type" parameter. When do_mount_root() passes a kernel address that points to an object which is smaller than a whole page, copy_mount_options() will happily go past this memory object, possibly dereferencing "wild" pointers that could be in any state (hence the kmemcheck warning, which shows that parts of the next page are not even allocated). (The likelihood of something going wrong here is pretty low -- first of all this only applies to kernel calls to sys_mount(), which are mostly found in the boot code. Secondly, I guess if the page was not mapped, exact_copy_from_user() _would_ in fact handle it correctly because of its access_ok(), etc. checks.) But it is much nicer to avoid the dubious reads altogether, by stopping as soon as we find a NUL byte. Is there a good reason why we can't do something like this, using the already existing strndup_from_user()? [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make copy_mount_string() static] [AV: fix compat mount breakage, which involves undoing akpm's change above] Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: al <al@dizzy.pdmi.ras.ru>
2009-06-12Trim a bit of crap from fs.hAl Viro1-0/+5
do_remount_sb() is fs/internal.h fodder, fsync_no_super() is long gone. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-12vfs: Make sys_sync() use fsync_super() (version 4)Jan Kara1-9/+7
It is unnecessarily fragile to have two places (fsync_super() and do_sync()) doing data integrity sync of the filesystem. Alter __fsync_super() to accommodate needs of both callers and use it. So after this patch __fsync_super() is the only place where we gather all the calls needed to properly send all data on a filesystem to disk. Nice bonus is that we get a complete livelock avoidance and write_supers() is now only used for periodic writeback of superblocks. sync_blockdevs() introduced a couple of patches ago is gone now. [build fixes folded] Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-12vfs: Fix sys_sync() and fsync_super() reliability (version 4)Jan Kara1-0/+9
So far, do_sync() called: sync_inodes(0); sync_supers(); sync_filesystems(0); sync_filesystems(1); sync_inodes(1); This ordering makes it kind of hard for filesystems as sync_inodes(0) need not submit all the IO (for example it skips inodes with I_SYNC set) so e.g. forcing transaction to disk in ->sync_fs() is not really enough. Therefore sys_sync has not been completely reliable on some filesystems (ext3, ext4, reiserfs, ocfs2 and others are hit by this) when racing e.g. with background writeback. A similar problem hits also other filesystems (e.g. ext2) because of write_supers() being called before the sync_inodes(1). Change the ordering of calls in do_sync() - this requires a new function sync_blockdevs() to preserve the property that block devices are always synced after write_super() / sync_fs() call. The same issue is fixed in __fsync_super() function used on umount / remount read-only. [AV: build fixes] Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-12fs: move mark_files_ro into file_table.cnpiggin@suse.de1-0/+5
This function walks the s_files lock, and operates primarily on the files in a superblock, so it better belongs here (eg. see also fs_may_remount_ro). [AV: ... and it shouldn't be static after that move] Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-01New locking/refcounting for fs_structAl Viro1-1/+1
* all changes of current->fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of old fs->lock * refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection) * its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the same time we decide whether to free it. * put_fs_struct() is gone * new field - ->in_exec. Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct. Cleared when finishing exec (success and failure alike). Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set. * check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread is in progress. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-01Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c)Al Viro1-0/+6
Pure code move; two new helper functions for nfsd and daemonize (unshare_fs_struct() and daemonize_fs_struct() resp.; for now - the same code as used to be in callers). unshare_fs_struct() exported (for nfsd, as copy_fs_struct()/exit_fs() used to be), copy_fs_struct() and exit_fs() don't need exports anymore. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-29fix setuid sometimes doesn'tHugh Dickins1-1/+1
Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely, a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way, they have a health check running lsof every few minutes. Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid. But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count. There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check. [Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().] Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com> Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com> Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-02-07CRED: Fix SUID exec regressionDavid Howells1-1/+1
The patch: commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the pthread library. However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the determination before calling de_thread(). So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec(). We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES. We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the threads we're going to kill. This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If successful, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0 SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID and if unsuccessful, something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID! The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as. [test1.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> static void *thread_func(void *arg) { while (1) {} } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pthread_t tid; uid_t uid, euid, suid; printf("--TEST1--\n"); getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) { perror("pthread_create"); exit(1); } printf("exec ./test2\n"); execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL); perror("./test2"); _exit(1); } [test2.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { uid_t uid, euid, suid; getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("--TEST2--\n"); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (euid != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n"); exit(1); } printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n"); exit(0); } [Makefile] CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused all: test1 test2 test1: test1.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread test2: test2.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c sudo chown root.root test2 sudo chmod +s test2 Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells1-0/+6
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-22[PATCH] move a bunch of declarations to fs/internal.hAl Viro1-0/+11
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-05-08cleanup compat ioctl handlingChristoph Hellwig1-10/+0
Merge all compat ioctl handling into compat_ioctl.c instead of splitting it over compat.c and compat_ioctl.c. This also allows to get rid of ioctl32.h Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Looks-good-to: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2006-09-30[PATCH] CONFIG_BLOCK internal.h cleanupsAndrew Morton1-3/+14
- forward declare struct superblock - use inlines, not macros Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30[PATCH] BLOCK: Make it possible to disable the block layer [try #6]David Howells1-0/+6
Make it possible to disable the block layer. Not all embedded devices require it, some can make do with just JFFS2, NFS, ramfs, etc - none of which require the block layer to be present. This patch does the following: (*) Introduces CONFIG_BLOCK to disable the block layer, buffering and blockdev support. (*) Adds dependencies on CONFIG_BLOCK to any configuration item that controls an item that uses the block layer. This includes: (*) Block I/O tracing. (*) Disk partition code. (*) All filesystems that are block based, eg: Ext3, ReiserFS, ISOFS. (*) The SCSI layer. As far as I can tell, even SCSI chardevs use the block layer to do scheduling. Some drivers that use SCSI facilities - such as USB storage - end up disabled indirectly from this. (*) Various block-based device drivers, such as IDE and the old CDROM drivers. (*) MTD blockdev handling and FTL. (*) JFFS - which uses set_bdev_super(), something it could avoid doing by taking a leaf out of JFFS2's book. (*) Makes most of the contents of linux/blkdev.h, linux/buffer_head.h and linux/elevator.h contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK being set. sector_div() is, however, still used in places, and so is still available. (*) Also made contingent are the contents of linux/mpage.h, linux/genhd.h and parts of linux/fs.h. (*) Makes a number of files in fs/ contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK. (*) Makes mm/bounce.c (bounce buffering) contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK. (*) set_page_dirty() doesn't call __set_page_dirty_buffers() if CONFIG_BLOCK is not enabled. (*) fs/no-block.c is created to hold out-of-line stubs and things that are required when CONFIG_BLOCK is not set: (*) Default blockdev file operations (to give error ENODEV on opening). (*) Makes some /proc changes: (*) /proc/devices does not list any blockdevs. (*) /proc/diskstats and /proc/partitions are contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK. (*) Makes some compat ioctl handling contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK. (*) If CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined, makes sys_quotactl() return -ENODEV if given command other than Q_SYNC or if a special device is specified. (*) In init/do_mounts.c, no reference is made to the blockdev routines if CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined. This does not prohibit NFS roots or JFFS2. (*) The bdflush, ioprio_set and ioprio_get syscalls can now be absent (return error ENOSYS by way of cond_syscall if so). (*) The seclvl_bd_claim() and seclvl_bd_release() security calls do nothing if CONFIG_BLOCK is not set, since they can't then happen. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30[PATCH] BLOCK: Remove dependence on existence of blockdev_superblock [try #6]David Howells1-0/+2
Move blockdev_superblock extern declaration from fs/fs-writeback.c to a headerfile and remove the dependence on it by wrapping it in a macro. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30[PATCH] BLOCK: Move extern declarations out of fs/*.c into header files [try #6]David Howells1-0/+36
Create a new header file, fs/internal.h, for common definitions local to the sources in the fs/ directory. Move extern definitions that should be in header files from fs/*.c to fs/internal.h or other main header files where they span directories. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>