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2021-02-24Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-131/+380
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner: "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and maintainers. Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here are just a few: - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the implementation of portable home directories in systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at login time. - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged containers without having to change ownership permanently through chown(2). - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their Linux subsystem. - It is possible to share files between containers with non-overlapping idmappings. - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC) permission checking. - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files. - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home directory and container and vm scenario. - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists. Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull this: - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away in their implementation of portable home directories. https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/ - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734 - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is ported. - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers. I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones: https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/ This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and xfs: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to merge this. In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the testsuite. Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is currently marked with. The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern of extensibility. The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped mount: - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in. - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts. - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped. - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem. The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler. By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no behavioral or performance changes are observed. The manpage with a detailed description can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8 In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify that port has been done correctly. The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform mounts based on file descriptors only. Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2() RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and path resolution. While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing. With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api, covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and projects. There is a simple tool available at https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you decide to pull this in the following weeks: Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home directory: u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 .. -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 .. -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: mnt/my-file # owner: u1001 # group: u1001 user::rw- user:u1001:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r-- u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: home/ubuntu/my-file # owner: ubuntu # group: ubuntu user::rw- user:ubuntu:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r--" * tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits) xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl xfs: support idmapped mounts ext4: support idmapped mounts fat: handle idmapped mounts tests: add mount_setattr() selftests fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP fs: add mount_setattr() fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper fs: split out functions to hold writers namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags nfs: do not export idmapped mounts overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ima: handle idmapped mounts apparmor: handle idmapped mounts fs: make helpers idmap mount aware exec: handle idmapped mounts would_dump: handle idmapped mounts ...
2021-02-20fix handling of nd->depth on LOOKUP_CACHED failures in try_to_unlazy*Al Viro1-4/+5
After switching to non-RCU mode, we want nd->depth to match the number of entries in nd->stack[] that need eventual path_put(). legitimize_links() takes care of that on failures; unfortunately, failure exits added for LOOKUP_CACHED do not. We could add the logics for that into those failure exits, both in try_to_unlazy() and in try_to_unlazy_next(), but since both checks are immediately followed by legitimize_links() and there's no calls of legitimize_links() other than those two... It's easier to move the check (and required handling of nd->depth on failure) into legitimize_links() itself. [caught by Jens: ... and since we are zeroing ->depth here, we need to do drop_links() first] Fixes: 6c6ec2b0a3e0 "fs: add support for LOOKUP_CACHED" Tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2021-01-24ima: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-2/+2
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24fs: make helpers idmap mount awareChristian Brauner1-23/+32
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all relevant helpers in earlier patches. As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate()Christian Brauner1-1/+1
When truncating files the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-16-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24namei: prepare for idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-43/+184
The various vfs_*() helpers are called by filesystems or by the vfs itself to perform core operations such as create, link, mkdir, mknod, rename, rmdir, tmpfile and unlink. Enable them to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user namespace and pass it down. Afterwards the checks and operations are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-15-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24namei: introduce struct renamedataChristian Brauner1-6/+15
In order to handle idmapped mounts we will extend the vfs rename helper to take two new arguments in follow up patches. Since this operations already takes a bunch of arguments add a simple struct renamedata and make the current helper use it before we extend it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-14-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpersChristian Brauner1-56/+92
The may_follow_link(), may_linkat(), may_lookup(), may_open(), may_o_create(), may_create_in_sticky(), may_delete(), and may_create() helpers determine whether the caller is privileged enough to perform the associated operations. Let them handle idmapped mounts by mapping the inode or fsids according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped inodes. The patch takes care to retrieve the mount's user namespace right before performing permission checks and passing it down into the fileystem so the user namespace can't change in between by someone idmapping a mount that is currently not idmapped. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-13-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount awareChristian Brauner1-2/+3
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount awareChristian Brauner1-35/+86
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument. On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24capability: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-5/+8
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested capability in their current user namespace. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in behavior. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-04fs: add support for LOOKUP_CACHEDJens Axboe1-0/+9
io_uring always punts opens to async context, since there's no control over whether the lookup blocks or not. Add LOOKUP_CACHED to support just doing the fast RCU based lookups, which we know will not block. If we can do a cached path resolution of the filename, then we don't have to always punt lookups for a worker. During path resolution, we always do LOOKUP_RCU first. If that fails and we terminate LOOKUP_RCU, then fail a LOOKUP_CACHED attempt as well. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2021-01-04saner calling conventions for unlazy_child()Al Viro1-14/+14
same as for the previous commit - instead of 0/-ECHILD make it return true/false, rename to try_to_unlazy_child(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2021-01-04fs: make unlazy_walk() error handling consistentJens Axboe1-26/+17
Most callers check for non-zero return, and assume it's -ECHILD (which it always will be). One caller uses the actual error return. Clean this up and make it fully consistent, by having unlazy_walk() return a bool instead. Rename it to try_to_unlazy() and return true on success, and failure on error. That's easier to read. No functional changes in this patch. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2021-01-04fs/namei.c: Remove unlikely of status being -ECHILD in lookup_fast()Steven Rostedt (VMware)1-1/+1
Running my yearly branch profiling code, it detected a 100% wrong branch condition in name.c for lookup_fast(). The code in question has: status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags); if (likely(status > 0)) return dentry; if (unlazy_child(nd, dentry, seq)) return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); if (unlikely(status == -ECHILD)) /* we'd been told to redo it in non-rcu mode */ status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags); If the status of the d_revalidate() is greater than zero, then the function finishes. Otherwise, if it is an "unlazy_child" it returns with -ECHILD. After the above two checks, the status is compared to -ECHILD, as that is what is returned if the original d_revalidate() needed to be done in a non-rcu mode. Especially this path is called in a condition of: if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) { And most of the d_revalidate() functions have: if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) return -ECHILD; It appears that that is the only case that this if statement is triggered on two of my machines, running in production. As it is dependent on what filesystem mix is configured in the running kernel, simply remove the unlikely() from the if statement. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2021-01-04do_tmpfile(): don't mess with finish_open()Al Viro1-4/+2
use vfs_open() instead Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-12-25Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted patches from previous cycle(s)..." * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fix hostfs_open() use of ->f_path.dentry Make sure that make_create_in_sticky() never sees uninitialized value of dir_mode fs: Kill DCACHE_DONTCACHE dentry even if DCACHE_REFERENCED is set fs: Handle I_DONTCACHE in iput_final() instead of generic_drop_inode() fs/namespace.c: WARN if mnt_count has become negative
2020-12-11Make sure that make_create_in_sticky() never sees uninitialized value of ↵Al Viro1-1/+3
dir_mode make sure nd->dir_mode is always initialized after success exit from link_path_walk(); in case of empty path it did not happen. Reported-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com> Tested-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-12-09fs: make do_renameat2() take struct filenameJens Axboe1-18/+22
Pass in the struct filename pointers instead of the user string, and update the three callers to do the same. This behaves like do_unlinkat(), which also takes a filename struct and puts it when it is done. Converting callers is then trivial. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-10-24Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted stuff all over the place (the largest group here is Christoph's stat cleanups)" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: remove KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS fs: remove vfs_stat_set_lookup_flags fs: move vfs_fstatat out of line fs: implement vfs_stat and vfs_lstat in terms of vfs_fstatat fs: remove vfs_statx_fd fs: omfs: use kmemdup() rather than kmalloc+memcpy [PATCH] reduce boilerplate in fsid handling fs: Remove duplicated flag O_NDELAY occurring twice in VALID_OPEN_FLAGS selftests: mount: add nosymfollow tests Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.
2020-09-24fs: remove the unused SB_I_MULTIROOT flagChristoph Hellwig1-2/+2
The last user of SB_I_MULTIROOT is disappeared with commit f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support.") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-08-27Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.Mattias Nissler1-1/+2
For mounts that have the new "nosymfollow" option, don't follow symlinks when resolving paths. The new option is similar in spirit to the existing "nodev", "noexec", and "nosuid" options, as well as to the LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS resolve flag in the openat2(2) syscall. Various BSD variants have been supporting the "nosymfollow" mount option for a long time with equivalent implementations. Note that symlinks may still be created on file systems mounted with the "nosymfollow" option present. readlink() remains functional, so user space code that is aware of symlinks can still choose to follow them explicitly. Setting the "nosymfollow" mount option helps prevent privileged writers from modifying files unintentionally in case there is an unexpected link along the accessed path. The "nosymfollow" option is thus useful as a defensive measure for systems that need to deal with untrusted file systems in privileged contexts. More information on the history and motivation for this patch can be found here: https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/hardening-against-malicious-stateful-data#TOC-Restricting-symlink-traversal Signed-off-by: Mattias Nissler <mnissler@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-08-15exec: restore EACCES of S_ISDIR execve()Kees Cook1-1/+3
Patch series "Fix S_ISDIR execve() errno". Fix an errno change for execve() of directories, noticed by Marc Zyngier. Along with the fix, include a regression test to avoid seeing this return in the future. This patch (of 2): The return code for attempting to execute a directory has always been EACCES. Adjust the S_ISDIR exec test to reflect the old errno instead of the general EISDIR for other kinds of "open" attempts on directories. Fixes: 633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier") Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@android.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200813231723.2725102-2-keescook@chromium.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200813151305.6191993b@why Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-12Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds1-2/+8
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton: - most of the rest of MM (memcg, hugetlb, vmscan, proc, compaction, mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, cma, util, memory-hotplug, cleanups, uaccess, migration, gup, pagemap), - various other subsystems (alpha, misc, sparse, bitmap, lib, bitops, checkpatch, autofs, minix, nilfs, ufs, fat, signals, kmod, coredump, exec, kdump, rapidio, panic, kcov, kgdb, ipc). * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (164 commits) mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code mm: clean up the last pieces of page fault accountings mm/xtensa: use general page fault accounting mm/x86: use general page fault accounting mm/sparc64: use general page fault accounting mm/sparc32: use general page fault accounting mm/sh: use general page fault accounting mm/s390: use general page fault accounting mm/riscv: use general page fault accounting mm/powerpc: use general page fault accounting mm/parisc: use general page fault accounting mm/openrisc: use general page fault accounting mm/nios2: use general page fault accounting mm/nds32: use general page fault accounting mm/mips: use general page fault accounting mm/microblaze: use general page fault accounting mm/m68k: use general page fault accounting mm/ia64: use general page fault accounting mm/hexagon: use general page fault accounting mm/csky: use general page fault accounting ...
2020-08-12exec: move path_noexec() check earlierKees Cook1-0/+4
The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s. Check it earlier as well in may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test under the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check. My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc: do_open_execat() struct open_flags open_exec_flags = { .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC, .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC, ... do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags) path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags) file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred()); do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags) may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag) /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */ inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode) security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode) vfs_open(path, file) do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open) security_file_open(f) open() /* old location of path_noexec() test */ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-12exec: move S_ISREG() check earlierKees Cook1-2/+4
The execve(2)/uselib(2) syscalls have always rejected non-regular files. Recently, it was noticed that a deadlock was introduced when trying to execute pipes, as the S_ISREG() test was happening too late. This was fixed in commit 73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during execve()"), but it was added after inode_permission() had already run, which meant LSMs could see bogus attempts to execute non-regular files. Move the test into the other inode type checks (which already look for other pathological conditions[1]). Since there is no need to use FMODE_EXEC while we still have access to "acc_mode", also switch the test to MAY_EXEC. Also include a comment with the redundant S_ISREG() checks at the end of execve(2)/uselib(2) to note that they are present to avoid any mistakes. My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc: do_open_execat() struct open_flags open_exec_flags = { .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC, .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC, ... do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags) path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags) file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred()); do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags) may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag) /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */ inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode) security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode) vfs_open(path, file) do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open) /* old location of FMODE_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */ security_file_open(f) open() [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006041910.9EF0C602@keescook/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-3-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-12fix breakage in do_rmdir()Al Viro1-1/+1
syzbot reported and bisected a use-after-free due to the recent init cleanups. The putname() should happen only after we'd *not* branched to retry, same as it's done in do_unlinkat(). Reported-by: syzbot+bbeb1c88016c7db4aa24@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e24ab0ef689d "fs: push the getname from do_rmdir into the callers" Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-07-31init: add an init_mknod helperChristoph Hellwig1-1/+1
Add a simple helper to mknod with a kernel space file name and switch the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_mknod. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-07-31init: add an init_mkdir helperChristoph Hellwig1-1/+1
Add a simple helper to mkdir with a kernel space file name and switch the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_mkdir. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-07-31init: add an init_symlink helperChristoph Hellwig1-1/+1
Add a simple helper to symlink with a kernel space file name and switch the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_symlink. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-07-31init: add an init_link helperChristoph Hellwig1-2/+2
Add a simple helper to link with a kernel space file name and switch the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_link. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-07-31fs: push the getname from do_rmdir into the callersChristoph Hellwig1-6/+4
This mirrors do_unlinkat and will make life a little easier for the init code to reuse the whole function with a kernel filename. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-06-08vfs: clean up posix_acl_permission() logic aroudn MAY_NOT_BLOCKLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
posix_acl_permission() does not care about MAY_NOT_BLOCK, and in fact the permission logic internally must not check that bit (it's only for upper layers to decide whether they can block to do IO to look up the acl information or not). But the way the code was written, it _looked_ like it cared, since the function explicitly did not mask that bit off. But it has exactly two callers: one for when that bit is set, which first clears the bit before calling posix_acl_permission(), and the other call site when that bit was clear. So stop the silly games "saving" the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit that must not be used for the actual permission test, and that currently is pointlessly cleared by the callers when the function itself should just not care. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08vfs: do not do group lookup when not necessaryLinus Torvalds1-15/+29
Rasmus Villemoes points out that the 'in_group_p()' tests can be a noticeable expense, and often completely unnecessary. A common situation is that the 'group' bits are the same as the 'other' bits wrt the permissions we want to test. So rewrite 'acl_permission_check()' to not bother checking for group ownership when the permission check doesn't care. For example, if we're asking for read permissions, and both 'group' and 'other' allow reading, there's really no reason to check if we're part of the group or not: either way, we'll allow it. Rasmus says: "On a bog-standard Ubuntu 20.04 install, a workload consisting of compiling lots of userspace programs (i.e., calling lots of short-lived programs that all need to get their shared libs mapped in, and the compilers poking around looking for system headers - lots of /usr/lib, /usr/bin, /usr/include/ accesses) puts in_group_p around 0.1% according to perf top. System-installed files are almost always 0755 (directories and binaries) or 0644, so in most cases, we can avoid the binary search and the cost of pulling the cred->groups array and in_group_p() .text into the cpu cache" Reported-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-14vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creationMiklos Szeredi1-18/+3
Whiteouts, unlike real device node should not require privileges to create. The general concern with device nodes is that opening them can have side effects. The kernel already avoids zero major (see Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt). To be on the safe side the patch explicitly forbids registering a char device with 0/0 number (see cdev_add()). This guarantees that a non-O_PATH open on a whiteout will fail with ENODEV; i.e. it won't have any side effect. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-04-06fix a braino in legitimize_path()Al Viro1-1/+1
brown paperbag time... wrong order of arguments ended up confusing the values to check dentry and mount_lock seqcounts against. Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Fixes: 2aa38470853a ("non-RCU analogue of the previous commit") Tested-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02lookup_open(): don't bother with fallbacks to lookup+createAl Viro1-25/+9
We fall back to lookup+create (instead of atomic_open) in several cases: 1) we don't have write access to filesystem and O_TRUNC is present in the flags. It's not something we want ->atomic_open() to see - it just might go ahead and truncate the file. However, we can pass it the flags sans O_TRUNC - eventually do_open() will call handle_truncate() anyway. 2) we have O_CREAT | O_EXCL and we can't write to parent. That's going to be an error, of course, but we want to know _which_ error should that be - might be EEXIST (if file exists), might be EACCES or EROFS. Simply stripping O_CREAT (and checking if we see ENOENT) would suffice, if not for O_EXCL. However, we used to have ->atomic_open() fully responsible for rejecting O_CREAT | O_EXCL on existing file and just stripping O_CREAT would've disarmed those checks. With nothing downstream to catch the problem - FMODE_OPENED used to be "don't bother with EEXIST checks, ->atomic_open() has done those". Now EEXIST checks downstream are skipped only if FMODE_CREATED is set - FMODE_OPENED alone is not enough. That has eliminated the need to fall back onto lookup+create path in this case. 3) O_WRONLY or O_RDWR when we have no write access to filesystem, with nothing else objectionable. Fallback is (and had always been) pointless. IOW, we don't really need that fallback; all we need in such cases is to trim O_TRUNC and O_CREAT properly. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02atomic_open(): no need to pass struct open_flags anymoreAl Viro1-2/+1
argument had been unused since 1643b43fbd052 (lookup_open(): lift the "fallback to !O_CREAT" logics from atomic_open()) back in 2016 Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02open_last_lookups(): move complete_walk() into do_open()Al Viro1-10/+8
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02open_last_lookups(): lift O_EXCL|O_CREAT handling into do_open()Al Viro1-5/+2
Currently path_openat() has "EEXIST on O_EXCL|O_CREAT" checks done on one of the ways out of open_last_lookups(). There are 4 cases: 1) the last component is . or ..; check is not done. 2) we had FMODE_OPENED or FMODE_CREATED set while in lookup_open(); check is not done. 3) symlink to be traversed is found; check is not done (nor should it be) 4) everything else: check done (before complete_walk(), even). In case (1) O_EXCL|O_CREAT ends up failing with -EISDIR - that's open("/tmp/.", O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600) Note that in the same conditions open("/tmp", O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600) would have yielded EEXIST. Either error is allowed, switching to -EEXIST in these cases would've been more consistent. Case (2) is more subtle; first of all, if we have FMODE_CREATED set, the object hadn't existed prior to the call. The check should not be done in such a case. The rest is problematic, though - we have FMODE_OPENED set (i.e. it went through ->atomic_open() and got successfully opened there) FMODE_CREATED is *NOT* set O_CREAT and O_EXCL are both set. Any such case is a bug - either we failed to set FMODE_CREATED when we had, in fact, created an object (no such instances in the tree) or we have opened a pre-existing file despite having had both O_CREAT and O_EXCL passed. One of those was, in fact caught (and fixed) while sorting out this mess (gfs2 on cold dcache). And in such situations we should fail with EEXIST. Note that for (1) and (4) FMODE_CREATED is not set - for (1) there's nothing in handle_dots() to set it, for (4) we'd explicitly checked that. And (1), (2) and (4) are exactly the cases when we leave the loop in the caller, with do_open() called immediately after that loop. IOW, we can move the check over there, and make it If we have O_CREAT|O_EXCL and after successful pathname resolution FMODE_CREATED is *not* set, we must have run into a preexisting file and should fail with EEXIST. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02open_last_lookups(): don't abuse complete_walk() when all we want is unlazyAl Viro1-9/+5
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02open_last_lookups(): consolidate fsnotify_create() callsAl Viro1-5/+2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02take post-lookup part of do_last() out of loopAl Viro1-12/+9
now we can have open_last_lookups() directly from the loop in path_openat() - the rest of do_last() never returns a symlink to follow, so we can bloody well leave the loop first. Rename the rest of that thing from do_last() to do_open() and make it return an int. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02link_path_walk(): sample parent's i_uid and i_mode for the last componentAl Viro1-10/+7
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02__nd_alloc_stack(): make it return boolAl Viro1-27/+18
... and adjust the caller (reserve_stack()). Rename to nd_alloc_stack(), while we are at it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02reserve_stack(): switch to __nd_alloc_stack()Al Viro1-11/+8
expand the call of nd_alloc_stack() into it (and don't recheck the depth on the second call) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02pick_link(): take reserving space on stack into a new helperAl Viro1-21/+25
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02pick_link(): more straightforward handling of allocation failuresAl Viro1-8/+7
pick_link() needs to push onto stack; we start with using two-element array embedded into struct nameidata and the first time we need more than that we switch to separately allocated array. Allocation can fail, of course, and handling of that would be simple enough - we need to drop 'link' and bugger off. However, the things get more complicated in RCU mode. There we must do GFP_ATOMIC allocation. If that fails, we try to switch to non-RCU mode and repeat the allocation. To switch to non-RCU mode we need to grab references to 'link' and to everything in nameidata. The latter done by unlazy_walk(); the former - legitimize_path(). 'link' must go first - after unlazy_walk() we are out of RCU-critical period and it's too late to call legitimize_path() since the references in link->mnt and link->dentry might be pointing to freed and reused memory. So we do legitimize_path(), then unlazy_walk(). And that's where it gets too subtle: what to do if the former fails? We MUST do path_put(link) to avoid leaks. And we can't do that under rcu_read_lock(). Solution in mainline was to empty then nameidata manually, drop out of RCU mode and then do put_path(). In effect, we open-code the things eventual terminate_walk() would've done on error in RCU mode. That looks badly out of place and confusing. We could add a comment along the lines of the explanation above, but... there's a simpler solution. Call unlazy_walk() even if legitimaze_path() fails. It will take us out of RCU mode, so we'll be able to do path_put(link). Yes, it will do unnecessary work - attempt to grab references on the stuff in nameidata, only to have them dropped as soon as we return the error to upper layer and get terminate_walk() called there. So what? We are thoroughly off the fast path by that point - we had GFP_ATOMIC allocation fail, we had ->d_seq or mount_lock mismatch and we are about to try walking the same path from scratch in non-RCU mode. Which will need to do the same allocation, this time with GFP_KERNEL, so it will be able to apply memory pressure for blocking stuff. Compared to that the cost of several lockref_get_not_dead() is noise. And the logics become much easier to understand that way. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02fold path_to_nameidata() into its only remaining callerAl Viro1-13/+6
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-02pick_link(): pass it struct path already with normal refcounting rulesAl Viro1-6/+6
step_into() tries to avoid grabbing and dropping mount references on the steps that do not involve crossing mountpoints (which is obviously the majority of cases). So it uses a local struct path with unusual refcounting rules - path.mnt is pinned if and only if it's not equal to nd->path.mnt. We used to have similar beasts all over the place and we had quite a few bugs crop up in their handling - it's easy to get confused when changing e.g. cleanup on failure exits (or adding a new check, etc.) Now that's mostly gone - the step_into() instance (which is what we need them for) is the only one left. It is exposed to mount traversal and it's (shortly) seen by pick_link(). Since pick_link() needs to store it in link stack, where the normal rules apply, it has to make sure that mount is pinned regardless of nd->path.mnt value. That's done on all calls of pick_link() and very early in those. Let's do that in the caller (step_into()) instead - that way the fewer places need to be aware of such struct path instances. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>