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2016-01-23wrappers for ->i_mutex accessAl Viro1-5/+5
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested}, inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex). Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held only shared. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-13Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-20/+19
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing. Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted cleanups and fixes from various people, etc. One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications, but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I *am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock taken shared. There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of ->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/ inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then: ----- | This is an automated patch using | | sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/' | sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/' | | with a very few manual fixups ----- I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking merges)" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits) nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common() logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE fs: xattr: Use kvfree() [s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE nbd: use ->compat_ioctl() fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user() cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user() rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user() mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user() [um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul() [um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user() ...
2016-01-04saner calling conventions for copy_mount_options()Al Viro1-18/+17
let it just return NULL, pointer to kernel copy or ERR_PTR(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-07fs/namespace.c: path_is_under can be booleanYaowei Bai1-2/+2
This patch makes path_is_under return bool to improve readability due to this particular function only using either one or zero as its return value. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Yaowei Bai <baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-11-16locks: Don't allow mounts in user namespaces to enable mandatory lockingEric W. Biederman1-1/+1
Since no one uses mandatory locking and files with mandatory locks can cause problems don't allow them in user namespaces. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
2015-11-16locks: Allow disabling mandatory locking at compile timeJeff Layton1-0/+10
Mandatory locking appears to be almost unused and buggy and there appears no real interest in doing anything with it. Since effectively no one uses the code and since the code is buggy let's allow it to be disabled at compile time. I would just suggest removing the code but undoubtedly that will break some piece of userspace code somewhere. For the distributions that don't care about this piece of code this gives a nice starting point to make mandatory locking go away. Cc: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
2015-09-02Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-8/+25
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start implementing executable files, as the there are application today that are only secure because such files do not exist. It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from /proc/<pid>/ns/*. It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel. Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application, by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted on /sys/fs/cgroup. The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch. and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0. userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing. unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
2015-07-23mnt: In detach_mounts detach the appropriate unmounted mountEric W. Biederman1-5/+2
The handling of in detach_mounts of unmounted but connected mounts is buggy and can lead to an infinite loop. Correct the handling of unmounted mounts in detach_mount. When the mountpoint of an unmounted but connected mount is connected to a dentry, and that dentry is deleted we need to disconnect that mount from the parent mount and the deleted dentry. Nothing changes for the unmounted and connected children. They can be safely ignored. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ce07d891a0891d3c0d0c2d73d577490486b809e1 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-23mnt: Clarify and correct the disconnect logic in umount_treeEric W. Biederman1-4/+31
rmdir mntpoint will result in an infinite loop when there is a mount locked on the mountpoint in another mount namespace. This is because the logic to test to see if a mount should be disconnected in umount_tree is buggy. Move the logic to decide if a mount should remain connected to it's mountpoint into it's own function disconnect_mount so that clarity of expression instead of terseness of expression becomes a virtue. When the conditions where it is invalid to leave a mount connected are first ruled out, the logic for deciding if a mount should be disconnected becomes much clearer and simpler. Fixes: e0c9c0afd2fc958ffa34b697972721d81df8a56f mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected Fixes: ce07d891a0891d3c0d0c2d73d577490486b809e1 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-10mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXECEric W. Biederman1-8/+25
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not have executable files do not have exectuable files today and portions of userspace break if we do enforce nosuid and noexec consistency of nosuid and noexec flags between previous mounts and new mounts of proc and sysfs. Add the code to enforce consistency of the nosuid and noexec flags, and use the presence of SB_I_NOEXEC to signal that there is no need to bother. This results in a completely userspace invisible change that makes it clear fs_fully_visible can only skip the enforcement of noexec and nosuid because it is known the filesystems in question do not support executables. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-04Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+33
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all. Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced. There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount points on proc and sysfs that are created specially. This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime, read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid attributes remains for another time. This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was converted) and is not now actively wrong. There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that I will mention briefly. It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount. At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the performance part of pathname resolution. As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once they are recognized" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points. kernfs: Add support for always empty directories. proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints. fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories. vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
2015-07-01mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directoriesEric W. Biederman1-3/+2
fs_fully_visible attempts to make fresh mounts of proc and sysfs give the mounter no more access to proc and sysfs than if they could have by creating a bind mount. One aspect of proc and sysfs that makes this particularly tricky is that there are other filesystems that typically mount on top of proc and sysfs. As those filesystems are mounted on empty directories in practice it is safe to ignore them. However testing to ensure filesystems are mounted on empty directories has not been something the in kernel data structures have supported so the current test for an empty directory which checks to see if nlink <= 2 is a bit lacking. proc and sysfs have recently been modified to use the new empty_dir infrastructure to create all of their dedicated mount points. Instead of testing for S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && i_nlink <= 2 to see if a directory is empty, test for is_empty_dir_inode(inode). That small change guaranteess mounts found on proc and sysfs really are safe to ignore, because the directories are not only empty but nothing can ever be added to them. This guarantees there is nothing to worry about when mounting proc and sysfs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visibleEric W. Biederman1-2/+6
Limit the mounts fs_fully_visible considers to locked mounts. Unlocked can always be unmounted so considering them adds hassle but no security benefit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01fs: use seq_open_private() for proc_mountsYann Droneaud1-3/+3
A patchset to remove support for passing pre-allocated struct seq_file to seq_open(). Such feature is undocumented and prone to error. In particular, if seq_release() is used in release handler, it will kfree() a pointer which was not allocated by seq_open(). So this patchset drops support for pre-allocated struct seq_file: it's only of use in proc_namespace.c and can be easily replaced by using seq_open_private()/seq_release_private(). Additionally, it documents the use of file->private_data to hold pointer to struct seq_file by seq_open(). This patch (of 3): Since patch described below, from v2.6.15-rc1, seq_open() could use a struct seq_file already allocated by the caller if the pointer to the structure is stored in file->private_data before calling the function. Commit 1abe77b0fc4b485927f1f798ae81a752677e1d05 Author: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Date: Mon Nov 7 17:15:34 2005 -0500 [PATCH] allow callers of seq_open do allocation themselves Allow caller of seq_open() to kmalloc() seq_file + whatever else they want and set ->private_data to it. seq_open() will then abstain from doing allocation itself. Such behavior is only used by mounts_open_common(). In order to drop support for such uncommon feature, proc_mounts is converted to use seq_open_private(), which take care of allocating the proc_mounts structure, making it available through ->private in struct seq_file. Conversely, proc_mounts is converted to use seq_release_private(), in order to release the private structure allocated by seq_open_private(). Then, ->private is used directly instead of proc_mounts() macro to access to the proc_mounts structure. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1433193673.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-04mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atimeEric W. Biederman1-3/+21
Ignore an existing mount if the locked readonly, nodev or atime attributes are less permissive than the desired attributes of the new mount. On success ensure the new mount locks all of the same readonly, nodev and atime attributes as the old mount. The nosuid and noexec attributes are not checked here as this change is destined for stable and enforcing those attributes causes a regression in lxc and libvirt-lxc where those applications will not start and there are no known executables on sysfs or proc and no known way to create exectuables without code modifications Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e51db73532955 ("userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-05-14mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespaceEric W. Biederman1-1/+7
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very much like a bind mount. Unfortunately the current structure can not preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags. Therefore refactor the logic into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits. Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace, before the filesystem may be mounted. Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-05-11new helper: __legitimize_mnt()Al Viro1-8/+19
same as legitimize_mnt(), except that it does *not* drop and regain rcu_read_lock; return values are 0 => grabbed a reference, we are fine 1 => failed, just go away -1 => failed, go away and mntput(bastard) when outside of rcu_read_lock Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-09mnt: Fix fs_fully_visible to verify the root directory is visibleEric W. Biederman1-0/+6
This fixes a dumb bug in fs_fully_visible that allows proc or sys to be mounted if there is a bind mount of part of /proc/ or /sys/ visible. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Eric Windisch <ewindisch@docker.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connectedEric W. Biederman1-2/+6
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use this flag in detach_mounts. This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09mnt: Fix the error check in __detach_mountsEric W. Biederman1-1/+1
lookup_mountpoint can return either NULL or an error value. Update the test in __detach_mounts to test for an error value to avoid pathological cases causing a NULL pointer dereferences. The callers of __detach_mounts should prevent it from ever being called on an unlinked dentry but don't take any chances. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mountsEric W. Biederman1-3/+26
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted. In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children. In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09mnt: Factor umount_mnt from umount_treeEric W. Biederman1-3/+11
For future use factor out a function umount_mnt from umount_tree. This function unhashes a mount and remembers where the mount was mounted so that eventually when the code makes it to a sleeping context the mountpoint can be dput. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09mnt: Factor out unhash_mnt from detach_mnt and umount_treeEric W. Biederman1-9/+12
Create a function unhash_mnt that contains the common code between detach_mnt and umount_tree, and use unhash_mnt in place of the common code. This add a unncessary list_del_init(mnt->mnt_child) into umount_tree but given that mnt_child is already empty this extra line is a noop. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mountsEric W. Biederman1-2/+5
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts it is reasonable to fail early. The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears reasonable. Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts that appear in the mount tree. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: On an unmount propagate clearing of MNT_LOCKEDEric W. Biederman1-0/+3
A prerequisite of calling umount_tree is that the point where the tree is mounted at is valid to unmount. If we are propagating the effect of the unmount clear MNT_LOCKED in every instance where the same filesystem is mounted on the same mountpoint in the mount tree, as we know (by virtue of the fact that umount_tree was called) that it is safe to reveal what is at that mountpoint. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: Delay removal from the mount hash.Eric W. Biederman1-5/+8
- Modify __lookup_mnt_hash_last to ignore mounts that have MNT_UMOUNTED set. - Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in propogate_umount - Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in umount_tree before the entire list of mounts to be umounted is selected. - Remove mounts from the mount hash table as the last thing that happens in the case where a mount has a parent in umount_tree. Mounts without parents are not hashed (by definition). This paves the way for delaying removal from the mount hash table even farther and fixing the MNT_LOCKED vs MNT_DETACH issue. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: Add MNT_UMOUNT flagEric W. Biederman1-1/+3
In some instances it is necessary to know if the the unmounting process has begun on a mount. Add MNT_UMOUNT to make that reliably testable. This fix gets used in fixing locked mounts in MNT_DETACH Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: In umount_tree reuse mnt_list instead of mnt_hashEric W. Biederman1-9/+11
umount_tree builds a list of mounts that need to be unmounted. Utilize mnt_list for this purpose instead of mnt_hash. This begins to allow keeping a mount on the mnt_hash after it is unmounted, which is necessary for a properly functioning MNT_LOCKED implementation. The fact that mnt_list is an ordinary list makding available list_move is nice bonus. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: Don't propagate umounts in __detach_mountsEric W. Biederman1-1/+1
Invoking mount propagation from __detach_mounts is inefficient and wrong. It is inefficient because __detach_mounts already walks the list of mounts that where something needs to be done, and mount propagation walks some subset of those mounts again. It is actively wrong because if the dentry that is passed to __detach_mounts is not part of the path to a mount that mount should not be affected. change_mnt_propagation(p,MS_PRIVATE) modifies the mount propagation tree of a master mount so it's slaves are connected to another master if possible. Which means even removing a mount from the middle of a mount tree with __detach_mounts will not deprive any mount propagated mount events. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: Improve the umount_tree flagsEric W. Biederman1-15/+16
- Remove the unneeded declaration from pnode.h - Mark umount_tree static as it has no callers outside of namespace.c - Define an enumeration of umount_tree's flags. - Pass umount_tree's flags in by name This removes the magic numbers 0, 1 and 2 making the code a little clearer and makes it possible for there to be lazy unmounts that don't propagate. Which is what __detach_mounts actually wants for example. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-03mnt: Use hlist_move_list in namespace_unlockEric W. Biederman1-7/+5
Small cleanup to make the code more readable and maintainable. Signed-off-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-02-22VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry)David Howells1-5/+5
Convert the following where appropriate: (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry). (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry). (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with a ->d_automount op. In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer). Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the type of the lower dentry. However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem. There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes. The following perl+coccinelle script was used: use strict; my @callers; open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') || die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers"; @callers = <$fd>; close($fd); unless (@callers) { print "No matches\n"; exit(0); } my @cocci = ( '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_symlink(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_dir(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_reg(E)' ); my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci"; open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile; print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci); close($fd); foreach my $file (@callers) { chomp $file; print "Processing ", $file, "\n"; system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 || die "spatch failed"; } [AV: overlayfs parts skipped] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-02-18Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-27/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro: "This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending more or less one pull request per branch. This is the first pile; more to follow in a few. In this one are several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount, switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in namespace_unlock()" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin new fs_pin killing logics allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock get rid of the second argument of acct_kill() take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock pull bumping refcount into ->kill() kill pin_put() mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open... get rid of lustre_dump_dentry() gut proc_register() a bit kill d_validate() ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
2015-02-14fs/namespace: convert devname allocation to kstrdup_constAndrzej Hajda1-3/+3
VFS frequently performs duplication of strings located in read-only memory section. Replacing kstrdup by kstrdup_const allows to avoid such operations. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com> Cc: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-01-26switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pinAl Viro1-27/+17
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-18mnt: Fix a memory stomp in umountEric W. Biederman1-0/+2
While reviewing the code of umount_tree I realized that when we append to a preexisting unmounted list we do not change pprev of the former first item in the list. Which means later in namespace_unlock hlist_del_init(&mnt->mnt_hash) on the former first item of the list will stomp unmounted.first leaving it set to some random mount point which we are likely to free soon. This isn't likely to hit, but if it does I don't know how anyone could track it down. [ This happened because we don't have all the same operations for hlist's as we do for normal doubly-linked lists. In particular, list_splice() is easy on our standard doubly-linked lists, while hlist_splice() doesn't exist and needs both start/end entries of the hlist. And commit 38129a13e6e7 incorrectly open-coded that missing hlist_splice(). We should think about making these kinds of "mindless" conversions easier to get right by adding the missing hlist helpers - Linus ] Fixes: 38129a13e6e71f666e0468e99fdd932a687b4d7e switch mnt_hash to hlist Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-17Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+15
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman: "As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for backporting to stable. The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it easy to detect if this issue reoccurs. Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes. Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes privileges. The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been set to permanently disable setgroups. The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c). To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes. > So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-) > Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9. > Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine. > Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com> > Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels. > Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using > my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid > as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches. > Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> > I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add > the setgroups thing. > Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :(" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests userns; Correct the comment in map_write userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings. groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers. umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs. umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force mnt: Update unprivileged remount test mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
2014-12-11take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fsAl Viro1-3/+6
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now. It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems, etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback(). This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well. get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache). proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops). Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path() if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details of that mechanism. As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt; it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets from ns_get_path(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04bury struct proc_ns in fs/procAl Viro1-11/+2
a) make get_proc_ns() return a pointer to struct ns_common b) mirror ns_ops in dentry->d_fsdata of ns dentries, so that is_mnt_ns_file() could get away with fewer dereferences. That way struct proc_ns becomes invisible outside of fs/proc/*.c Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04copy address of proc_ns_ops into ns_commonAl Viro1-0/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04new helpers: ns_alloc_inum/ns_free_inumAl Viro1-2/+2
take struct ns_common *, for now simply wrappers around proc_{alloc,free}_inum() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04make proc_ns_operations work with struct ns_common * instead of void *Al Viro1-10/+3
We can do that now. And kill ->inum(), while we are at it - all instances are identical. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04make mntns ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() work with &mnt_ns->nsAl Viro1-8/+13
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04common object embedded into various struct ....nsAl Viro1-3/+3
for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-02mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_rootEric W. Biederman1-0/+2
When inspecting the pivot_root and the current mount expiry logic I realized that pivot_root fails to clear like mount move does. Add the missing line in case someone does the interesting feat of moving an expirable submount. This gives a strong guarantee that root of the filesystem tree will never expire. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mntEric W. Biederman1-1/+2
old->mnt_expiry should be ignored unless CL_EXPIRE is set. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.Eric W. Biederman1-1/+0
Clear MNT_LOCKED in the callers of copy_tree except copy_mnt_ns, and collect_mounts. In copy_mnt_ns it is necessary to create an exact copy of a mount tree, so not clearing MNT_LOCKED is important. Similarly collect_mounts is used to take a snapshot of the mount tree for audit logging purposes and auditing using a faithful copy of the tree is important. This becomes particularly significant when we start setting MNT_LOCKED on rootfs to prevent it from being unmounted. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.Eric W. Biederman1-0/+1
Andrew Vagin <avagin@parallels.com> writes: > #define _GNU_SOURCE > #include <sys/types.h> > #include <sys/stat.h> > #include <fcntl.h> > #include <sched.h> > #include <unistd.h> > #include <sys/mount.h> > > int main(int argc, char **argv) > { > int fd; > > fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY); > if (fd < 0) > return 1; > while (1) { > if (umount2("/", MNT_DETACH) || > setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS)) > break; > } > > return 0; > } > > root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# gcc -Wall nsenter.c -o nsenter > root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# strace ./nsenter > execve("./nsenter", ["./nsenter"], [/* 22 vars */]) = 0 > ... > open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY) = 3 > umount("/", MNT_DETACH) = 0 > setns(3, 131072) = 0 > umount("/", MNT_DETACH > causes: > [ 260.548301] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > [ 260.550941] kernel BUG at /build/buildd/linux-3.13.0/fs/pnode.c:372! > [ 260.552068] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP > [ 260.552068] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_tcpudp xt_addrtype xt_conntrack ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack bridge stp llc dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_bio_prison iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel binfmt_misc nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl aesni_intel nfs lockd aes_x86_64 sunrpc fscache lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw ppdev parport_pc lp parport btrfs xor raid6_pq libcrc32c psmouse floppy > [ 260.552068] CPU: 0 PID: 1723 Comm: nsenter Not tainted 3.13.0-30-generic #55-Ubuntu > [ 260.552068] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 > [ 260.552068] task: ffff8800376097f0 ti: ffff880074824000 task.ti: ffff880074824000 > [ 260.552068] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811e9483>] [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130 > [ 260.552068] RSP: 0018:ffff880074825e98 EFLAGS: 00010246 > [ 260.552068] RAX: ffff88007c741140 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff88007c741190 > [ 260.552068] RDX: ffff88007c741190 RSI: ffff880074825ec0 RDI: ffff880074825ec0 > [ 260.552068] RBP: ffff880074825eb0 R08: 00000000000172e0 R09: ffff88007fc172e0 > [ 260.552068] R10: ffffffff811cc642 R11: ffffea0001d59000 R12: ffff88007c741140 > [ 260.552068] R13: ffff88007c741140 R14: ffff88007c741140 R15: 0000000000000000 > [ 260.552068] FS: 00007fd5c7e41740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 260.552068] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 260.552068] CR2: 00007fd5c7968050 CR3: 0000000070124000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 > [ 260.552068] Stack: > [ 260.552068] 0000000000000002 0000000000000002 ffff88007c631000 ffff880074825ed8 > [ 260.552068] ffffffff811dcfac ffff88007c741140 0000000000000002 ffff88007c741160 > [ 260.552068] ffff880074825f38 ffffffff811dd12b ffffffff811cc642 0000000075640000 > [ 260.552068] Call Trace: > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dcfac>] umount_tree+0x20c/0x260 > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd12b>] do_umount+0x12b/0x300 > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc642>] ? final_putname+0x22/0x50 > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc849>] ? putname+0x29/0x40 > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd88c>] SyS_umount+0xdc/0x100 > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff8172aeff>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 > [ 260.552068] Code: 89 50 08 48 8b 50 08 48 89 02 49 89 45 08 e9 72 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 e7 e8 f5 f6 ff ff 48 89 c3 e9 39 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 b8 01 > [ 260.552068] RIP [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130 > [ 260.552068] RSP <ffff880074825e98> > [ 260.611451] ---[ end trace 11c33d85f1d4c652 ]-- Which in practice is totally uninteresting. Only the global root user can do it, and it is just a stupid thing to do. However that is no excuse to allow a silly way to oops the kernel. We can avoid this silly problem by setting MNT_LOCKED on the rootfs mount point and thus avoid needing any special cases in the unmount code. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02umount: Disallow unprivileged mount forceEric W. Biederman1-0/+3
Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying superblock as well. Restrict forced unmount to the global root user for now. Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mountEric W. Biederman1-1/+7
Now that remount is properly enforcing the rule that you can't remove nodev at least sandstorm.io is breaking when performing a remount. It turns out that there is an easy intuitive solution implicitly add nodev on remount when nodev was implicitly added on mount. Tested-by: Cedric Bosdonnat <cbosdonnat@suse.com> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>