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commit e2c9e0b28e146c9a3bce21408f3c02e24ac7ac31 upstream.
ex->ee_block is not host-endian (note that accesses of other fields
of *ex right next to that line go through the helpers that do proper
conversion from little-endian to host-endian; it might make sense
to add similar for ->ee_block to avoid reintroducing that kind of
bugs...)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a4dad1ae24f850410c4e60f22823cba1289b8d52 upstream.
In ext4, the bottom two bits of {a,c,m}time_extra are used to extend
the {a,c,m}time fields, deferring the year 2038 problem to the year
2446.
When decoding these extended fields, for times whose bottom 32 bits
would represent a negative number, sign extension causes the 64-bit
extended timestamp to be negative as well, which is not what's
intended. This patch corrects that issue, so that the only negative
{a,c,m}times are those between 1901 and 1970 (as per 32-bit signed
timestamps).
Some older kernels might have written pre-1970 dates with 1,1 in the
extra bits. This patch treats those incorrectly-encoded dates as
pre-1970, instead of post-2311, until kernel 4.20 is released.
Hopefully by then e2fsck will have fixed up the bad data.
Also add a comment explaining the encoding of ext4's extra {a,c,m}time
bits.
Signed-off-by: David Turner <novalis@novalis.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Mark Harris <mh8928@yahoo.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23732
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ef83b6e8f40bb24b92ad73b5889732346e54a793 upstream.
Similar to XFS warn when mounting DAX while it is still considered under
development. Also, aspects of the DAX implementation, for example
synchronization against multiple faults and faults causing block
allocation, depend on the correct implementation in the filesystem. The
maturity of a given DAX implementation is filesystem specific.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ebf7f10d67a70e120f365018f1c5fce9ddc567d upstream.
The thing got broken back in 2002 - sysvfs does *not* have inline
symlinks; even short ones have bodies stored in the first block
of file. sysv_symlink() handles that correctly; unfortunately,
attempting to look an existing symlink up will end up confusing
them for inline symlinks, and interpret the block number containing
the body as the body itself.
Nobody has noticed until now, which says something about the level
of testing sysvfs gets ;-/
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 904dad4742d211b7a8910e92695c0fa957483836 upstream.
"group" is the group where the backup will be placed, and is
initialized to zero in the declaration. This meant that backups for
meta_bg descriptors were erroneously written to the backup block group
descriptors in groups 1 and (desc_per_block-1).
Reproduction information:
mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -b 1024 -O ^resize_inode /tmp/foo.img 16G
truncate -s 24G /tmp/foo.img
losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/foo.img
mount /dev/loop0 /mnt
resize2fs /dev/loop0
umount /dev/loop0
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/loop0 bs=1024 count=2
e2fsck -fy /dev/loop0
losetup -d /dev/loop0
Signed-off-by: Andy Leiserson <andy@leiserson.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 087ffd4eae9929afd06f6a709861df3c3508492a upstream.
introduced jbd2_write_access_granted() to improve write|undo_access
speed, but missed to check the status of b_committed_data which caused
a kernel panic on ocfs2.
[ 6538.405938] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 6538.406686] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2400!
[ 6538.406686] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 6538.406686] Modules linked in: ocfs2 nfsd lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrpc autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sd_mod sg ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ppdev xen_kbdfront xen_netfront xen_fbfront parport_pc parport pcspkr i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq ext4 jbd2 mbcache xen_blkfront floppy pata_acpi ata_generic ata_piix cirrus ttm drm_kms_helper drm fb_sys_fops sysimgblt sysfillrect i2c_core syscopyarea dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 6538.406686] CPU: 1 PID: 16265 Comm: mmap_truncate Not tainted 4.3.0 #1
[ 6538.406686] Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.3.1OVM 05/14/2014
[ 6538.406686] task: ffff88007c2bab00 ti: ffff880075b78000 task.ti: ffff880075b78000
[ 6538.406686] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa06a286b>] [<ffffffffa06a286b>] ocfs2_block_group_clear_bits+0x23b/0x250 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] RSP: 0018:ffff880075b7b7f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 6538.406686] RAX: ffff8800760c5b40 RBX: ffff88006c06a000 RCX: ffffffffa06e6df0
[ 6538.406686] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007a6f6ea0 RDI: ffff88007a760430
[ 6538.406686] RBP: ffff880075b7b878 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 6538.406686] R10: ffffffffa06769be R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 6538.406686] R13: ffffffffa06a1750 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88007a6f6ea0
[ 6538.406686] FS: 00007f17fde30720(0000) GS:ffff88007f040000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 6538.406686] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6538.406686] CR2: 0000000000601730 CR3: 000000007aea0000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[ 6538.406686] Stack:
[ 6538.406686] ffff88007c2bb5b0 ffff880075b7b8e0 ffff88007a7604b0 ffff88006c640800
[ 6538.406686] ffff88007a7604b0 ffff880075d77390 0000000075b7b878 ffffffffa06a309d
[ 6538.406686] ffff880075d752d8 ffff880075b7b990 ffff880075b7b898 0000000000000000
[ 6538.406686] Call Trace:
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a309d>] ? ocfs2_read_group_descriptor+0x6d/0xa0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a3654>] _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0xe4/0x320 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a1750>] ? ocfs2_put_slot+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a397e>] _ocfs2_free_clusters+0xee/0x210 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a1750>] ? ocfs2_put_slot+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a1750>] ? ocfs2_put_slot+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa0682d50>] ? ocfs2_extend_trans+0x50/0x1a0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06a3ad5>] ocfs2_free_clusters+0x15/0x20 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa065072c>] ocfs2_replay_truncate_records+0xfc/0x290 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa06843ac>] ? ocfs2_start_trans+0xec/0x1d0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa0654600>] __ocfs2_flush_truncate_log+0x140/0x2d0 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa0654394>] ? ocfs2_reserve_blocks_for_rec_trunc.clone.0+0x44/0x170 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa065acd4>] ocfs2_remove_btree_range+0x374/0x630 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa017486b>] ? jbd2_journal_stop+0x25b/0x470 [jbd2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa065d5b5>] ocfs2_commit_truncate+0x305/0x670 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa0683430>] ? ocfs2_journal_access_eb+0x20/0x20 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa067adb7>] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x297/0x380 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa01759e4>] ? jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate+0x64/0xc0 [jbd2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffffa067c7a2>] ocfs2_setattr+0x572/0x860 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff810e4a3f>] ? current_fs_time+0x3f/0x50
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff812124b7>] notify_change+0x1d7/0x340
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff8121abf9>] ? generic_getxattr+0x79/0x80
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff811f5876>] do_truncate+0x66/0x90
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff81120e30>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xb0/0x110
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff811f5bb3>] do_sys_ftruncate.clone.0+0xf3/0x120
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff811f5bee>] SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
[ 6538.406686] [<ffffffff816aa2ae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
[ 6538.406686] Code: 28 48 81 ee b0 04 00 00 48 8b 92 50 fb ff ff 48 8b 80 b0 03 00 00 48 39 90 88 00 00 00 0f 84 30 fe ff ff 0f 0b eb fe 0f 0b eb fe <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 eb fb 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
[ 6538.406686] RIP [<ffffffffa06a286b>] ocfs2_block_group_clear_bits+0x23b/0x250 [ocfs2]
[ 6538.406686] RSP <ffff880075b7b7f8>
[ 6538.691128] ---[ end trace 31cd7011d6770d7e ]---
[ 6538.694492] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 6538.695484] Kernel Offset: disabled
Fixes: de92c8caf16c("jbd2: speedup jbd2_journal_get_[write|undo]_access()")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bc23f0c8d7ccd8d924c4e70ce311288cb3e61ea8 upstream.
Ted and Namjae have reported that truncated pages don't get timely
reclaimed after being truncated in data=journal mode. The following test
triggers the issue easily:
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
pwrite(fd, buf, 1024*1024, 0);
fsync(fd);
fsync(fd);
ftruncate(fd, 0);
}
The reason is that journal_unmap_buffer() finds that truncated buffers
are not journalled (jh->b_transaction == NULL), they are part of
checkpoint list of a transaction (jh->b_cp_transaction != NULL) and have
been already written out (!buffer_dirty(bh)). We clean such buffers but
we leave them in the checkpoint list. Since checkpoint transaction holds
a reference to the journal head, these buffers cannot be released until
the checkpoint transaction is cleaned up. And at that point we don't
call release_buffer_page() anymore so pages detached from mapping are
lingering in the system waiting for reclaim to find them and free them.
Fix the problem by removing buffers from transaction checkpoint lists
when journal_unmap_buffer() finds out they don't have to be there
anymore.
Reported-and-tested-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Fixes: de1b794130b130e77ffa975bb58cb843744f9ae5
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 33d14975e5ac469963d5d63856b61698ad0bff07 upstream.
Unlike comments and expectation of callers journal_clean_one_cp_list()
returned 1 not only if it freed the transaction but also if it freed
some buffers in the transaction. That could make
__jbd2_journal_clean_checkpoint_list() skip processing
t_checkpoint_io_list and continue with processing the next transaction.
This is mostly a cosmetic issue since the only result is we can
sometimes free less memory than we could. But it's still worth fixing.
Fix journal_clean_one_cp_list() to return 1 only if the transaction was
really freed.
Fixes: 50849db32a9f529235a84bcc84a6b8e631b1d0ec
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d227c3ae4e94e5eb11dd780a811f59e1a7b74ccd upstream.
In tracefs' start_creating(), we pin the file system to safely access
its root. When we failed to create a file, we unpin the file system via
failed_creating() to release the mount count and eventually the reference
of the singleton vfsmount.
However, when we run into an error during lookup_one_len() when still
in start_creating(), we only release the parent's mutex but not so the
reference on the mount.
F.e., in securityfs_create_file(), after doing simple_pin_fs() when
lookup_one_len() fails there, we infact do simple_release_fs(). This
seems necessary here as well.
Same issue seen in debugfs due to 190afd81e4a5 ("debugfs: split the
beginning and the end of __create_file() off"), which seemed to got
carried over into tracefs, too. Noticed during code review.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/68efa86101b778cf7517ed7c6ad573bd69f60ec6.1446672850.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Fixes: 4282d60689d4 ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c95a51807b730e4681e2ecbdfd669ca52601959e upstream.
When recovery master down, dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup() only remove
the $RECOVERY lock owned by dead node, but do not clear the refmap bit.
Which will make umount thread falling in dead loop migrating $RECOVERY
to the dead node.
Signed-off-by: xuejiufei <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bef5502de074b6f6fa647b94b73155d675694420 upstream.
We have found that migration source will trigger a BUG that the refcount
of mle is already zero before put when the target is down during
migration. The situation is as follows:
dlm_migrate_lockres
dlm_add_migration_mle
dlm_mark_lockres_migrating
dlm_get_mle_inuse
<<<<<< Now the refcount of the mle is 2.
dlm_send_one_lockres and wait for the target to become the
new master.
<<<<<< o2hb detect the target down and clean the migration
mle. Now the refcount is 1.
dlm_migrate_lockres woken, and put the mle twice when found the target
goes down which trigger the BUG with the following message:
"ERROR: bad mle: ".
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c9ee4cbf2a945271f25b89b137f2c03bbc3be33 upstream.
When resizing, it firstly extends the last gd. Once it should backup
super in the gd, it calculates new backup super and update the
corresponding value.
But it currently doesn't consider the situation that the backup super is
already done. And in this case, it still sets the bit in gd bitmap and
then decrease from bg_free_bits_count, which leads to a corrupted gd and
trigger the BUG in ocfs2_block_group_set_bits:
BUG_ON(le16_to_cpu(bg->bg_free_bits_count) < num_bits);
So check whether the backup super is done and then do the updates.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiufei Xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 854ee2e944b4daf795e32562a7d2f9e90ab5a6a8 upstream.
Commit 8f1eb48758aa ("ocfs2: fix umask ignored issue") introduced an
issue, SGID of sub dir was not inherited from its parents dir. It is
because SGID is set into "inode->i_mode" in ocfs2_get_init_inode(), but
is overwritten by "mode" which don't have SGID set later.
Fixes: 8f1eb48758aa ("ocfs2: fix umask ignored issue")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Acked-by: Srinivas Eeda <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 928a477102c4fc6739883415b66987207e3502f4 upstream.
For the root directory, . and .. are faked (using dir_emit_dots()) and
ctx->pos is reset from 2 to 0.
A corrupted root directory could cause fat_get_entry() to fail, but
->iterate() (fat_readdir()) reports progress to the VFS (with ctx->pos
rewound to 0), so any following calls to ->iterate() continue to return
the same entries again and again.
The result is that userspace will never see the end of the directory,
causing e.g. 'ls' to hang in a getdents() loop.
[hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: cleanup and make sure to correct fake_offset]
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1817889e3b2cc1db8abb595712095129ff9156c1 upstream.
Hugh Dickins pointed out problems with the new hugetlbfs fallocate hole
punch code. These problems are in the routine remove_inode_hugepages and
mostly occur in the case where there are holes in the range of pages to be
removed. These holes could be the result of a previous hole punch or
simply sparse allocation. The current code could access pages outside the
specified range.
remove_inode_hugepages handles both hole punch and truncate operations.
Page index handling was fixed/cleaned up so that the loop index always
matches the page being processed. The code now only makes a single pass
through the range of pages as it was determined page faults could not race
with truncate. A cond_resched() was added after removing up to
PAGEVEC_SIZE pages.
Some totally unnecessary code in hugetlbfs_fallocate() that remained from
early development was also removed.
Tested with fallocate tests submitted here:
http://librelist.com/browser//libhugetlbfs/2015/6/25/patch-tests-add-tests-for-fallocate-system-call/
And, some ftruncate tests under development
Fixes: b5cec28d36f5 ("hugetlbfs: truncate_hugepages() takes a range of pages")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: "Hillf Danton" <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0f930902eb8806cff8dcaef9ff9faf3cfa5fd748 upstream.
Since 5cec38ac866b ("fs, seq_file: fallback to vmalloc instead of oom kill
processes") seq_buf_alloc() avoids calling the oom killer for PAGE_SIZE or
smaller allocations; but larger allocations can use the oom killer via
vmalloc(). Thus reads of small files can return ENOMEM, but larger files
use the oom killer to avoid ENOMEM.
The effect of this bug is that reads from /proc and other virtual
filesystems can return ENOMEM instead of the preferred behavior - oom
killing something (possibly the calling process). I don't know of anyone
except Google who has noticed the issue.
I suspect the fix is more needed in smaller systems where there isn't any
reclaimable memory. But these seem like the kinds of systems which
probably don't use the oom killer for production situations.
Memory overcommit requires use of the oom killer to select a victim
regardless of file size.
Enable oom killer for small seq_buf_alloc() allocations.
Fixes: 5cec38ac866b ("fs, seq_file: fallback to vmalloc instead of oom kill processes")
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 41a0c249cb8706a2efa1ab3d59466b23a27d0c8b upstream.
Writing to /proc/$pid/coredump_filter always returns -ESRCH because commit
774636e19ed51 ("proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()") removed
the setting of ret after the get_proc_task call and incorrectly left it as
-ESRCH. Instead, return 0 when successful.
Example breakage:
echo 0 > /proc/self/coredump_filter
bash: echo: write error: No such process
Fixes: 774636e19ed51 ("proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54708d2858e79a2bdda10bf8a20c80eb96c20613 upstream.
The commit 96d0df79f264 ("proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly")
fixed the access to /proc/self/fd from sub-threads, but introduced another
problem: a sub-thread can't access /proc/<tid>/fd/ or /proc/thread-self/fd
if generic_permission() fails.
Change proc_fd_permission() to check same_thread_group(pid_task(), current).
Fixes: 96d0df79f264 ("proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly")
Reported-by: "Jin, Yihua" <yihua.jin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1b1e15ef6b80facf76d6757649dfd7295eda29f upstream.
NFS on a 2 node ocfs2 cluster each node exporting dir. The lock causing
the hang is the global bit map inode lock. Node 1 is master, has the
lock granted in PR mode; Node 2 is in the converting list (PR -> EX).
There are no holders of the lock on the master node so it should
downconvert to NL and grant EX to node 2 but that does not happen.
BLOCKED + QUEUED in lock res are set and it is on osb blocked list.
Threads are waiting in __ocfs2_cluster_lock on BLOCKED. One thread
wants EX, rest want PR. So it is as though the downconvert thread needs
to be kicked to complete the conv.
The hang is caused by an EX req coming into __ocfs2_cluster_lock on the
heels of a PR req after it sets BUSY (drops l_lock, releasing EX
thread), forcing the incoming EX to wait on BUSY without doing anything.
PR has called ocfs2_dlm_lock, which sets the node 1 lock from NL -> PR,
queues ast.
At this time, upconvert (PR ->EX) arrives from node 2, finds conflict
with node 1 lock in PR, so the lock res is put on dlm thread's dirty
listt.
After ret from ocf2_dlm_lock, PR thread now waits behind EX on BUSY till
awoken by ast.
Now it is dlm_thread that serially runs dlm_shuffle_lists, ast, bast, in
that order. dlm_shuffle_lists ques a bast on behalf of node 2 (which
will be run by dlm_thread right after the ast). ast does its part, sets
UPCONVERT_FINISHING, clears BUSY and wakes its waiters. Next,
dlm_thread runs bast. It sets BLOCKED and kicks dc thread. dc thread
runs ocfs2_unblock_lock, but since UPCONVERT_FINISHING set, skips doing
anything and reques.
Inside of __ocfs2_cluster_lock, since EX has been waiting on BUSY ahead
of PR, it wakes up first, finds BLOCKED set and skips doing anything but
clearing UPCONVERT_FINISHING (which was actually "meant" for the PR
thread), and this time waits on BLOCKED. Next, the PR thread comes out
of wait but since UPCONVERT_FINISHING is not set, it skips updating the
l_ro_holders and goes straight to wait on BLOCKED. So there, we have a
hang! Threads in __ocfs2_cluster_lock wait on BLOCKED, lock res in osb
blocked list. Only when dc thread is awoken, it will run
ocfs2_unblock_lock and things will unhang.
One way to fix this is to wake the dc thread on the flag after clearing
UPCONVERT_FINISHING
Orabug: 20933419
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1a093ceb053832c25b92f3cf26b957543c7baf9b upstream.
Since commit 2d8ae84fbc32, nothing is bumping lo->plh_block_lgets in the
layoutreturn path, so it should not be touched in nfs4_layoutreturn_release
either.
Fixes: 2d8ae84fbc32 ("NFSv4.1/pnfs: Remove redundant lo->plh_block_lgets...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 569cf1876a32e574ba8a7fb825cd91bafd003882 upstream.
We got dentry pages from high_mem, and its address space directly goes into the
decryption path via f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr.
But, sg_init_one assumes the address is not from high_mem, so we can get this
panic since it doesn't call kmap_high but kunmap_high is triggered at the end.
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/mm/highmem.c:290!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
...
(kunmap_high+0xb0/0xb8) from [<c0114534>] (__kunmap_atomic+0xa0/0xa4)
(__kunmap_atomic+0xa0/0xa4) from [<c035f028>] (blkcipher_walk_done+0x128/0x1ec)
(blkcipher_walk_done+0x128/0x1ec) from [<c0366c24>] (crypto_cbc_decrypt+0xc0/0x170)
(crypto_cbc_decrypt+0xc0/0x170) from [<c0367148>] (crypto_cts_decrypt+0xc0/0x114)
(crypto_cts_decrypt+0xc0/0x114) from [<c035ea98>] (async_decrypt+0x40/0x48)
(async_decrypt+0x40/0x48) from [<c032ca34>] (f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr+0x124/0x304)
(f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr+0x124/0x304) from [<c03056fc>] (f2fs_fill_dentries+0xac/0x188)
(f2fs_fill_dentries+0xac/0x188) from [<c03059c8>] (f2fs_readdir+0x1f0/0x300)
(f2fs_readdir+0x1f0/0x300) from [<c0218054>] (vfs_readdir+0x90/0xb4)
(vfs_readdir+0x90/0xb4) from [<c0218418>] (SyS_getdents64+0x64/0xcc)
(SyS_getdents64+0x64/0xcc) from [<c0105ba0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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eof"
commit 2d4594acbf6d8f75a27f3578476b6a27d8b13ebb upstream.
Sure, it's better to bail out of past-the-eof read and return 0 than return
a bogus negative value on such. Only we'd better make sure we are bailing out
with 0 and not -ENOMEM...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 74cedf9b6c603f2278a05bc91b140b32b434d0b5 upstream.
Assume a filesystem with 4KB blocks. When a file has size 1000 bytes and
we issue direct IO read at offset 1024, blockdev_direct_IO() reads the
tail of the last block and the logic for handling short DIO reads in
dio_complete() results in a return value -24 (1000 - 1024) which
obviously confuses userspace.
Fix the problem by bailing out early once we sample i_size and can
reliably check that direct IO read starts beyond i_size.
Reported-by: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Fixes: 9fe55eea7e4b444bafc42fa0000cc2d1d2847275
CC: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b06c4bf5c874a57254b197f53ddf588e7a24a2bf upstream.
In the kernel 4.2 merge window we had a big changes to the implementation
of delayed references and qgroups which made the no_quota field of delayed
references not used anymore. More specifically the no_quota field is not
used anymore as of:
commit 0ed4792af0e8 ("btrfs: qgroup: Switch to new extent-oriented qgroup mechanism.")
Leaving the no_quota field actually prevents delayed references from
getting merged, which in turn cause the following BUG_ON(), at
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c, to be hit when qgroups are enabled:
static int run_delayed_tree_ref(...)
{
(...)
BUG_ON(node->ref_mod != 1);
(...)
}
This happens on a scenario like the following:
1) Ref1 bytenr X, action = BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_REF, no_quota = 1, added.
2) Ref2 bytenr X, action = BTRFS_DROP_DELAYED_REF, no_quota = 0, added.
It's not merged with Ref1 because Ref1->no_quota != Ref2->no_quota.
3) Ref3 bytenr X, action = BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_REF, no_quota = 1, added.
It's not merged with the reference at the tail of the list of refs
for bytenr X because the reference at the tail, Ref2 is incompatible
due to Ref2->no_quota != Ref3->no_quota.
4) Ref4 bytenr X, action = BTRFS_DROP_DELAYED_REF, no_quota = 0, added.
It's not merged with the reference at the tail of the list of refs
for bytenr X because the reference at the tail, Ref3 is incompatible
due to Ref3->no_quota != Ref4->no_quota.
5) We run delayed references, trigger merging of delayed references,
through __btrfs_run_delayed_refs() -> btrfs_merge_delayed_refs().
6) Ref1 and Ref3 are merged as Ref1->no_quota = Ref3->no_quota and
all other conditions are satisfied too. So Ref1 gets a ref_mod
value of 2.
7) Ref2 and Ref4 are merged as Ref2->no_quota = Ref4->no_quota and
all other conditions are satisfied too. So Ref2 gets a ref_mod
value of 2.
8) Ref1 and Ref2 aren't merged, because they have different values
for their no_quota field.
9) Delayed reference Ref1 is picked for running (select_delayed_ref()
always prefers references with an action == BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_REF).
So run_delayed_tree_ref() is called for Ref1 which triggers the
BUG_ON because Ref1->red_mod != 1 (equals 2).
So fix this by removing the no_quota field, as it's not used anymore as
of commit 0ed4792af0e8 ("btrfs: qgroup: Switch to new extent-oriented
qgroup mechanism.").
The use of no_quota was also buggy in at least two places:
1) At delayed-refs.c:btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref() - we were setting
no_quota to 0 instead of 1 when the following condition was true:
is_fstree(ref_root) || !fs_info->quota_enabled
2) At extent-tree.c:__btrfs_inc_extent_ref() - we were attempting to
reset a node's no_quota when the condition "!is_fstree(root_objectid)
|| !root->fs_info->quota_enabled" was true but we did it only in
an unused local stack variable, that is, we never reset the no_quota
value in the node itself.
This fixes the remainder of problems several people have been having when
running delayed references, mostly while a balance is running in parallel,
on a 4.2+ kernel.
Very special thanks to Stéphane Lesimple for helping debugging this issue
and testing this fix on his multi terabyte filesystem (which took more
than one day to balance alone, plus fsck, etc).
Also, this fixes deadlock issue when using the clone ioctl with qgroups
enabled, as reported by Elias Probst in the mailing list. The deadlock
happens because after calling btrfs_insert_empty_item we have our path
holding a write lock on a leaf of the fs/subvol tree and then before
releasing the path we called check_ref() which did backref walking, when
qgroups are enabled, and tried to read lock the same leaf. The trace for
this case is the following:
INFO: task systemd-nspawn:6095 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
(...)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff86999201>] schedule+0x74/0x83
[<ffffffff863ef64c>] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0xc0/0xea
[<ffffffff86137ed7>] ? wait_woken+0x74/0x74
[<ffffffff8639f0a7>] btrfs_search_old_slot+0x51a/0x810
[<ffffffff863a129b>] btrfs_next_old_leaf+0xdf/0x3ce
[<ffffffff86413a00>] ? ulist_add_merge+0x1b/0x127
[<ffffffff86411688>] __resolve_indirect_refs+0x62a/0x667
[<ffffffff863ef546>] ? btrfs_clear_lock_blocking_rw+0x78/0xbe
[<ffffffff864122d3>] find_parent_nodes+0xaf3/0xfc6
[<ffffffff86412838>] __btrfs_find_all_roots+0x92/0xf0
[<ffffffff864128f2>] btrfs_find_all_roots+0x45/0x65
[<ffffffff8639a75b>] ? btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq+0x2b/0x88
[<ffffffff863e852e>] check_ref+0x64/0xc4
[<ffffffff863e9e01>] btrfs_clone+0x66e/0xb5d
[<ffffffff863ea77f>] btrfs_ioctl_clone+0x48f/0x5bb
[<ffffffff86048a68>] ? native_sched_clock+0x28/0x77
[<ffffffff863ed9b0>] btrfs_ioctl+0xabc/0x25cb
(...)
The problem goes away by eleminating check_ref(), which no longer is
needed as its purpose was to get a value for the no_quota field of
a delayed reference (this patch removes the no_quota field as mentioned
earlier).
Reported-by: Stéphane Lesimple <stephane_btrfs@lesimple.fr>
Tested-by: Stéphane Lesimple <stephane_btrfs@lesimple.fr>
Reported-by: Elias Probst <mail@eliasprobst.eu>
Reported-by: Peter Becker <floyd.net@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Malte Schröder <malte@tnxip.de>
Reported-by: Derek Dongray <derek@valedon.co.uk>
Reported-by: Erkki Seppala <flux-btrfs@inside.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
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commit 777d738a5e58ba3b6f3932ab1543ce93703f4873 upstream.
create_request_message() computes the maximum length of a message,
but uses the wrong type for the time stamp: sizeof(struct timespec)
may be 8 or 16 depending on the architecture, while sizeof(struct
ceph_timespec) is always 8, and that is what gets put into the
message.
Found while auditing the uses of timespec for y2038 problems.
Fixes: b8e69066d8af ("ceph: include time stamp in every MDS request")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8f1eb48758aacf6c1ffce18179295adbf3bd7640 upstream.
New created file's mode is not masked with umask, and this makes umask not
work for ocfs2 volume.
Fixes: 702e5bc ("ocfs2: use generic posix ACL infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c812012f9ca7cf89c9e1a1cd512e6c3b5be04b85 upstream.
If we pass in an empty nfs_fattr struct to nfs_update_inode, it will
(correctly) not update any of the attributes, but it then clears the
NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR flag, which indicates that the attributes are
up to date. Don't clear the flag if the fattr struct has no valid
attrs to apply.
Reviewed-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4f2e9dce0c6348a95eaa56ade9bab18572221088 upstream.
pnfs_layout_process will check the returned layout stateid against what
the kernel has in-core. If it turns out that the stateid we received is
older, then we should resend the LAYOUTGET instead of falling back to
MDS I/O.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c68a027c05709330fe5b2f50c50d5fa02124b5d8 upstream.
If clp->cl_cb_ident is zero, then nfs_cb_idr_remove_locked() skips removing
it when the nfs_client is freed. A decoding or server bug can then find
and try to put that first nfs_client which would lead to a crash.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Fixes: d6870312659d ("nfs4client: convert to idr_alloc()")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ee9608c89e81a1ccee52ecb58a7ff040e2522d9 upstream.
In debugfs' start_creating(), we pin the file system to safely access
its root. When we failed to create a file, we unpin the file system via
failed_creating() to release the mount count and eventually the reference
of the vfsmount.
However, when we run into an error during lookup_one_len() when still
in start_creating(), we only release the parent's mutex but not so the
reference on the mount. Looks like it was done in the past, but after
splitting portions of __create_file() into start_creating() and
end_creating() via 190afd81e4a5 ("debugfs: split the beginning and the
end of __create_file() off"), this seemed missed. Noticed during code
review.
Fixes: 190afd81e4a5 ("debugfs: split the beginning and the end of __create_file() off")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 34ed9872e745fa56f10e9bef2cf3d2336c6c8816 upstream.
We've observed the nfsd server in a state where there are
multiple delegations on the same nfs4_file for the same client.
The nfs client does attempt to DELEGRETURN these when they are presented to
it - but apparently under some (unknown) circumstances the client does not
manage to return all of them. This leads to the eventual
attempt to CB_RECALL more than one delegation with the same nfs
filehandle to the same client. The first recall will succeed, but the
next recall will fail with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE. This leads to the server
having delegations on cl_revoked that the client has no way to FREE
or DELEGRETURN, with resulting inability to recover. The state manager
on the server will continually assert SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED,
and the state manager on the client will be looping unable to satisfy
the server.
List discussion also reports a race between OPEN and DELEGRETURN that
will be avoided by only sending the delegation once to the
client. This is also logically in accordance with RFC5561 9.1.1 and 10.2.
So, let's:
1.) Not hand out duplicate delegations.
2.) Only send them to the client once.
RFC 5561:
9.1.1:
"Delegations and layouts, on the other hand, are not associated with a
specific owner but are associated with the client as a whole
(identified by a client ID)."
10.2:
"...the stateid for a delegation is associated with a client ID and may be
used on behalf of all the open-owners for the given client. A
delegation is made to the client as a whole and not to any specific
process or thread of control within it."
Reported-by: Eric Meddaugh <etmsys@rit.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 35a92fe8770ce54c5eb275cd76128645bea2d200 upstream.
Andrew was seeing a race occur when an OPEN and OPEN_DOWNGRADE were
running in parallel. The server would receive the OPEN_DOWNGRADE first
and check its seqid, but then an OPEN would race in and bump it. The
OPEN_DOWNGRADE would then complete and bump the seqid again. The result
was that the OPEN_DOWNGRADE would be applied after the OPEN, even though
it should have been rejected since the seqid changed.
The only recourse we have here I think is to serialize operations that
bump the seqid in a stateid, particularly when we're given a seqid in
the call. To address this, we add a new rw_semaphore to the
nfs4_ol_stateid struct. We do a down_write prior to checking the seqid
after looking up the stateid to ensure that nothing else is going to
bump it while we're operating on it.
In the case of OPEN, we do a down_read, as the call doesn't contain a
seqid. Those can run in parallel -- we just need to serialize them when
there is a concurrent OPEN_DOWNGRADE or CLOSE.
LOCK and LOCKU however always take the write lock as there is no
opportunity for parallelizing those.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Andrew W Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4327ba52afd03fc4b5afa0ee1d774c9c5b0e85c5 upstream.
If a EXT4 filesystem utilizes JBD2 journaling and an error occurs, the
journaling will be aborted first and the error number will be recorded
into JBD2 superblock and, finally, the system will enter into the
panic state in "errors=panic" option. But, in the rare case, this
sequence is little twisted like the below figure and it will happen
that the system enters into panic state, which means the system reset
in mobile environment, before completion of recording an error in the
journal superblock. In this case, e2fsck cannot recognize that the
filesystem failure occurred in the previous run and the corruption
wouldn't be fixed.
Task A Task B
ext4_handle_error()
-> jbd2_journal_abort()
-> __journal_abort_soft()
-> __jbd2_journal_abort_hard()
| -> journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT;
|
| __ext4_abort()
| -> jbd2_journal_abort()
| | -> __journal_abort_soft()
| | -> if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT)
| | return;
| -> panic()
|
-> jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno()
Tested-by: Hobin Woo <hobin.woo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong <daeho.jeong@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6934da9238da947628be83635e365df41064b09b upstream.
There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the
case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because
we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in
9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by
storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing
potentially freed handle.
Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 36086d43f6575c081067de9855786a2fc91df77b upstream.
Fix multiple bugs in ext4_encrypted_zeroout(), including one that
could cause us to write an encrypted zero page to the wrong location
on disk, potentially causing data and file system corruption.
Fortunately, this tends to only show up in stress tests, but even with
these fixes, we are seeing some test failures with generic/127 --- but
these are now caused by data failures instead of metadata corruption.
Since ext4_encrypted_zeroout() is only used for some optimizations to
keep the extent tree from being too fragmented, and
ext4_encrypted_zeroout() itself isn't all that optimized from a time
or IOPS perspective, disable the extent tree optimization for
encrypted inodes for now. This prevents the data corruption issues
reported by generic/127 until we can figure out what's going wrong.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 937d7b84dca58f2565715f2c8e52f14c3d65fb22 upstream.
There are times when ext4_bio_write_page() is called even though we
don't actually need to do any I/O. This happens when ext4_writepage()
gets called by the jbd2 commit path when an inode needs to force its
pages written out in order to provide data=ordered guarantees --- and
a page is backed by an unwritten (e.g., uninitialized) block on disk,
or if delayed allocation means the page's backing store hasn't been
allocated yet. In that case, we need to skip the call to
ext4_encrypt_page(), since in addition to wasting CPU, it leads to a
bounce page and an ext4 crypto context getting leaked.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 9dcbeed4d7e11e1dcf5e55475de3754f0855d1c2 upstream.
The calculation of range length in btrfs_sync_file leads to signed
overflow. This was caught by PaX gcc SIZE_OVERFLOW plugin.
https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=4284
The fsync call passes 0 and LLONG_MAX, the range length does not fit to
loff_t and overflows, but the value is converted to u64 so it silently
works as expected.
The minimal fix is a typecast to u64, switching functions to take
(start, end) instead of (start, len) would be more intrusive.
Coccinelle script found that there's one more opencoded calculation of
the length.
<smpl>
@@
loff_t start, end;
@@
* end - start
</smpl>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f1cd1f0b7d1b5d4aaa5711e8f4e4898b0045cb6d upstream.
When listing a inode's xattrs we have a time window where we race against
a concurrent operation for adding a new hard link for our inode that makes
us not return any xattr to user space. In order for this to happen, the
first xattr of our inode needs to be at slot 0 of a leaf and the previous
leaf must still have room for an inode ref (or extref) item, and this can
happen because an inode's listxattrs callback does not lock the inode's
i_mutex (nor does the VFS does it for us), but adding a hard link to an
inode makes the VFS lock the inode's i_mutex before calling the inode's
link callback.
If we have the following leafs:
Leaf X (has N items) Leaf Y
[ ... (257 INODE_ITEM 0) (257 INODE_REF 256) ] [ (257 XATTR_ITEM 12345), ... ]
slot N - 2 slot N - 1 slot 0
The race illustrated by the following sequence diagram is possible:
CPU 1 CPU 2
btrfs_listxattr()
searches for key (257 XATTR_ITEM 0)
gets path with path->nodes[0] == leaf X
and path->slots[0] == N
because path->slots[0] is >=
btrfs_header_nritems(leaf X), it calls
btrfs_next_leaf()
btrfs_next_leaf()
releases the path
adds key (257 INODE_REF 666)
to the end of leaf X (slot N),
and leaf X now has N + 1 items
searches for the key (257 INODE_REF 256),
with path->keep_locks == 1, because that
is the last key it saw in leaf X before
releasing the path
ends up at leaf X again and it verifies
that the key (257 INODE_REF 256) is no
longer the last key in leaf X, so it
returns with path->nodes[0] == leaf X
and path->slots[0] == N, pointing to
the new item with key (257 INODE_REF 666)
btrfs_listxattr's loop iteration sees that
the type of the key pointed by the path is
different from the type BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY
and so it breaks the loop and stops looking
for more xattr items
--> the application doesn't get any xattr
listed for our inode
So fix this by breaking the loop only if the key's type is greater than
BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY and skip the current key if its type is smaller.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 1d512cb77bdbda80f0dd0620a3b260d697fd581d upstream.
If we are using the NO_HOLES feature, we have a tiny time window when
running delalloc for a nodatacow inode where we can race with a concurrent
link or xattr add operation leading to a BUG_ON.
This happens because at run_delalloc_nocow() we end up casting a leaf item
of type BTRFS_INODE_[REF|EXTREF]_KEY or of type BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY to a
file extent item (struct btrfs_file_extent_item) and then analyse its
extent type field, which won't match any of the expected extent types
(values BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_[REG|PREALLOC|INLINE]) and therefore trigger an
explicit BUG_ON(1).
The following sequence diagram shows how the race happens when running a
no-cow dellaloc range [4K, 8K[ for inode 257 and we have the following
neighbour leafs:
Leaf X (has N items) Leaf Y
[ ... (257 INODE_ITEM 0) (257 INODE_REF 256) ] [ (257 EXTENT_DATA 8192), ... ]
slot N - 2 slot N - 1 slot 0
(Note the implicit hole for inode 257 regarding the [0, 8K[ range)
CPU 1 CPU 2
run_dealloc_nocow()
btrfs_lookup_file_extent()
--> searches for a key with value
(257 EXTENT_DATA 4096) in the
fs/subvol tree
--> returns us a path with
path->nodes[0] == leaf X and
path->slots[0] == N
because path->slots[0] is >=
btrfs_header_nritems(leaf X), it
calls btrfs_next_leaf()
btrfs_next_leaf()
--> releases the path
hard link added to our inode,
with key (257 INODE_REF 500)
added to the end of leaf X,
so leaf X now has N + 1 keys
--> searches for the key
(257 INODE_REF 256), because
it was the last key in leaf X
before it released the path,
with path->keep_locks set to 1
--> ends up at leaf X again and
it verifies that the key
(257 INODE_REF 256) is no longer
the last key in the leaf, so it
returns with path->nodes[0] ==
leaf X and path->slots[0] == N,
pointing to the new item with
key (257 INODE_REF 500)
the loop iteration of run_dealloc_nocow()
does not break out the loop and continues
because the key referenced in the path
at path->nodes[0] and path->slots[0] is
for inode 257, its type is < BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY
and its offset (500) is less then our delalloc
range's end (8192)
the item pointed by the path, an inode reference item,
is (incorrectly) interpreted as a file extent item and
we get an invalid extent type, leading to the BUG_ON(1):
if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG ||
extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
(...)
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
(...)
} else {
BUG_ON(1)
}
The same can happen if a xattr is added concurrently and ends up having
a key with an offset smaller then the delalloc's range end.
So fix this by skipping keys with a type smaller than
BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit aeafbf8486c9e2bd53f5cc3c10c0b7fd7149d69c upstream.
While running a stress test I got the following warning triggered:
[191627.672810] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[191627.673949] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 8447 at fs/btrfs/file.c:779 __btrfs_drop_extents+0x391/0xa50 [btrfs]()
(...)
[191627.701485] Call Trace:
[191627.702037] [<ffffffff8145f077>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[191627.702992] [<ffffffff81095de5>] ? console_unlock+0x356/0x3a2
[191627.704091] [<ffffffff8104b3b0>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb
[191627.705380] [<ffffffffa0664499>] ? __btrfs_drop_extents+0x391/0xa50 [btrfs]
[191627.706637] [<ffffffff8104b46d>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x1c
[191627.707789] [<ffffffffa0664499>] __btrfs_drop_extents+0x391/0xa50 [btrfs]
[191627.709155] [<ffffffff8115663c>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after.isra.32+0x171/0x1d0
[191627.712444] [<ffffffff81155007>] ? kmemleak_alloc_recursive.constprop.40+0x16/0x18
[191627.714162] [<ffffffffa06570c9>] insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.40+0x83/0x24e [btrfs]
[191627.715887] [<ffffffffa065422b>] ? start_transaction+0x3bb/0x610 [btrfs]
[191627.717287] [<ffffffffa065b604>] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x273/0x4e2 [btrfs]
[191627.728865] [<ffffffffa065b888>] finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x17 [btrfs]
[191627.730045] [<ffffffffa067d688>] normal_work_helper+0x14c/0x32c [btrfs]
[191627.731256] [<ffffffffa067d96a>] btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x14 [btrfs]
[191627.732661] [<ffffffff81061119>] process_one_work+0x24c/0x4ae
[191627.733822] [<ffffffff810615b0>] worker_thread+0x206/0x2c2
[191627.734857] [<ffffffff810613aa>] ? process_scheduled_works+0x2f/0x2f
[191627.736052] [<ffffffff810613aa>] ? process_scheduled_works+0x2f/0x2f
[191627.737349] [<ffffffff810669a6>] kthread+0xef/0xf7
[191627.738267] [<ffffffff810f3b3a>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28
[191627.739330] [<ffffffff810668b7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0xad/0xad
[191627.741976] [<ffffffff81465592>] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
[191627.743080] [<ffffffff810668b7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0xad/0xad
[191627.744206] ---[ end trace bbfddacb7aaada8d ]---
$ cat -n fs/btrfs/file.c
691 int __btrfs_drop_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
(...)
758 btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, path->slots[0]);
759 if (key.objectid > ino ||
760 key.type > BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY || key.offset >= end)
761 break;
762
763 fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
764 struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
765 extent_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
766
767 if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG ||
768 extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
(...)
774 } else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
(...)
778 } else {
779 WARN_ON(1);
780 extent_end = search_start;
781 }
(...)
This happened because the item we were processing did not match a file
extent item (its key type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY), and even on this
case we cast the item to a struct btrfs_file_extent_item pointer and
then find a type field value that does not match any of the expected
values (BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_[REG|PREALLOC|INLINE]). This scenario happens
due to a tiny time window where a race can happen as exemplified below.
For example, consider the following scenario where we're using the
NO_HOLES feature and we have the following two neighbour leafs:
Leaf X (has N items) Leaf Y
[ ... (257 INODE_ITEM 0) (257 INODE_REF 256) ] [ (257 EXTENT_DATA 8192), ... ]
slot N - 2 slot N - 1 slot 0
Our inode 257 has an implicit hole in the range [0, 8K[ (implicit rather
than explicit because NO_HOLES is enabled). Now if our inode has an
ordered extent for the range [4K, 8K[ that is finishing, the following
can happen:
CPU 1 CPU 2
btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
insert_reserved_file_extent()
__btrfs_drop_extents()
Searches for the key
(257 EXTENT_DATA 4096) through
btrfs_lookup_file_extent()
Key not found and we get a path where
path->nodes[0] == leaf X and
path->slots[0] == N
Because path->slots[0] is >=
btrfs_header_nritems(leaf X), we call
btrfs_next_leaf()
btrfs_next_leaf() releases the path
inserts key
(257 INODE_REF 4096)
at the end of leaf X,
leaf X now has N + 1 keys,
and the new key is at
slot N
btrfs_next_leaf() searches for
key (257 INODE_REF 256), with
path->keep_locks set to 1,
because it was the last key it
saw in leaf X
finds it in leaf X again and
notices it's no longer the last
key of the leaf, so it returns 0
with path->nodes[0] == leaf X and
path->slots[0] == N (which is now
< btrfs_header_nritems(leaf X)),
pointing to the new key
(257 INODE_REF 4096)
__btrfs_drop_extents() casts the
item at path->nodes[0], slot
path->slots[0], to a struct
btrfs_file_extent_item - it does
not skip keys for the target
inode with a type less than
BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY
(BTRFS_INODE_REF_KEY < BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
sees a bogus value for the type
field triggering the WARN_ON in
the trace shown above, and sets
extent_end = search_start (4096)
does the if-then-else logic to
fixup 0 length extent items created
by a past bug from hole punching:
if (extent_end == key.offset &&
extent_end >= search_start)
goto delete_extent_item;
that evaluates to true and it ends
up deleting the key pointed to by
path->slots[0], (257 INODE_REF 4096),
from leaf X
The same could happen for example for a xattr that ends up having a key
with an offset value that matches search_start (very unlikely but not
impossible).
So fix this by ensuring that keys smaller than BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY are
skipped, never casted to struct btrfs_file_extent_item and never deleted
by accident. Also protect against the unexpected case of getting a key
for a lower inode number by skipping that key and issuing a warning.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2c3cf7d5f6105bb957df125dfce61d4483b8742d upstream.
In the kernel 4.2 merge window we had a refactoring/rework of the delayed
references implementation in order to fix certain problems with qgroups.
However that rework introduced one more regression that leads to the
following trace when running delayed references for metadata:
[35908.064664] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:1832!
[35908.065201] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[35908.065201] Modules linked in: dm_flakey dm_mod btrfs crc32c_generic xor raid6_pq nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc loop fuse parport_pc psmouse i2
[35908.065201] CPU: 14 PID: 15014 Comm: kworker/u32:9 Tainted: G W 4.3.0-rc5-btrfs-next-17+ #1
[35908.065201] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20150316_085822-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[35908.065201] Workqueue: btrfs-extent-refs btrfs_extent_refs_helper [btrfs]
[35908.065201] task: ffff880114b7d780 ti: ffff88010c4c8000 task.ti: ffff88010c4c8000
[35908.065201] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa04928b5>] [<ffffffffa04928b5>] insert_inline_extent_backref+0x52/0xb1 [btrfs]
[35908.065201] RSP: 0018:ffff88010c4cbb08 EFLAGS: 00010293
[35908.065201] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88008a661000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[35908.065201] RDX: ffffffffa04dd58f RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[35908.065201] RBP: ffff88010c4cbb40 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffff88010c4cb9f8
[35908.065201] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000002c R12: 0000000000000000
[35908.065201] R13: ffff88020a74c578 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[35908.065201] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88023edc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[35908.065201] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[35908.065201] CR2: 00000000015e8708 CR3: 0000000102185000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[35908.065201] Stack:
[35908.065201] ffff88010c4cbb18 0000000000000f37 ffff88020a74c578 ffff88015a408000
[35908.065201] ffff880154a44000 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 ffff88010c4cbbd8
[35908.065201] ffffffffa0492b9a 0000000000000005 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[35908.065201] Call Trace:
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa0492b9a>] __btrfs_inc_extent_ref+0x8b/0x208 [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa0497117>] ? __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x4d4/0xd33 [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa049773d>] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xafa/0xd33 [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa04a976a>] ? join_transaction.isra.10+0x25/0x41f [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa04a97ed>] ? join_transaction.isra.10+0xa8/0x41f [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa049914d>] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x75/0x1dd [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa04992f1>] delayed_ref_async_start+0x3c/0x7b [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa04d4b4f>] normal_work_helper+0x14c/0x32a [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffffa04d4e93>] btrfs_extent_refs_helper+0x12/0x14 [btrfs]
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff81063b23>] process_one_work+0x24a/0x4ac
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff81064285>] worker_thread+0x206/0x2c2
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff8106407f>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2cb/0x2cb
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff8106407f>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2cb/0x2cb
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff8106904d>] kthread+0xef/0xf7
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff81068f5e>] ? kthread_parkme+0x24/0x24
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff8147d10f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[35908.065201] [<ffffffff81068f5e>] ? kthread_parkme+0x24/0x24
[35908.065201] Code: 6a 01 41 56 41 54 ff 75 10 41 51 4d 89 c1 49 89 c8 48 8d 4d d0 e8 f6 f1 ff ff 48 83 c4 28 85 c0 75 2c 49 81 fc ff 00 00 00 77 02 <0f> 0b 4c 8b 45 30 8b 4d 28 45 31
[35908.065201] RIP [<ffffffffa04928b5>] insert_inline_extent_backref+0x52/0xb1 [btrfs]
[35908.065201] RSP <ffff88010c4cbb08>
[35908.310885] ---[ end trace fe4299baf0666457 ]---
This happens because the new delayed references code no longer merges
delayed references that have different sequence values. The following
steps are an example sequence leading to this issue:
1) Transaction N starts, fs_info->tree_mod_seq has value 0;
2) Extent buffer (btree node) A is allocated, delayed reference Ref1 for
bytenr A is created, with a value of 1 and a seq value of 0;
3) fs_info->tree_mod_seq is incremented to 1;
4) Extent buffer A is deleted through btrfs_del_items(), which calls
btrfs_del_leaf(), which in turn calls btrfs_free_tree_block(). The
later returns the metadata extent associated to extent buffer A to
the free space cache (the range is not pinned), because the extent
buffer was created in the current transaction (N) and writeback never
happened for the extent buffer (flag BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_WRITTEN not set
in the extent buffer).
This creates the delayed reference Ref2 for bytenr A, with a value
of -1 and a seq value of 1;
5) Delayed reference Ref2 is not merged with Ref1 when we create it,
because they have different sequence numbers (decided at
add_delayed_ref_tail_merge());
6) fs_info->tree_mod_seq is incremented to 2;
7) Some task attempts to allocate a new extent buffer (done at
extent-tree.c:find_free_extent()), but due to heavy fragmentation
and running low on metadata space the clustered allocation fails
and we fall back to unclustered allocation, which finds the
extent at offset A, so a new extent buffer at offset A is allocated.
This creates delayed reference Ref3 for bytenr A, with a value of 1
and a seq value of 2;
8) Ref3 is not merged neither with Ref2 nor Ref1, again because they
all have different seq values;
9) We start running the delayed references (__btrfs_run_delayed_refs());
10) The delayed Ref1 is the first one being applied, which ends up
creating an inline extent backref in the extent tree;
10) Next the delayed reference Ref3 is selected for execution, and not
Ref2, because select_delayed_ref() always gives a preference for
positive references (that have an action of BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_REF);
11) When running Ref3 we encounter alreay the inline extent backref
in the extent tree at insert_inline_extent_backref(), which makes
us hit the following BUG_ON:
BUG_ON(owner < BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID);
This is always true because owner corresponds to the level of the
extent buffer/btree node in the btree.
For the scenario described above we hit the BUG_ON because we never merge
references that have different seq values.
We used to do the merging before the 4.2 kernel, more specifically, before
the commmits:
c6fc24549960 ("btrfs: delayed-ref: Use list to replace the ref_root in ref_head.")
c43d160fcd5e ("btrfs: delayed-ref: Cleanup the unneeded functions.")
This issue became more exposed after the following change that was added
to 4.2 as well:
cffc3374e567 ("Btrfs: fix order by which delayed references are run")
Which in turn fixed another regression by the two commits previously
mentioned.
So fix this by bringing back the delayed reference merge code, with the
proper adaptations so that it operates against the new data structure
(linked list vs old red black tree implementation).
This issue was hit running fstest btrfs/063 in a loop. Several people have
reported this issue in the mailing list when running on kernels 4.2+.
Very special thanks to Stéphane Lesimple for helping debugging this issue
and testing this fix on his multi terabyte filesystem (which took more
than one day to balance alone, plus fsck, etc).
Fixes: c6fc24549960 ("btrfs: delayed-ref: Use list to replace the ref_root in ref_head.")
Reported-by: Peter Becker <floyd.net@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Stéphane Lesimple <stephane_btrfs@lesimple.fr>
Tested-by: Stéphane Lesimple <stephane_btrfs@lesimple.fr>
Reported-by: Malte Schröder <malte@tnxip.de>
Reported-by: Derek Dongray <derek@valedon.co.uk>
Reported-by: Erkki Seppala <flux-btrfs@inside.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7 upstream.
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8039d87d9e473aeb740d4fdbd59b9d2f89b2ced9 upstream.
Currently the clone ioctl allows to clone an inline extent from one file
to another that already has other (non-inlined) extents. This is a problem
because btrfs is not designed to deal with files having inline and regular
extents, if a file has an inline extent then it must be the only extent
in the file and must start at file offset 0. Having a file with an inline
extent followed by regular extents results in EIO errors when doing reads
or writes against the first 4K of the file.
Also, the clone ioctl allows one to lose data if the source file consists
of a single inline extent, with a size of N bytes, and the destination
file consists of a single inline extent with a size of M bytes, where we
have M > N. In this case the clone operation removes the inline extent
from the destination file and then copies the inline extent from the
source file into the destination file - we lose the M - N bytes from the
destination file, a read operation will get the value 0x00 for any bytes
in the the range [N, M] (the destination inode's i_size remained as M,
that's why we can read past N bytes).
So fix this by not allowing such destructive operations to happen and
return errno EOPNOTSUPP to user space.
Currently the fstest btrfs/035 tests the data loss case but it totally
ignores this - i.e. expects the operation to succeed and does not check
the we got data loss.
The following test case for fstests exercises all these cases that result
in file corruption and data loss:
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
_require_btrfs_fs_feature "no_holes"
_require_btrfs_mkfs_feature "no-holes"
rm -f $seqres.full
test_cloning_inline_extents()
{
local mkfs_opts=$1
local mount_opts=$2
_scratch_mkfs $mkfs_opts >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount $mount_opts
# File bar, the source for all the following clone operations, consists
# of a single inline extent (50 bytes).
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 50" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar \
| _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning into a file with an extent (non-inlined) where the
# destination offset overlaps that extent. It should not be possible to
# clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0K 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "File foo data after clone operation:"
# All bytes should have the value 0xaa (clone operation failed and did
# not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 0 100" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a hole in its
# first 4K followed by a non-inlined extent. It should not be possible
# as well to clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 4K 12K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "File foo2 data after clone operation:"
# All bytes should have the value 0x00 (clone operation failed and did
# not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xee 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size of zero
# but has a prealloc extent. It should not be possible as well to clone
# the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "First 50 bytes of foo3 after clone operation:"
# Should not be able to read any bytes, file has 0 bytes i_size (the
# clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
# single inline extent that has a size not greater than the size of
# bar's inline extent (40 < 50).
# It should be possible to do the extent cloning from bar to this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x01 0 40" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
echo "File foo4 data after clone operation:"
# Must match file bar's content.
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0x02 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
# single inline extent that has a size greater than the size of bar's
# inline extent (60 > 50).
# It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
# into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x03 0 60" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo5 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 60 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x03
# (the clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
# has a size greater than bar's inline extent (16K > 50).
# It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
# into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo6 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 16K, with all bytes having a value of 0x00 (the
# clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
# has a size not greater than bar's inline extent (30 < 50).
# It should be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar into
# this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 30" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo7 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 50 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0xbb.
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size not
# greater than the size of bar's inline extent (20 < 50) but has
# a prealloc extent that goes beyond the file's size. It should not be
# possible to clone the inline extent from bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x88 0 20" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
echo "File foo8 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 20 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x88
# (the clone operation did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
_scratch_unmount
}
echo -e "\nTesting without compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents
echo -e "\nTesting with compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "" "-o compress"
echo -e "\nTesting without compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" ""
echo -e "\nTesting with compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" "-o compress"
status=0
exit
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit b96b1db039ebc584d03a9933b279e0d3e704c528 upstream.
This fixes a regression introduced by 37b8d27d between v4.1 and v4.2.
When a snapshot is received, its received_uuid is set to the original
uuid of the subvolume. When that snapshot is then resent to a third
filesystem, it's received_uuid is set to the second uuid
instead of the original one. The same was true for the parent_uuid.
This behaviour was partially changed in 37b8d27d, but in that patch
only the parent_uuid was taken from the real original,
not the uuid itself, causing the search for the parent to fail in
the case below.
This happens for example when trying to send a series of linked
snapshots (e.g. created by snapper) from the backup file system back
to the original one.
The following commands reproduce the issue in v4.2.1
(no error in 4.1.6)
# setup three test file systems
for i in 1 2 3; do
truncate -s 50M fs$i
mkfs.btrfs fs$i
mkdir $i
mount fs$i $i
done
echo "content" > 1/testfile
btrfs su snapshot -r 1/ 1/snap1
echo "changed content" > 1/testfile
btrfs su snapshot -r 1/ 1/snap2
# works fine:
btrfs send 1/snap1 | btrfs receive 2/
btrfs send -p 1/snap1 1/snap2 | btrfs receive 2/
# ERROR: could not find parent subvolume
btrfs send 2/snap1 | btrfs receive 3/
btrfs send -p 2/snap1 2/snap2 | btrfs receive 3/
Signed-off-by: Robin Ruede <rruede+git@gmail.com>
Fixes: 37b8d27de5d0 ("Btrfs: use received_uuid of parent during send")
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Tested-by: Ed Tomlinson <edt@aei.ca>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit b2f73922d119686323f14fbbe46587f863852328 upstream.
So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains
the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in)
leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space:
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);
The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if
KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason:
static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
unsigned long wchan;
char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return 0;
seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan);
} else {
seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
}
return 0;
}
This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset
to any local attacker:
fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35)
ffffffff8123b380
Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic:
ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm
and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat:
triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1
open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY) = 6
There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the
absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality
by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked
(whether there's a wchan address).
These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason
user-space would be interested in the absolute address. The
absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we
didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the
decoding itself via the System.map.
So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only
symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan.
( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via
perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. )
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs
Pull overlayfs bug fixes from Miklos Szeredi:
"This contains fixes for bugs that appeared in earlier kernels (all are
marked for -stable)"
* 'overlayfs-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
ovl: free lower_mnt array in ovl_put_super
ovl: free stack of paths in ovl_fill_super
ovl: fix open in stacked overlay
ovl: fix dentry reference leak
ovl: use O_LARGEFILE in ovl_copy_up()
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Pull block layer fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A final set of fixes for 4.3.
It is (again) bigger than I would have liked, but it's all been
through the testing mill and has been carefully reviewed by multiple
parties. Each fix is either a regression fix for this cycle, or is
marked stable. You can scold me at KS. The pull request contains:
- Three simple fixes for NVMe, fixing regressions since 4.3. From
Arnd, Christoph, and Keith.
- A single xen-blkfront fix from Cathy, fixing a NULL dereference if
an error is returned through the staste change callback.
- Fixup for some bad/sloppy code in nbd that got introduced earlier
in this cycle. From Markus Pargmann.
- A blk-mq tagset use-after-free fix from Junichi.
- A backing device lifetime fix from Tejun, fixing a crash.
- And finally, a set of regression/stable fixes for cgroup writeback
from Tejun"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
writeback: remove broken rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe() usage in cgwb_bdi_destroy()
NVMe: Fix memory leak on retried commands
block: don't release bdi while request_queue has live references
nvme: use an integer value to Linux errno values
blk-mq: fix use-after-free in blk_mq_free_tag_set()
nvme: fix 32-bit build warning
writeback: fix incorrect calculation of available memory for memcg domains
writeback: memcg dirty_throttle_control should be initialized with wb->memcg_completions
writeback: bdi_writeback iteration must not skip dying ones
writeback: fix bdi_writeback iteration in wakeup_dirtytime_writeback()
writeback: laptop_mode_timer_fn() needs rcu_read_lock() around bdi_writeback iteration
nbd: Add locking for tasks
xen-blkfront: check for null drvdata in blkback_changed (XenbusStateClosing)
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs
Pull btrfs fixes from Chris Mason:
"I have two more small fixes this week:
Qu's fix avoids unneeded COW during fallocate, and Christian found a
memory leak in the error handling of an earlier fix"
* 'for-linus-4.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs:
btrfs: fix possible leak in btrfs_ioctl_balance()
btrfs: Avoid truncate tailing page if fallocate range doesn't exceed inode size
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dlm_lockres_put will call dlm_lockres_release if it is the last
reference, and then it may call dlm_print_one_lock_resource and
take lockres spinlock.
So unlock lockres spinlock before dlm_lockres_put to avoid deadlock.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
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Commit 8eb934591f8b ("btrfs: check unsupported filters in balance
arguments") adds a jump to exit label out_bargs in case the argument
check fails. At this point in addition to the bargs memory, the
memory for struct btrfs_balance_control has already been allocated.
Ownership of bctl is passed to btrfs_balance() in the good case,
thus the memory is not freed due to the introduced jump. Make sure
that the memory gets freed in any case as necessary. Detected by
Coverity CID 1328378.
Signed-off-by: Christian Engelmayer <cengelma@gmx.at>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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