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[ Upstream commit b05fbcc36be1f8597a1febef4892053a0b2f3f60 ]
With a config having PAGE_SIZE set to 256K, BTRFS build fails
with the following message
include/linux/compiler_types.h:326:38: error: call to
'__compiletime_assert_791' declared with attribute error:
BUILD_BUG_ON failed: (BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED % PAGE_SIZE) != 0
BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED being 128K, BTRFS cannot support platforms with
256K pages at the time being.
There are two platforms that can select 256K pages:
- hexagon
- powerpc
Disable BTRFS when 256K page size is selected. Supporting this would
require changes to the subpage mode that's currently being developed.
Given that 256K is many times larger than page sizes commonly used and
for what the algorithms and structures have been tuned, it's out of
scope and disabling build is a reasonable option.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 04587ad9bef6ce9d510325b4ba9852b6129eebdb ]
If we fail to update the delayed inode we need to abort the transaction,
because we could leave an inode with the improper counts or some other
such corruption behind.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bb385bedded3ccbd794559600de4a09448810f4a ]
If we get an error while looking up the inode item we'll simply bail
without cleaning up the delayed node. This results in this style of
warning happening on commit:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 76403 at fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1365 btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty+0x5b/0x90
CPU: 0 PID: 76403 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc1+ #373
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty+0x5b/0x90
RSP: 0018:ffffb8bb815a7e50 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95d6d07e1888 RCX: ffff95d6c0fa3000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000000000029e91c RDI: ffff95d6c0fc8060
RBP: ffff95d6c0fc8060 R08: 00008d6d701a2c1d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff95d6d1760ea0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff95d6c15a4d00
R13: ffff95d6c0fa3000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffb8bb815a7e90
FS: 00007f490e8dbb80(0000) GS:ffff95d73bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6e75555cb0 CR3: 00000001101ce001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x43c/0xb00
? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
? vfs_fsync_range+0x90/0x90
iterate_supers+0x8c/0x100
ksys_sync+0x50/0x90
__do_sys_sync+0xa/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Because the iref isn't dropped and this leaves an elevated node->count,
so any release just re-queues it onto the delayed inodes list. Fix this
by going to the out label to handle the proper cleanup of the delayed
node.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 80ef08670d4c28a06a3de954bd350368780bcfef upstream.
A request could end up on the fpq->io list after fuse_abort_conn() has
reset fpq->connected and aborted requests on that list:
Thread-1 Thread-2
======== ========
->fuse_simple_request() ->shutdown
->__fuse_request_send()
->queue_request() ->fuse_abort_conn()
->fuse_dev_do_read() ->acquire(fpq->lock)
->wait_for(fpq->lock) ->set err to all req's in fpq->io
->release(fpq->lock)
->acquire(fpq->lock)
->add req to fpq->io
After the userspace copy is done the request will be ended, but
req->out.h.error will remain uninitialized. Also the copy might block
despite being already aborted.
Fix both issues by not allowing the request to be queued on the fpq->io
list after fuse_abort_conn() has processed this list.
Reported-by: Pradeep P V K <pragalla@codeaurora.org>
Fixes: fd22d62ed0c3 ("fuse: no fc->lock for iqueue parts")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cd84bbbac12a173a381a64c6ec8b76a5277b87b5 upstream.
Commit 5d1b1b3f492f ("ext4: fix BUG when calling ext4_error with locked
block group") introduces ext4_grp_locked_error to handle unlocking a
group in error cases. Otherwise, there is a possibility of a sleep while
atomic. However, since 43c73221b3b1 ("ext4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON
in mb_find_extent()"), mb_find_extent() has contained a ext4_error()
call while a group spinlock is held. Replace this with
ext4_grp_locked_error.
Fixes: 43c73221b3b1 ("ext4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON in mb_find_extent()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210623232114.34457-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c89849cc0259f3d33624cc3bd127685c3c0fa25d upstream.
The avefreec should be average free clusters instead
of average free blocks, otherwize Orlov's allocator
will not work properly when bigalloc enabled.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pan Dong <pandong.peter@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525073656.31594-1-pandong.peter@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e5e7010e5444d923e4091cafff61d05f2d19cada upstream.
After converting fs shrinkers to new scan/count API, we are no longer
pass zero nr_to_scan parameter to detect the number of objects to free,
just remove this check.
Fixes: 1ab6c4997e04 ("fs: convert fs shrinkers to new scan/count API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210522103045.690103-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fb7c70a889ead2e91e184895ac6e5354b759135 upstream.
The cache_cnt parameter of tracepoint ext4_es_shrink_exit means the
remaining cache count after shrink, but now it is the cache count before
shrink, fix it by read sbi->s_extent_cache_cnt again.
Fixes: 1ab6c4997e04 ("fs: convert fs shrinkers to new scan/count API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210522103045.690103-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce3aba43599f0b50adbebff133df8d08a3d5fffe upstream.
Initialize eh_generation of struct ext4_extent_header to prevent leaking
info to userspace. Fixes KMSAN kernel-infoleak bug reported by syzbot at:
http://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=78e9ad0e6952a3ca16e8234724b2fa92d041b9b8
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+2dcfeaf8cb49b05e8f1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: a86c61812637 ("[PATCH] ext3: add extent map support")
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam <mail@anirudhrb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506185655.7118-1-mail@anirudhrb.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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transaction handle
commit b9a037b7f3c401d3c63e0423e56aef606b1ffaaf upstream.
In ext4_orphan_cleanup(), if ext4_truncate() failed to get a transaction
handle, it didn't remove the inode from the in-core orphan list, which
may probably trigger below error dump in ext4_destroy_inode() during the
final iput() and could lead to memory corruption on the later orphan
list changes.
EXT4-fs (sda): Inode 6291467 (00000000b8247c67): orphan list check failed!
00000000b8247c67: 0001f30a 00000004 00000000 00000023 ............#...
00000000e24cde71: 00000006 014082a3 00000000 00000000 ......@.........
0000000072c6a5ee: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
...
This patch fix this by cleanup in-core orphan list manually if
ext4_truncate() return error.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507071904.160808-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6819703f5a365c95488b07066a8744841bf14231 upstream.
The defrag loop processes leaves in batches and starting transaction for
each. The whole defragmentation on a given root is protected by a bit
but in case the transaction fails, the bit is not cleared
In case the transaction fails the bit would prevent starting
defragmentation again, so make sure it's cleared.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8ac76cdd1755b21e8c008c28d0b7251c0b14986 upstream.
During an incremental send operation, when processing the new references
for the current inode, we might send an unlink operation for another inode
that has a conflicting path and has more than one hard link. However this
path was computed and cached before we processed previous new references
for the current inode. We may have orphanized a directory of that path
while processing a previous new reference, in which case the path will
be invalid and cause the receiver process to fail.
The following reproducer triggers the problem and explains how/why it
happens in its comments:
$ cat test-send-unlink.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
# Create our test files and directory. Inode 259 (file3) has two hard
# links.
touch $MNT/file1
touch $MNT/file2
touch $MNT/file3
mkdir $MNT/A
ln $MNT/file3 $MNT/A/hard_link
# Filesystem looks like:
#
# . (ino 256)
# |----- file1 (ino 257)
# |----- file2 (ino 258)
# |----- file3 (ino 259)
# |----- A/ (ino 260)
# |---- hard_link (ino 259)
#
# Now create the base snapshot, which is going to be the parent snapshot
# for a later incremental send.
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap1
btrfs send -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT/snap1
# Move inode 257 into directory inode 260. This results in computing the
# path for inode 260 as "/A" and caching it.
mv $MNT/file1 $MNT/A/file1
# Move inode 258 (file2) into directory inode 260, with a name of
# "hard_link", moving first inode 259 away since it currently has that
# location and name.
mv $MNT/A/hard_link $MNT/tmp
mv $MNT/file2 $MNT/A/hard_link
# Now rename inode 260 to something else (B for example) and then create
# a hard link for inode 258 that has the old name and location of inode
# 260 ("/A").
mv $MNT/A $MNT/B
ln $MNT/B/hard_link $MNT/A
# Filesystem now looks like:
#
# . (ino 256)
# |----- tmp (ino 259)
# |----- file3 (ino 259)
# |----- B/ (ino 260)
# | |---- file1 (ino 257)
# | |---- hard_link (ino 258)
# |
# |----- A (ino 258)
# Create another snapshot of our subvolume and use it for an incremental
# send.
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap2
btrfs send -f /tmp/snap2.send -p $MNT/snap1 $MNT/snap2
# Now unmount the filesystem, create a new one, mount it and try to
# apply both send streams to recreate both snapshots.
umount $DEV
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
# First add the first snapshot to the new filesystem by applying the
# first send stream.
btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT
# The incremental receive operation below used to fail with the
# following error:
#
# ERROR: unlink A/hard_link failed: No such file or directory
#
# This is because when send is processing inode 257, it generates the
# path for inode 260 as "/A", since that inode is its parent in the send
# snapshot, and caches that path.
#
# Later when processing inode 258, it first processes its new reference
# that has the path of "/A", which results in orphanizing inode 260
# because there is a a path collision. This results in issuing a rename
# operation from "/A" to "/o260-6-0".
#
# Finally when processing the new reference "B/hard_link" for inode 258,
# it notices that it collides with inode 259 (not yet processed, because
# it has a higher inode number), since that inode has the name
# "hard_link" under the directory inode 260. It also checks that inode
# 259 has two hardlinks, so it decides to issue a unlink operation for
# the name "hard_link" for inode 259. However the path passed to the
# unlink operation is "/A/hard_link", which is incorrect since currently
# "/A" does not exists, due to the orphanization of inode 260 mentioned
# before. The path is incorrect because it was computed and cached
# before the orphanization. This results in the receiver to fail with
# the above error.
btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap2.send $MNT
umount $MNT
When running the test, it fails like this:
$ ./test-send-unlink.sh
Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap1'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap1
Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap2'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap2
At subvol snap1
At snapshot snap2
ERROR: unlink A/hard_link failed: No such file or directory
Fix this by recomputing a path before issuing an unlink operation when
processing the new references for the current inode if we previously
have orphanized a directory.
A test case for fstests will follow soon.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d98e4d95411bbde2220a7afa38dcc9c14d71acbe upstream.
When checking the file name attribute, we want to ensure that it fits
within the bounds of ATTR_RECORD. To do this, we should check that (attr
record + file name offset + file name length) < (attr record + attr record
length).
However, the original check did not include the file name offset in the
calculation. This means that corrupted on-disk metadata might not caught
by the incorrect file name check, and lead to an invalid memory access.
An example can be seen in the crash report of a memory corruption error
found by Syzbot:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a1a1e379b225812688566745c3e2f7242bffc246
Adding the file name offset to the validity check fixes this error and
passes the Syzbot reproducer test.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210614050540.289494-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+213ac8bb98f7f4420840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+213ac8bb98f7f4420840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8fd0c1b0647a6bda4067ee0cd61e8395954b6f28 ]
My local syzbot instance hit memory leak in nilfs2. The problem was in
missing kobject_put() in nilfs_sysfs_delete_device_group().
kobject_del() does not call kobject_cleanup() for passed kobject and it
leads to leaking duped kobject name if kobject_put() was not called.
Fail log:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880596171e0 (size 8):
comm "syz-executor379", pid 8381, jiffies 4294980258 (age 21.100s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
6c 6f 6f 70 30 00 00 00 loop0...
backtrace:
kstrdup+0x36/0x70 mm/util.c:60
kstrdup_const+0x53/0x80 mm/util.c:83
kvasprintf_const+0x108/0x190 lib/kasprintf.c:48
kobject_set_name_vargs+0x56/0x150 lib/kobject.c:289
kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:384 [inline]
kobject_init_and_add+0xc9/0x160 lib/kobject.c:473
nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group+0x150/0x800 fs/nilfs2/sysfs.c:999
init_nilfs+0xe26/0x12b0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:637
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210612140559.20022-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: da7141fb78db ("nilfs2: add /sys/fs/nilfs2/<device> group")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7b745a4e4051e1bbce40e0b1c2cf636c70583aa4 upstream.
new_sb is left uninitialized in case of early failures in kernfs_mount_ns(),
and while IS_ERR(root) is true in all such cases, using IS_ERR(root) || !new_sb
is not a solution - IS_ERR(root) is true in some cases when new_sb is true.
Make sure new_sb is initialized (and matches the reality) in all cases and
fix the condition for dropping kobj reference - we want it done precisely
in those situations where the reference has not been transferred into a new
super_block instance.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 82382acec0c97b91830fff7130d0acce4ac4f3f3 upstream.
make sure that info->node is initialized early, so that kernfs_kill_sb()
can list_del() it safely.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1ab19c5de4c537ec0d9b21020395a5b5a6c059b2 ]
The GLF_LRU flag is checked under lru_lock in gfs2_glock_remove_from_lru() to
remove the glock from the lru list in __gfs2_glock_put().
On the shrink scan path, the same flag is cleared under lru_lock but because
of cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) in gfs2_dispose_glock_lru(), progress on the
put side can be made without deleting the glock from the lru list.
Keep GLF_LRU across the race window opened by cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) to
ensure correct behavior on both sides - clear GLF_LRU after list_del under
lru_lock.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+34ba7ddbf3021981a228@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 94f0b2d4a1d0c52035aef425da5e022bd2cb1c71 upstream.
Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we
started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that
we could then check it for writes.
But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much
stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too. And that in turn
caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to
start when using NetworkManager.
Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures
by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected. The write()
time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure
case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current->mm'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/
Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct")
Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f8849e206ef52b584cd9227255f4724f0cc900bb upstream.
Currently if __nfs4_proc_set_acl fails with NFS4ERR_BADOWNER it
re-enables the idmapper by clearing NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP before
retrying again. The NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP remains cleared even if
the retry fails. This causes problem for subsequent setattr
requests for v4 server that does not have idmapping configured.
This patch modifies nfs4_proc_set_acl to detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skips the retry, since the kernel isn't
involved in encoding the ACEs, and return -EINVAL.
Steps to reproduce the problem:
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# touch /tmp/mnt/file1
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
# nfs4_setfacl -a A::unknown.user@xyz.com:wrtncy /tmp/mnt/file1
Failed setxattr operation: Invalid argument
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
chown: changing ownership of ‘/tmp/mnt/file1’: Invalid argument
# umount /tmp/mnt
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
#
v2: detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skip retry
in nfs4_proc_set_acl.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 476bdb04c501fc64bf3b8464ffddefc8dbe01577 upstream.
KASAN reports a use-after-free when attempting to mount two different
exports through two different NICs that belong to the same server.
Olga was able to hit this with kernels starting somewhere between 5.7
and 5.10, but I traced the patch that introduced the clear_bit() call to
4.13. So something must have changed in the refcounting of the clp
pointer to make this call to nfs_put_client() the very last one.
Fixes: 8dcbec6d20 ("NFSv41: Handle EXCHID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R during NFSv4.1 migration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.13+
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 09226e8303beeec10f2ff844d2e46d1371dc58e0 ]
None of the callers are expecting NULL returns from nfs_get_client() so
this code will lead to an Oops. It's better to return an error
pointer. I expect that this is dead code so hopefully no one is
affected.
Fixes: 31434f496abb ("nfs: check hostname in nfs_get_client")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
commit e7b2ec3d3d4ebeb4cff7ae45cf430182fa6a49fb upstream.
We always return 0 even in case of an error in btrfs_mark_extent_written().
Fix it to return proper error value in case of a failure. All callers
handle it.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.
Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.
This function has the following pattern
while (1) {
ret = whatever();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0
out:
return ret;
However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.
Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the
ret = 0;
out:
bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit b86652be7c83f70bf406bed18ecf55adb9bfb91b upstream.
Error injection stress would sometimes fail with checksums on disk that
did not have a corresponding extent. This occurred because the pattern
in btrfs_del_csums was
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
ret = 0;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
If we got an error from btrfs_search_slot we'd clear the error because
we were breaking instead of goto out. Instead of using goto out, simply
handle the cases where we may leave a random value in ret, and get rid
of the
ret = 0;
out:
pattern and simply allow break to have the proper error reporting. With
this fix we properly abort the transaction and do not commit thinking we
successfully deleted the csum.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.
When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped. That will cause file corruption. Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.
Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.
qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
-O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv
The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.
fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac98fec68 upstream.
We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553] ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975] ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368] ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179] ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995] ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359] generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152] ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556] __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110] ksys_read+0x74/0xf0
This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable). Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 552546366a30d88bd1d6f5efe848b2ab50fd57e5 upstream.
A new clang diagnostic (-Wsizeof-array-div) warns about the calculation
to determine the number of u32's in an array of unsigned longs.
Suppress warning by adding parentheses.
While looking at the above issue, noticed that the 'address' parameter
to hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash is no longer used. So, remove it from the
definition and all callers.
No functional change.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190919011847.18400-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Ilie Halip <ilie.halip@gmail.com>
Cc: David Bolvansky <david.bolvansky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c0d46717b95735b0eacfddbcca9df37a49de9c7a ]
See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.4, file ids in compounded requests should be set to
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (we were treating it as u32 not u64 and setting
it incorrectly).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 91df99a6eb50d5a1bc70fff4a09a0b7ae6aab96d ]
While doing error injection testing I got the following panic
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:1862!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 7836 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ #305
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:link_to_fixup_dir+0xd5/0xe0
RSP: 0018:ffffb5800180fa30 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00000000fffffffb RCX: ffff8f595287faf0
RDX: ffffb5800180fa37 RSI: ffff8f5954978800 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff8f5953af9450 R08: 0000000000000019 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 000151f408682970 R11: 0000000120021001 R12: ffff8f5954978800
R13: ffff8f595287faf0 R14: ffff8f5953c77dd0 R15: 0000000000000065
FS: 00007fc5284c8c40(0000) GS:ffff8f59bbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc5287f47c0 CR3: 000000011275e002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
Call Trace:
replay_one_buffer+0x409/0x470
? btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0xd0/0x110
walk_up_log_tree+0x157/0x1e0
walk_log_tree+0xa6/0x1d0
btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1da/0x360
? replay_one_extent+0x7b0/0x7b0
open_ctree+0x1486/0x1720
btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x12f/0x240
legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40
vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0
vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x4d/0x90
legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40
vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0
path_mount+0x433/0xa10
__x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
We can get -EIO or any number of legitimate errors from
btrfs_search_slot(), panicing here is not the appropriate response. The
error path for this code handles errors properly, simply return the
error.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e67afa7ee4a59584d7253e45d7f63b9528819a13 upstream.
Since commit bdcc2cd14e4e ("NFSv4.2: handle NFS-specific llseek errors"),
nfs42_proc_llseek would return -EOPNOTSUPP rather than -ENOTSUPP when
SEEK_DATA on NFSv4.0/v4.1.
This will lead xfstests generic/285 not run on NFSv4.0/v4.1 when set the
CONFIG_NFS_V4_2, rather than run failed.
Fixes: bdcc2cd14e4e ("NFSv4.2: handle NFS-specific llseek errors")
Cc: <stable.vger.kernel.org> # 4.2
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d0ea309357dea0d85a82815f02157eb7fcda39f upstream.
The value of mirror->pg_bytes_written should only be updated after a
successful attempt to flush out the requests on the list.
Fixes: a7d42ddb3099 ("nfs: add mirroring support to pgio layer")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 769b01ea68b6c49dc3cde6adf7e53927dacbd3a8 upstream.
The "sizeof(struct nfs_fh)" is two bytes too large and could lead to
memory corruption. It should be NFS_MAXFHSIZE because that's the size
of the ->data[] buffer.
I reversed the size of the arguments to put the variable on the left.
Fixes: 16b374ca439f ("NFSv4.1: pnfs: filelayout: add driver's LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream.
Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a421d218603ffa822a0b8045055c03eae394a7eb upstream.
Commit de144ff4234f changes _pnfs_return_layout() to call
pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return() passing NULL as the struct
pnfs_layout_range argument. Unfortunately,
pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return() doesn't check if we have a value here
before dereferencing it, causing an oops.
I'm able to hit this crash consistently when running connectathon basic
tests on NFS v4.1/v4.2 against Ontap.
Fixes: de144ff4234f ("NFSv4: Don't discard segments marked for return in _pnfs_return_layout()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e1436df2f2550bc89d832ffd456373fdf5d5b5d7 upstream.
This reverts commit 2c2a7552dd6465e8fde6bc9cccf8d66ed1c1eb72.
Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.
Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted. It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.
The original commit log for this change was incorrect, no "error
handling code" was added, things will blow up just as badly as before if
any of these cases ever were true. As this BUG_ON() never fired, and
most of these checks are "obviously" never going to be true, let's just
revert to the original code for now until this gets unwound to be done
correctly in the future.
Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Fixes: 2c2a7552dd64 ("ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-49-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d201d7631ca170b038e7f8921120d05eec70d7c5 upstream.
When using smb2_copychunk_range() for large ranges we will
run through several iterations of a loop calling SMB2_ioctl()
but never actually free the returned buffer except for the final
iteration.
This leads to memory leaks everytime a large copychunk is requested.
Fixes: 9bf0c9cd4314 ("CIFS: Fix SMB2/SMB3 Copy offload support (refcopy) for large files")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit cf7b39a0cbf6bf57aa07a008d46cf695add05b4c ]
We get a bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404
lib/iov_iter.c:1139
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d3fb11f8 by task
CPU: 0 PID: 12582 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted
5.10.0-00843-g352c8610ccd2 #2
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132
show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
__asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252
iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404 lib/iov_iter.c:1139
io_read fs/io_uring.c:3421 [inline]
io_issue_sqe+0x2344/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
__io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
__do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
__se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
__arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670
Allocated by task 12570:
stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461
kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475
__kmalloc+0x23c/0x334 mm/slub.c:3970
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:557 [inline]
__io_alloc_async_data+0x68/0x9c fs/io_uring.c:3210
io_setup_async_rw fs/io_uring.c:3229 [inline]
io_read fs/io_uring.c:3436 [inline]
io_issue_sqe+0x2954/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
__io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
__do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
__se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
__arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670
Freed by task 12570:
stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
__kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline]
kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124
io_dismantle_req fs/io_uring.c:1855 [inline]
__io_free_req+0x70/0x254 fs/io_uring.c:1867
io_put_req_find_next fs/io_uring.c:2173 [inline]
__io_queue_sqe+0x1fc/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6279
__io_req_task_submit+0x154/0x21c fs/io_uring.c:2051
io_req_task_submit+0x2c/0x44 fs/io_uring.c:2063
task_work_run+0xdc/0x128 kernel/task_work.c:151
get_signal+0x6f8/0x980 kernel/signal.c:2562
do_signal+0x108/0x3a4 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:658
do_notify_resume+0xbc/0x25c arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:722
work_pending+0xc/0x180
blkdev_read_iter can truncate iov_iter's count since the count + pos may
exceed the size of the blkdev. This will confuse io_read that we have
consume the iovec. And once we do the iov_iter_revert in io_read, we
will trigger the slab-out-of-bounds. Fix it by reexpand the count with
size has been truncated.
blkdev_write_iter can trigger the problem too.
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silencec@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401071807.3328235-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10a7052c7868bc7bc72d947f5aac6f768928db87 ]
Ensure that we invalidate the fscache whenever we invalidate the
pagecache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d6e621de1fceb3b098ebf435ef7ea91ec4838a1a upstream.
Sysbot has reported a "divide error" which has been identified as being
caused by a corrupted file_size value within the file inode. This value
has been corrupted to a much larger value than expected.
Calculate_skip() is passed i_size_read(inode) >> msblk->block_log. Due to
the file_size value corruption this overflows the int argument/variable in
that function, leading to the divide error.
This patch changes the function to use u64. This will accommodate any
unexpectedly large values due to corruption.
The value returned from calculate_skip() is clamped to be never more than
SQUASHFS_CACHED_BLKS - 1, or 7. So file_size corruption does not lead to
an unexpectedly large return result here.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210507152618.9447-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: <syzbot+e8f781243ce16ac2f962@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+7b98870d4fec9447b951@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 73f5c88f521a630ea1628beb9c2d48a2e777a419 ]
Currently the client ignores the value of the sr_eof of the SEEK
operation. According to the spec, if the server didn't find the
requested extent and reached the end of the file, the server
would return sr_eof=true. In case the request for DATA and no
data was found (ie in the middle of the hole), then the lseek
expects that ENXIO would be returned.
Fixes: 1c6dcbe5ceff8 ("NFS: Implement SEEK")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925 ]
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <nlivic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9fdbfad1777cb4638f489eeb62d85432010c0031 ]
We need to use unsigned long subtraction and then convert to signed in
order to deal correcly with C overflow rules.
Fixes: f5062003465c ("NFS: Set an attribute barrier on all updates")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 99f23783224355e7022ceea9b8d9f62c0fd01bd8 ]
Whether we're allocating or delallocating space, we should flush out the
pending writes in order to avoid races with attribute updates.
Fixes: 1e564d3dbd68 ("NFSv4.2: Fix a race in nfs42_proc_deallocate()")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 28e18ee636ba28532dbe425540af06245a0bbecb ]
The uninitialized variable dn.node_changed does not get set when a
call to f2fs_get_node_page fails. This uninitialized value gets used
in the call to f2fs_balance_fs() that may or not may not balances
dirty node and dentry pages depending on the uninitialized state of
the variable. Fix this by only calling f2fs_balance_fs if err is
not set.
Thanks to Jaegeuk Kim for suggesting an appropriate fix.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Fixes: 2a3407607028 ("f2fs: call f2fs_balance_fs only when node was changed")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8217673d07256b22881127bf50dce874d0e51653 ]
For cloned connections cuse_channel_release() will be called more than
once, resulting in use after free.
Prevent device cloning for CUSE, which does not make sense at this point,
and highly unlikely to be used in real life.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 92c48950b43f4a767388cf87709d8687151a641f ]
This patch fixes the following message which randomly pops up during
glocktop call:
seq_file: buggy .next function table_seq_next did not update position index
The issue is that seq_read_iter() in fs/seq_file.c also needs an
increment of the index in an non next record case as well which this
patch fixes otherwise seq_read_iter() will print out the above message.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f88f1466e2a2e5ca17dfada436d3efa1b03a3972 upstream.
We should set the error code when ext4_commit_super check argument failed.
Found in code review.
Fixes: c4be0c1dc4cdc ("filesystem freeze: add error handling of write_super_lockfs/unlockfs").
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fengnan Chang <changfengnan@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210402101631.561-1-changfengnan@vivo.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a149d2a5cabbf6507a7832a1c4fd2593c55fd450 upstream.
Commit <50122847007> ("ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved
inodes") check the block group zero and prevent initializing reserved
inodes. But in some special cases, the reserved inode may not all belong
to the group zero, it may exist into the second group if we format
filesystem below.
mkfs.ext4 -b 4096 -g 8192 -N 1024 -I 4096 /dev/sda
So, it will end up triggering a false positive report of a corrupted
file system. This patch fix it by avoid check reserved inodes if no free
inode blocks will be zeroed.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 50122847007 ("ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210331121516.2243099-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 90ada91f4610c5ef11bc52576516d96c496fc3f1 upstream.
KASAN reports a BUG when download file in jffs2 filesystem.It is
because when dstlen == 1, cpage_out will write array out of bounds.
Actually, data will not be compressed in jffs2_zlib_compress() if
data's length less than 4.
[ 393.799778] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0 at addr ffff800062e3b281
[ 393.809166] Write of size 1 by task tftp/2918
[ 393.813526] CPU: 3 PID: 2918 Comm: tftp Tainted: G B 4.9.115-rt93-EMBSYS-CGEL-6.1.R6-dirty #1
[ 393.823173] Hardware name: LS1043A RDB Board (DT)
[ 393.827870] Call trace:
[ 393.830322] [<ffff20000808c700>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f0
[ 393.835721] [<ffff20000808ca04>] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[ 393.840774] [<ffff2000086ef700>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0
[ 393.845829] [<ffff20000827b19c>] kasan_object_err+0x24/0x80
[ 393.851402] [<ffff20000827b404>] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4d8
[ 393.857323] [<ffff20000827bae8>] kasan_report+0x38/0x40
[ 393.862548] [<ffff200008279d44>] __asan_store1+0x4c/0x58
[ 393.867859] [<ffff2000084ce2ec>] jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0
[ 393.873955] [<ffff2000084bb3b0>] jffs2_selected_compress+0x178/0x2a0
[ 393.880308] [<ffff2000084bb530>] jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478
[ 393.885796] [<ffff2000084c5b34>] jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450
[ 393.892150] [<ffff2000084be0b8>] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[ 393.897811] [<ffff2000081f3008>] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[ 393.903990] [<ffff2000081f5074>] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[ 393.910517] [<ffff2000081f5210>] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[ 393.916870] [<ffff20000829ec1c>] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[ 393.922181] [<ffff20000829ff00>] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[ 393.927232] [<ffff2000082a1ba8>] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[ 393.932283] [<ffff20000808429c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[ 393.937851] Object at ffff800062e3b280, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
[ 393.944197] Allocated:
[ 393.946552] PID = 2918
[ 393.948913] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220
[ 393.953096] save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
[ 393.956932] kasan_kmalloc+0xd8/0x188
[ 393.960594] __kmalloc+0x144/0x238
[ 393.963994] jffs2_selected_compress+0x48/0x2a0
[ 393.968524] jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478
[ 393.972273] jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450
[ 393.976889] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[ 393.980810] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[ 393.985251] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[ 393.990040] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[ 393.994655] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[ 393.998228] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[ 394.001543] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[ 394.004856] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[ 394.008684] Freed:
[ 394.010691] PID = 2918
[ 394.013051] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220
[ 394.017233] save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
[ 394.021069] kasan_slab_free+0x88/0x188
[ 394.024902] kfree+0x6c/0x1d8
[ 394.027868] jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0x2c4/0x880
[ 394.032486] jffs2_do_reserve_space+0x198/0x598
[ 394.037016] jffs2_reserve_space+0x3f8/0x4d8
[ 394.041286] jffs2_write_inode_range+0xf0/0x450
[ 394.045816] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[ 394.049737] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[ 394.054179] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[ 394.058968] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[ 394.063583] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[ 394.067157] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[ 394.070470] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[ 394.073783] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[ 394.077612] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 394.082404] ffff800062e3b180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 394.089623] ffff800062e3b200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 394.096842] >ffff800062e3b280: 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 394.104056] ^
[ 394.107283] ffff800062e3b300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 394.114502] ffff800062e3b380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 394.121718] ==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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