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2016-02-10tpm: fix checks for policy digest existence in tpm2_seal_trusted()Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue. Fixes: 5beb0c435bdd ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-26Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris1-0/+24
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
2015-12-20keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policyJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+4
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use authorization policies to seal trusted keys. Two following new options have been added for trusted keys: * 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing. * 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing. If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this will result an error because the state of the option would become mixed. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-20keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chipsJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+1
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support TPM_ALG_SM3_256: * hash_algo_name * hash_digest_size Includes support for the following hash algorithms: * sha1 * sha256 * sha384 * sha512 * sm3-256 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-15IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyringsPetko Manolov1-0/+24
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-10-21KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells3-1/+24
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-19tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing trusted keys. This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for TPM 2.0: * Seal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value. * Unseal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-19keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.hJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+12
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-08-12PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content typeDavid Howells1-1/+3
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-07MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signingDavid Howells1-0/+5
Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
2014-10-06KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keysDmitry Kasatkin1-0/+3
Bring back the functionality whereby an asymmetric key can be matched with a partial match on one of its IDs. Whilst we're at it, allow for the possibility of having an increased number of IDs. Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handlingDavid Howells1-0/+38
Implement the first step in using binary key IDs for asymmetric keys rather than hex string keys. The previously added match data preparsing will be able to convert hex criterion strings into binary which can then be compared more rapidly. Further, we actually want more then one ID string per public key. The problem is that X.509 certs refer to other X.509 certs by matching Issuer + AuthKeyId to Subject + SubjKeyId, but PKCS#7 messages match against X.509 Issuer + SerialNumber. This patch just provides facilities for a later patch to make use of. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparseDavid Howells1-3/+0
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm. Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse to override it as needed. The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the user_match() function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Preparse match dataDavid Howells1-1/+3
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages: (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front. (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs). (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type. (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-23Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-nextDavid Howells1-1/+9
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-23KEYS: big_key: Use key preparsingDavid Howells1-1/+2
Make use of key preparsing in the big key type so that quota size determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
2014-07-23KEYS: user: Use key preparsingDavid Howells1-1/+2
Make use of key preparsing in user-defined and logon keys so that quota size determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added. Also the idmapper key types need to change to match as they use the user-defined key type routines. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
2014-07-17KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' keyMimi Zohar1-1/+9
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Changelog v6: - on error free key - Dmitry - validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry - formatting cleanup Changelog: - define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
2013-09-25KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signingDavid Howells1-0/+23
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it can be used by code other than the module-signing code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfsDavid Howells1-0/+25
Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus swapspace when memory is tight. This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
2013-09-24KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyringDavid Howells1-15/+2
Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using the previously added associative array implementation. Currently the maximum capacity is: (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *) which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500. However, since this is being used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that. The new implementation gives us effectively unlimited capacity. With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion after this patch is applied. The alterations are because (a) keyrings that are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have changed a bit. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-08KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsersDavid Howells1-0/+37
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format the data. The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful when dealing with, say, eCryptfs. Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of the hardware. From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example, an X.509 binary certificate: keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem or a PGP key: keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub or a pointer into the contents of the TPM: keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get to: (1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL. (2) Specify the key subtype. (3) Provide the data for the subtype. The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-08KEYS: Implement asymmetric key typeDavid Howells2-0/+80
Create a key type that can be used to represent an asymmetric key type for use in appropriate cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption, signature generation and signature verification. The key type is "asymmetric" and can provide access to a variety of cryptographic algorithms. Possibly, this would be better as "public_key" - but that has the disadvantage that "public key" is an overloaded term. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-08KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or updateDavid Howells1-2/+4
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-05-11KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring listDavid Howells1-1/+1
Make use of the previous patch that makes the garbage collector perform RCU synchronisation before destroying defunct keys. Key pointers can now be replaced in-place without creating a new keyring payload and replacing the whole thing as the discarded keys will not be destroyed until all currently held RCU read locks are released. If the keyring payload space needs to be expanded or contracted, then a replacement will still need allocating, and the original will still have to be freed by RCU. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-01-18keys: add a "logon" key typeJeff Layton1-1/+2
For CIFS, we want to be able to store NTLM credentials (aka username and password) in the keyring. We do not, however want to allow users to fetch those keys back out of the keyring since that would be a security risk. Unfortunately, due to the nuances of key permission bits, it's not possible to do this. We need to grant search permissions so the kernel can find these keys, but that also implies permissions to read the payload. Resolve this by adding a new key_type. This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but does not define a .read op. This prevents the payload from ever being visible from userspace. This key type also vets the description to ensure that it's "qualified" by checking to ensure that it has a ':' in it that is preceded by other characters. Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-06-27encrypted-keys: add key format supportRoberto Sassu1-2/+11
This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2011-03-29libceph: Create a new key type "ceph".Tommi Virtanen1-0/+8
This allows us to use existence of the key type as a feature test, from userspace. Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2011-03-03RxRPC: Fix v1 keysAnton Blanchard1-1/+0
commit 339412841d7 (RxRPC: Allow key payloads to be passed in XDR form) broke klog for me. I notice the v1 key struct had a kif_version field added: -struct rxkad_key { - u16 security_index; /* RxRPC header security index */ - u16 ticket_len; /* length of ticket[] */ - u32 expiry; /* time at which expires */ - u32 kvno; /* key version number */ - u8 session_key[8]; /* DES session key */ - u8 ticket[0]; /* the encrypted ticket */ -}; +struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 { + u32 kif_version; /* 1 */ + u16 security_index; + u16 ticket_length; + u32 expiry; /* time_t */ + u32 kvno; + u8 session_key[8]; + u8 ticket[0]; +}; However the code in rxrpc_instantiate strips it away: data += sizeof(kver); datalen -= sizeof(kver); Removing kif_version fixes my problem. Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-11-29keys: add new key-type encryptedMimi Zohar1-0/+29
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted' symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel. Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. Changelog: - bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore (reported by David Howells) - Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output - Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with one based on string constants. - Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells) - Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells) Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int' (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long) - Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells) - allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key (fixed by Roberto Sassu) - wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered - cleanup security/Kconfig - Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu) - Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure, remove unnecessary tests. - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-11-29keys: add new trusted key-typeMimi Zohar1-0/+31
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs. Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been added to support additional usages. The new options are: migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.) pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value, so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed again until after a reboot. keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle. keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth. blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth. Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be investigated for a possible future extension. Changelog: - Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h (David Howell's suggestion.) - trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate. - moved to late_initcall - updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells) - reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes - moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells) - all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells - Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe) - New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on discussions with Jason Gunthorpe) - Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn) Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-05DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver codeWang Lei1-0/+23
Separate out the DNS resolver key type from the CIFS filesystem into its own module so that it can be made available for general use, including the AFS filesystem module. This facility makes it possible for the kernel to upcall to userspace to have it issue DNS requests, package up the replies and present them to the kernel in a useful form. The kernel is then able to cache the DNS replies as keys can be retained in keyrings. Resolver keys are of type "dns_resolver" and have a case-insensitive description that is of the form "[<type>:]<domain_name>". The optional <type> indicates the particular DNS lookup and packaging that's required. The <domain_name> is the query to be made. If <type> isn't given, a basic hostname to IP address lookup is made, and the result is stored in the key in the form of a printable string consisting of a comma-separated list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. This key type is supported by userspace helpers driven from /sbin/request-key and configured through /etc/request-key.conf. The cifs.upcall utility is invoked for UNC path server name to IP address resolution. The CIFS functionality is encapsulated by the dns_resolve_unc_to_ip() function, which is used to resolve a UNC path to an IP address for CIFS filesystem. This part remains in the CIFS module for now. See the added Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt for more information. Signed-off-by: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2009-09-16RxRPC: Use uX/sX rather than uintX_t/intX_t typesDavid Howells1-10/+10
Use uX rather than uintX_t types for consistency. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-09-15RxRPC: Parse security index 5 keys (Kerberos 5)David Howells1-0/+52
Parse RxRPC security index 5 type keys (Kerberos 5 tokens). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-09-15RxRPC: Allow key payloads to be passed in XDR formDavid Howells1-0/+55
Allow add_key() and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE to accept key payloads in XDR form as described by openafs-1.4.10/src/auth/afs_token.xg. This provides a way of passing kaserver, Kerberos 4, Kerberos 5 and GSSAPI keys from userspace, and allows for future expansion. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-11-14KEYS: Disperse linux/key_ui.hDavid Howells1-0/+31
Disperse the bits of linux/key_ui.h as the reason they were put here (keyfs) didn't get in. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-22KEYS: Fix the comment to match the file name in rxrpc-type.h.Robert P. J. Day1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
2007-10-17KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronousDavid Howells1-0/+2
Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous to make it easier for NFS to make use of them. There are now accessor functions that do asynchronous constructions, a wait function to wait for construction to complete, and a completion function for the key type to indicate completion of construction. Note that the construction queue is now gone. Instead, keys under construction are linked in to the appropriate keyring in advance, and that anyone encountering one must wait for it to be complete before they can use it. This is done automatically for userspace. The following auxiliary changes are also made: (1) Key type implementation stuff is split from linux/key.h into linux/key-type.h. (2) AF_RXRPC provides a way to allocate null rxrpc-type keys so that AFS does not need to call key_instantiate_and_link() directly. (3) Adjust the debugging macros so that they're -Wformat checked even if they are disabled, and make it so they can be enabled simply by defining __KDEBUG to be consistent with other code of mine. (3) Documentation. [alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk: keys: missing word in documentation] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-04-27[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel bothDavid Howells1-0/+22
Provide AF_RXRPC sockets that can be used to talk to AFS servers, or serve answers to AFS clients. KerberosIV security is fully supported. The patches and some example test programs can be found in: http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/rxrpc/ This will eventually replace the old implementation of kernel-only RxRPC currently resident in net/rxrpc/. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: discard the contents of a key on revocationDavid Howells1-0/+1
Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked. This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than waiting for the key to actually be destroyed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-06[PATCH] Keys: Remove key duplicationDavid Howells1-1/+0
Remove the key duplication stuff since there's nothing that uses it, no way to get at it and it's awkward to deal with for LSM purposes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-31[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operationsDavid Howells1-0/+47
Export user-defined key operations so that those who wish to define their own key type based on the user-defined key operations may do so (as has been requested). The header file created has been placed into include/keys/user-type.h, thus creating a directory where other key types may also be placed. Any objections to doing this? Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>