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path: root/include/linux/dm-verity-loadpin.h
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2022-07-08dm: verity-loadpin: Use CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY for conditional ↵Matthias Kaehlcke1-1/+1
compilation The verity glue for LoadPin is only needed when CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY is set, use this option for conditional compilation instead of the combo of CONFIG_DM_VERITY and CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN. Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220627083512.v7.3.I5aca2dcc3b06de4bf53696cd21329dce8272b8aa@changeid Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-07-08dm: Add verity helpers for LoadPinMatthias Kaehlcke1-0/+27
LoadPin limits loading of kernel modules, firmware and certain other files to a 'pinned' file system (typically a read-only rootfs). To provide more flexibility LoadPin is being extended to also allow loading these files from trusted dm-verity devices. For that purpose LoadPin can be provided with a list of verity root digests that it should consider as trusted. Add a bunch of helpers to allow LoadPin to check whether a DM device is a trusted verity device. The new functions broadly fall in two categories: those that need access to verity internals (like the root digest), and the 'glue' between LoadPin and verity. The new file dm-verity-loadpin.c contains the glue functions. Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220627083512.v7.1.I3e928575a23481121e73286874c4c2bdb403355d@changeid Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>