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Instead of blindly creating the EFI random seed configuration table if
the RNG protocol is implemented and works, check whether such a EFI
configuration table was provided by an earlier boot stage and if so,
concatenate the existing and the new seeds, leaving it up to the core
code to mix it in and credit it the way it sees fit.
This can be used for, e.g., systemd-boot, to pass an additional seed to
Linux in a way that can be consumed by the kernel very early. In that
case, the following definitions should be used to pass the seed to the
EFI stub:
struct linux_efi_random_seed {
u32 size; // of the 'seed' array in bytes
u8 seed[];
};
The memory for the struct must be allocated as EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY
pool memory, and the address of the struct in memory should be installed
as a EFI configuration table using the following GUID:
LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID 1ce1e5bc-7ceb-42f2-81e5-8aadf180f57b
Note that doing so is safe even on kernels that were built without this
patch applied, but the seed will simply be overwritten with a seed
derived from the EFI RNG protocol, if available. The recommended seed
size is 32 bytes, and seeds larger than 512 bytes are considered
corrupted and ignored entirely.
In order to preserve forward secrecy, seeds from previous bootloaders
are memzero'd out, and in order to preserve memory, those older seeds
are also freed from memory. Freeing from memory without first memzeroing
is not safe to do, as it's possible that nothing else will ever
overwrite those pages used by EFI.
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
[ardb: incorporate Jason's followup changes to extend the maximum seed
size on the consumer end, memzero() it and drop a needless printk]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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The EFI runtime map code is only wired up on x86, which is the only
architecture that has a need for it in its implementation of kexec.
So let's move this code under arch/x86 and drop all references to it
from generic code. To ensure that the efi_runtime_map_init() is invoked
at the appropriate time use a 'sync' subsys_initcall() that will be
called right after the EFI initcall made from generic code where the
original invocation of efi_runtime_map_init() resided.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
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The EFI memory map is a description of the memory layout as provided by
the firmware, and only x86 manipulates it in various different ways for
its own memory bookkeeping. So let's move the memmap routines that are
only used by x86 into the x86 arch tree.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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The EFI fake memmap support is specific to x86, which manipulates the
EFI memory map in various different ways after receiving it from the EFI
stub. On other architectures, we have managed to push back on this, and
the EFI memory map is kept pristine.
So let's move the fake memmap code into the x86 arch tree, where it
arguably belongs.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Currently, the initrd= command line option to the EFI stub only supports
loading files that reside on the same volume as the loaded image, which
is not workable for loaders like GRUB that don't even implement the
volume abstraction (EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL), and load the
kernel from an anonymous buffer in memory. For this reason, another
method was devised that relies on the LoadFile2 protocol.
However, the command line loader is rather useful when using the UEFI
shell or other generic loaders that have no awareness of Linux specific
protocols so let's make it a bit more flexible, by permitting textual
device paths to be provided to initrd= as well, provided that they refer
to a file hosted on a EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL volume. E.g.,
initrd=PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xBE1AFDFA,0x3F,0xFBFC1)/rootfs.cpio.gz
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Ampere Altra machines are reported to misbehave when the SetTime() EFI
runtime service is called after ExitBootServices() but before calling
SetVirtualAddressMap(). Given that the latter is horrid, pointless and
explicitly documented as optional by the EFI spec, we no longer invoke
it at boot if the configured size of the VA space guarantees that the
EFI runtime memory regions can remain mapped 1:1 like they are at boot
time.
On Ampere Altra machines, this results in SetTime() calls issued by the
rtc-efi driver triggering synchronous exceptions during boot. We can
now recover from those without bringing down the system entirely, due to
commit 23715a26c8d81291 ("arm64: efi: Recover from synchronous
exceptions occurring in firmware"). However, it would be better to avoid
the issue entirely, given that the firmware appears to remain in a funny
state after this.
So attempt to identify these machines based on the 'family' field in the
type #1 SMBIOS record, and call SetVirtualAddressMap() unconditionally
in that case.
Tested-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Even though our EFI zboot decompressor is pedantically spec compliant
and idiomatic for EFI image loaders, calling LoadImage() and
StartImage() for the nested image is a bit of a burden. Not only does it
create workflow issues for the distros (as both the inner and outer
PE/COFF images need to be signed for secure boot), it also copies the
image around in memory numerous times:
- first, the image is decompressed into a buffer;
- the buffer is consumed by LoadImage(), which copies the sections into
a newly allocated memory region to hold the executable image;
- once the EFI stub is invoked by StartImage(), it will also move the
image in memory in case of KASLR, mirrored memory or if the image must
execute from a certain a priori defined address.
There are only two EFI spec compliant ways to load code into memory and
execute it:
- use LoadImage() and StartImage(),
- call ExitBootServices() and take ownership of the entire system, after
which anything goes.
Given that the EFI zboot decompressor always invokes the EFI stub, and
given that both are built from the same set of objects, let's merge the
two, so that we can avoid LoadImage()/StartImage but still load our
image into memory without breaking the above rules.
This also means we can decompress the image directly into its final
location, which could be randomized or meet other platform specific
constraints that LoadImage() does not know how to adhere to. It also
means that, even if the encapsulated image still has the EFI stub
incorporated as well, it does not need to be signed for secure boot when
wrapping it in the EFI zboot decompressor.
In the future, we might decide to retire the EFI stub attached to the
decompressed image, but for the time being, they can happily coexist.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Currently, arm64, RISC-V and LoongArch rely on the fact that struct
screen_info can be accessed directly, due to the fact that the EFI stub
and the core kernel are part of the same image. This will change after a
future patch, so let's ensure that the screen_info handling is able to
deal with this, by adopting the arm32 approach of passing it as a
configuration table. While at it, switch to ACPI reclaim memory to hold
the screen_info data, which is more appropriate for this kind of
allocation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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We no longer need at least 64 bytes of random seed to permit the early
crng init to complete. The RNG is now based on Blake2s, so reduce the
EFI seed size to the Blake2s hash size, which is sufficient for our
purposes.
While at it, drop the READ_ONCE(), which was supposed to prevent size
from being evaluated after seed was unmapped. However, this cannot
actually happen, so READ_ONCE() is unnecessary here.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
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Commit bbc6d2c6ef22 ("efi: vars: Switch to new wrapper layer")
refactored the efivars layer so that the 'business logic' related to
which UEFI variables affect the boot flow in which way could be moved
out of it, and into the efivarfs driver.
This inadvertently broke setting variables on firmware implementations
that lack the QueryVariableInfo() boot service, because we no longer
tolerate a EFI_UNSUPPORTED result from check_var_size() when calling
efivar_entry_set_get_size(), which now ends up calling check_var_size()
a second time inadvertently.
If QueryVariableInfo() is missing, we support writes of up to 64k -
let's move that logic into check_var_size(), and drop the redundant
call.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0
Fixes: bbc6d2c6ef22 ("efi: vars: Switch to new wrapper layer")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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LoadImage() is supposed to install an instance of the protocol
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL onto the loaded image's handle so
that the program can figure out where it was loaded from. The reference
implementation even does this (with a NULL protocol pointer) if the call
to LoadImage() used the source buffer and size arguments, and passed
NULL for the image device path. Hand rolled implementations of LoadImage
may behave differently, though, and so it is better to tolerate
situations where the protocol is missing. And actually, concatenating an
Offset() node to a NULL device path (as we do currently) is not great
either.
So in cases where the protocol is absent, or when it points to NULL,
construct a MemoryMapped() device node as the base node that describes
the parent image's footprint in memory.
Cc: Daan De Meyer <daandemeyer@fb.com>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Second shared stable tag between EFI and LoongArch trees
This is necessary because the EFI libstub refactoring patches are mostly
directed at enabling LoongArch to wire up generic EFI boot support
without being forced to consume DT properties that conflict with
information that EFI also provides, e.g., memory map and reservations,
etc.
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Expose the EFI boot time memory map to the kernel via a configuration
table. This is arch agnostic and enables future changes that remove the
dependency on DT on architectures that don't otherwise rely on it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Use a EFI configuration table to pass the initrd to the core kernel,
instead of per-arch methods. This cleans up the code considerably, and
should make it easier for architectures to get rid of their reliance on
DT for doing EFI boot in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Currently, struct efi_boot_memmap is a struct that is passed around
between callers of efi_get_memory_map() and the users of the resulting
data, and which carries pointers to various variables whose values are
provided by the EFI GetMemoryMap() boot service.
This is overly complex, and it is much easier to carry these values in
the struct itself. So turn the struct into one that carries these data
items directly, including a flex array for the variable number of EFI
memory descriptors that the boot service may return.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Implement a minimal EFI app that decompresses the real kernel image and
launches it using the firmware's LoadImage and StartImage boot services.
This removes the need for any arch-specific hacks.
Note that on systems that have UEFI secure boot policies enabled,
LoadImage/StartImage require images to be signed, or their hashes known
a priori, in order to be permitted to boot.
There are various possible strategies to work around this requirement,
but they all rely either on overriding internal PI/DXE protocols (which
are not part of the EFI spec) or omitting the firmware provided
LoadImage() and StartImage() boot services, which is also undesirable,
given that they encapsulate platform specific policies related to secure
boot and measured boot, but also related to memory permissions (whether
or not and which types of heap allocations have both write and execute
permissions.)
The only generic and truly portable way around this is to simply sign
both the inner and the outer image with the same key/cert pair, so this
is what is implemented here.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Define the correct prototypes for the load_image, start_image and
unload_image boot service pointers so we can call them from the EFI
zboot code.
Also add some prototypes related to installation and deinstallation of
protocols in to the EFI protocol database, including some definitions
related to device paths.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull efivars sysfs interface removal from Ard Biesheuvel:
"Remove the obsolete 'efivars' sysfs based interface to the EFI
variable store, now that all users have moved to the efivarfs pseudo
file system, which was created ~10 years ago to address some
fundamental shortcomings in the sysfs based driver.
Move the 'business logic' related to which EFI variables are important
and may affect the boot flow from the efivars support layer into the
efivarfs pseudo file system, so it is no longer exposed to other parts
of the kernel"
* tag 'efi-efivars-removal-for-v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi: vars: Move efivar caching layer into efivarfs
efi: vars: Switch to new wrapper layer
efi: vars: Remove deprecated 'efivars' sysfs interface
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Currently, the arch_efi_call_virt() assumes all users of it will have
defined a type 'efi_##f##_t' to make use of it.
Simplify the arch_efi_call_virt() macro by eliminating the explicit
need for efi_##f##_t type for every user of this macro.
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
[ardb: apply Sudeep's ARM fix to i686, Loongarch and RISC-V too]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Move the fiddly bits of the efivar layer into its only remaining user,
efivarfs, and confine its use to that particular module. All other uses
of the EFI variable store have no need for this additional layer of
complexity, given that they either only read variables, or read and
write variables into a separate GUIDed namespace, and cannot be used to
manipulate EFI variables that are covered by the EFI spec and/or affect
the boot flow.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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__efivar_entry_iter() uses a list iterator in a dubious way, i.e., it
assumes that the iteration variable always points to an object of the
appropriate type, even if the list traversal exhausts the list
completely, in which case it will point somewhere in the vicinity of the
list's anchor instead.
Fortunately, we no longer use this function so we can just get rid of it
entirely.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Both efivars and efivarfs uses __efivar_entry_iter() to go over the
linked list that shadows the list of EFI variables held by the firmware,
but fail to call the begin/end helpers that are documented as a
prerequisite.
So switch to the proper version, which is efivar_entry_iter(). Given
that in both cases, efivar_entry_remove() is invoked with the lock held
already, don't take the lock there anymore.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Commit 5d9db883761a ("efi: Add support for a UEFI variable filesystem")
dated Oct 5, 2012, introduced a new efivarfs pseudo-filesystem to
replace the efivars sysfs interface that was used up to that point to
expose EFI variables to user space.
The main problem with the sysfs interface was that it only supported up
to 1024 bytes of payload per file, whereas the underlying variables
themselves are only bounded by a platform specific per-variable and
global limit that is typically much higher than 1024 bytes.
The deprecated sysfs interface is only enabled on x86 and Itanium, other
EFI enabled architectures only support the efivarfs pseudo-filesystem.
So let's finally rip off the band aid, and drop the old interface
entirely. This will make it easier to refactor and clean up the
underlying infrastructure that is shared between efivars, efivarfs and
efi-pstore, and is long overdue for a makeover.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Avoid the efivars layer and simply call the newly introduced EFI
varstore helpers instead. This simplifies the code substantially, and
also allows us to remove some hacks in the shared efivars layer that
were added for efi-pstore specifically.
In order to be able to delete the EFI variable associated with a record,
store the UTF-16 name of the variable in the pstore record's priv field.
That way, we don't have to make guesses regarding which variable the
record may have been loaded from.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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The current efivars layer is a jumble of list iterators, shadow data
structures and safe variable manipulation helpers that really belong in
the efivarfs pseudo file system once the obsolete sysfs access method to
EFI variables is removed.
So split off a minimal efivar get/set variable API that reuses the
existing efivars_lock semaphore to mediate access to the various runtime
services, primarily to ensure that performing a SetVariable() on one CPU
while another is calling GetNextVariable() in a loop to enumerate the
contents of the EFI variable store does not result in surprises.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Even though the efivars_lock lock is documented as protecting the
efivars->ops pointer (among other things), efivar_init() happily
releases and reacquires the lock for every EFI variable that it
enumerates. This used to be needed because the lock was originally a
spinlock, which prevented the callback that is invoked for every
variable from being able to sleep. However, releasing the lock could
potentially invalidate the ops pointer, but more importantly, it might
allow a SetVariable() runtime service call to take place concurrently,
and the UEFI spec does not define how this affects an enumeration that
is running in parallel using the GetNextVariable() runtime service,
which is what efivar_init() uses.
In the meantime, the lock has been converted into a semaphore, and the
only reason we need to drop the lock is because the efivarfs pseudo
filesystem driver will otherwise deadlock when it invokes the efivars
API from the callback to create the efivar_entry items and insert them
into the linked list. (EFI pstore is affected in a similar way)
So let's switch to helpers that can be used while the lock is already
taken. This way, we can hold on to the lock throughout the enumeration.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Commit b05b9f5f9dcf ("x86, mirror: x86 enabling - find mirrored memory
ranges") introduce the efi_find_mirror() function on x86. In order to reuse
the API we make it public.
Arm64 can support mirrored memory too, so function efi_find_mirror() is added to
efi_init() to this support for arm64.
Since efi_init() is shared by ARM, arm64 and riscv, this patch will bring
mirror memory support for these architectures, but this support is only tested
in arm64.
Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614092156.1972846-2-mawupeng1@huawei.com
[ardb: fix subject to better reflect the payload]
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Pull drm updates from Dave Airlie:
"Intel have enabled DG2 on certain SKUs for laptops, AMD has started
some new GPU support, msm has user allocated VA controls
dma-buf:
- add dma_resv_replace_fences
- add dma_resv_get_singleton
- make dma_excl_fence private
core:
- EDID parser refactorings
- switch drivers to drm_mode_copy/duplicate
- DRM managed mutex initialization
display-helper:
- put HDMI, SCDC, HDCP, DSC and DP into new module
gem:
- rework fence handling
ttm:
- rework bulk move handling
- add common debugfs for resource managers
- convert to kvcalloc
format helpers:
- support monochrome formats
- RGB888, RGB565 to XRGB8888 conversions
fbdev:
- cfb/sys_imageblit fixes
- pagelist corruption fix
- create offb platform device
- deferred io improvements
sysfb:
- Kconfig rework
- support for VESA mode selection
bridge:
- conversions to devm_drm_of_get_bridge
- conversions to panel_bridge
- analogix_dp - autosuspend support
- it66121 - audio support
- tc358767 - DSI to DPI support
- icn6211 - PLL/I2C fixes, DT property
- adv7611 - enable DRM_BRIDGE_OP_HPD
- anx7625 - fill ELD if no monitor
- dw_hdmi - add audio support
- lontium LT9211 support, i.MXMP LDB
- it6505: Kconfig fix, DPCD set power fix
- adv7511 - CEC support for ADV7535
panel:
- ltk035c5444t, B133UAN01, NV3052C panel support
- DataImage FG040346DSSWBG04 support
- st7735r - DT bindings fix
- ssd130x - fixes
i915:
- DG2 laptop PCI-IDs ("motherboard down")
- Initial RPL-P PCI IDs
- compute engine ABI
- DG2 Tile4 support
- DG2 CCS clear color compression support
- DG2 render/media compression formats support
- ATS-M platform info
- RPL-S PCI IDs added
- Bump ADL-P DMC version to v2.16
- Support static DRRS
- Support multiple eDP/LVDS native mode refresh rates
- DP HDR support for HSW+
- Lots of display refactoring + fixes
- GuC hwconfig support and query
- sysfs support for multi-tile
- fdinfo per-client gpu utilisation
- add geometry subslices query
- fix prime mmap with LMEM
- fix vm open count and remove vma refcounts
- contiguous allocation fixes
- steered register write support
- small PCI BAR enablement
- GuC error capture support
- sunset igpu legacy mmap support for newer devices
- GuC version 70.1.1 support
amdgpu:
- Initial SoC21 support
- SMU 13.x enablement
- SMU 13.0.4 support
- ttm_eu cleanups
- USB-C, GPUVM updates
- TMZ fixes for RV
- RAS support for VCN
- PM sysfs code cleanup
- DC FP rework
- extend CG/PG flags to 64-bit
- SI dpm lockdep fix
- runtime PM fixes
amdkfd:
- RAS/SVM fixes
- TLB flush fixes
- CRIU GWS support
- ignore bogus MEC signals more efficiently
msm:
- Fourcc modifier for tiled but not compressed layouts
- Support for userspace allocated IOVA (GPU virtual address)
- DPU: DSC (Display Stream Compression) support
- DP: eDP support
- DP: conversion to use drm_bridge and drm_bridge_connector
- Merge DPU1 and MDP5 MDSS driver
- DPU: writeback support
nouveau:
- make some structures static
- make some variables static
- switch to drm_gem_plane_helper_prepare_fb
radeon:
- misc fixes/cleanups
mxsfb:
- rework crtc mode setting
- LCDIF CRC support
etnaviv:
- fencing improvements
- fix address space collisions
- cleanup MMU reference handling
gma500:
- GEM/GTT improvements
- connector handling fixes
komeda:
- switch to plane reset helper
mediatek:
- MIPI DSI improvements
omapdrm:
- GEM improvements
qxl:
- aarch64 support
vc4:
- add a CL submission tracepoint
- HDMI YUV support
- HDMI/clock improvements
- drop is_hdmi caching
virtio:
- remove restriction of non-zero blob types
vmwgfx:
- support for cursormob and cursorbypass 4
- fence improvements
tidss:
- reset DISPC on startup
solomon:
- SPI support
- DT improvements
sun4i:
- allwinner D1 support
- drop is_hdmi caching
imx:
- use swap() instead of open-coding
- use devm_platform_ioremap_resource
- remove redunant initializations
ast:
- Displayport support
rockchip:
- Refactor IOMMU initialisation
- make some structures static
- replace drm_detect_hdmi_monitor with drm_display_info.is_hdmi
- support swapped YUV formats,
- clock improvements
- rk3568 support
- VOP2 support
mediatek:
- MT8186 support
tegra:
- debugabillity improvements"
* tag 'drm-next-2022-05-25' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm: (1740 commits)
drm/i915/dsi: fix VBT send packet port selection for ICL+
drm/i915/uc: Fix undefined behavior due to shift overflowing the constant
drm/i915/reg: fix undefined behavior due to shift overflowing the constant
drm/i915/gt: Fix use of static in macro mismatch
drm/i915/audio: fix audio code enable/disable pipe logging
drm/i915: Fix CFI violation with show_dynamic_id()
drm/i915: Fix 'mixing different enum types' warnings in intel_display_power.c
drm/i915/gt: Fix build error without CONFIG_PM
drm/msm/dpu: handle pm_runtime_get_sync() errors in bind path
drm/msm/dpu: add DRM_MODE_ROTATE_180 back to supported rotations
drm/msm: don't free the IRQ if it was not requested
drm/msm/dpu: limit writeback modes according to max_linewidth
drm/amd: Don't reset dGPUs if the system is going to s2idle
drm/amdgpu: Unmap legacy queue when MES is enabled
drm: msm: fix possible memory leak in mdp5_crtc_cursor_set()
drm/msm: Fix fb plane offset calculation
drm/msm/a6xx: Fix refcount leak in a6xx_gpu_init
drm/msm/dsi: don't powerup at modeset time for parade-ps8640
drm/rockchip: Change register space names in vop2
dt-bindings: display: rockchip: make reg-names mandatory for VOP2
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov:
"The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested
Paging.
Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
hypervisor.
At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
appropriate action.
In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a
SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.
And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
not just bolted on"
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation
x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap
x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler
x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info
x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning
x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page
x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines
virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest
virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support
x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section
x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor
virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value
virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages()
x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate()
virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
...
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Add support for getting the boot hart ID from the Linux EFI stub using
RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL. This method is preferred over the existing DT
based approach since it works irrespective of DT or ACPI.
The specification of the protocol is hosted at:
https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-uefi
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519051512.136724-2-sunilvl@ventanamicro.com
[ardb: minor tweaks for coding style and whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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If the loader has already placed the EFI kernel image randomly in
physical memory, and indicates having done so by installing the 'fixed
placement' protocol onto the image handle, don't bother randomizing the
placement again in the EFI stub.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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UEFI DXE services are not yet used in kernel code
but are required to manipulate page table memory
protection flags.
Add required declarations to use DXE services functions.
Signed-off-by: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@ispras.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303142120.1975-2-baskov@ispras.ru
[ardb: ignore absent DXE table but warn if the signature check fails]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Fixes "no previous declaration for 'efi_capsule_setup_info'" warnings
under W=1.
Fixes: 2959c95d510c ("efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c28d3f86-dd72-27d1-e2c2-40971b8da6bd@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs
memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which
reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it
the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID.
If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to
the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later
by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also
appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
[ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018
The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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While launching encrypted guests, the hypervisor may need to provide
some additional information during the guest boot. When booting under an
EFI-based BIOS, the EFI configuration table contains an entry for the
confidential computing blob that contains the required information.
To support booting encrypted guests on non-EFI VMs, the hypervisor
needs to pass this additional information to the guest kernel using a
different method.
For this purpose, introduce SETUP_CC_BLOB type in setup_data to hold
the physical address of the confidential computing blob location. The
boot loader or hypervisor may choose to use this method instead of an
EFI configuration table. The CC blob location scanning should give
preference to a setup_data blob over an EFI configuration table.
In AMD SEV-SNP, the CC blob contains the address of the secrets and
CPUID pages. The secrets page includes information such as a VM to PSP
communication key and the CPUID page contains PSP-filtered CPUID values.
Define the AMD SEV confidential computing blob structure.
While at it, define the EFI GUID for the confidential computing blob.
[ bp: Massage commit message, mark struct __packed. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-30-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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efifb is the only user of efifb_setup_from_dmi which is provided by
sysfb which is selected by efifb. That makes the stub redundant.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/7416c439d68e9e96068ea5c77e05c99c7df41750.1645822213.git.msuchanek@suse.de
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull more ACPI updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"The most significant item here is the Platform Firmware Runtime Update
and Telemetry (PFRUT) support designed to allow certain pieces of the
platform firmware to be updated on the fly, among other things.
Also important is the e820 handling change on x86 that should work
around PCI BAR allocation issues on some systems shipping since 2019.
The rest is just a handful of assorted fixes and cleanups on top of
the ACPI material merged previously.
Specifics:
- Add support for the the Platform Firmware Runtime Update and
Telemetry (PFRUT) interface based on ACPI to allow certain pieces
of the platform firmware to be updated without restarting the
system and to provide a mechanism for collecting platform firmware
telemetry data (Chen Yu, Dan Carpenter, Yang Yingliang).
- Ignore E820 reservations covering PCI host bridge windows on
sufficiently recent x86 systems to avoid issues with allocating PCI
BARs on systems where the E820 reservations cover the entire PCI
host bridge memory window returned by the _CRS object in the
system's ACPI tables (Hans de Goede).
- Fix and clean up acpi_scan_init() (Rafael Wysocki).
- Add more sanity checking to ACPI SPCR tables parsing (Mark
Langsdorf).
- Fix up ACPI APD (AMD Soc) driver initialization (Jiasheng Jiang).
- Drop unnecessary "static" from the ACPI PCC address space handling
driver added recently (kernel test robot)"
* tag 'acpi-5.17-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: PCC: pcc_ctx can be static
ACPI: scan: Rename label in acpi_scan_init()
ACPI: scan: Simplify initialization of power and sleep buttons
ACPI: scan: Change acpi_scan_init() return value type to void
ACPI: SPCR: check if table->serial_port.access_width is too wide
ACPI: APD: Check for NULL pointer after calling devm_ioremap()
x86/PCI: Ignore E820 reservations for bridge windows on newer systems
ACPI: pfr_telemetry: Fix info leak in pfrt_log_ioctl()
ACPI: pfr_update: Fix return value check in pfru_write()
ACPI: tools: Introduce utility for firmware updates/telemetry
ACPI: Introduce Platform Firmware Runtime Telemetry driver
ACPI: Introduce Platform Firmware Runtime Update device driver
efi: Introduce EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_HEADER and corresponding structures
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Merge support for the Platform Firmware Runtime Update and Telemetry
interface based on ACPI.
The interface provided here allows updating certain pieces of the
platform firmware without restarting the system and collecting
platform firmware telemetry data.
This also includes a utility for accesing the new interface from user
space.
* acpi-pfrut:
ACPI: pfr_telemetry: Fix info leak in pfrt_log_ioctl()
ACPI: pfr_update: Fix return value check in pfru_write()
ACPI: tools: Introduce utility for firmware updates/telemetry
ACPI: Introduce Platform Firmware Runtime Telemetry driver
ACPI: Introduce Platform Firmware Runtime Update device driver
efi: Introduce EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_HEADER and corresponding structures
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
- support taking the measurement of the initrd when loaded via the
LoadFile2 protocol
- kobject API cleanup from Greg
- some header file whitespace fixes
* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi: use default_groups in kobj_type
efi/libstub: measure loaded initrd info into the TPM
efi/libstub: consolidate initrd handling across architectures
efi/libstub: x86/mixed: increase supported argument count
efi/libstub: add prototype of efi_tcg2_protocol::hash_log_extend_event()
include/linux/efi.h: Remove unneeded whitespaces before tabs
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structures
Platform Firmware Runtime Update image starts with UEFI headers, and the
headers are defined in UEFI specification, but some of them have not been
defined in the kernel yet.
For example, the header layout of a capsule file looks like this:
EFI_CAPSULE_HEADER
EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_HEADER
EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_IMAGE_HEADER
EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_AUTHENTICATION
These structures would be used by the Platform Firmware Runtime Update
driver to parse the format of capsule file to verify if the corresponding
version number is valid. In this way, if the user provides an invalid
capsule image, the kernel could be used as a guard to reject it, without
switching to the Management Mode (which might be costly).
EFI_CAPSULE_HEADER has been defined in the kernel, but the other
structures have not been defined yet, so do that. Besides,
EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_HEADER and
EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_IMAGE_HEADER are required to be packed
in the uefi specification. For this reason, use the __packed attribute
to indicate to the compiler that the entire structure can appear
misaligned in memory (as suggested by Ard) in case one of them follows
the other directly in a capsule header.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Commit 8633ef82f101 ("drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup
for all arches") made the Generic System Framebuffers (sysfb) driver able
to be built on non-x86 architectures.
But it left the efifb_setup_from_dmi() function prototype declaration in
the architecture specific headers. This could lead to the following
compiler warning as reported by the kernel test robot:
drivers/firmware/efi/sysfb_efi.c:70:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'efifb_setup_from_dmi' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt)
^
drivers/firmware/efi/sysfb_efi.c:70:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt)
Fixes: 8633ef82f101 ("drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.15.x
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211126001333.555514-1-javierm@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Introduce a new AMD Memory Encryption GUID which is currently
used for defining a new UEFI environment variable which indicates
UEFI/OVMF support for the SEV live migration feature. This variable
is setup when UEFI/OVMF detects host/hypervisor support for SEV
live migration and later this variable is read by the kernel using
EFI runtime services to verify if OVMF supports the live migration
feature.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <1cea22976d2208f34d47e0c1ce0ecac816c13111.1629726117.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t") updated
the type definition of efi_guid_t to ensure that it always appears
sufficiently aligned (the UEFI spec is ambiguous about this, but given
the fact that its EFI_GUID type is defined in terms of a struct carrying
a uint32_t, the natural alignment is definitely >= 32 bits).
However, we missed the EFI_GUID() macro which is used to instantiate
efi_guid_t literals: that macro is still based on the guid_t type,
which does not have a minimum alignment at all. This results in warnings
such as
In file included from drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c:35:
include/linux/efi.h:1093:34: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to
4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer
access [-Walign-mismatch]
status = get_var(L"SecureBoot", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size,
^
include/linux/efi.h:1101:24: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to
4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer
access [-Walign-mismatch]
get_var(L"SetupMode", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, &setupmode);
The distinction only matters on CPUs that do not support misaligned loads
fully, but 32-bit ARM's load-multiple instructions fall into that category,
and these are likely to be emitted by the compiler that built the firmware
for loading word-aligned 128-bit GUIDs from memory
So re-implement the initializer in terms of our own efi_guid_t type, so that
the alignment becomes a property of the literal's type.
Fixes: 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1327
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Move TPM related definitions that are only used in the EFI stub into
efistub.h, which is a local header.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Trivial whitespace cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Move some EFI related declarations that are only referenced on IA64 to
a new asm/efi.h arch header.
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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EFI capsule loading is a feature that was introduced into EFI long after
its initial introduction on Itanium, and it is highly unlikely that IA64
systems are receiving firmware updates in the first place, let alone
using EFI capsules.
So let's disable capsule support altogether on IA64. This fixes a build
error on IA64 due to a recent change that added an unconditional
include of asm/efi.h, which IA64 does not provide.
While at it, tweak the make rules a bit so that the EFI capsule
component that is always builtin (even if the EFI capsule loader itself
is built as a module) is omitted for all architectures if the module is
not enabled in the build.
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-efi/20201214152200.38353-1-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Generalize the efi_get_secureboot() function so not only efistub but also
other subsystems can use it.
Note that the MokSbState handling is not factored out: the variable is
boot time only, and so it cannot be parameterized as easily. Also, the
IMA code will switch to this version in a future patch, and it does not
incorporate the MokSbState exception in the first place.
Note that the new efi_get_secureboot_mode() helper treats any failures
to read SetupMode as setup mode being disabled.
Co-developed-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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