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2019-05-08Merge branch 'work.mount-syscalls' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+7
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull mount ABI updates from Al Viro: "The syscalls themselves, finally. That's not all there is to that stuff, but switching individual filesystems to new methods is fortunately independent from everything else, so e.g. NFS series can go through NFS tree, etc. As those conversions get done, we'll be finally able to get rid of a bunch of duplication in fs/super.c introduced in the beginning of the entire thing. I expect that to be finished in the next window..." * 'work.mount-syscalls' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vfs: Add a sample program for the new mount API vfs: syscall: Add fspick() to select a superblock for reconfiguration vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock vfs: syscall: Add fsconfig() for configuring and managing a context vfs: Implement logging through fs_context vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation Make anon_inodes unconditional teach move_mount(2) to work with OPEN_TREE_CLONE vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount
2019-03-21LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initializationOndrej Mosnacek1-0/+9
This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation). The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes. This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs them). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: more manual merge fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts aroundDavid Howells1-0/+7
Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree. The new system call looks like the following: int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path, int to_dfd, const char *to_path, unsigned int flags); Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-13Merge branch 'work.mount' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro: "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the next cycle fodder. It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better to fix it up after -rc1 instead. That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next cycle" * 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits) afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount afs: Add fs_context support vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log vfs: Implement logging through fs_context vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API vfs: Remove kern_mount_data() hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context cpuset: Use fs_context kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic() cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree() cgroup: start switching to fs_context ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context proc: Add fs_context support to procfs ...
2019-03-07Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1. Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another. Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems. All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1" * tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: mark expected switch fall-through audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes audit: join tty records to their syscall audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match audit: ignore fcaps on umount audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic audit: add support for fcaps v3 audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
2019-02-28introduce cloning of fs_contextAl Viro1-0/+6
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for doing the same to LSM parts. [needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28vfs: Put security flags into the fs_context structDavid Howells1-1/+1
Put security flags, such as SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS, into the filesystem context so that the filesystem can communicate them to the LSM more easily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount APIDavid Howells1-0/+10
Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code. This includes: (1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security record attached to a filesystem context. (2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly remote server specifications, if false. (3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form. If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas and binary data with the fsopen patch. (4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up. (5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created superblock. (6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint. These are intended to replace: security_sb_copy_data security_sb_kern_mount security_sb_mount security_sb_set_mnt_opts security_sb_clone_mnt_opts security_sb_parse_opts_str [AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the methods are not added for the lack of need] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-01audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_matchRichard Guy Briggs1-3/+2
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack). The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be accessed by audit accessor functions. It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used. Remove it. Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the referenced commit title] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-11LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capableMicah Morton1-14/+14
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-09procfs: add smack subdir to attrsCasey Schaufler1-5/+10
Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-12-21LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()Al Viro1-2/+4
Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: bury struct security_mnt_optsAl Viro1-8/+0
no users left Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic codeAl Viro1-33/+10
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro1-4/+2
... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()Al Viro1-25/+3
combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(), security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata(). Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: lift extracting and parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_remount()Al Viro1-2/+3
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: lift parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro1-2/+4
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-10-03signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfoEric W. Biederman1-3/+3
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying around in the kernel. The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in the kernel that embed struct siginfo. So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to 128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo. The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have the same field offsets. To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-08-15Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+27
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file descriptor, from Mimi Zohar. - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from Mimi. - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if using signed firmware), from Mimi. - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be measured by IMA, from Mimi. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append() security: export security_kernel_load_data function ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module ima: add build time policy ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
2018-07-16security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_dataMimi Zohar1-0/+27
Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace. This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-12security_file_open(): lose cred argumentAl Viro1-3/+2
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-05-04security: add hook for socketpair()David Herrmann1-0/+7
Right now the LSM labels for socketpairs are always uninitialized, since there is no security hook for the socketpair() syscall. This patch adds the required hooks so LSMs can properly label socketpairs. This allows SO_PEERSEC to return useful information on those sockets. Note that the behavior of socketpair() can be emulated by creating a listener socket, connecting to it, and then discarding the initial listener socket. With this workaround, SO_PEERSEC would return the caller's security context. However, with socketpair(), the uninitialized context is returned unconditionally. This is unexpected and makes socketpair() less useful in situations where the security context is crucial to the application. With the new socketpair-hook this disparity can be solved by making socketpair() return the expected security context. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-04-23Merge tag 'v4.17-rc2' into next-generalJames Morris1-35/+58
Sync to Linux 4.17-rc2 for developers.
2018-04-17security: remove security_settimeSargun Dhillon1-14/+0
security_settime was a wrapper around security_settime64. There are no more users of it. Therefore it can be removed. It was removed in: commit 4eb1bca17933 ("time: Use do_settimeofday64() internally") Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-04-08Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps. Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew Garrett: For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA: In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did previously" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement() ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init() integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement() ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[] evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted ima: fail signature verification based on policy ima: clear IMA_HASH ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
2018-04-07Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull general security layer updates from James Morris: - Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon. - Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred), from Stephen Smalley. - Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: convert security hooks to use hlist exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
2018-04-07Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+25
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "A bigger than usual pull request for SELinux, 13 patches (lucky!) along with a scary looking diffstat. Although if you look a bit closer, excluding the usual minor tweaks/fixes, there are really only two significant changes in this pull request: the addition of proper SELinux access controls for SCTP and the encapsulation of a lot of internal SELinux state. The SCTP changes are the result of a multi-month effort (maybe even a year or longer?) between the SELinux folks and the SCTP folks to add proper SELinux controls. A special thanks go to Richard for seeing this through and keeping the effort moving forward. The state encapsulation work is a bit of janitorial work that came out of some early work on SELinux namespacing. The question of namespacing is still an open one, but I believe there is some real value in the encapsulation work so we've split that out and are now sending that up to you" * tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: wrap AVC state selinux: wrap selinuxfs state selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classes selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentation selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions selinux: wrap global selinux state selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration selinux: Add SCTP support sctp: Add LSM hooks sctp: Add ip option support security: Add support for SCTP security hooks netlabel: If PF_INET6, check sk_buff ip header version
2018-03-23security: Add a cred_getsecid hookMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-23msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooksEric W. Biederman1-13/+12
All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-23shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooksEric W. Biederman1-11/+10
All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel.. Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-23sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooksEric W. Biederman1-11/+10
All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-07usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to ↵Stephen Smalley1-2/+2
kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill commit d178bc3a708f39cbfefc3fab37032d3f2511b4ec ("user namespace: usb: make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of uids. Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to kill_pid_info_as_cred. Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill with the cred. Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook. Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability checking based on the supplied cred. The changes to Smack and AppArmor have only been compile-tested. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-02-22security: Add support for SCTP security hooksRichard Haines1-0/+25
The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-11-02security: bpf: replace include of linux/bpf.h with forward declarationsJakub Kicinski1-1/+4
Touching linux/bpf.h makes us rebuild a surprisingly large portion of the kernel. Remove the unnecessary dependency from security.h, it only needs forward declarations. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-20security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscallChenbo Feng1-0/+45
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-12Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three having any substantive changes. These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file explosion in the diffstat). Everything passes the selinux-testsuite" [ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ] * tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: constify nf_hook_ops selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs lsm_audit: update my email address selinux: update my email address MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS credits: update Paul Moore's info selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
2017-09-12Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next before I sent this pull request. This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to generalize this and encode some of the namespace information information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy more expensive. Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from complaining about unitialized variables. I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial copy to user. The code is available at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3 But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed before the merge window opened. I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable() userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
2017-09-01Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilitiesSerge E. Hallyn1-0/+2
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the host. However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root. This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect. When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes. Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns, will run the file with capabilities. Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace. If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the given uid is root will. Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful. This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent namespace. Example using tar: $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx $ mkdir b1 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx v3 xattr, rootid is 100001 A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp Changelog: Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite() Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017) commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3 get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr() Apr 09 2017: don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root. return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns Apr 18 2017: . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing. . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous xattr doesn't matter. Apr 24 2017: . incorporate Eric's incremental diff . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage May 8, 2017: . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-08-01LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook1-6/+0
This removes the bprm_secureexec hook since the logic has been folded into the bprm_set_creds hook for all LSMs now. Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook1-2/+1
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch. Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect, since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the "elevated privileges" calculation. The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec() since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-07-18LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.Tetsuo Handa1-6/+0
Since commit a79be238600d1a03 ("selinux: Use task_alloc hook rather than task_create hook") changed to use task_alloc hook, task_create hook is no longer used. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-23Merge branch 'stable-4.13' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris1-2/+56
into next
2017-06-09security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native ↵Scott Mayhew1-2/+6
labeling behavior When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's superblock to the submount's superblock in the process. Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the "security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set. Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value when the client traverses from an exported path without the "security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option. Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35 Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-06-08securityfs: add the ability to support symlinksJohn Johansen1-0/+12
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-23IB/core: Enforce security on management datagramsDaniel Jurgens1-0/+6
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending and receiving SMPs. When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port. During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed. When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer is. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: remove the LSM hook init code] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification systemDaniel Jurgens1-0/+23
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPsDaniel Jurgens1-0/+21
Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-28LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security ↵Tetsuo Handa1-0/+7
blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-06prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimitStephen Smalley1-0/+13
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2) with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context transitions. Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook. This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the resource limits of another process. Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission() function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource limits of the target process. The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the inline documentation for the hook to match the code. Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit (soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could only be used to obtain a process' own limits. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>