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2022-10-31audit: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for AUDIT_BITGaosheng Cui1-1/+1
Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in kernel/auditfilter.c:179:23 left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c audit_register_class+0x9d/0x137 audit_classes_init+0x4d/0xb8 do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430 kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> [PM: remove bad 'Fixes' tag as issue predates git, added in v2.6.6-rc1] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-06-03LoongArch: Add ELF-related definitionsHuacai Chen1-0/+2
Add ELF-related definitions for LoongArch, including: EM_LOONGARCH, KEXEC_ARCH_LOONGARCH, AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH32, AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64 and NT_LOONGARCH_*. Reviewed-by: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name> Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
2021-12-20audit: replace zero-length array with flexible-array memberXiu Jianfeng1-1/+1
Zero-length arrays are deprecated and should be replaced with flexible-array members. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/78 Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-11-09Merge tag 'for-5.16/dm-changes' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer: - Add DM core support for emitting audit events through the audit subsystem. Also enhance both the integrity and crypt targets to emit events to via dm-audit. - Various other simple code improvements and cleanups. * tag 'for-5.16/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: dm table: log table creation error code dm: make workqueue names device-specific dm writecache: Make use of the helper macro kthread_run() dm crypt: Make use of the helper macro kthread_run() dm verity: use bvec_kmap_local in verity_for_bv_block dm log writes: use memcpy_from_bvec in log_writes_map dm integrity: use bvec_kmap_local in __journal_read_write dm integrity: use bvec_kmap_local in integrity_metadata dm: add add_disk() error handling dm: Remove redundant flush_workqueue() calls dm crypt: log aead integrity violations to audit subsystem dm integrity: log audit events for dm-integrity target dm: introduce audit event module for device mapper
2021-11-02Merge tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Add some additional audit logging to capture the openat2() syscall open_how struct info. Previous variations of the open()/openat() syscalls allowed audit admins to inspect the syscall args to get the information contained in the new open_how struct used in openat2()" * tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: return early if the filter rule has a lower priority audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info audit: add support for the openat2 syscall audit: replace magic audit syscall class numbers with macros lsm_audit: avoid overloading the "key" audit field audit: Convert to SPDX identifier audit: rename struct node to struct audit_node to prevent future name collisions
2021-10-27dm: introduce audit event module for device mapperMichael Weiß1-0/+2
To be able to send auditing events to user space, we introduce a generic dm-audit module. It provides helper functions to emit audit events through the kernel audit subsystem. We claim the AUDIT_DM_CTRL type=1336 and AUDIT_DM_EVENT type=1337 out of the audit event messages range in the corresponding userspace api in 'include/uapi/linux/audit.h' for those events. AUDIT_DM_CTRL is used to provide information about creation and destruction of device mapper targets which are triggered by user space admin control actions. AUDIT_DM_EVENT is used to provide information about actual errors during operation of the mapped device, showing e.g. integrity violations in audit log. Following commits to device mapper targets actually will make use of this to emit those events in relevant cases. The audit logs look like this if executing the following simple test: # dd if=/dev/zero of=test.img bs=1M count=1024 # losetup -f test.img # integritysetup -vD format --integrity sha256 -t 32 /dev/loop0 # integritysetup open -D /dev/loop0 --integrity sha256 integritytest # integritysetup status integritytest # integritysetup close integritytest # integritysetup open -D /dev/loop0 --integrity sha256 integritytest # integritysetup status integritytest # dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/loop0 bs=512 count=1 seek=100000 # dd if=/dev/mapper/integritytest of=/dev/null ------------------------- audit.log from auditd type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425039.363:184): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425039.471:185): module=integrity op=dtr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425039.611:186): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425054.475:187): module=integrity op=dtr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425073.171:191): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3883 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425087.239:192): module=integrity op=dtr ppid=3807 pid=3902 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425093.755:193): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3906 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:194): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:195): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:196): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:197): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:198): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:199): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:200): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:201): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:202): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:203): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 Signed-off-by: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> # fix audit.h numbering Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2021-10-04audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" infoRichard Guy Briggs1-0/+1
Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's four existing arguments. Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve. The new record in the context of an event would look like: time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle= 73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D 7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2" inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437 success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18 items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2" exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-20audit: add filtering for io_uring recordsPaul Moore1-1/+2
This patch adds basic audit io_uring filtering, using as much of the existing audit filtering infrastructure as possible. In order to do this we reuse the audit filter rule's syscall mask for the io_uring operation and we create a new filter for io_uring operations as AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT/audit_filter_list[7]. Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for his review, feedback, and work on the corresponding audit userspace changes. Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-20audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uringPaul Moore1-0/+1
This patch adds basic auditing to io_uring operations, regardless of their context. This is accomplished by allocating audit_context structures for the io-wq worker and io_uring SQPOLL kernel threads as well as explicitly auditing the io_uring operations in io_issue_sqe(). Individual io_uring operations can bypass auditing through the "audit_skip" field in the struct io_op_def definition for the operation; although great care must be taken so that security relevant io_uring operations do not bypass auditing; please contact the audit mailing list (see the MAINTAINERS file) with any questions. The io_uring operations are audited using a new AUDIT_URINGOP record, an example is shown below: type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1631800225.981:37289): uring_op=19 success=yes exit=0 items=0 ppid=15454 pid=15681 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-06-11audit: remove trailing spaces and tabsZhen Lei1-2/+2
Run the following command to find and remove the trailing spaces and tabs: sed -r -i 's/[ \t]+$//' <audit_files> The files to be checked are as follows: kernel/audit* include/linux/audit.h include/uapi/linux/audit.h Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-21audit: report audit wait metric in audit status replyMax Englander1-7/+11
In environments where the preservation of audit events and predictable usage of system memory are prioritized, admins may use a combination of --backlog_wait_time and -b options at the risk of degraded performance resulting from backlog waiting. In some cases, this risk may be preferred to lost events or unbounded memory usage. Ideally, this risk can be mitigated by making adjustments when backlog waiting is detected. However, detection can be difficult using the currently available metrics. For example, an admin attempting to debug degraded performance may falsely believe a full backlog indicates backlog waiting. It may turn out the backlog frequently fills up but drains quickly. To make it easier to reliably track degraded performance to backlog waiting, this patch makes the following changes: Add a new field backlog_wait_time_total to the audit status reply. Initialize this field to zero. Add to this field the total time spent by the current task on scheduled timeouts while the backlog limit is exceeded. Reset field to zero upon request via AUDIT_SET. Tested on Ubuntu 18.04 using complementary changes to the audit-userspace and audit-testsuite: - https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/pull/134 - https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/97 Signed-off-by: Max Englander <max.englander@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-28audit: log audit netlink multicast bind and unbindRichard Guy Briggs1-0/+1
Log information about programs connecting to and disconnecting from the audit netlink multicast socket. This is needed so that during investigations a security officer can tell who or what had access to the audit trail. This helps to meet the FAU_SAR.2 requirement for Common Criteria. Here is the systemd startup event: type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 10:10:21.787:10) : proctitle=/init type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 10:10:21.787:10) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x19 a1=0x555f4aac7e90 a2=0xc a3=0x7ffcb792ff44 items=0 ppid=0 pid=1 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=kernel key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 10:10:21.787:10) : pid=1 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=kernel comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes And events from the test suite that just uses close(): type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:442) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w amcast_joinpart/test type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:442) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=0x563004378760 a2=0xc a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=815 pid=818 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:442) : pid=818 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:443) : pid=818 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=disconnect res=yes And the events from the test suite using setsockopt with NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.291:439) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w amcast_joinpart/test type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.291:439) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=0x5560877c2d20 a2=0xc a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=772 pid=775 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.291:439) : pid=775 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.292:440) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w amcast_joinpart/test type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.292:440) : arch=x86_64 syscall=setsockopt success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=SOL_NETLINK a2=0x2 a3=0x7ffc8366f000 items=0 ppid=772 pid=775 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.292:440) : pid=775 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=disconnect res=yes Please see the upstream issue tracker at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/28 With the feature description at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Multicast-Socket-Join-Part The testsuite support is at https://github.com/rgbriggs/audit-testsuite/compare/ghak28-mcast-part-join https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/93 And the userspace support patch is at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/pull/114 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-11bpf: Emit audit messages upon successful prog load and unloadDaniel Borkmann1-0/+1
Allow for audit messages to be emitted upon BPF program load and unload for having a timeline of events. The load itself is in syscall context, so additional info about the process initiating the BPF prog creation can be logged and later directly correlated to the unload event. The only info really needed from BPF side is the globally unique prog ID where then audit user space tooling can query / dump all info needed about the specific BPF program right upon load event and enrich the record, thus these changes needed here can be kept small and non-intrusive to the core. Raw example output: # auditctl -D # auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S bpf # ausearch --start recent -m 1334 ... ---- time->Wed Nov 27 16:04:13 2019 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1574867053.120:84664): proctitle="./bpf" type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1574867053.120:84664): arch=c000003e syscall=321 \ success=yes exit=3 a0=5 a1=7ffea484fbe0 a2=70 a3=0 items=0 ppid=7477 \ pid=12698 auid=1001 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 suid=1001 fsuid=1001 \ egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts2 ses=4 comm="bpf" \ exe="/home/jolsa/auditd/audit-testsuite/tests/bpf/bpf" \ subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1334] msg=audit(1574867053.120:84664): prog-id=76 op=LOAD ---- time->Wed Nov 27 16:04:13 2019 type=UNKNOWN[1334] msg=audit(1574867053.120:84665): prog-id=76 op=UNLOAD ... Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Co-developed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191206214934.11319-1-jolsa@kernel.org
2019-10-03audit: Report suspicious O_CREAT usageKees Cook1-0/+1
This renames the very specific audit_log_link_denied() to audit_log_path_denied() and adds the AUDIT_* type as an argument. This allows for the creation of the new AUDIT_ANOM_CREAT that can be used to report the fifo/regular file creation restrictions that were introduced in commit 30aba6656f61 ("namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files"). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-05-24audit: add saddr_fam filter fieldRichard Guy Briggs1-0/+1
Provide a method to filter out sockaddr and bind calls by network address family. Existing SOCKADDR records are listed for any network activity. Implement the AUDIT_SADDR_FAM field selector to be able to classify or limit records to specific network address families, such as AF_INET or AF_INET6. An example of a network record that is unlikely to be useful and flood the logs: type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : saddr={ fam=local path=/var/run/nscd/socket } type=SYSCALL msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : arch=x86_64 syscall=connect success=no exit=ENOENT(No such file or directory) a0=0x3 a1=0x7fff229c4980 a2=0x6e a3=0x6 items=1 ppid=3301 pid=6145 auid=sgrubb uid=sgrubb gid=sgrubb euid=sgrubb suid=sgrubb fsuid=sgrubb egid=sgrubb sgid=sgrubb fsgid=sgrubb tty=pts3 ses=4 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=network-test Please see the audit-testsuite PR at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/87 Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/64 Please see the github issue for the accompanying userspace support https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/93 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in auditfilter.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-04-16ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustmentOndrej Mosnacek1-0/+1
Emit an audit record every time selected NTP parameters are modified from userspace (via adjtimex(2) or clock_adjtime(2)). These parameters may be used to indirectly change system clock, and thus their modifications should be audited. Such events will now generate records of type AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL containing the following fields: - op -- which value was adjusted: - offset -- corresponding to the time_offset variable - freq -- corresponding to the time_freq variable - status -- corresponding to the time_status variable - adjust -- corresponding to the time_adjust variable - tick -- corresponding to the tick_usec variable - tai -- corresponding to the timekeeping's TAI offset - old -- the old value - new -- the new value Example records: type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.507:7): op=status old=64 new=8256 type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.511:11): op=freq old=0 new=49180377088000 The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding syscall records. An overview of parameter changes that can be done via do_adjtimex() (based on information from Miroslav Lichvar) and whether they are audited: __timekeeping_set_tai_offset() -- sets the offset from the International Atomic Time (AUDITED) NTP variables: time_offset -- can adjust the clock by up to 0.5 seconds per call and also speed it up or slow down by up to about 0.05% (43 seconds per day) (AUDITED) time_freq -- can speed up or slow down by up to about 0.05% (AUDITED) time_status -- can insert/delete leap seconds and it also enables/ disables synchronization of the hardware real-time clock (AUDITED) time_maxerror, time_esterror -- change error estimates used to inform userspace applications (NOT AUDITED) time_constant -- controls the speed of the clock adjustments that are made when time_offset is set (NOT AUDITED) time_adjust -- can temporarily speed up or slow down the clock by up to 0.05% (AUDITED) tick_usec -- a more extreme version of time_freq; can speed up or slow down the clock by up to 10% (AUDITED) Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-04-16timekeeping: Audit clock adjustmentsOndrej Mosnacek1-0/+1
Emit an audit record whenever the system clock is changed (i.e. shifted by a non-zero offset) by a syscall from userspace. The syscalls than can (at the time of writing) trigger such record are: - settimeofday(2), stime(2), clock_settime(2) -- via do_settimeofday64() - adjtimex(2), clock_adjtime(2) -- via do_adjtimex() The new records have type AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET and contain the following fields: - sec -- the 'seconds' part of the offset - nsec -- the 'nanoseconds' part of the offset Example record (time was shifted backwards by ~15.875 seconds): type=TIME_INJOFFSET msg=audit(1530616049.652:13): sec=-16 nsec=124887145 The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding syscall records. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> [PM: fixed a line width problem in __audit_tk_injoffset()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21unicore32: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+1
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21nios2: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+1
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21nds32: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+2
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Vincent Chen <vincentc@andestech.com> Acked-by: Greentime Hu <greentime@andestech.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21hexagon: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+1
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21h8300: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+1
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21c6x: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+2
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <jacquiot.aurelien@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21arc: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+4
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Brodkin <alexey.brodkin@synopsys.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-07Fix a handful of audit-related issuePalmer Dabbelt1-0/+2
This is sort of a mix between a new feature and a bug fix. I've managed to screw up merging this patch set a handful of times but I think it's OK this time around. The main new feature here is audit support for RISC-V, with some fixes to audit-related bugs that cropped up along the way: * The addition of NR_syscalls into unistd.h, which is necessary for CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS. * The definition of CREATE_TRACE_POINTS so __tracepoint_sys_{enter,exit} get defined. * A fix for trace_sys_exit() so we can enable CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS.
2019-01-07riscv: add audit supportDavid Abdurachmanov1-0/+2
On RISC-V (riscv) audit is supported through generic lib/audit.c. The patch adds required arch specific definitions. Signed-off-by: David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
2019-01-05Merge tag 'csky-for-linus-4.21' of git://github.com/c-sky/csky-linuxLinus Torvalds1-0/+1
Pull arch/csky updates from Guo Ren: "Here are three main features (cpu_hotplug, basic ftrace, basic perf) and some bugfixes: Features: - Add CPU-hotplug support for SMP - Add ftrace with function trace and function graph trace - Add Perf support - Add EM_CSKY_OLD 39 - optimize kernel panic print. - remove syscall_exit_work Bugfixes: - fix abiv2 mmap(... O_SYNC) failure - fix gdb coredump error - remove vdsp implement for kernel - fix qemu failure to bootup sometimes - fix ftrace call-graph panic - fix device tree node reference leak - remove meaningless header-y - fix save hi,lo,dspcr regs in switch_stack - remove unused members in processor.h" * tag 'csky-for-linus-4.21' of git://github.com/c-sky/csky-linux: csky: Add perf support for C-SKY csky: Add EM_CSKY_OLD 39 clocksource/drivers/c-sky: fixup ftrace call-graph panic csky: ftrace call graph supported. csky: basic ftrace supported csky: remove unused members in processor.h csky: optimize kernel panic print. csky: stacktrace supported. csky: CPU-hotplug supported for SMP clocksource/drivers/c-sky: fixup qemu fail to bootup sometimes. csky: fixup save hi,lo,dspcr regs in switch_stack. csky: remove syscall_exit_work csky: fixup remove vdsp implement for kernel. csky: bugfix gdb coredump error. csky: fixup abiv2 mmap(... O_SYNC) failed. csky: define syscall_get_arch() elf-em.h: add EM_CSKY csky: remove meaningless header-y csky: Don't leak device tree node reference
2018-12-30csky: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+1
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> arch/csky/include/asm/syscall.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
2018-12-18xtensa: define syscall_get_arch()Dmitry V. Levin1-0/+1
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
2018-08-16Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans up the audit messages" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs() integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification. evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string() ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
2018-07-18ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actionsStefan Berger1-0/+1
The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules: type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \ success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \ items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \ fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \ exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-06-19audit: rename FILTER_TYPE to FILTER_EXCLUDERichard Guy Briggs1-1/+2
The AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE name is vague and misleading due to not describing where or when the filter is applied and obsolete due to its available filter fields having been expanded. Userspace has already renamed it from AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE to AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE without checking if it already exists. The userspace maintainer assures that as long as it is set to the same value it will not be a problem since the userspace code does not treat compiler warnings as errors. If this policy changes then checks if it already exists can be added at the same time. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/89 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-08Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "From Mimi: - add run time support for specifying additional security xattrs included in the security.evm HMAC/signature - some code clean up and bug fixes" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs() EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs() EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp' IMA: use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() instead of its open coded variant ima: use match_string() helper ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer) ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs ima: Remove unused variable ima_initialized ima: Unify logging ima: Reflect correct permissions for policy
2018-05-18EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrsMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less convenient for distributions to enable. This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs node, which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes - missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash. [1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted uploaders. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-14audit: convert sessionid unset to a macroRichard Guy Briggs1-0/+1
Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of initialization and comparison to an audit session ID. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-11-16Merge tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another relatively small pull request for audit, nine patches total. The only real new bit of functionality is the patch from Richard which adds the ability to filter records based on the filesystem type. The remainder are bug fixes and cleanups; the bug fix highlights include: - ensuring that we properly audit init/PID-1 (me) - allowing the audit daemon to shutdown the kernel/auditd connection cleanly by setting the audit PID to zero (Steve)" * tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing audit: Add new syscalls to the perm=w filter audit: use audit_set_enabled() in audit_enable() audit: convert audit_ever_enabled to a boolean audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore audit: initialize the audit subsystem as early as possible audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1
2017-11-15Merge branch 'for_linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs Pull quota, ext2, isofs and udf fixes from Jan Kara: - two small quota error handling fixes - two isofs fixes for architectures with signed char - several udf block number overflow and signedness fixes - ext2 rework of mount option handling to avoid GFP_KERNEL allocation with spinlock held - ... it also contains a patch to implement auditing of responses to fanotify permission events. That should have been in the fanotify pull request but I mistakenly merged that patch into a wrong branch and noticed only now at which point I don't think it's worth rebasing and redoing. * 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs: quota: be aware of error from dquot_initialize quota: fix potential infinite loop isofs: use unsigned char types consistently isofs: fix timestamps beyond 2027 udf: Fix some sign-conversion warnings udf: Fix signed/unsigned format specifiers udf: Fix 64-bit sign extension issues affecting blocks > 0x7FFFFFFF udf: Remove some outdate references from documentation udf: Avoid overflow when session starts at large offset ext2: Fix possible sleep in atomic during mount option parsing ext2: Parse mount options into a dedicated structure audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
2017-11-11audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magicRichard Guy Briggs1-2/+6
Tracefs or debugfs were causing hundreds to thousands of PATH records to be associated with the init_module and finit_module SYSCALL records on a few modules when the following rule was in place for startup: -a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S init_module -F key=mod-load Provide a method to ignore these large number of PATH records from overwhelming the logs if they are not of interest. Introduce a new filter list "AUDIT_FILTER_FS", with a new field type AUDIT_FSTYPE, which keys off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic identifier to filter specific filesystem PATH records. An example rule would look like: -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x74726163 -F key=ignore_tracefs -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x64626720 -F key=ignore_debugfs Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable tracefs and debugfs on boot from production systems. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/8 Test case: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/42 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the whitespace damage in kernel/auditsc.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
Many user space API headers have licensing information, which is either incomplete, badly formatted or just a shorthand for referring to the license under which the file is supposed to be. This makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license. Update these files with an SPDX license identifier. The identifier was chosen based on the license information in the file. GPL/LGPL licensed headers get the matching GPL/LGPL SPDX license identifier with the added 'WITH Linux-syscall-note' exception, which is the officially assigned exception identifier for the kernel syscall exception: NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work". This exception makes it possible to include GPL headers into non GPL code, without confusing license compliance tools. Headers which have either explicit dual licensing or are just licensed under a non GPL license are updated with the corresponding SPDX identifier and the GPLv2 with syscall exception identifier. The format is: ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR SPDX-ID-OF-OTHER-LICENSE) SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. The update does not remove existing license information as this has to be done on a case by case basis and the copyright holders might have to be consulted. This will happen in a separate step. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the methodology of how this patch was researched. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-10audit: Record fanotify access control decisionsSteve Grubb1-0/+1
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask, FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it. It would be used something like this in user space code: response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT; write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response)); When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify rather than DAC or MAC policy. A sample event looks like this: type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls" inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb" type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901 pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t: s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2 Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capability. Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2017-02-22Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/auditLinus Torvalds1-1/+6
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "The audit changes for v4.11 are relatively small compared to what we did for v4.10, both in terms of size and impact. - two patches from Steve tweak the formatting for some of the audit records to make them more consistent with other audit records. - three patches from Richard record the name of a module on module load, fix the logging of sockaddr information when using socketcall() on 32-bit systems, and add the ability to reset audit's lost record counter. - my lone patch just fixes an annoying style nit that I was reminded about by one of Richard's patches. All these patches pass our test suite" * 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: audit: remove unnecessary curly braces from switch/case statements audit: log module name on init_module audit: log 32-bit socketcalls audit: add feature audit_lost reset audit: Make AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event normalized audit: Make AUDIT_KERNEL event conform to the specification
2017-02-14audit: log module name on init_moduleRichard Guy Briggs1-0/+1
This adds a new auxiliary record MODULE_INIT to the SYSCALL event. We get finit_module for free since it made most sense to hook this in to load_module(). https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/7 https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Module-Load-Record-Format Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> [PM: corrected links in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-18audit: add feature audit_lost resetRichard Guy Briggs1-1/+5
Add a method to reset the audit_lost value. An AUDIT_SET message with the AUDIT_STATUS_LOST flag set by itself will return a positive value repesenting the current audit_lost value and reset the counter to zero. If AUDIT_STATUS_LOST is not the only flag set, the reset command will be ignored. The value sent with the command is ignored. The return value will be the +ve lost value at reset time. An AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE message will be queued to the listening audit daemon. The message will be a standard CONFIG_CHANGE message with the fields "lost=0" and "old=" with the latter containing the value of audit_lost at reset time. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/3 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-12-15Merge branch 'stable-4.10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/auditLinus Torvalds1-1/+4
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "After the small number of patches for v4.9, we've got a much bigger pile for v4.10. The bulk of these patches involve a rework of the audit backlog queue to enable us to move the netlink multicasting out of the task/thread that generates the audit record and into the kernel thread that emits the record (just like we do for the audit unicast to auditd). While we were playing with the backlog queue(s) we fixed a number of other little problems with the code, and from all the testing so far things look to be in much better shape now. Doing this also allowed us to re-enable disabling IRQs for some netns operations ("netns: avoid disabling irq for netns id"). The remaining patches fix some small problems that are well documented in the commit descriptions, as well as adding session ID filtering support" * 'stable-4.10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: audit: use proper refcount locking on audit_sock netns: avoid disabling irq for netns id audit: don't ever sleep on a command record/message audit: handle a clean auditd shutdown with grace audit: wake up kauditd_thread after auditd registers audit: rework audit_log_start() audit: rework the audit queue handling audit: rename the queues and kauditd related functions audit: queue netlink multicast sends just like we do for unicast sends audit: fixup audit_init() audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit init (#2) audit: add support for session ID user filter audit: fix formatting of AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE events audit: skip sessionid sentinel value when auto-incrementing audit: tame initialization warning len_abuf in audit_log_execve_info audit: less stack usage for /proc/*/loginuid
2016-11-29audit: add support for session ID user filterRichard Guy Briggs1-1/+4
Define AUDIT_SESSIONID in the uapi and add support for specifying user filters based on the session ID. Also add the new session ID filter to the feature bitmap so userspace knows it is available. https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/4 RFE: add a session ID filter to the kernel's user filter Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: combine multiple patches from Richard into this one] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-10-05Merge branch 'stable-4.9' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/auditLinus Torvalds1-1/+3
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another relatively small pull request for v4.9 with just two patches. The patch from Richard updates the list of features we support and report back to userspace; this should have been sent earlier with the rest of the v4.8 patches but it got lost in my inbox. The second patch fixes a problem reported by our Android friends where we weren't very consistent in recording PIDs" * 'stable-4.9' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: audit: add exclude filter extension to feature bitmap audit: consistently record PIDs with task_tgid_nr()
2016-09-29audit: add exclude filter extension to feature bitmapRichard Guy Briggs1-1/+3
Add to the audit feature bitmap to indicate availability of the extension of the exclude filter to include PID, UID, AUID, GID, SUBJ_*. RFE: add additional fields for use in audit filter exclude rules https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/5 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-06-27netlabel: Initial support for the CALIPSO netlink protocol.Huw Davies1-0/+2
CALIPSO is a packet labelling protocol for IPv6 which is very similar to CIPSO. It is specified in RFC 5570. Much of the code is based on the current CIPSO code. This adds support for adding passthrough-type CALIPSO DOIs through the NLBL_CALIPSO_C_ADD command. It requires attributes: NLBL_CALIPSO_A_TYPE which must be CALIPSO_MAP_PASS. NLBL_CALIPSO_A_DOI. In passthrough mode the CALIPSO engine will map MLS secattr levels and categories directly to the packet label. At this stage, the major difference between this and the CIPSO code is that IPv6 may be compiled as a module. To allow for this the CALIPSO functions are registered at module init time. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-01-26audit: stop an old auditd being starved out by a new auditdRichard Guy Briggs1-0/+1
Nothing prevents a new auditd starting up and replacing a valid audit_pid when an old auditd is still running, effectively starving out the old auditd since audit_pid no longer points to the old valid auditd. If no message to auditd has been attempted since auditd died unnaturally or got killed, audit_pid will still indicate it is alive. There isn't an easy way to detect if an old auditd is still running on the existing audit_pid other than attempting to send a message to see if it fails. An -ECONNREFUSED almost certainly means it disappeared and can be replaced. Other errors are not so straightforward and may indicate transient problems that will resolve themselves and the old auditd will recover. Yet others will likely need manual intervention for which a new auditd will not solve the problem. Send a new message type (AUDIT_REPLACE) to the old auditd containing a u32 with the PID of the new auditd. If the audit replace message succeeds (or doesn't fail with certainty), fail to register the new auditd and return an error (-EEXIST). This is expected to make the patch preventing an old auditd orphaning a new auditd redundant. V3: Switch audit message type from 1000 to 1300 block. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-09-08Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/auditLinus Torvalds1-1/+4
Pull audit update from Paul Moore: "This is one of the larger audit patchsets in recent history, consisting of eight patches and almost 400 lines of changes. The bulk of the patchset is the new "audit by executable" functionality which allows admins to set an audit watch based on the executable on disk. Prior to this, admins could only track an application by PID, which has some obvious limitations. Beyond the new functionality we also have some refcnt fixes and a few minor cleanups" * 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: fixup: audit: implement audit by executable audit: implement audit by executable audit: clean simple fsnotify implementation audit: use macros for unset inode and device values audit: make audit_del_rule() more robust audit: fix uninitialized variable in audit_add_rule() audit: eliminate unnecessary extra layer of watch parent references audit: eliminate unnecessary extra layer of watch references