Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|
commit 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 upstream.
The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.
To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that
the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not
below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will
end with the length value being zero after the last option has been
parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the
length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort
and ignore the option.
In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will
be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also
the option parameter size checks.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit af3d5d1c87664a4f150fcf3534c6567cb19909b0 upstream.
When doing option parsing for standard type values of 1, 2 or 4 octets,
the value is converted directly into a variable instead of a pointer. To
avoid being tricked into being a pointer, check that for these option
types that sizes actually match. In L2CAP every option is fixed size and
thus it is prudent anyway to ensure that the remote side sends us the
right option size along with option paramters.
If the option size is not matching the option type, then that option is
silently ignored. It is a protocol violation and instead of trying to
give the remote attacker any further hints just pretend that option is
not present and proceed with the default values. Implementation
following the specification and its qualification procedures will always
use the correct size and thus not being impacted here.
To keep the code readable and consistent accross all options, a few
cosmetic changes were also required.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b3cadaa485f0c20add1644a5c877b0765b285c0c ]
This fixes two issues with setting hid->name information.
CC net/bluetooth/hidp/core.o
In function ‘hidp_setup_hid’,
inlined from ‘hidp_session_dev_init’ at net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:815:9,
inlined from ‘hidp_session_new’ at net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:953:8,
inlined from ‘hidp_connection_add’ at net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1366:8:
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:778:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ output may be truncated copying 127 bytes from a string of length 127 [-Wstringop-truncation]
strncpy(hid->name, req->name, sizeof(req->name) - 1);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
CC net/bluetooth/hidp/core.o
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c: In function ‘hidp_setup_hid’:
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:778:38: warning: argument to ‘sizeof’ in ‘strncpy’ call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]
strncpy(hid->name, req->name, sizeof(req->name));
^
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4e1a720d0312fd510699032c7694a362a010170f upstream.
slub debug reported:
[ 440.648642] =============================================================================
[ 440.648649] BUG kmalloc-1024 (Tainted: G BU O ): Poison overwritten
[ 440.648651] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 440.648655] INFO: 0xe70f4bec-0xe70f4bec. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
[ 440.648665] INFO: Allocated in sk_prot_alloc+0x6b/0xc6 age=33155 cpu=1 pid=1047
[ 440.648671] ___slab_alloc.constprop.24+0x1fc/0x292
[ 440.648675] __slab_alloc.isra.18.constprop.23+0x1c/0x25
[ 440.648677] __kmalloc+0xb6/0x17f
[ 440.648680] sk_prot_alloc+0x6b/0xc6
[ 440.648683] sk_alloc+0x1e/0xa1
[ 440.648700] sco_sock_alloc.constprop.6+0x26/0xaf [bluetooth]
[ 440.648716] sco_connect_cfm+0x166/0x281 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648731] hci_conn_request_evt.isra.53+0x258/0x281 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648746] hci_event_packet+0x28b/0x2326 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648759] hci_rx_work+0x161/0x291 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648764] process_one_work+0x163/0x2b2
[ 440.648767] worker_thread+0x1a9/0x25c
[ 440.648770] kthread+0xf8/0xfd
[ 440.648774] ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38
[ 440.648779] INFO: Freed in __sk_destruct+0xd3/0xdf age=3815 cpu=1 pid=1047
[ 440.648782] __slab_free+0x4b/0x27a
[ 440.648784] kfree+0x12e/0x155
[ 440.648787] __sk_destruct+0xd3/0xdf
[ 440.648790] sk_destruct+0x27/0x29
[ 440.648793] __sk_free+0x75/0x91
[ 440.648795] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e
[ 440.648810] sco_sock_kill+0x5a/0x5f [bluetooth]
[ 440.648825] sco_conn_del+0x8e/0xba [bluetooth]
[ 440.648840] sco_disconn_cfm+0x3a/0x41 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648855] hci_event_packet+0x45e/0x2326 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648868] hci_rx_work+0x161/0x291 [bluetooth]
[ 440.648872] process_one_work+0x163/0x2b2
[ 440.648875] worker_thread+0x1a9/0x25c
[ 440.648877] kthread+0xf8/0xfd
[ 440.648880] ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38
[ 440.648884] INFO: Slab 0xf4718580 objects=27 used=27 fp=0x (null) flags=0x40008100
[ 440.648886] INFO: Object 0xe70f4b88 @offset=19336 fp=0xe70f54f8
When KASAN was enabled, it reported:
[ 210.096613] ==================================================================
[ 210.096634] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ex_handler_refcount+0x5b/0x127
[ 210.096641] Write of size 4 at addr ffff880107e17160 by task kworker/u9:1/2040
[ 210.096651] CPU: 1 PID: 2040 Comm: kworker/u9:1 Tainted: G U O 4.14.47-20180606+ #2
[ 210.096654] Hardware name: , BIOS 2017.01-00087-g43e04de 08/30/2017
[ 210.096693] Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth]
[ 210.096698] Call Trace:
[ 210.096711] dump_stack+0x46/0x59
[ 210.096722] print_address_description+0x6b/0x23b
[ 210.096729] ? ex_handler_refcount+0x5b/0x127
[ 210.096736] kasan_report+0x220/0x246
[ 210.096744] ex_handler_refcount+0x5b/0x127
[ 210.096751] ? ex_handler_clear_fs+0x85/0x85
[ 210.096757] fixup_exception+0x8c/0x96
[ 210.096766] do_trap+0x66/0x2c1
[ 210.096773] do_error_trap+0x152/0x180
[ 210.096781] ? fixup_bug+0x78/0x78
[ 210.096817] ? hci_debugfs_create_conn+0x244/0x26a [bluetooth]
[ 210.096824] ? __schedule+0x113b/0x1453
[ 210.096830] ? sysctl_net_exit+0xe/0xe
[ 210.096837] ? __wake_up_common+0x343/0x343
[ 210.096843] ? insert_work+0x107/0x163
[ 210.096850] invalid_op+0x1b/0x40
[ 210.096888] RIP: 0010:hci_debugfs_create_conn+0x244/0x26a [bluetooth]
[ 210.096892] RSP: 0018:ffff880094a0f970 EFLAGS: 00010296
[ 210.096898] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880107e170e8 RCX: ffff880107e17160
[ 210.096902] RDX: 000000000000002f RSI: ffff88013b80ed40 RDI: ffffffffa058b940
[ 210.096906] RBP: ffff88011b2b0578 R08: 00000000852f0ec9 R09: ffffffff81cfcf9b
[ 210.096909] R10: 00000000d21bdad7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800967b0488
[ 210.096913] R13: ffff880107e17168 R14: 0000000000000068 R15: ffff8800949c0008
[ 210.096920] ? __sk_destruct+0x2c6/0x2d4
[ 210.096959] hci_event_packet+0xff5/0x7de2 [bluetooth]
[ 210.096969] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x43/0x5b
[ 210.097004] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x158/0x166 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097039] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x2bb3/0x2bb3 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097075] ? l2cap_ertm_init+0x94e/0x94e [bluetooth]
[ 210.097093] ? xhci_urb_enqueue+0xbd8/0xcf5 [xhci_hcd]
[ 210.097102] ? __accumulate_pelt_segments+0x24/0x33
[ 210.097109] ? __accumulate_pelt_segments+0x24/0x33
[ 210.097115] ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.2+0x217/0x3a4
[ 210.097122] ? set_next_entity+0x7c3/0x12cd
[ 210.097128] ? pick_next_entity+0x25e/0x26c
[ 210.097135] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x2ca/0xc1a
[ 210.097141] ? switch_mm_irqs_off+0x346/0xb4f
[ 210.097147] ? __switch_to+0x769/0xbc4
[ 210.097153] ? compat_start_thread+0x66/0x66
[ 210.097188] ? hci_conn_check_link_mode+0x1cd/0x1cd [bluetooth]
[ 210.097195] ? finish_task_switch+0x392/0x431
[ 210.097228] ? hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097260] hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097269] process_one_work+0x579/0x9e9
[ 210.097277] worker_thread+0x68f/0x804
[ 210.097285] kthread+0x31c/0x32b
[ 210.097292] ? rescuer_thread+0x70c/0x70c
[ 210.097299] ? kthread_create_on_node+0xa3/0xa3
[ 210.097306] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 210.097314] Allocated by task 2040:
[ 210.097323] kasan_kmalloc.part.1+0x51/0xc7
[ 210.097328] __kmalloc+0x17f/0x1b6
[ 210.097335] sk_prot_alloc+0xf2/0x1a3
[ 210.097340] sk_alloc+0x22/0x297
[ 210.097375] sco_sock_alloc.constprop.7+0x23/0x202 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097410] sco_connect_cfm+0x2d0/0x566 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097443] hci_conn_request_evt.isra.53+0x6d3/0x762 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097476] hci_event_packet+0x85e/0x7de2 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097507] hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097512] process_one_work+0x579/0x9e9
[ 210.097517] worker_thread+0x68f/0x804
[ 210.097523] kthread+0x31c/0x32b
[ 210.097529] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 210.097533] Freed by task 2040:
[ 210.097539] kasan_slab_free+0xb3/0x15e
[ 210.097544] kfree+0x103/0x1a9
[ 210.097549] __sk_destruct+0x2c6/0x2d4
[ 210.097584] sco_conn_del.isra.1+0xba/0x10e [bluetooth]
[ 210.097617] hci_event_packet+0xff5/0x7de2 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097648] hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth]
[ 210.097653] process_one_work+0x579/0x9e9
[ 210.097658] worker_thread+0x68f/0x804
[ 210.097663] kthread+0x31c/0x32b
[ 210.097670] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 210.097676] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880107e170e8
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 210.097681] The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff880107e170e8, ffff880107e174e8)
[ 210.097683] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 210.097689] page:ffffea00041f8400 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0xffff880107e15b68 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 210.110194] flags: 0x8000000000008100(slab|head)
[ 210.115441] raw: 8000000000008100 0000000000000000 ffff880107e15b68 0000000100170016
[ 210.115448] raw: ffffea0004a47620 ffffea0004b48e20 ffff88013b80ed40 0000000000000000
[ 210.115451] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 210.115454] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 210.115460] ffff880107e17000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 210.115465] ffff880107e17080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb
[ 210.115469] >ffff880107e17100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 210.115472] ^
[ 210.115477] ffff880107e17180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 210.115481] ffff880107e17200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 210.115483] ==================================================================
And finally when BT_DBG() and ftrace was enabled it showed:
<...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104191: sco_sock_kill <-sco_sock_close
<...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104191: sco_sock_kill <-sco_sock_release
<...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104192: sco_sock_kill: sk ef0497a0 state 9
<...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104193: bt_sock_unlink <-sco_sock_kill
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104246: sco_sock_kill <-sco_conn_del
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104248: sco_sock_kill: sk ef0497a0 state 9
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104249: bt_sock_unlink <-sco_sock_kill
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104250: sco_sock_destruct <-__sk_destruct
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104250: sco_sock_destruct: sk ef0497a0
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104860: hci_conn_del <-hci_event_packet
kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104864: hci_conn_del: hci0 hcon ef0484c0 handle 266
Only in the failed case, sco_sock_kill() gets called with the same sock
pointer two times. Add a check for SOCK_DEAD to avoid continue killing
a socket which has already been killed.
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7992c18810e568b95c869b227137a2215702a805 upstream.
CVE-2018-9363
The buffer length is unsigned at all layers, but gets cast to int and
checked in hidp_process_report and can lead to a buffer overflow.
Switch len parameter to unsigned int to resolve issue.
This affects 3.18 and newer kernels.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Fixes: a4b1b5877b514b276f0f31efe02388a9c2836728 ("HID: Bluetooth: hidp: make sure input buffers are big enough")
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 313f6888c8fbb1bc8b36c9012ce4e1de848df696 ]
The Broadcom BCM20702 Bluetooth controller in ThinkPad-T530 devices
report support for the Set Event Mask Page 2 command, but actually do
return an error when trying to use it.
< HCI Command: Read Local Supported Commands (0x04|0x0002) plen 0
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 68
Read Local Supported Commands (0x04|0x0002) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
Commands: 162 entries
...
Set Event Mask Page 2 (Octet 22 - Bit 2)
...
< HCI Command: Set Event Mask Page 2 (0x03|0x0063) plen 8
Mask: 0x0000000000000000
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
Set Event Mask Page 2 (0x03|0x0063) ncmd 1
Status: Unknown HCI Command (0x01)
Since these controllers do not support any feature that would require
the event mask page 2 to be modified, it is safe to not send this
command at all. The default value is all bits set to zero.
T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=03 Cnt=03 Dev#= 9 Spd=12 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=0a5c ProdID=21e6 Rev= 1.12
S: Manufacturer=Broadcom Corp
S: Product=BCM20702A0
S: SerialNumber=F82FA8E8CFC0
C:* #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr= 0mA
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 64 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 64 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 2 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 3 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 4 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 5 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=btusb
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 32 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 32 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=fe(app. ) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 64e759f58f128730b97a3c3a26d283c075ad7c86 upstream.
If Security Request is received on connection that is already encrypted
with sufficient security master should perform encryption key refresh
procedure instead of just ignoring Slave Security Request
(Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3 Part H 2.4.6).
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 6
SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
< HCI Command: LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) plen 28
Handle: 3585
Random number: 0x0000000000000000
Encrypted diversifier: 0x0000
Long term key: 44264272a5c426a9e868f034cf0e69f3
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Encryption Key Refresh Complete (0x30) plen 3
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 3585
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e860d2c904d1a9f38a24eb44c9f34b8f915a6ea3 upstream.
Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses
to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks.
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 25717382c1dd0ddced2059053e3ca5088665f7a5 upstream.
It looks like bnep_session has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (condition)
break;
// may call might_sleep here
schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
Which fixed at:
dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps
So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/
Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho <acho@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f06d977309d09253c744e54e75c5295ecc52b7b4 upstream.
It looks like cmtp_session has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (condition)
break;
// may call might_sleep here
schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
Which fixed at:
dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps
So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/
Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho <acho@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 5da8e47d849d3d37b14129f038782a095b9ad049 upstream.
It looks like hidp_session_thread has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (condition)
break;
// may call might_sleep here
schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
Which fixed at:
dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps
So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/
Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com>
Tested-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho <acho@suse.com>
Tested-by: Rohit Vaswani <rvaswani@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
l2cap socket
commit 96c26653ce65bf84f3212f8b00d4316c1efcbf4c upstream.
... rather than relying on ciptool(8) never passing it anything else. Give
it e.g. an AF_UNIX connected socket (from socketpair(2)) and it'll oops,
trying to evaluate &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 88d9077c27d0c1a7c022d9dc987640beecf23560 upstream.
The bnep_get_device function may be triggered by an ioctl just after a
connection has gone down. In such a case the respective L2CAP chan->conn
pointer will get set to NULL (by l2cap_chan_del). This patch adds a
missing NULL check for this case in the bnep_get_device() function.
Reported-by: Patrik Flykt <patrik.flykt@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
l2cap socket
commit 71bb99a02b32b4cc4265118e85f6035ca72923f0 upstream.
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 329d82309824ff1082dc4a91a5bbed8c3bec1580 upstream.
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ab89f0bdd63a3721f7cd3f064f39fc4ac7ca14d4 upstream.
Running 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel results in MSG_CMSG_COMPAT being
defined as 0x80000000. This results in sendmsg failure if used from 32bit
userspace running on 64bit kernel. Fix this by accounting for MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
in flags check in hci_sock_sendmsg.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marko Kiiskila <marko@runtime.io>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 9391976a4da0d2a30abdb8d2704cfc7bf4bf9aab upstream.
gcc5 warns about passing a const array to hci_test_bit which takes a
non-const pointer:
net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c: In function ‘hci_sock_sendmsg’:
net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:955:8: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘hci_test_bit’ discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-array-qualifiers]
&hci_sec_filter.ocf_mask[ogf])) &&
^
net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:49:19: note: expected ‘void *’ but argument is of type ‘const __u32 (*)[4] {aka const unsigned int (*)[4]}’
static inline int hci_test_bit(int nr, void *addr)
^
So make 'addr' 'const void *'.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 951b6a0717db97ce420547222647bcc40bf1eacd ]
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 23bc6ab0a0912146fd674a0becc758c3162baabc ]
When we retrieve imtu value from userspace we should use 16 bit pointer
cast instead of 32 as it's defined that way in headers. Fixes setsockopt
calls on big-endian platforms.
Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński <amadeusz.slawinski@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5233252fce714053f0151680933571a2da9cbfb4 ]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
|
|
commit e12af489b91d47a806f4e96e4edc20df612482e7 upstream.
According to the Bluetooth core specification valid identity addresses
are either Public Device Addresses or Static Random Addresses. IRKs
received with any other type of address should be discarded since we
cannot assume to know the permanent identity of the peer device.
This patch fixes a missing check for the Identity Address when receiving
the Identity Address Information SMP PDU.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 6a8fc95c87110a466ee81675b41170b963f82bdb upstream.
When connectable mode is enabled (page scan on) through some non-mgmt
method the HCI_CONNECTABLE flag will not be set. For backwards
compatibility with user space versions not using mgmt we should not
require HCI_CONNECTABLE to be set if HCI_MGMT is not set.
Reported-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 8bfe8442ff20fdc2d965c197103d935a99bd3296 upstream.
When controllers set the HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR flag, it is required
by userspace to program a valid public Bluetooth device address into
the controller before it can be used.
After successful address configuration, the internal state changes and
the controller runs the complete initialization procedure. However one
small difference is that this is no longer the HCI_SETUP stage. The
HCI_SETUP stage is only valid during initial controller setup. In this
case the stack runs the initialization as part of the HCI_CONFIG stage.
The controller version information, default name and supported commands
are only stored during HCI_SETUP. While these information are static,
they are not read initially when HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR is set. So
when running in HCI_CONFIG state, these information need to be updated
as well.
This especially impacts Bluetooth 4.1 and later controllers using
extended feature pages and second event mask page.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a4d5504d5c39cc84f1f828e19967595597a8136e upstream.
The internal representation of the LE white list needs to be cleared
when receiving a successful HCI_Reset command. A reset of the controller
is expected to start with an empty LE white list.
When the LE white list is not cleared on controller reset, the passive
background scanning might skip programming the remote devices. Only
changes to the LE white list are programmed when passive background
is started.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0b1db38ca26b322296cbd141f3080eccfe1cc3e1 upstream.
These days we allow simultaneous LE scanning and advertising. Checking
for whether advertising is enabled or not is therefore not a reliable
way to determine whether directed advertising was used to trigger the
connection creation. The appropriate place to check (instead of the hdev
context) is the connection role that's stored in the hci_conn. This
patch fixes such a check in le_conn_timeout() which could otherwise lead
to incorrect HCI commands being sent.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 980ffc0a2cec2c37589cc97993e1ad17252f4f47 upstream.
The le_conn_timeout() may call hci_le_conn_failed() which in turn may
call hci_conn_del(). Trying to use the _sync variant for cancelling the
conn timeout from hci_conn_del() could therefore result in a deadlock.
This patch converts hci_conn_del() to use the non-sync variant so the
deadlock is not possible.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit b0c42cd7b210efc74aa4bfc3e39a2814dfaa9b89 upstream.
This patch reverts commit:
a7807d73 ("Bluetooth: 6lowpan: Avoid memory leak if memory allocation
fails")
which was wrong suggested by Alexander Aring. The function skb_unshare
run also kfree_skb on failure.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
We did not return error if multicast packet transmit failed.
This might not be desired so return error also in this case.
If there are multiple 6lowpan devices where the multicast packet
is sent, then return error even if sending to only one of them fails.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
Make sure that we are able to return EAGAIN from l2cap_chan_send()
even for multicast packets. The error code was ignored unncessarily.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
If skb_unshare() returns NULL, then we leak the original skb.
Solution is to use temp variable to hold the new skb.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
The earlier multicast commit 36b3dd250dde ("Bluetooth: 6lowpan:
Ensure header compression does not corrupt IPv6 header") lost one
skb free which then caused memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
The L2CAP connection's channel list lock (conn->chan_lock) must never be
taken while already holding a channel lock (chan->lock) in order to
avoid lock-inversion and lockdep warnings. So far the l2cap_chan_connect
function has acquired the chan->lock early in the function and then
later called l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan) which will try to take the
conn->chan_lock. This violates the correct order of taking the locks and
may lead to the following type of lockdep warnings:
-> #1 (&conn->chan_lock){+.+...}:
[<c109324d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x140
[<c188459c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6c/0x420
[<d0aab48e>] l2cap_chan_add+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth]
[<d0aac618>] l2cap_chan_connect+0x348/0x8f0 [bluetooth]
[<d0cc9a91>] lowpan_control_write+0x221/0x2d0 [bluetooth_6lowpan]
-> #0 (&chan->lock){+.+.+.}:
[<c10928d8>] __lock_acquire+0x1a18/0x1d20
[<c109324d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x140
[<c188459c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6c/0x420
[<d0ab05fd>] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x1dd/0x3f0 [bluetooth]
[<d0a909c4>] hci_le_meta_evt+0x11a4/0x1260 [bluetooth]
[<d0a910eb>] hci_event_packet+0x3ab/0x3120 [bluetooth]
[<d0a7cb08>] hci_rx_work+0x208/0x4a0 [bluetooth]
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&conn->chan_lock);
lock(&chan->lock);
lock(&conn->chan_lock);
lock(&chan->lock);
Before calling l2cap_chan_add() the channel is not part of the
conn->chan_l list, and can therefore only be accessed by the L2CAP user
(such as l2cap_sock.c). We can therefore assume that it is the
responsibility of the user to handle mutual exclusion until this point
(which we can see is already true in l2cap_sock.c by it in many places
touching chan members without holding chan->lock).
Since the hci_conn and by exctension l2cap_conn creation in the
l2cap_chan_connect() function depend on chan details we cannot simply
add a mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock) in the beginning of the function
(since the conn object doesn't yet exist there). What we can do however
is move the chan->lock taking later into the function where we already
have the conn object and can that way take conn->chan_lock first.
This patch implements the above strategy and does some other necessary
changes such as using __l2cap_chan_add() which assumes conn->chan_lock
is held, as well as adding a second needed label so the unlocking
happens as it should.
Reported-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
Set multicast support for 6lowpan network interface.
This is needed in every network interface that supports IPv6.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
If skb is going to multiple destinations, then make sure that we
do not overwrite the common IPv6 headers. So before compressing
the IPv6 headers, we copy the skb and that is then sent to 6LoWPAN
Bluetooth devices.
This is a similar patch as what was done for IEEE 802.154 6LoWPAN
in commit f19f4f9525cf3 ("ieee802154: 6lowpan: ensure header compression
does not corrupt ipv6 header")
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
We need to make sure that the saved skb exists when
resuming or suspending a CoC channel. This can happen if
initial credits is 0 when channel is connected.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
The sco_param_wideband table represents the eSCO parameters for
specifically mSBC encoding. This patch renames the table to the more
descriptive esco_param_msbc name.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
It is expected that new parameter combinations will have the
retransmission effort value different between some entries (mainly
because of the new S4 configuration added by HFP 1.7), so it makes sense
to move it into the table instead of having it hard coded based on the
selected SCO_AIRMODE_*.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
The core specification defines valid values for the
HCI_Reject_Synchronous_Connection_Request command to be 0x0D-0x0F. So
far the code has been using HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM (0x13) which is
not a valid value and is therefore being rejected by some controllers:
> HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10
bdaddr 40:6F:2A:6A:E5:E0 class 0x000000 type eSCO
< HCI Command: Reject Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x002a) plen 7
bdaddr 40:6F:2A:6A:E5:E0 reason 0x13
Reason: Remote User Terminated Connection
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
Reject Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x002a) status 0x12 ncmd 1
Error: Invalid HCI Command Parameters
This patch introduces a new define for a value from the valid range
(0x0d == Connection Rejected Due To Limited Resources) and uses it
instead for rejecting incoming connections.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
No caller or macro uses the return value so make all
the functions return void.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
SCO connection cannot be setup to devices that do not support retransmission.
Patch based on http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.bluez.kernel/7779 and
adapted for this kernel version.
Code changed to check SCO/eSCO type before setting retransmission effort
and max. latency. The purpose of the patch is to support older devices not
capable of eSCO.
Tested on Blackberry 655+ headset which does not support retransmission.
Credits go to Alexander Sommerhuber.
Signed-off-by: Bernhard Thaler <bernhard.thaler@r-it.at>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
We can only determine the final security level when both pairing request
and response have been exchanged. When initiating pairing the starting
target security level is set to MEDIUM unless explicitly specified to be
HIGH, so that we can still perform pairing even if the remote doesn't
have MITM capabilities. However, once we've received the pairing
response we should re-consult the remote and local IO capabilities and
upgrade the target security level if necessary.
Without this patch the resulting Long Term Key will occasionally be
reported to be unauthenticated when it in reality is an authenticated
one.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
|
The hci_recv_fragment function is no longer used by any driver and thus
do not export it. In fact it is not even needed by the core and it can
be removed altogether.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
The Bluetooth core already does processing of the HCI command header
and puts it together before sending it to the driver. It is not really
efficient for the driver to look at the HCI command header again in
case it has to make certain decisions about certain commands. To make
this easier, just provide the opcode as part of the SKB control buffer
information. The extra information about the opcode is optional and
only provided for HCI commands.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
The struct bt_skb_cb size needs to stay within the limits of skb->cb
at all times and to ensure that add a BUILD_BUG_ON to check for it at
compile time.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
|
|
The hci_update_random_address will clear the RPA_EXPIRED flag and
proceed with setting a new one if the flag was set. However, the
set_random_addr() function that is called may choose to defer the update
to a later moment. In such a case the flag would incorrectly remain
unset unless set_random_addr() re-sets it. This patch fixes the issue.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
If encryption fails and we're using an RPA it may be because of a
conflict with another device. To avoid repeated failures the safest
action is to simply mark the RPA as expired so that a new one gets
generated as soon as the connection drops.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
This is a trivial change to use a proper define for the NoInputNoOutput
IO capability instead of hard-coded values.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
Even if we have no connection-oriented channels we should perform the
L2CAP Information Request procedures before notifying L2CAP channels of
the connection. This is so that the L2CAP channel implementations can
perform checks on what the remote side supports (e.g. does it support
the fixed channel in question).
So far the code has relied on the l2cap_do_start() function to initiate
the Information Request, however l2cap_do_start() is used on a
per-channel basis and only for connection-oriented channels. This means
that if there are no connection-oriented channels on the system we would
never start the Information Request procedure.
This patch creates a new l2cap_request_info() helper function to
initiate the Information Request procedure, and ensures that it is
called whenever a BR/EDR connection has been established. The patch also
updates fixed channels to be notified of connection readiness only once
the Information Request procedure has completed.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
|
There are several places that need to determine the security level that
an LTK can provide. This patch adds a convenience function for this to
help make the code more readable.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|