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2021-06-24libceph: set global_id as soon as we get an auth ticketIlya Dryomov1-5/+6
Commit 61ca49a9105f ("libceph: don't set global_id until we get an auth ticket") delayed the setting of global_id too much. It is set only after all tickets are received, but in pre-nautilus clusters an auth ticket and the service tickets are obtained in separate steps (for a total of three MAuth replies). When the service tickets are requested, global_id is used to build an authorizer; if global_id is still 0 we never get them and fail to establish the session. Moving the setting of global_id into protocol implementations. This way global_id can be set exactly when an auth ticket is received, not sooner nor later. Fixes: 61ca49a9105f ("libceph: don't set global_id until we get an auth ticket") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
2021-06-24libceph: don't pass result into ac->ops->handle_reply()Ilya Dryomov1-4/+2
There is no result to pass in msgr2 case because authentication failures are reported through auth_bad_method frame and in MAuth case an error is returned immediately. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
2021-04-28libceph: bump CephXAuthenticate encoding versionIlya Dryomov1-1/+1
A dummy v3 encoding (exactly the same as v2) was introduced so that the monitors can distinguish broken clients that may not include their auth ticket in CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY request on reconnects, thus failing to prove previous possession of their global_id (one part of CVE-2021-20288). The kernel client has always included its auth ticket, so it is compatible with enforcing mode as is. However we want to bump the encoding version to avoid having to authenticate twice on the initial connect -- all legacy (CephXAuthenticate < v3) are now forced do so in order to expose insecure global_id reclaim. Marking for stable since at least for 5.11 and 5.12 it is trivial (v2 -> v3). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11+ URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/50452 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2021-01-04libceph: zero out session key and connection secretIlya Dryomov1-23/+34
Try and avoid leaving bits and pieces of session key and connection secret (gets split into GCM key and a pair of GCM IVs) around. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
2020-12-15libceph: drop ac->ops->name fieldIlya Dryomov1-1/+0
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2020-12-15libceph, ceph: incorporate nautilus cephx changesIlya Dryomov1-42/+173
- request service tickets together with auth ticket. Currently we get auth ticket via CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY op and then request service tickets via CEPHX_GET_PRINCIPAL_SESSION_KEY op in a separate message. Since nautilus, desired service tickets are shared togther with auth ticket in CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY reply. - propagate session key and connection secret, if any. In preparation for msgr2, update handle_reply() and verify_authorizer_reply() auth ops to propagate session key and connection secret. Since nautilus, if secure mode is negotiated, connection secret is shared either in CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY reply (for mons) or in a final authorizer reply (for osds and mdses). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2020-12-15libceph: safer en/decoding of cephx requests and repliesIlya Dryomov1-21/+26
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2020-12-15libceph: more insight into ticket expiry and invalidationIlya Dryomov1-14/+25
Make it clear that "need" is a union of "missing" and "have, but up for renewal" and dout when the ticket goes missing due to expiry or invalidation by client. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2018-08-02libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply()Ilya Dryomov1-2/+4
Allow for extending ceph_x_authorize_reply in the future. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2018-08-02libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation modeIlya Dryomov1-17/+56
Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks) instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out data_crc entirely. This addresses CVE-2018-1129. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2018-08-02libceph: add authorizer challengeIlya Dryomov1-5/+67
When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse the same authorizer to authenticate themselves. Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection instance. The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit. This addresses CVE-2018-1128. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2018-08-02libceph: factor out encrypt_authorizer()Ilya Dryomov1-13/+36
Will be used for encrypting both the initial and updated authorizers. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2018-08-02libceph: factor out __ceph_x_decrypt()Ilya Dryomov1-9/+24
Will be used for decrypting the server challenge which is only preceded by ceph_x_encrypt_header. Drop struct_v check to allow for extending ceph_x_encrypt_header in the future. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2018-08-02ceph: fix whitespaceStephen Hemminger1-2/+0
Remove blank lines at end of file and trailing whitespace. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2018-08-02libceph: use timespec64 in for keepalive2 and ticket validityArnd Bergmann1-7/+7
ceph_con_keepalive_expired() is the last user of timespec_add() and some of the last uses of ktime_get_real_ts(). Replacing this with timespec64 based interfaces lets us remove that deprecated API. I'm introducing new ceph_encode_timespec64()/ceph_decode_timespec64() here that take timespec64 structures and convert to/from ceph_timespec, which is defined to have an unsigned 32-bit tv_sec member. This extends the range of valid times to year 2106, avoiding the year 2038 overflow. The ceph file system portion still uses the old functions for inode timestamps, this will be done separately after the VFS layer is converted. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-05-23libceph: fix error handling in process_one_ticket()Ilya Dryomov1-5/+5
Don't leak key internals after new_session_key is populated. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
2017-05-23libceph: validate blob_struct_v in process_one_ticket()Ilya Dryomov1-0/+3
None of these are validated in userspace, but since we do validate reply_struct_v in ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(), tkt_struct_v (first) and CephXServiceTicket struct_v (second) in process_one_ticket(), validate CephXTicketBlob struct_v as well. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
2016-12-13libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply()Ilya Dryomov1-1/+1
The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the messenger layer anyway. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: switch ceph_x_decrypt() to ceph_crypt()Ilya Dryomov1-46/+32
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: switch ceph_x_encrypt() to ceph_crypt()Ilya Dryomov1-34/+37
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: tweak calcu_signature() a littleIlya Dryomov1-15/+28
- replace an ad-hoc array with a struct - rename to calc_signature() for consistency Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: rename and align ceph_x_authorizer::reply_bufIlya Dryomov1-5/+5
It's going to be used as a temporary buffer for in-place en/decryption with ceph_crypt() instead of on-stack buffers, so rename to enc_buf. Ensure alignment to avoid GFP_ATOMIC allocations in the crypto stack. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: introduce ceph_x_encrypt_offset()Ilya Dryomov1-2/+6
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: old_key in process_one_ticket() is redundantIlya Dryomov1-3/+1
Since commit 0a990e709356 ("ceph: clean up service ticket decoding"), th->session_key isn't assigned until everything is decoded. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-12-13libceph: ceph_x_encrypt_buflen() takes in_lenIlya Dryomov1-3/+4
Pass what's going to be encrypted - that's msg_b, not ticket_blob. ceph_x_encrypt_buflen() returns the upper bound, so this doesn't change the maxlen calculation, but makes it a bit clearer. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-04-25libceph: make authorizer destruction independent of ceph_auth_clientIlya Dryomov1-11/+10
Starting the kernel client with cephx disabled and then enabling cephx and restarting userspace daemons can result in a crash: [262671.478162] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffebe000000000 [262671.531460] IP: [<ffffffff811cd04a>] kfree+0x5a/0x130 [262671.584334] PGD 0 [262671.635847] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [262672.055841] CPU: 22 PID: 2961272 Comm: kworker/22:2 Not tainted 4.2.0-34-generic #39~14.04.1-Ubuntu [262672.162338] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/068CDY, BIOS 2.4.3 07/09/2014 [262672.268937] Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [libceph] [262672.322290] task: ffff88081c2d0dc0 ti: ffff880149ae8000 task.ti: ffff880149ae8000 [262672.428330] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811cd04a>] [<ffffffff811cd04a>] kfree+0x5a/0x130 [262672.535880] RSP: 0018:ffff880149aeba58 EFLAGS: 00010286 [262672.589486] RAX: 000001e000000000 RBX: 0000000000000012 RCX: ffff8807e7461018 [262672.695980] RDX: 000077ff80000000 RSI: ffff88081af2be04 RDI: 0000000000000012 [262672.803668] RBP: ffff880149aeba78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [262672.912299] R10: ffffebe000000000 R11: ffff880819a60e78 R12: ffff8800aec8df40 [262673.021769] R13: ffffffffc035f70f R14: ffff8807e5b138e0 R15: ffff880da9785840 [262673.131722] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88081fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [262673.245377] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [262673.303281] CR2: ffffebe000000000 CR3: 0000000001c0d000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [262673.417556] Stack: [262673.472943] ffff880149aeba88 ffff88081af2be04 ffff8800aec8df40 ffff88081af2be04 [262673.583767] ffff880149aeba98 ffffffffc035f70f ffff880149aebac8 ffff8800aec8df00 [262673.694546] ffff880149aebac8 ffffffffc035c89e ffff8807e5b138e0 ffff8805b047f800 [262673.805230] Call Trace: [262673.859116] [<ffffffffc035f70f>] ceph_x_destroy_authorizer+0x1f/0x50 [libceph] [262673.968705] [<ffffffffc035c89e>] ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer+0x3e/0x60 [libceph] [262674.078852] [<ffffffffc0352805>] put_osd+0x45/0x80 [libceph] [262674.134249] [<ffffffffc035290e>] remove_osd+0xae/0x140 [libceph] [262674.189124] [<ffffffffc0352aa3>] __reset_osd+0x103/0x150 [libceph] [262674.243749] [<ffffffffc0354703>] kick_requests+0x223/0x460 [libceph] [262674.297485] [<ffffffffc03559e2>] ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x282/0x5e0 [libceph] [262674.350813] [<ffffffffc035022e>] dispatch+0x4e/0x720 [libceph] [262674.403312] [<ffffffffc034bd91>] try_read+0x3d1/0x1090 [libceph] [262674.454712] [<ffffffff810ab7c2>] ? dequeue_entity+0x152/0x690 [262674.505096] [<ffffffffc034cb1b>] con_work+0xcb/0x1300 [libceph] [262674.555104] [<ffffffff8108fb3e>] process_one_work+0x14e/0x3d0 [262674.604072] [<ffffffff810901ea>] worker_thread+0x11a/0x470 [262674.652187] [<ffffffff810900d0>] ? rescuer_thread+0x310/0x310 [262674.699022] [<ffffffff810957a2>] kthread+0xd2/0xf0 [262674.744494] [<ffffffff810956d0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c0/0x1c0 [262674.789543] [<ffffffff817bd81f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [262674.834094] [<ffffffff810956d0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c0/0x1c0 What happens is the following: (1) new MON session is established (2) old "none" ac is destroyed (3) new "cephx" ac is constructed ... (4) old OSD session (w/ "none" authorizer) is put ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(ac, osd->o_auth.authorizer) osd->o_auth.authorizer in the "none" case is just a bare pointer into ac, which contains a single static copy for all services. By the time we get to (4), "none" ac, freed in (2), is long gone. On top of that, a new vtable installed in (3) points us at ceph_x_destroy_authorizer(), so we end up trying to destroy a "none" authorizer with a "cephx" destructor operating on invalid memory! To fix this, decouple authorizer destruction from ac and do away with a single static "none" authorizer by making a copy for each OSD or MDS session. Authorizers themselves are independent of ac and so there is no reason for destroy_authorizer() to be an ac op. Make it an op on the authorizer itself by turning ceph_authorizer into a real struct. Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/15447 Reported-by: Alan Zhang <alan.zhang@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-01-21libceph: kill off ceph_x_ticket_handler::validityIlya Dryomov1-4/+2
With it gone, no need to preserve ceph_timespec in process_one_ticket() either. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-01-21libceph: invalidate AUTH in addition to a service ticketIlya Dryomov1-2/+14
If we fault due to authentication, we invalidate the service ticket we have and request a new one - the idea being that if a service rejected our authorizer, it must have expired, despite mon_client's attempts at periodic renewal. (The other possibility is that our ticket is too new and the service hasn't gotten it yet, in which case invalidating isn't necessary but doesn't hurt.) Invalidating just the service ticket is not enough, though. If we assume a failure on mon_client's part to renew a service ticket, we have to assume the same for the AUTH ticket. If our AUTH ticket is bad, we won't get any service tickets no matter how hard we try, so invalidate AUTH ticket along with the service ticket. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2016-01-21libceph: fix authorizer invalidation, take 2Ilya Dryomov1-5/+22
Back in 2013, commit 4b8e8b5d78b8 ("libceph: fix authorizer invalidation") tried to fix authorizer invalidation issues by clearing validity field. However, nothing ever consults this field, so it doesn't force us to request any new secrets in any way and therefore we never get out of the exponential backoff mode: [ 129.973812] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure [ 130.706785] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure [ 131.710088] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure [ 133.708321] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure [ 137.706598] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure ... AFAICT this was the case at the time 4b8e8b5d78b8 was merged, too. Using timespec solely as a bool isn't nice, so introduce a new have_key flag, specifically for this purpose. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2015-11-03libceph: add nocephx_sign_messages optionIlya Dryomov1-0/+7
Support for message signing was merged into 3.19, along with nocephx_require_signatures option. But, all that option does is allow the kernel client to talk to clusters that don't support MSG_AUTH feature bit. That's pretty useless, given that it's been supported since bobtail. Meanwhile, if one disables message signing on the server side with "cephx sign messages = false", it becomes impossible to use the kernel client since it expects messages to be signed if MSG_AUTH was negotiated. Add nocephx_sign_messages option to support this use case. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2015-11-03libceph: drop authorizer check from cephx msg signing routinesIlya Dryomov1-4/+1
I don't see a way for auth->authorizer to be NULL in ceph_x_sign_message() or ceph_x_check_message_signature(). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2015-11-03libceph: introduce ceph_x_authorizer_cleanup()Ilya Dryomov1-11/+17
Commit ae385eaf24dc ("libceph: store session key in cephx authorizer") introduced ceph_x_authorizer::session_key, but didn't update all the exit/error paths. Introduce ceph_x_authorizer_cleanup() to encapsulate ceph_x_authorizer cleanup and switch to it. This fixes ceph_x_destroy(), which currently always leaks key and ceph_x_build_authorizer() error paths. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
2015-01-08libceph: fix sparse endianness warningsIlya Dryomov1-1/+1
The only real issue is the one in auth_x.c and it came with 3.19-rc1 merge. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
2014-12-17libceph: message signature supportYan, Zheng1-0/+58
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
2014-12-17libceph: store session key in cephx authorizerYan, Zheng1-7/+11
Session key is required when calculating message signature. Save the session key in authorizer, this avoid lookup ticket handler for each message Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
2014-10-31libceph: eliminate unnecessary allocation in process_one_ticket()Ilya Dryomov1-15/+10
Commit c27a3e4d667f ("libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len") while fixing a buffer overlow tried to keep the same as much of the surrounding code as possible and introduced an unnecessary kmalloc() in the unencrypted ticket path. It is likely to fail on huge tickets, so get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2014-09-10libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket lenIlya Dryomov1-35/+29
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at the point where we know how much is going to be needed. Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2014-09-10libceph: add process_one_ticket() helperIlya Dryomov1-104/+124
Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets. Needed for the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers. (Most of the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2013-05-02libceph: wrap auth ops in wrapper functionsSage Weil1-1/+0
Use wrapper functions that check whether the auth op exists so that callers do not need a bunch of conditional checks. Simplifies the external interface. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
2013-05-02libceph: add update_authorizer auth methodSage Weil1-0/+23
Currently the messenger calls out to a get_authorizer con op, which will create a new authorizer if it doesn't yet have one. In the meantime, when we rotate our service keys, the authorizer doesn't get updated. Eventually it will be rejected by the server on a new connection attempt and get invalidated, and we will then rebuild a new authorizer, but this is not ideal. Instead, if we do have an authorizer, call a new update_authorizer op that will verify that the current authorizer is using the latest secret. If it is not, we will build a new one that does. This avoids the transient failure. This fixes one of the sorry sequence of events for bug http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4282 Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
2013-05-02libceph: fix authorizer invalidationSage Weil1-1/+1
We were invalidating the authorizer by removing the ticket handler entirely. This was effective in inducing us to request a new authorizer, but in the meantime it mean that any authorizer we generated would get a new and initialized handler with secret_id=0, which would always be rejected by the server side with a confusing error message: auth: could not find secret_id=0 cephx: verify_authorizer could not get service secret for service osd secret_id=0 Instead, simply clear the validity field. This will still induce the auth code to request a new secret, but will let us continue to use the old ticket in the meantime. The messenger code will probably continue to fail, but the exponential backoff will kick in, and eventually the we will get a new (hopefully more valid) ticket from the mon and be able to continue. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
2012-05-17ceph: messenger: reduce args to create_authorizerAlex Elder1-8/+7
Make use of the new ceph_auth_handshake structure in order to reduce the number of arguments passed to the create_authorizor method in ceph_auth_client_ops. Use a local variable of that type as a shorthand in the get_authorizer method definitions. Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
2011-03-29ceph: Move secret key parsing earlier.Tommi Virtanen1-3/+5
This makes the base64 logic be contained in mount option parsing, and prepares us for replacing the homebew key management with the kernel key retention service. Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2010-10-21ceph: factor out libceph from Ceph file systemYehuda Sadeh1-0/+688
This factors out protocol and low-level storage parts of ceph into a separate libceph module living in net/ceph and include/linux/ceph. This is mostly a matter of moving files around. However, a few key pieces of the interface change as well: - ceph_client becomes ceph_fs_client and ceph_client, where the latter captures the mon and osd clients, and the fs_client gets the mds client and file system specific pieces. - Mount option parsing and debugfs setup is correspondingly broken into two pieces. - The mon client gets a generic handler callback for otherwise unknown messages (mds map, in this case). - The basic supported/required feature bits can be expanded (and are by ceph_fs_client). No functional change, aside from some subtle error handling cases that got cleaned up in the refactoring process. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>