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commit 40fc3054b45820c28ea3c65e2c86d041dc244a8a upstream.
Commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE") introduced
ip6_skb_dst_mtu with return value of signed int which is inconsistent
with actually returned values. Also 2 users of this function actually
assign its value to unsigned int variable and only __xfrm6_output
assigns result of this function to signed variable but actually uses
as unsigned in further comparisons and calls. Change this function
to return unsigned int value.
Fixes: 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE")
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6d123b81ac615072a8525c13c6c41b695270a15d ]
Dave observed number of machines hitting OOM on the UDP send
path. The workload seems to be sending large UDP packets over
loopback. Since loopback has MTU of 64k kernel will try to
allocate an skb with up to 64k of head space. This has a good
chance of failing under memory pressure. What's worse if
the message length is <32k the allocation may trigger an
OOM killer.
This is entirely avoidable, we can use an skb with page frags.
af_unix solves a similar problem by limiting the head
length to SKB_MAX_ALLOC. This seems like a good and simple
approach. It means that UDP messages > 16kB will now
use fragments if underlying device supports SG, if extra
allocator pressure causes regressions in real workloads
we can switch to trying the large allocation first and
falling back.
v4: pre-calculate all the additions to alloclen so
we can be sure it won't go over order-2
Reported-by: Dave Jones <dsj@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 62f20e068ccc50d6ab66fdb72ba90da2b9418c99 ]
This is a complement to commit aa6dd211e4b1 ("inet: use bigger hash
table for IP ID generation"), but focusing on some specific aspects
of IPv6.
Contary to IPv4, IPv6 only uses packet IDs with fragments, and with a
minimum MTU of 1280, it's much less easy to force a remote peer to
produce many fragments to explore its ID sequence. In addition packet
IDs are 32-bit in IPv6, which further complicates their analysis. On
the other hand, it is often easier to choose among plenty of possible
source addresses and partially work around the bigger hash table the
commit above permits, which leaves IPv6 partially exposed to some
possibilities of remote analysis at the risk of weakening some
protocols like DNS if some IDs can be predicted with a good enough
probability.
Given the wide range of permitted IDs, the risk of collision is extremely
low so there's no need to rely on the positive increment algorithm that
is shared with the IPv4 code via ip_idents_reserve(). We have a fast
PRNG, so let's simply call prandom_u32() and be done with it.
Performance measurements at 10 Gbps couldn't show any difference with
the previous code, even when using a single core, because due to the
large fragments, we're limited to only ~930 kpps at 10 Gbps and the cost
of the random generation is completely offset by other operations and by
the network transfer time. In addition, this change removes the need to
update a shared entry in the idents table so it may even end up being
slightly faster on large scale systems where this matters.
The risk of at least one collision here is about 1/80 million among
10 IDs, 1/850k among 100 IDs, and still only 1/8.5k among 1000 IDs,
which remains very low compared to IPv4 where all IDs are reused
every 4 to 80ms on a 10 Gbps flow depending on packet sizes.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210529110746.6796-1-w@1wt.eu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 624085a31c1ad6a80b1e53f686bf6ee92abbf6e8 ]
First problem is that optlen is fetched without checking
there is more than one byte to parse.
Fix this by taking care of IPV6_TLV_PAD1 before
fetching optlen (under appropriate sanity checks against len)
Second problem is that IPV6_TLV_PADN checks of zero
padding are performed before the check of remaining length.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Fixes: c1412fce7ecc ("net/ipv6/exthdrs.c: Strict PadN option checking")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bcc3f2a829b9edbe3da5fb117ee5a63686d31834 ]
I see no reason why max_dst_opts_cnt and max_hbh_opts_cnt
are fetched from the initial net namespace.
The other sysctls (max_dst_opts_len & max_hbh_opts_len)
are in fact already using the current ns.
Note: it is not clear why ipv6_destopt_rcv() use two ways to
get to the netns :
1) dev_net(dst->dev)
Originally used to increment IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS
2) dev_net(skb->dev)
Tom used this variant in his patch.
Maybe this calls to use ipv6_skb_net() instead ?
Fixes: 47d3d7ac656a ("ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
Cc: Coco Li <lixiaoyan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a ]
Jianwen reported that IPv6 Interoperability tests are failing in an
IPsec case where one of the links between the IPsec peers has an MTU
of 1280. The peer generates a packet larger than this MTU, the router
replies with a "Packet too big" message indicating an MTU of 1280.
When the peer tries to send another large packet, xfrm_state_mtu
returns 1280 - ipsec_overhead, which causes ip6_setup_cork to fail
with EINVAL.
We can fix this by forcing xfrm_state_mtu to return IPV6_MIN_MTU when
IPv6 is used. After going through IPsec, the packet will then be
fragmented to obey the actual network's PMTU, just before leaving the
host.
Currently, TFC padding is capped to PMTU - overhead to avoid
fragementation: after padding and encapsulation, we still fit within
the PMTU. That behavior is preserved in this patch.
Fixes: 91657eafb64b ("xfrm: take net hdr len into account for esp payload size calculation")
Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5ac6b198d7e312bd10ebe7d58c64690dc59cc49a ]
When 'nla_parse_nested_deprecated' failed, it's no need to
BUG() here, return -EINVAL is ok.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a8b897c7bcd47f4147d066e22cc01d1026d7640e ]
Kaustubh reported and diagnosed a panic in udp_lib_lookup().
The root cause is udp_abort() racing with close(). Both
racing functions acquire the socket lock, but udp{v6}_destroy_sock()
release it before performing destructive actions.
We can't easily extend the socket lock scope to avoid the race,
instead use the SOCK_DEAD flag to prevent udp_abort from doing
any action when the critical race happens.
Diagnosed-and-tested-by: Kaustubh Pandey <kapandey@codeaurora.org>
Fixes: 5d77dca82839 ("net: diag: support SOCK_DESTROY for UDP sockets")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 821bbf79fe46a8b1d18aa456e8ed0a3c208c3754 ]
Reported by syzbot:
HEAD commit: 90c911ad Merge tag 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm..
git tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=123aa35098fd3c000eb7
compiler: Debian clang version 11.0.1-2
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fib6_nh_get_excptn_bucket net/ipv6/route.c:1604 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fib6_nh_flush_exceptions+0xbd/0x360 net/ipv6/route.c:1732
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880145c78f8 by task syz-executor.4/17760
CPU: 0 PID: 17760 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x202/0x31e lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x5f/0x3b0 mm/kasan/report.c:232
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline]
kasan_report+0x15c/0x200 mm/kasan/report.c:416
fib6_nh_get_excptn_bucket net/ipv6/route.c:1604 [inline]
fib6_nh_flush_exceptions+0xbd/0x360 net/ipv6/route.c:1732
fib6_nh_release+0x9a/0x430 net/ipv6/route.c:3536
fib6_info_destroy_rcu+0xcb/0x1c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:174
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2559 [inline]
rcu_core+0x8f6/0x1450 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2794
__do_softirq+0x372/0x7a6 kernel/softirq.c:345
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:221 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x22c/0x260 kernel/softirq.c:422
irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:434
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x91/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1100
</IRQ>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:632
RIP: 0010:lock_acquire+0x1f6/0x720 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5515
Code: f6 84 24 a1 00 00 00 02 0f 85 8d 02 00 00 f7 c3 00 02 00 00 49 bd 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 74 01 fb 48 c7 44 24 40 0e 36 e0 45 <4b> c7 44 3d 00 00 00 00 00 4b c7 44 3d 09 00 00 00 00 43 c7 44 3d
RSP: 0018:ffffc90009e06560 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 1ffff920013c0cc0 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90009e066e0 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: fffffbfff1f992b1
R10: fffffbfff1f992b1 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 1ffff920013c0cb4
rcu_lock_acquire+0x2a/0x30 include/linux/rcupdate.h:267
rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:656 [inline]
ext4_get_group_info+0xea/0x340 fs/ext4/ext4.h:3231
ext4_mb_prefetch+0x123/0x5d0 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2212
ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x8a5/0x28f0 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2379
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0xc6e/0x24f0 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:4982
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x2be3/0x7210 fs/ext4/extents.c:4238
ext4_map_blocks+0xab3/0x1cb0 fs/ext4/inode.c:638
ext4_getblk+0x187/0x6c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:848
ext4_bread+0x2a/0x1c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:900
ext4_append+0x1a4/0x360 fs/ext4/namei.c:67
ext4_init_new_dir+0x337/0xa10 fs/ext4/namei.c:2768
ext4_mkdir+0x4b8/0xc00 fs/ext4/namei.c:2814
vfs_mkdir+0x45b/0x640 fs/namei.c:3819
ovl_do_mkdir fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h:161 [inline]
ovl_mkdir_real+0x53/0x1a0 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:146
ovl_create_real+0x280/0x490 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:193
ovl_workdir_create+0x425/0x600 fs/overlayfs/super.c:788
ovl_make_workdir+0xed/0x1140 fs/overlayfs/super.c:1355
ovl_get_workdir fs/overlayfs/super.c:1492 [inline]
ovl_fill_super+0x39ee/0x5370 fs/overlayfs/super.c:2035
mount_nodev+0x52/0xe0 fs/super.c:1413
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x86/0x270 fs/super.c:1497
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2903 [inline]
path_mount+0x196f/0x2be0 fs/namespace.c:3233
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3246 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3454 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x2f9/0x3b0 fs/namespace.c:3431
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f68f2b87188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 00000000004665f9
RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 000000000040000a
RBP: 00000000004bfbb9 R08: 0000000020000100 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
R13: 00007ffe19002dff R14: 00007f68f2b87300 R15: 0000000000022000
Allocated by task 17768:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:38 [inline]
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:427 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc+0xc2/0xf0 mm/kasan/common.c:506
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
__kmalloc+0xb4/0x380 mm/slub.c:4055
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:559 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:684 [inline]
fib6_info_alloc+0x2c/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:154
ip6_route_info_create+0x55d/0x1a10 net/ipv6/route.c:3638
ip6_route_add+0x22/0x120 net/ipv6/route.c:3728
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x2cd/0x2260 net/ipv6/route.c:5352
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xb34/0xe70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f0/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7de/0x9b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0xaa6/0xe90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x5a2/0x900 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x319/0x400 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x27/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xee/0x120 mm/kasan/generic.c:345
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3039 [inline]
call_rcu+0x1b1/0xa30 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3114
fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:337 [inline]
ip6_route_info_create+0x10c4/0x1a10 net/ipv6/route.c:3718
ip6_route_add+0x22/0x120 net/ipv6/route.c:3728
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x2cd/0x2260 net/ipv6/route.c:5352
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xb34/0xe70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f0/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7de/0x9b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0xaa6/0xe90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x5a2/0x900 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x319/0x400 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Second to last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x27/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xee/0x120 mm/kasan/generic.c:345
insert_work+0x54/0x400 kernel/workqueue.c:1331
__queue_work+0x981/0xcc0 kernel/workqueue.c:1497
queue_work_on+0x111/0x200 kernel/workqueue.c:1524
queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:507 [inline]
call_usermodehelper_exec+0x283/0x470 kernel/umh.c:433
kobject_uevent_env+0x1349/0x1730 lib/kobject_uevent.c:617
kvm_uevent_notify_change+0x309/0x3b0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4809
kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:877 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0x9c/0xd10 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:920
kvm_vcpu_release+0x53/0x60 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3120
__fput+0x352/0x7b0 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x146/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:140
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:174 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x10b/0x1e0 kernel/entry/common.c:208
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:290 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x70 kernel/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880145c7800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 56 bytes to the right of
192-byte region [ffff8880145c7800, ffff8880145c78c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00005171c0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x145c7
flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000200 ffffea00006474c0 0000000200000002 ffff888010c41a00
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880145c7780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8880145c7800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8880145c7880: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff8880145c7900: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880145c7980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
In the ip6_route_info_create function, in the case that the nh pointer
is not NULL, the fib6_nh in fib6_info has not been allocated.
Therefore, when trying to free fib6_info in this error case using
fib6_info_release, the function will call fib6_info_destroy_rcu,
which it will access fib6_nh_release(f6i->fib6_nh);
However, f6i->fib6_nh doesn't have any refcount yet given the lack of allocation
causing the reported memory issue above.
Therefore, releasing the empty pointer directly instead would be the solution.
Fixes: f88d8ea67fbdb ("ipv6: Plumb support for nexthop object in a fib6_info")
Fixes: 706ec91916462 ("ipv6: Fix nexthop refcnt leak when creating ipv6 route info")
Signed-off-by: Coco Li <lixiaoyan@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e29f011e8fc04b2cdc742a2b9bbfa1b62518381a ]
Commit dbd1759e6a9c ("ipv6: on reassembly, record frag_max_size")
filled the frag_max_size field in IP6CB in the input path.
The field should also be filled in case of atomic fragments.
Fixes: dbd1759e6a9c ('ipv6: on reassembly, record frag_max_size')
Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 020ef930b826d21c5446fdc9db80fd72a791bc21 ]
mld_newpack() doesn't allow to allocate high order page,
only order-0 allocation is allowed.
If headroom size is too large, a kernel panic could occur in skb_put().
Test commands:
ip netns del A
ip netns del B
ip netns add A
ip netns add B
ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
ip link set veth0 netns A
ip link set veth1 netns B
ip netns exec A ip link set lo up
ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::1/64 dev veth0
ip netns exec B ip link set lo up
ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::2/64 dev veth1
for i in {1..99}
do
let A=$i-1
ip netns exec A ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
local 2001:db8:$A::1 remote 2001:db8:$A::2 encaplimit 100
ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::1/64 dev ip6gre$i
ip netns exec A ip link set ip6gre$i up
ip netns exec B ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
local 2001:db8:$A::2 remote 2001:db8:$A::1 encaplimit 100
ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::2/64 dev ip6gre$i
ip netns exec B ip link set ip6gre$i up
done
Splat looks like:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.12.0+ #891
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15d/0x15f
Code: 92 fe 4c 8b 4c 24 10 53 8b 4d 70 45 89 e0 48 c7 c7 00 ae 79 83
41 57 41 56 41 55 48 8b 54 24 a6 26 f9 ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 6c 24 20 89
34 24 e8 4a 4e 92 fe 8b 34 24 48 c7 c1 20
RSP: 0018:ffff88810091f820 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8881086e9000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1020123efb
RBP: ffff888005f6eac0 R08: ffffed1022fc0031 R09: ffffed1022fc0031
R10: ffff888117e00187 R11: ffffed1022fc0030 R12: 0000000000000028
R13: ffff888008284eb0 R14: 0000000000000ed8 R15: 0000000000000ec0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888117c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8b801c5640 CR3: 0000000033c2c006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
skb_put.cold.104+0x22/0x22
ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
mld_newpack+0x398/0x8f0
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x600/0x600
? lock_contended+0xc40/0xc40
add_grhead.isra.33+0x280/0x380
add_grec+0x5ca/0xff0
? mld_sendpack+0xf40/0xf40
? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
mld_send_initial_cr.part.34+0xb9/0x180
ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x15d/0x1b0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x8d2/0xbb0
? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
? addrconf_rs_timer+0x660/0x660
? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
Allowing high order page allocation could fix this problem.
Fixes: 72e09ad107e7 ("ipv6: avoid high order allocations")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 0d7a7b2014b1a499a0fe24c9f3063d7856b5aaaf upstream.
My previous commits added a dev_hold() in tunnels ndo_init(),
but forgot to remove it from special functions setting up fallback tunnels.
Fallback tunnels do call their respective ndo_init()
This leads to various reports like :
unregister_netdevice: waiting for ip6gre0 to become free. Usage count = 2
Fixes: 48bb5697269a ("ip6_tunnel: sit: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
Fixes: 6289a98f0817 ("sit: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
Fixes: 40cb881b5aaa ("ip6_vti: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
Fixes: 7f700334be9a ("ip6_gre: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 48bb5697269a7cbe5194dbb044dc38c517e34c58 upstream.
Same reasons than for the previous commits :
6289a98f0817 ("sit: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
40cb881b5aaa ("ip6_vti: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
7f700334be9a ("ip6_gre: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods")
After adopting CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT=n option, syzbot was able to trigger
a warning [1]
Issue here is that:
- all dev_put() should be paired with a corresponding prior dev_hold().
- A driver doing a dev_put() in its ndo_uninit() MUST also
do a dev_hold() in its ndo_init(), only when ndo_init()
is returning 0.
Otherwise, register_netdevice() would call ndo_uninit()
in its error path and release a refcount too soon.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21059 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 21059 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31
Code: 1d 6a 5a e8 09 31 ff 89 de e8 8d 1a ab fd 84 db 75 e0 e8 d4 13 ab fd 48 c7 c7 a0 e1 c1 89 c6 05 4a 5a e8 09 01 e8 2e 36 fb 04 <0f> 0b eb c4 e8 b8 13 ab fd 0f b6 1d 39 5a e8 09 31 ff 89 de e8 58
RSP: 0018:ffffc900025aefe8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff815c51f5 RDI: fffff520004b5def
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815bdf8e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888023488568
R13: ffff8880254e9000 R14: 00000000dfd82cfd R15: ffff88802ee2d7c0
FS: 00007f13bc590700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0943e74000 CR3: 0000000025273000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline]
refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline]
dev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4135 [inline]
ip6_tnl_dev_uninit+0x370/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:387
register_netdevice+0xadf/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10308
ip6_tnl_create2+0x1b5/0x400 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:263
ip6_tnl_newlink+0x312/0x580 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:2052
__rtnl_newlink+0x1062/0x1710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3443
rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3491
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: 919067cc845f ("net: add CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 6289a98f0817a4a457750d6345e754838eae9439 upstream.
After adopting CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT=n option, syzbot was able to trigger
a warning [1]
Issue here is that:
- all dev_put() should be paired with a corresponding prior dev_hold().
- A driver doing a dev_put() in its ndo_uninit() MUST also
do a dev_hold() in its ndo_init(), only when ndo_init()
is returning 0.
Otherwise, register_netdevice() would call ndo_uninit()
in its error path and release a refcount too soon.
Fixes: 919067cc845f ("net: add CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7f700334be9aeb91d5d86ef9ad2d901b9b453e9b upstream.
After adopting CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT=n option, syzbot was able to trigger
a warning [1]
Issue here is that:
- all dev_put() should be paired with a corresponding dev_hold(),
and vice versa.
- A driver doing a dev_put() in its ndo_uninit() MUST also
do a dev_hold() in its ndo_init(), only when ndo_init()
is returning 0.
Otherwise, register_netdevice() would call ndo_uninit()
in its error path and release a refcount too soon.
ip6_gre for example (among others problematic drivers)
has to use dev_hold() in ip6gre_tunnel_init_common()
instead of from ip6gre_newlink_common(), covering
both ip6gre_tunnel_init() and ip6gre_tap_init()/
Note that ip6gre_tunnel_init_common() is not called from
ip6erspan_tap_init() thus we also need to add a dev_hold() there,
as ip6erspan_tunnel_uninit() does call dev_put()
[1]
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8422 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 8422 Comm: syz-executor854 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31
Code: 1d 6a 5a e8 09 31 ff 89 de e8 8d 1a ab fd 84 db 75 e0 e8 d4 13 ab fd 48 c7 c7 a0 e1 c1 89 c6 05 4a 5a e8 09 01 e8 2e 36 fb 04 <0f> 0b eb c4 e8 b8 13 ab fd 0f b6 1d 39 5a e8 09 31 ff 89 de e8 58
RSP: 0018:ffffc900018befd0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88801ef19c40 RSI: ffffffff815c51f5 RDI: fffff52000317dec
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815bdf8e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888018cf4568
R13: ffff888018cf4c00 R14: ffff8880228f2000 R15: ffffffff8d659b80
FS: 00000000014eb300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d7bf2b3138 CR3: 0000000014933000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline]
refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline]
dev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4135 [inline]
ip6gre_tunnel_uninit+0x3d7/0x440 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:420
register_netdevice+0xadf/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10308
ip6gre_newlink_common.constprop.0+0x158/0x410 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1984
ip6gre_newlink+0x275/0x7a0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:2017
__rtnl_newlink+0x1062/0x1710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3443
rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3491
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
Fixes: 919067cc845f ("net: add CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 40cb881b5aaa0b69a7d93dec8440d5c62dae299f ]
After adopting CONFIG_PCPU_DEV_REFCNT=n option, syzbot was able to trigger
a warning [1]
Issue here is that:
- all dev_put() should be paired with a corresponding prior dev_hold().
- A driver doing a dev_put() in its ndo_uninit() MUST also
do a dev_hold() in its ndo_init(), only when ndo_init()
is returning 0.
Otherwise, register_netdevice() would call ndo_uninit()
in its error path and release a refcount too soon.
Therefore, we need to move dev_hold() call from
vti6_tnl_create2() to vti6_dev_init_gen()
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15951 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 15951 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31
Code: 1d 6a 5a e8 09 31 ff 89 de e8 8d 1a ab fd 84 db 75 e0 e8 d4 13 ab fd 48 c7 c7 a0 e1 c1 89 c6 05 4a 5a e8 09 01 e8 2e 36 fb 04 <0f> 0b eb c4 e8 b8 13 ab fd 0f b6 1d 39 5a e8 09 31 ff 89 de e8 58
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001eaef28 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff815c51f5 RDI: fffff520003d5dd7
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815bdf8e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801bb1c568
R13: ffff88801f69e800 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff888050889d40
FS: 00007fc79314e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1c1ff47108 CR3: 0000000020fd5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline]
refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline]
dev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4135 [inline]
vti6_dev_uninit+0x31a/0x360 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:297
register_netdevice+0xadf/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10308
vti6_tnl_create2+0x1b5/0x400 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:190
vti6_newlink+0x9d/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:1020
__rtnl_newlink+0x1062/0x1710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3443
rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3491
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2516
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 99014088156cd78867d19514a0bc771c4b86b93b ]
The IPv6 Multicast Router Advertisements parsing has the following two
issues:
For one thing, ICMPv6 MRD Advertisements are smaller than ICMPv6 MLD
messages (ICMPv6 MRD Adv.: 8 bytes vs. ICMPv6 MLDv1/2: >= 24 bytes,
assuming MLDv2 Reports with at least one multicast address entry).
When ipv6_mc_check_mld_msg() tries to parse an Multicast Router
Advertisement its MLD length check will fail - and it will wrongly
return -EINVAL, even if we have a valid MRD Advertisement. With the
returned -EINVAL the bridge code will assume a broken packet and will
wrongly discard it, potentially leading to multicast packet loss towards
multicast routers.
The second issue is the MRD header parsing in
br_ip6_multicast_mrd_rcv(): It wrongly checks for an ICMPv6 header
immediately after the IPv6 header (IPv6 next header type). However
according to RFC4286, section 2 all MRD messages contain a Router Alert
option (just like MLD). So instead there is an IPv6 Hop-by-Hop option
for the Router Alert between the IPv6 and ICMPv6 header, again leading
to the bridge wrongly discarding Multicast Router Advertisements.
To fix these two issues, introduce a new return value -ENODATA to
ipv6_mc_check_mld() to indicate a valid ICMPv6 packet with a hop-by-hop
option which is not an MLD but potentially an MRD packet. This also
simplifies further parsing in the bridge code, as ipv6_mc_check_mld()
already fully checks the ICMPv6 header and hop-by-hop option.
These issues were found and fixed with the help of the mrdisc tool
(https://github.com/troglobit/mrdisc).
Fixes: 4b3087c7e37f ("bridge: Snoop Multicast Router Advertisements")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 941ea91e87a6e879ed82dad4949f6234f2702bec upstream.
Similarly to the sit case, we need to remove the tunnels with no
addresses that have been moved to another network namespace.
Fixes: 0bd8762824e73 ("ip6tnl: add x-netns support")
Signed-off-by: Hristo Venev <hristo@venev.name>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 610f8c0fc8d46e0933955ce13af3d64484a4630a upstream.
A sit interface created without a local or a remote address is linked
into the `sit_net::tunnels_wc` list of its original namespace. When
deleting a network namespace, delete the devices that have been moved.
The following script triggers a null pointer dereference if devices
linked in a deleted `sit_net` remain:
for i in `seq 1 30`; do
ip netns add ns-test
ip netns exec ns-test ip link add dev veth0 type veth peer veth1
ip netns exec ns-test ip link add dev sit$i type sit dev veth0
ip netns exec ns-test ip link set dev sit$i netns $$
ip netns del ns-test
done
for i in `seq 1 30`; do
ip link del dev sit$i
done
Fixes: 5e6700b3bf98f ("sit: add support of x-netns")
Signed-off-by: Hristo Venev <hristo@venev.name>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit b29c457a6511435960115c0f548c4360d5f4801d upstream.
xt_compat_match/target_from_user doesn't check that zeroing the area
to start of next rule won't write past end of allocated ruleset blob.
Remove this code and zero the entire blob beforehand.
Reported-by: syzbot+cfc0247ac173f597aaaa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Fixes: 9fa492cdc160c ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: simplify compat API")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 154deab6a3ba47792936edf77f2f13a1cbc4351d ]
Now in esp4/6_gso_segment(), before calling inner proto .gso_segment,
NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK bits are deleted, as HW won't be able to do the
csum for inner proto due to the packet encrypted already.
So the UDP/TCP packet has to do the checksum on its own .gso_segment.
But SCTP is using CRC checksum, and for that NETIF_F_SCTP_CRC should
be deleted to make SCTP do the csum in own .gso_segment as well.
In Xiumei's testing with SCTP over IPsec/veth, the packets are kept
dropping due to the wrong CRC checksum.
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Fixes: 7862b4058b9f ("esp: Add gso handlers for esp4 and esp6")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 630e4576f83accf90366686f39808d665d8dbecc upstream.
Found by virtue of ipv6 raw sockets not honouring the per-socket
IP{,V6}_FREEBIND setting.
Based on hits found via:
git grep '[.]ip_nonlocal_bind'
We fix both raw ipv6 sockets to honour IP{,V6}_FREEBIND and IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT,
and we fix sctp sockets to honour IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT (they already honoured
FREEBIND), and not just the ipv6 'ip_nonlocal_bind' sysctl.
The helper is defined as:
static inline bool ipv6_can_nonlocal_bind(struct net *net, struct inet_sock *inet) {
return net->ipv6.sysctl.ip_nonlocal_bind || inet->freebind || inet->transparent;
}
so this change only widens the accepted opt-outs and is thus a clean bugfix.
I'm not entirely sure what 'fixes' tag to add, since this is AFAICT an ancient bug,
but IMHO this should be applied to stable kernels as far back as possible.
As such I'm adding a 'fixes' tag with the commit that originally added the helper,
which happened in 4.19. Backporting to older LTS kernels (at least 4.9 and 4.14)
would presumably require open-coding it or backporting the helper as well.
Other possibly relevant commits:
v4.18-rc6-1502-g83ba4645152d net: add helpers checking if socket can be bound to nonlocal address
v4.18-rc6-1431-gd0c1f01138c4 net/ipv6: allow any source address for sendmsg pktinfo with ip_nonlocal_bind
v4.14-rc5-271-gb71d21c274ef sctp: full support for ipv6 ip_nonlocal_bind & IP_FREEBIND
v4.7-rc7-1883-g9b9742022888 sctp: support ipv6 nonlocal bind
v4.1-12247-g35a256fee52c ipv6: Nonlocal bind
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Fixes: 83ba4645152d ("net: add helpers checking if socket can be bound to nonlocal address")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Reviewed-By: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 864db232dc7036aa2de19749c3d5be0143b24f8f upstream.
nlh is being checked for validtity two times when it is dereferenced in
this function. Check for validity again when updating the flags through
nlh pointer to make the dereferencing safe.
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Addresses-Coverity: ("NULL pointer dereference")
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <musamaanjum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dcc32f4f183ab8479041b23a1525d48233df1d43 ]
This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3.
Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped
source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses.
Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not
allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
lists potential issues.
Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses,
and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped
addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used
for uni-direction event streams or packet export.
Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with
TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6
and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with
v4mapped address as the source.
Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the
user-visible changes.
Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address")
Reported-by: Sunyi Shao <sunyishao@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit abe7034b9a8d57737e80cc16d60ed3666990bdbf ]
This reverts commit 443d6e86f821a165fae3fc3fc13086d27ac140b1.
This (and the following) patch basically re-implemented the RCU
mechanisms of patch 784544739a25. That patch was replaced because of the
performance problems that it created when replacing tables. Now, we have
the same issue: the call to synchronize_rcu() makes replacing tables
slower by as much as an order of magnitude.
Revert these patches and fix the issue in a different way.
Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d3d40f237480abf3268956daf18cdc56edd32834 ]
This reverts commit cc00bcaa589914096edef7fb87ca5cee4a166b5c.
This (and the preceding) patch basically re-implemented the RCU
mechanisms of patch 784544739a25. That patch was replaced because of the
performance problems that it created when replacing tables. Now, we have
the same issue: the call to synchronize_rcu() makes replacing tables
slower by as much as an order of magnitude.
Prior to using RCU a script calling "iptables" approx. 200 times was
taking 1.16s. With RCU this increased to 11.59s.
Revert these patches and fix the issue in a different way.
Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 28259bac7f1dde06d8ba324e222bbec9d4e92f2b ]
Syzbot reported the suspecious RCU usage in nexthop_fib6_nh() when
called from ipv6_route_seq_show(). The reason is ipv6_route_seq_start()
calls rcu_read_lock_bh(), while nexthop_fib6_nh() calls
rcu_dereference_rtnl().
The fix proposed is to add a variant of nexthop_fib6_nh() to use
rcu_dereference_bh_rtnl() for ipv6_route_seq_show().
The reported trace is as follows:
./include/net/nexthop.h:416 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by syz-executor.0/17895:
at: seq_read+0x71/0x12a0 fs/seq_file.c:169
at: seq_file_net include/linux/seq_file_net.h:19 [inline]
at: ipv6_route_seq_start+0xaf/0x300 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2616
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 17895 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.15.0-syzkaller #0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff849edf9e>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
[<ffffffff849edf9e>] dump_stack+0xd8/0x147 lib/dump_stack.c:53
[<ffffffff8480b7fa>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5745
[<ffffffff8459ada6>] nexthop_fib6_nh include/net/nexthop.h:416 [inline]
[<ffffffff8459ada6>] ipv6_route_native_seq_show net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2488 [inline]
[<ffffffff8459ada6>] ipv6_route_seq_show+0x436/0x7a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2673
[<ffffffff81c556df>] seq_read+0xccf/0x12a0 fs/seq_file.c:276
[<ffffffff81dbc62c>] proc_reg_read+0x10c/0x1d0 fs/proc/inode.c:231
[<ffffffff81bc28ae>] do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:714 [inline]
[<ffffffff81bc28ae>] do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:701 [inline]
[<ffffffff81bc28ae>] do_iter_read+0x49e/0x660 fs/read_write.c:935
[<ffffffff81bc81ab>] vfs_readv+0xfb/0x170 fs/read_write.c:997
[<ffffffff81c88847>] kernel_readv fs/splice.c:361 [inline]
[<ffffffff81c88847>] default_file_splice_read+0x487/0x9c0 fs/splice.c:416
[<ffffffff81c86189>] do_splice_to+0x129/0x190 fs/splice.c:879
[<ffffffff81c86f66>] splice_direct_to_actor+0x256/0x890 fs/splice.c:951
[<ffffffff81c8777d>] do_splice_direct+0x1dd/0x2b0 fs/splice.c:1060
[<ffffffff81bc4747>] do_sendfile+0x597/0xce0 fs/read_write.c:1459
[<ffffffff81bca205>] SYSC_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1520 [inline]
[<ffffffff81bca205>] SyS_sendfile64+0x155/0x170 fs/read_write.c:1506
[<ffffffff81015fcf>] do_syscall_64+0x1ff/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
[<ffffffff84a00076>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
Fixes: f88d8ea67fbdb ("ipv6: Plumb support for nexthop object in a fib6_info")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Cc: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ad5d07f4a9cd671233ae20983848874731102c08 upstream.
The current CIPSO and CALIPSO refcounting scheme for the DOI
definitions is a bit flawed in that we:
1. Don't correctly match gets/puts in netlbl_cipsov4_list().
2. Decrement the refcount on each attempt to remove the DOI from the
DOI list, only removing it from the list once the refcount drops
to zero.
This patch fixes these problems by adding the missing "puts" to
netlbl_cipsov4_list() and introduces a more conventional, i.e.
not-buggy, refcounting mechanism to the DOI definitions. Upon the
addition of a DOI to the DOI list, it is initialized with a refcount
of one, removing a DOI from the list removes it from the list and
drops the refcount by one; "gets" and "puts" behave as expected with
respect to refcounts, increasing and decreasing the DOI's refcount by
one.
Fixes: b1edeb102397 ("netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts")
Fixes: d7cce01504a0 ("netlabel: Add support for removing a CALIPSO DOI.")
Reported-by: syzbot+9ec037722d2603a9f52e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream.
The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:
panic+0x108/0x2ea
__stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
__icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160
In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:
// sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
// dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
dptr = dopt->__data;
// sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
// flowing the stack:
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
}
In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.
This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
__kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
kasan_report+0x32/0x40
check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
__ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
__icmp_send+0x744/0x1700
Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.
This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.
Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cc7a21b6fbd945f8d8f61422ccd27203c1fafeb7 upstream.
If IPv6 is builtin, we do not need an expensive indirect call
to reach icmp6_send().
v2: put inline keyword before the type to avoid sparse warnings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0b41713b606694257b90d61ba7e2712d8457648b upstream.
This introduces a helper function to be called only by network drivers
that wraps calls to icmp[v6]_send in a conntrack transformation, in case
NAT has been used. We don't want to pollute the non-driver path, though,
so we introduce this as a helper to be called by places that actually
make use of this, as suggested by Florian.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2efdaaaf883a143061296467913c01aa1ff4b3ce upstream.
Based on RFC 8200, Section 4.5 Fragment Header:
- If the first fragment does not include all headers through an
Upper-Layer header, then that fragment should be discarded and
an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 3, message should be sent to
the source of the fragment, with the Pointer field set to zero.
Checking each packet header in IPv6 fast path will have performance impact,
so I put the checking in ipv6_frag_rcv().
As the packet may be any kind of L4 protocol, I only checked some common
protocols' header length and handle others by (offset + 1) > skb->len.
Also use !(frag_off & htons(IP6_OFFSET)) to catch atomic fragments
(fragmented packet with only one fragment).
When send ICMP error message, if the 1st truncated fragment is ICMP message,
icmp6_send() will break as is_ineligible() return true. So I added a check
in is_ineligible() to let fragment packet with nexthdr ICMP but no ICMP header
return false.
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Aviraj CJ <acj@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ceed9038b2783d14e0422bdc6fd04f70580efb4c upstream.
The multicast route ff00::/8 is created with type RTN_UNICAST:
$ ip -6 -d route
unicast ::1 dev lo proto kernel scope global metric 256 pref medium
unicast fe80::/64 dev eth0 proto kernel scope global metric 256 pref medium
unicast ff00::/8 dev eth0 proto kernel scope global metric 256 pref medium
Set the type to RTN_MULTICAST which is more appropriate.
Fixes: e8478e80e5a7 ("net/ipv6: Save route type in rt6_info")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a826b04303a40d52439aa141035fca5654ccaccd upstream.
The ff00::/8 multicast route is created without specifying the fc_protocol
field, so the default RTPROT_BOOT value is used:
$ ip -6 -d route
unicast ::1 dev lo proto kernel scope global metric 256 pref medium
unicast fe80::/64 dev eth0 proto kernel scope global metric 256 pref medium
unicast ff00::/8 dev eth0 proto boot scope global metric 256 pref medium
As the documentation says, this value identifies routes installed during
boot, but the route is created when interface is set up.
Change the value to RTPROT_KERNEL which is a better value.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 47e4bb147a96f1c9b4e7691e7e994e53838bfff8 ]
We need to unregister the netdevice if config failed.
.ndo_uninit takes care of most of the heavy lifting.
This was uncovered by recent commit c269a24ce057 ("net: make
free_netdev() more lenient with unregistering devices").
Previously the partially-initialized device would be left
in the system.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2393580080a2da190f04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e2f1f072db8d ("sit: allow to configure 6rd tunnels via netlink")
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114012947.2515313-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9bd6b629c39e3fa9e14243a6d8820492be1a5b2e ]
esp(6)_output_head uses skb_page_frag_refill to allocate a buffer for
the esp trailer.
It accesses the page with kmap_atomic to handle highmem. But
skb_page_frag_refill can return compound pages, of which
kmap_atomic only maps the first underlying page.
skb_page_frag_refill does not return highmem, because flag
__GFP_HIGHMEM is not set. ESP uses it in the same manner as TCP.
That also does not call kmap_atomic, but directly uses page_address,
in skb_copy_to_page_nocache. Do the same for ESP.
This issue has become easier to trigger with recent kmap local
debugging feature CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL_FORCE_MAP.
Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b210de4f8c97d57de051e805686248ec4c6cfc52 ]
There are cases where GSO segment's length exceeds the egress MTU:
- Forwarding of a TCP GRO skb, when DF flag is not set.
- Forwarding of an skb that arrived on a virtualisation interface
(virtio-net/vhost/tap) with TSO/GSO size set by other network
stack.
- Local GSO skb transmitted on an NETIF_F_TSO tunnel stacked over an
interface with a smaller MTU.
- Arriving GRO skb (or GSO skb in a virtualised environment) that is
bridged to a NETIF_F_TSO tunnel stacked over an interface with an
insufficient MTU.
If so:
- Consume the SKB and its segments.
- Issue an ICMP packet with 'Packet Too Big' message containing the
MTU, allowing the source host to reduce its Path MTU appropriately.
Note: These cases are handled in the same manner in IPv4 output finish.
This patch aligns the behavior of IPv6 and the one of IPv4.
Fixes: 9e50849054a4 ("netfilter: ipv6: move POSTROUTING invocation before fragmentation")
Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <ayal@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1610027418-30438-1-git-send-email-ayal@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d8f5c29653c3f6995e8979be5623d263e92f6b86 ]
Route removal is handled by two code paths. The main removal path is via
fib6_del_route() which will handle purging any PMTU exceptions from the
cache, removing all per-cpu copies of the DST entry used by the route, and
releasing the fib6_info struct.
The second removal location is during fib6_add_rt2node() during a route
replacement operation. This path also calls fib6_purge_rt() to handle
cleaning up the per-cpu copies of the DST entries and releasing the
fib6_info associated with the older route, but it does not flush any PMTU
exceptions that the older route had. Since the older route is removed from
the tree during the replacement, we lose any way of accessing it again.
As these lingering DSTs and the fib6_info struct are holding references to
the underlying netdevice struct as well, unregistering that device from the
kernel can never complete.
Fixes: 2b760fcf5cfb3 ("ipv6: hook up exception table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1609892546-11389-1-git-send-email-stranche@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 443d6e86f821a165fae3fc3fc13086d27ac140b1 upstream.
This fixes the dereference to fetch the RCU pointer when holding
the appropriate xtables lock.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: cc00bcaa5899 ("netfilter: x_tables: Switch synchronization to RCU")
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cc00bcaa589914096edef7fb87ca5cee4a166b5c ]
When running concurrent iptables rules replacement with data, the per CPU
sequence count is checked after the assignment of the new information.
The sequence count is used to synchronize with the packet path without the
use of any explicit locking. If there are any packets in the packet path using
the table information, the sequence count is incremented to an odd value and
is incremented to an even after the packet process completion.
The new table value assignment is followed by a write memory barrier so every
CPU should see the latest value. If the packet path has started with the old
table information, the sequence counter will be odd and the iptables
replacement will wait till the sequence count is even prior to freeing the
old table info.
However, this assumes that the new table information assignment and the memory
barrier is actually executed prior to the counter check in the replacement
thread. If CPU decides to execute the assignment later as there is no user of
the table information prior to the sequence check, the packet path in another
CPU may use the old table information. The replacement thread would then free
the table information under it leading to a use after free in the packet
processing context-
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual
address 000000000000008e
pc : ip6t_do_table+0x5d0/0x89c
lr : ip6t_do_table+0x5b8/0x89c
ip6t_do_table+0x5d0/0x89c
ip6table_filter_hook+0x24/0x30
nf_hook_slow+0x84/0x120
ip6_input+0x74/0xe0
ip6_rcv_finish+0x7c/0x128
ipv6_rcv+0xac/0xe4
__netif_receive_skb+0x84/0x17c
process_backlog+0x15c/0x1b8
napi_poll+0x88/0x284
net_rx_action+0xbc/0x23c
__do_softirq+0x20c/0x48c
This could be fixed by forcing instruction order after the new table
information assignment or by switching to RCU for the synchronization.
Fixes: 80055dab5de0 ("netfilter: x_tables: make xt_replace_table wait until old rules are not used anymore")
Reported-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 832ba596494b2c9eac7760259eff2d8b7dcad0ee ]
syzkaller managed to crash the kernel using an NBMA ip6gre interface. I
could reproduce it creating an NBMA ip6gre interface and forwarding
traffic to it:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8250e927 len:148 put:44 head:ffff8c03c7a33
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:109!
Call Trace:
skb_push+0x10/0x10
ip6gre_header+0x47/0x1b0
neigh_connected_output+0xae/0xf0
ip6gre tunnel provides its own header_ops->create, and sets it
conditionally when initializing the tunnel in NBMA mode. When
header_ops->create is used, dev->hard_header_len should reflect the
length of the header created. Otherwise, when not used,
dev->needed_headroom should be used.
Fixes: eb95f52fc72d ("net: ipv6_gre: Fix GRO to work on IPv6 over GRE tap")
Cc: Maria Pasechnik <mariap@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201130161911.464106-1-atenart@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e255e11e66da8281e337e4e352956e8a4999fca4 ]
kmemleak report a memory leak as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff8880059c6a00 (size 64):
comm "ip", pid 23696, jiffies 4296590183 (age 1755.384s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
20 01 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
1c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000aa4e7a87>] ip6addrlbl_add+0x90/0xbb0
[<0000000070b8d7f1>] ip6addrlbl_net_init+0x109/0x170
[<000000006a9ca9d4>] ops_init+0xa8/0x3c0
[<000000002da57bf2>] setup_net+0x2de/0x7e0
[<000000004e52d573>] copy_net_ns+0x27d/0x530
[<00000000b07ae2b4>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0xa30
[<000000003b76d36f>] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa1/0x1d0
[<0000000030653721>] ksys_unshare+0x3a4/0x780
[<0000000007e82e40>] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40
[<0000000031a10c08>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[<0000000099df30e7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
We should free all rules when we catch an error in ip6addrlbl_net_init().
otherwise a memory leak will occur.
Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201124071728.8385-1-wanghai38@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ceb736e1d45c253f5e86b185ca9b497cdd43063f ]
genlmsg_cancel() needs to be called in the error path of
inet6_fill_ifmcaddr and inet6_fill_ifacaddr to cancel
the message.
Fixes: 6ecf4c37eb3e ("ipv6: enable IFA_TARGET_NETNSID for RTM_GETADDR")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201112080950.1476302-1-zhangqilong3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8cf8821e15cd553339a5b48ee555a0439c2b2742 ]
Commit 58956317c8de ("neighbor: Improve garbage collection")
guarantees neighbour table entries a five-second lifetime. Processes
which make heavy use of multicast can fill the neighour table with
multicast addresses in five seconds. At that point, neighbour entries
can't be GC-ed because they aren't five seconds old yet, the kernel
log starts to fill up with "neighbor table overflow!" messages, and
sends start to fail.
This patch allows multicast addresses to be thrown out before they've
lived out their five seconds. This makes room for non-multicast
addresses and makes messages to all addresses more reliable in these
circumstances.
Fixes: 58956317c8de ("neighbor: Improve garbage collection")
Signed-off-by: Jeff Dike <jdike@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113015815.31397-1-jdike@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a5ebcbdf34b65fcc07f38eaf2d60563b42619a59 ]
Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605581105-35295-1-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 909172a149749242990a6e64cb55d55460d4e417 ]
When net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 and syn flood is happened,
cookie_v4_check or cookie_v6_check tries to redo what
tcp_v4_send_synack or tcp_v6_send_synack did,
rsk_window_clamp will be changed if SOCK_RCVBUF is set,
which will make rcv_wscale is different, the client
still operates with initial window scale and can overshot
granted window, the client use the initial scale but local
server use new scale to advertise window value, and session
work abnormally.
Fixes: e88c64f0a425 ("tcp: allow effective reduction of TCP's rcv-buffer via setsockopt")
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <wenan.mao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604967391-123737-1-git-send-email-wenan.mao@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8ef9ba4d666614497a057d09b0a6eafc1e34eadf ]
Due to the legacy usage of hard_header_len for SIT tunnels while
already using infrastructure from net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c the
calculation of the path MTU in tnl_update_pmtu is incorrect.
This leads to unnecessary creation of MTU exceptions for any
flow going over a SIT tunnel.
As SIT tunnels do not have a header themsevles other than their
transport (L3, L2) headers we're leaving hard_header_len set to zero
as tnl_update_pmtu is already taking care of the transport headers
sizes.
This will also help avoiding unnecessary IPv6 GC runs and spinlock
contention seen when using SIT tunnels and for more than
net.ipv6.route.gc_thresh flows.
Fixes: c54419321455 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Herms <oliver.peter.herms@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201103104133.GA1573211@tws
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 46d6c5ae953cc0be38efd0e469284df7c4328cf8 ]
If netfilter changes the packet mark when mangling, the packet is
rerouted using the route_me_harder set of functions. Prior to this
commit, there's one big difference between route_me_harder and the
ordinary initial routing functions, described in the comment above
__ip_queue_xmit():
/* Note: skb->sk can be different from sk, in case of tunnels */
int __ip_queue_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,
That function goes on to correctly make use of sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
rather than skb->sk->sk_bound_dev_if. And indeed the comment is true: a
tunnel will receive a packet in ndo_start_xmit with an initial skb->sk.
It will make some transformations to that packet, and then it will send
the encapsulated packet out of a *new* socket. That new socket will
basically always have a different sk_bound_dev_if (otherwise there'd be
a routing loop). So for the purposes of routing the encapsulated packet,
the routing information as it pertains to the socket should come from
that socket's sk, rather than the packet's original skb->sk. For that
reason __ip_queue_xmit() and related functions all do the right thing.
One might argue that all tunnels should just call skb_orphan(skb) before
transmitting the encapsulated packet into the new socket. But tunnels do
*not* do this -- and this is wisely avoided in skb_scrub_packet() too --
because features like TSQ rely on skb->destructor() being called when
that buffer space is truely available again. Calling skb_orphan(skb) too
early would result in buffers filling up unnecessarily and accounting
info being all wrong. Instead, additional routing must take into account
the new sk, just as __ip_queue_xmit() notes.
So, this commit addresses the problem by fishing the correct sk out of
state->sk -- it's already set properly in the call to nf_hook() in
__ip_local_out(), which receives the sk as part of its normal
functionality. So we make sure to plumb state->sk through the various
route_me_harder functions, and then make correct use of it following the
example of __ip_queue_xmit().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0d9826bc18ce356e8909919ad681ad65d0a6061e ]
Dump vlan tag and proto for the usual vlan offload case if the
NF_LOG_MACDECODE flag is set on. Without this information the logging is
misleading as there is no reference to the VLAN header.
[12716.993704] test: IN=veth0 OUT= MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 VPROTO=8100 VID=10 MACPROTO=0800 SRC=192.168.10.2 DST=172.217.168.163 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=2548 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=55848 DPT=80 WINDOW=501 RES=0x00 ACK FIN URGP=0
[12721.157643] test: IN=veth0 OUT= MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 VPROTO=8100 VID=10 MACPROTO=0806 ARP HTYPE=1 PTYPE=0x0800 OPCODE=2 MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 IPSRC=192.168.10.2 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 IPDST=192.168.10.1
Fixes: 83e96d443b37 ("netfilter: log: split family specific code to nf_log_{ip,ip6,common}.c files")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6617dfd440149e42ce4d2be615eb31a4755f4d30 ]
Commit 4fc427e05158 ("ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index")
tried to fix the issue where seq_file pos is not increased
if a NULL element is returned with seq_ops->next(). See bug
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
The commit effectively does:
- increase pos for all seq_ops->start()
- increase pos for all seq_ops->next()
For ipv6_route, increasing pos for all seq_ops->next() is correct.
But increasing pos for seq_ops->start() is not correct
since pos is used to determine how many items to skip during
seq_ops->start():
iter->skip = *pos;
seq_ops->start() just fetches the *current* pos item.
The item can be skipped only after seq_ops->show() which essentially
is the beginning of seq_ops->next().
For example, I have 7 ipv6 route entries,
root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next dd if=/proc/net/ipv6_route bs=4096
00000000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000400 00000001 00000000 00000001 eth0
fe800000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000100 00000001 00000000 00000001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
00000000000000000000000000000001 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000003 00000000 80200001 lo
fe800000000000002050e3fffebd3be8 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 80200001 eth0
ff000000000000000000000000000000 08 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000100 00000004 00000000 00000001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
1050 bytes (1.0 kB, 1.0 KiB) copied, 0.00707908 s, 148 kB/s
root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next
In the above, I specify buffer size 4096, so all records can be returned
to user space with a single trip to the kernel.
If I use buffer size 128, since each record size is 149, internally
kernel seq_read() will read 149 into its internal buffer and return the data
to user space in two read() syscalls. Then user read() syscall will trigger
next seq_ops->start(). Since the current implementation increased pos even
for seq_ops->start(), it will skip record #2, #4 and #6, assuming the first
record is #1.
root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next dd if=/proc/net/ipv6_route bs=128
00000000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000400 00000001 00000000 00000001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
fe800000000000002050e3fffebd3be8 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 80200001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
4+1 records in
4+1 records out
600 bytes copied, 0.00127758 s, 470 kB/s
To fix the problem, create a fake pos pointer so seq_ops->start()
won't actually increase seq_file pos. With this fix, the
above `dd` command with `bs=128` will show correct result.
Fixes: 4fc427e05158 ("ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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