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On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are
needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These
third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform
KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer,
administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed
trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring.
The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform
dependent.
Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring
on PowerVM platform.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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On PowerVM guest, variable data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp.
Extract ESL by stripping off the timestamp before passing to ESL parser.
Fixes: 4b3e71e9a34c ("integrity/powerpc: Support loading keys from PLPKS")
Cc: stable@vger.kenrnel.org # v6.3
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230608120444.382527-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com
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Add support for loading keys from the PLPKS on pseries machines, with the
"ibm,plpks-sb-v1" format.
The object format is expected to be the same, so there shouldn't be any
functional differences between objects retrieved on powernv or pseries.
Unlike on powernv, on pseries the format string isn't contained in the
device tree. Use secvar_ops->format() to fetch the format string in a
generic manner, rather than searching the device tree ourselves.
(The current code searches the device tree for a node compatible with
"ibm,edk2-compat-v1". This patch switches to calling secvar_ops->format(),
which in the case of OPAL/powernv means opal_secvar_format(), which
searches the device tree for a node compatible with "ibm,secvar-backend"
and checks its "format" property. These are equivalent, as skiboot creates
a node with both "ibm,edk2-compat-v1" and "ibm,secvar-backend" as
compatible strings.)
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-27-ajd@linux.ibm.com
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A few improvements to load_powerpc.c:
- include integrity.h for the pr_fmt()
- move all error reporting out of get_cert_list()
- use ERR_PTR() to better preserve error detail
- don't use pr_err() for missing keys
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-26-ajd@linux.ibm.com
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There's no reason for secvar_operations to use uint64_t vs the more
common kernel type u64.
The types are compatible, but they require different printk format
strings which can lead to confusion.
Change all the secvar related routines to use u64.
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-5-ajd@linux.ibm.com
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The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
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