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2019-09-10security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSMMatthew Garrett1-2/+2
No reason for these not to be const. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messagesMatthew Garrett1-2/+6
Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find out what caused the message. The message now patterned something like: Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing open(). (Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in default_file_open()) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked downDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic instead. The following changes are made: (1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that). (2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria are permitted to be opened: - The file must have mode 00444 - The file must not have ioctl methods - The file must not have mmap (3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading. Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a miscdev, not debugfs. Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(), show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver. I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly, though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of them in loops scanning tables). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality modeDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to access kernel data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality modeDavid Howells1-0/+1
bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality modeDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration. This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed modules. Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcoreDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace moduleDavid Howells1-0/+1
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes depending on local policy. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)David Howells1-0/+1
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types). Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIALDavid Howells1-0/+1
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error. Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked downDavid Howells1-0/+1
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the kernel is locked down. Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and KDDISABIO console ioctls. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked downJosh Boyer1-0/+1
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: pavel@ucw.cz cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation. This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a signature on the image to be booted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and also to steal cryptographic information. Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has been locked down to prevent this. Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked downDavid Howells2-0/+2
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify. I have adjusted the errors generated: (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY), then: (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned. (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with other lockdown cases). (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return the error we got. Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet. [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy patchset.] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20security: Add a static lockdown policy LSMMatthew Garrett3-0/+216
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>