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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux update from Paul Moore:
"A single SELinux patch to change the type of a pre-processor constant
to better match its use"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20240715' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Use 1UL for EBITMAP_BIT to match maps type
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This patch modifies the definition of EBITMAP_BIT in
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h from 1ULL to 1UL to match the type
of elements in the ebitmap_node maps array.
This change does not affect the functionality or correctness of
the code but aims to enhance code quality by adhering to good
programming practices and avoiding unnecessary type conversions.
Signed-off-by: Canfeng Guo <guocanfeng@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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A panic happens in ima_match_policy:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
path_openat+0x571/0x1720
do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.
Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.
The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B |
| |ima_match_policy |
| | rcu_read_lock |
|ima_lsm_update_rule | |
| synchronize_rcu | |
| | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
| | sleep |
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
| kfree(entry) | |
| | entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| | entry->action |
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.
To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.
Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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cond_policydb_dup() duplicates conditional parts of an existing policy.
Declare the source policy const, since it should not be modified.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: various line length fixups]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The usage of printk_ratelimit() is discouraged, see
include/linux/printk.h, thus use pr_warn_ratelimited().
While editing this line address the following checkpatch warning:
WARNING: Integer promotion: Using 'h' in '%hu' is unnecessary
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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For the "conflicting/duplicate rules" branch in
filename_trans_read_helper_compat() the Smatch static checker reports:
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1953 filename_trans_read_helper_compat()
warn: missing error code 'rc'
While the value of rc will already always be zero here, it is not
obvious that it's the case and that it's the intended return value
(Smatch expects rc to be assigned within 5 lines from the goto).
Therefore, add an explicit assignment just before the goto to make the
intent more clear and the code less error-prone.
Fixes: c3a276111ea2 ("selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/722b90c4-1f4b-42ff-a6c2-108ea262bd10@moroto.mountain/
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The extensible bitmap supports bit positions up to U32_MAX due to the
type of the member highbit being u32. Use u32 consistently as the type
for bit positions to announce to callers what range of values is
supported.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The number of buckets is calculated by performing a binary AND against
the mask of the hash table, which is one less than its size (which is a
power of two). This leads to all top bits being discarded, requiring
for short or similar inputs a hash function with a good avalanche
effect.
Use djb2a:
# current
common prefixes: 7 entries and 5/8 buckets used, longest chain
length 2, sum of chain length^2 11
classes: 134 entries and 100/256 buckets used, longest chain
length 5, sum of chain length^2 234
roles: 15 entries and 6/16 buckets used, longest chain length 5,
sum of chain length^2 57
types: 4448 entries and 3016/8192 buckets used, longest chain
length 41, sum of chain length^2 14922
users: 7 entries and 3/8 buckets used, longest chain length 3,
sum of chain length^2 17
bools: 306 entries and 221/512 buckets used, longest chain
length 4, sum of chain length^2 524
levels: 1 entries and 1/1 buckets used, longest chain length 1,
sum of chain length^2 1
categories: 1024 entries and 400/1024 buckets used, longest chain
length 4, sum of chain length^2 2740
# patch
common prefixes: 7 entries and 5/8 buckets used, longest chain
length 2, sum of chain length^2 11
classes: 134 entries and 101/256 buckets used, longest chain
length 3, sum of chain length^2 210
roles: 15 entries and 9/16 buckets used, longest chain length 3,
sum of chain length^2 31
types: 4448 entries and 3459/8192 buckets used, longest chain
length 5, sum of chain length^2 6778
users: 7 entries and 5/8 buckets used, longest chain length 3,
sum of chain length^2 13
bools: 306 entries and 236/512 buckets used, longest chain
length 5, sum of chain length^2 470
levels: 1 entries and 1/1 buckets used, longest chain length 1,
sum of chain length^2 1
categories: 1024 entries and 518/1024 buckets used, longest chain
length 7, sum of chain length^2 2992
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: line length fixes in the commit message]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Dump in the SELinux debug configuration the statistics for the
conditional rules avtab, the role transition, and class and common
permission hash tables.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the correct, according to Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst,
format specifiers for numeric arguments in string formatting.
The general bit type is u32 thus use %u, EBITMAP_SIZE is a constant
computed via sizeof() thus use %zu.
Fixes: 0142c56682fb ("selinux: reject invalid ebitmaps")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/20240327131044.2c629921@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Reject ebitmaps with a node containing an empty map or with an incorrect
highbit. Both checks are already performed by userspace, the former
since 2008 (patch 13cd4c896068 ("initial import from svn trunk revision
2950")), the latter since v2.7 in 2017 (patch 75b14a5de10a ("libsepol:
ebitmap: reject loading bitmaps with incorrect high bit")).
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, SELinux doesn't allow distinguishing between kernel threads
and userspace processes that are started before the policy is first
loaded - both get the label corresponding to the kernel SID. The only
way a process that persists from early boot can get a meaningful label
is by doing a voluntary dyntransition or re-executing itself.
Reusing the kernel label for userspace processes is problematic for
several reasons:
1. The kernel is considered to be a privileged domain and generally
needs to have a wide range of permissions allowed to work correctly,
which prevents the policy writer from effectively hardening against
early boot processes that might remain running unintentionally after
the policy is loaded (they represent a potential extra attack surface
that should be mitigated).
2. Despite the kernel being treated as a privileged domain, the policy
writer may want to impose certain special limitations on kernel
threads that may conflict with the requirements of intentional early
boot processes. For example, it is a good hardening practice to limit
what executables the kernel can execute as usermode helpers and to
confine the resulting usermode helper processes. However, a
(legitimate) process surviving from early boot may need to execute a
different set of executables.
3. As currently implemented, overlayfs remembers the security context of
the process that created an overlayfs mount and uses it to bound
subsequent operations on files using this context. If an overlayfs
mount is created before the SELinux policy is loaded, these "mounter"
checks are made against the kernel context, which may clash with
restrictions on the kernel domain (see 2.).
To resolve this, introduce a new initial SID (reusing the slot of the
former "init" initial SID) that will be assigned to any userspace
process started before the policy is first loaded. This is easy to do,
as we can simply label any process that goes through the
bprm_creds_for_exec LSM hook with the new init-SID instead of
propagating the kernel SID from the parent.
To provide backwards compatibility for existing policies that are
unaware of this new semantic of the "init" initial SID, introduce a new
policy capability "userspace_initial_context" and set the "init" SID to
the same context as the "kernel" SID unless this capability is set by
the policy.
Another small backwards compatibility measure is needed in
security_sid_to_context_core() for before the initial SELinux policy
load - see the code comment for explanation.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: edited comments based on feedback/discussion]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In four separate functions within avtab, the same comparison logic is
used. The only difference is how the result is handled or whether there
is a unique specifier value to be checked for or used.
Extracting this functionality into the avtab_node_cmp() function unifies
the comparison logic between searching and insertion and gets rid of
duplicative code so that the implementation is easier to maintain.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Satterfield <jsatterfield.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Using full_name_hash() instead of partial_name_hash() should result
in cleaner and better performing code.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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__hashtab_insert() in hashtab.h has a cleaner interface that allows the
caller to specify the chain node location that the new node is being
inserted into so that it can update the node that currently occupies it.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Satterfield <jsatterfield.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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avtab_read_item() is a hot function called when reading each rule in a
binary policydb. With the current Fedora policy and refpolicy, this
function is called nearly 100,000 times per policy load.
A single avtab node is only permitted to have a single specifier to
describe the data it holds. As such, a check is performed to make sure
only one specifier is set. Previously this was done via a for-loop.
However, there is already an optimal function for finding the number of
bits set (hamming weight) and on some architectures, dedicated
instructions (popcount) which can be executed much more efficiently.
Even when using -mcpu=generic on a x86-64 Fedora 38 VM, this commit
results in a modest 2-4% speedup for policy loading due to a substantial
reduction in the number of instructions executed.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Satterfield <jsatterfield.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The number of buckets is calculated by performing a binary AND against
the mask of the hash table, which is one less than its size (which is a
power of two). This leads to all top bits being discarded, e.g. with
the Reference Policy on Debian there exists 376 entries, leading to a
size of 512, discarding the top 23 bits.
Use jhash to improve the hash table utilization:
# current
roletr: 376 entries and 124/512 buckets used,
longest chain length 8, sum of chain length^2 1496
# patch
roletr: 376 entries and 266/512 buckets used,
longest chain length 4, sum of chain length^2 646
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: line wrap in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Instead of dividing by 8 and then performing log2 by hand, use a more
readable calculation.
The behavior of rounddown_pow_of_two() for an input of 0 is undefined,
so handle that case and small values manually to achieve the same
results.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Print the sum of chain lengths squared as a metric for hash tables to
provide more insights, similar to avtabs.
While on it add a comma in the avtab message to improve readability of
the output.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by
attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have
their accesses bounds-checked at run-time checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS
(for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family
functions).
As found with Coccinelle[1], add __counted_by for struct sidtab_str_cache.
[1] https://github.com/kees/kernel-tools/blob/trunk/coccinelle/examples/counted_by.cocci
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirty three SELinux patches, which is a pretty big number for us, but
there isn't really anything scary in here; in fact we actually manage
to remove 10 lines of code with this :)
- Promote the SELinux DEBUG_HASHES macro to CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
The DEBUG_HASHES macro was a buried SELinux specific preprocessor
debug macro that was a problem waiting to happen. Promoting the
debug macro to a proper Kconfig setting should help both improve
the visibility of the feature as well enable improved test
coverage. We've moved some additional debug functions under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG flag and we may see more work in the
future.
- Emit a pr_notice() message if virtual memory is executable by default
As this impacts the SELinux access control policy enforcement, if
the system's configuration is such that virtual memory is
executable by default we print a single line notice to the console.
- Drop avtab_search() in favor of avtab_search_node()
Both functions are nearly identical so we removed avtab_search()
and converted the callers to avtab_search_node().
- Add some SELinux network auditing helpers
The helpers not only reduce a small amount of code duplication, but
they provide an opportunity to improve UDP flood performance
slightly by delaying initialization of the audit data in some
cases.
- Convert GFP_ATOMIC allocators to GFP_KERNEL when reading SELinux policy
There were two SELinux policy load helper functions that were
allocating memory using GFP_ATOMIC, they have been converted to
GFP_KERNEL.
- Quiet a KMSAN warning in selinux_inet_conn_request()
A one-line error path (re)set patch that resolves a KMSAN warning.
It is important to note that this doesn't represent a real bug in
the current code, but it quiets KMSAN and arguably hardens the code
against future changes.
- Cleanup the policy capability accessor functions
This is a follow-up to the patch which reverted SELinux to using a
global selinux_state pointer. This patch cleans up some artifacts
of that change and turns each accessor into a one-line READ_ONCE()
call into the policy capabilities array.
- A number of patches from Christian Göttsche
Christian submitted almost two-thirds of the patches in this pull
request as he worked to harden the SELinux code against type
differences, variable overflows, etc.
- Support for separating early userspace from the kernel in policy,
with a later revert
We did have a patch that added a new userspace initial SID which
would allow SELinux to distinguish between early user processes
created before the initial policy load and the kernel itself.
Unfortunately additional post-merge testing revealed a problematic
interaction with an old SELinux userspace on an old version of
Ubuntu so we've reverted the patch until we can resolve the
compatibility issue.
- Remove some outdated comments dealing with LSM hook registration
When we removed the runtime disable functionality we forgot to
remove some old comments discussing the importance of LSM hook
registration ordering.
- Minor administrative changes
Stephen Smalley updated his email address and "debranded" SELinux
from "NSA SELinux" to simply "SELinux". We've come a long way from
the original NSA submission and I would consider SELinux a true
community project at this point so removing the NSA branding just
makes sense"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (33 commits)
selinux: prevent KMSAN warning in selinux_inet_conn_request()
selinux: use unsigned iterator in nlmsgtab code
selinux: avoid implicit conversions in policydb code
selinux: avoid implicit conversions in selinuxfs code
selinux: make left shifts well defined
selinux: update type for number of class permissions in services code
selinux: avoid implicit conversions in avtab code
selinux: revert SECINITSID_INIT support
selinux: use GFP_KERNEL while reading binary policy
selinux: update comment on selinux_hooks[]
selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services code
selinux: avoid implicit conversions in mls code
selinux: use identical iterator type in hashtab_duplicate()
selinux: move debug functions into debug configuration
selinux: log about VM being executable by default
selinux: fix a 0/NULL mistmatch in ad_net_init_from_iif()
selinux: introduce SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG configuration
selinux: introduce and use lsm_ad_net_init*() helpers
selinux: update my email address
selinux: add missing newlines in pr_err() statements
...
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Set the next pointer in filename_trans_read_helper() before attaching
the new node under construction to the list, otherwise garbage would be
dereferenced on subsequent failure during cleanup in the out goto label.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 430059024389 ("selinux: implement new format of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the identical type for local variables, e.g. loop counters.
Declare members of struct policydb_compat_info unsigned to consistently
use unsigned iterators. They hold read-only non-negative numbers in the
global variable policydb_compat.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The loops upper bound represent the number of permissions used (for the
current class or in general). The limit for this is 32, thus we might
left shift of one less, 31. Shifting a base of 1 results in undefined
behavior; use (u32)1 as base.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Security classes have only up to 32 permissions, hence using an u16 is
sufficient (while improving padding in struct selinux_mapping).
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Return u32 from avtab_hash() instead of int, since the hashing is done
on u32 and the result is used as an index on the hash array.
Use the type of the limit in for loops.
Avoid signed to unsigned conversion of multiplication result in
avtab_hash_eval() and perform multiplication in destination type.
Use unsigned loop iterator for index operations, to avoid sign
extension.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This commit reverts 5b0eea835d4e ("selinux: introduce an initial SID
for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on
distros with old SELinux userspace tools/libraries, specifically
Ubuntu 16.04.
Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later
date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and
backwards compatible SELinux tree.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/87edkseqf8.fsf@mail.lhotse
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_ATOMIC while reading a binary policy in
sens_read() and cat_read(), similar to surrounding code.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and
security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim
member.
Declare the read-only class string parameter of
security_get_permissions() const.
Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the
destination.
Use the type identical to the source for local variables.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: cleanup extra whitespace in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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