From 7777f47f2ea64efd1016262e7b59fab34adfb869 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li Lingfeng Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 21:04:01 +0800 Subject: block: Move checking GENHD_FL_NO_PART to bdev_add_partition() Commit 1a721de8489f ("block: don't add or resize partition on the disk with GENHD_FL_NO_PART") prevented all operations about partitions on disks with GENHD_FL_NO_PART in blkpg_do_ioctl() since they are meaningless. However, it changed error code in some scenarios. So move checking GENHD_FL_NO_PART to bdev_add_partition() to eliminate impact. Fixes: 1a721de8489f ("block: don't add or resize partition on the disk with GENHD_FL_NO_PART") Reported-by: Allison Karlitskaya Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOYeF9VsmqKMcQjo1k6YkGNujwN-nzfxY17N3F-CMikE1tYp+w@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118130401.792757-1-lilingfeng@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- block/ioctl.c | 2 -- block/partitions/core.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/ioctl.c b/block/ioctl.c index 9c73a763ef88..438f79c564cf 100644 --- a/block/ioctl.c +++ b/block/ioctl.c @@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ static int blkpg_do_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, struct blkpg_partition p; sector_t start, length; - if (disk->flags & GENHD_FL_NO_PART) - return -EINVAL; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; if (copy_from_user(&p, upart, sizeof(struct blkpg_partition))) diff --git a/block/partitions/core.c b/block/partitions/core.c index cab0d76a828e..5f5ed5c75f04 100644 --- a/block/partitions/core.c +++ b/block/partitions/core.c @@ -439,6 +439,11 @@ int bdev_add_partition(struct gendisk *disk, int partno, sector_t start, goto out; } + if (disk->flags & GENHD_FL_NO_PART) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if (partition_overlaps(disk, start, length, -1)) { ret = -EBUSY; goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 13f3956eb5681a4045a8dfdef48df5dc4d9f58a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Christian A. Ehrhardt" Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2024 21:26:34 +0100 Subject: block: Fix WARNING in _copy_from_iter Syzkaller reports a warning in _copy_from_iter because an iov_iter is supposedly used in the wrong direction. The reason is that syzcaller managed to generate a request with a transfer direction of SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV. This instructs the kernel to copy user buffers into the kernel, read into the copied buffers and then copy the data back to user space. Thus the iovec is used in both directions. Detect this situation in the block layer and construct a new iterator with the correct direction for the copy-in. Reported-by: syzbot+a532b03fdfee2c137666@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000009b92c10604d7a5e9@google.com/t/ Reported-by: syzbot+63dec323ac56c28e644f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000003faaa105f6e7c658@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240121202634.275068-1-lk@c--e.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- block/blk-map.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-map.c b/block/blk-map.c index 8584babf3ea0..71210cdb3442 100644 --- a/block/blk-map.c +++ b/block/blk-map.c @@ -205,12 +205,19 @@ static int bio_copy_user_iov(struct request *rq, struct rq_map_data *map_data, /* * success */ - if ((iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE && - (!map_data || !map_data->null_mapped)) || - (map_data && map_data->from_user)) { + if (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE && + (!map_data || !map_data->null_mapped)) { ret = bio_copy_from_iter(bio, iter); if (ret) goto cleanup; + } else if (map_data && map_data->from_user) { + struct iov_iter iter2 = *iter; + + /* This is the copy-in part of SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV. */ + iter2.data_source = ITER_SOURCE; + ret = bio_copy_from_iter(bio, &iter2); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; } else { if (bmd->is_our_pages) zero_fill_bio(bio); -- cgit v1.2.3 From e169bd4fb2b36c4b2bee63c35c740c85daeb2e86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maksim Kiselev Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 10:24:36 +0300 Subject: aoe: avoid potential deadlock at set_capacity Move set_capacity() outside of the section procected by (&d->lock). To avoid possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- [1] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); local_irq_disable(); [2] lock(&d->lock); [3] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); [4] lock(&d->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Where [1](&bdev->bd_size_lock) hold by zram_add()->set_capacity(). [2]lock(&d->lock) hold by aoeblk_gdalloc(). And aoeblk_gdalloc() is trying to acquire [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) at set_capacity() call. In this situation an attempt to acquire [4]lock(&d->lock) from aoecmd_cfg_rsp() will lead to deadlock. So the simplest solution is breaking lock dependency [2](&d->lock) -> [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) by moving set_capacity() outside. Signed-off-by: Maksim Kiselev Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124072436.3745720-2-bigunclemax@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- drivers/block/aoe/aoeblk.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/aoe/aoeblk.c b/drivers/block/aoe/aoeblk.c index d2dbf8aaccb5..b1b47d88f5db 100644 --- a/drivers/block/aoe/aoeblk.c +++ b/drivers/block/aoe/aoeblk.c @@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ aoeblk_gdalloc(void *vp) struct gendisk *gd; mempool_t *mp; struct blk_mq_tag_set *set; + sector_t ssize; ulong flags; int late = 0; int err; @@ -396,7 +397,7 @@ aoeblk_gdalloc(void *vp) gd->minors = AOE_PARTITIONS; gd->fops = &aoe_bdops; gd->private_data = d; - set_capacity(gd, d->ssize); + ssize = d->ssize; snprintf(gd->disk_name, sizeof gd->disk_name, "etherd/e%ld.%d", d->aoemajor, d->aoeminor); @@ -405,6 +406,8 @@ aoeblk_gdalloc(void *vp) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&d->lock, flags); + set_capacity(gd, ssize); + err = device_add_disk(NULL, gd, aoe_attr_groups); if (err) goto out_disk_cleanup; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9f3fe29d77ef4e7f7cb5c4c8c59f6dc373e57e78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 19:22:36 +0100 Subject: md: fix a suspicious RCU usage warning RCU protection was removed in the commit 2d32777d60de ("raid1: remove rcu protection to access rdev from conf"). However, the code in fix_read_error does rcu_dereference outside rcu_read_lock - this triggers the following warning. The warning is triggered by a LVM2 test shell/integrity-caching.sh. This commit removes rcu_dereference. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.7.0 #2 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/md/raid1.c:2265 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by mdX_raid1/1859. stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 1859 Comm: mdX_raid1 Not tainted 6.7.0 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x70 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x1b0 raid1d+0x1732/0x1750 [raid1] ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x270 ? finish_wait+0x3d/0x80 ? md_thread+0xf7/0x130 [md_mod] ? lock_release+0xaa/0x230 ? md_register_thread+0xd0/0xd0 [md_mod] md_thread+0xa0/0x130 [md_mod] ? housekeeping_test_cpu+0x30/0x30 kthread+0xdc/0x110 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x28/0x40 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Fixes: ca294b34aaf3 ("md/raid1: support read error check") Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai Signed-off-by: Song Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/51539879-e1ca-fde3-b8b4-8934ddedcbc@redhat.com --- drivers/md/raid1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid1.c b/drivers/md/raid1.c index 24f0d799fd98..286f8b16c7bd 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid1.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid1.c @@ -2262,7 +2262,7 @@ static void fix_read_error(struct r1conf *conf, struct r1bio *r1_bio) int sectors = r1_bio->sectors; int read_disk = r1_bio->read_disk; struct mddev *mddev = conf->mddev; - struct md_rdev *rdev = rcu_dereference(conf->mirrors[read_disk].rdev); + struct md_rdev *rdev = conf->mirrors[read_disk].rdev; if (exceed_read_errors(mddev, rdev)) { r1_bio->bios[r1_bio->read_disk] = IO_BLOCKED; -- cgit v1.2.3