From f9d480b6ffbeb336bf7f6ce44825c00f61b3abae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 10:47:42 -0500 Subject: seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path The overhead of running Seccomp filters has been part of some past discussions [1][2][3]. Oftentimes, the filters have a large number of instructions that check syscall numbers one by one and jump based on that. Some users chain BPF filters which further enlarge the overhead. A recent work [6] comprehensively measures the Seccomp overhead and shows that the overhead is non-negligible and has a non-trivial impact on application performance. We observed some common filters, such as docker's [4] or systemd's [5], will make most decisions based only on the syscall numbers, and as past discussions considered, a bitmap where each bit represents a syscall makes most sense for these filters. The fast (common) path for seccomp should be that the filter permits the syscall to pass through, and failing seccomp is expected to be an exceptional case; it is not expected for userspace to call a denylisted syscall over and over. When it can be concluded that an allow must occur for the given architecture and syscall pair (this determination is introduced in the next commit), seccomp will immediately allow the syscall, bypassing further BPF execution. Each architecture number has its own bitmap. The architecture number in seccomp_data is checked against the defined architecture number constant before proceeding to test the bit against the bitmap with the syscall number as the index of the bit in the bitmap, and if the bit is set, seccomp returns allow. The bitmaps are all clear in this patch and will be initialized in the next commit. When only one architecture exists, the check against architecture number is skipped, suggested by Kees Cook [7]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/c22a6c3cefc2412cad00ae14c1371711@huawei.com/T/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202005181120.971232B7B@keescook/T/ [3] https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/116 [4] https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/ae0ef82b90356ac613f329a8ef5ee42ca923417d/profiles/seccomp/default.json [5] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/6743a1caf4037f03dc51a1277855018e4ab61957/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L270 [6] Draco: Architectural and Operating System Support for System Call Security https://tianyin.github.io/pub/draco.pdf, MICRO-53, Oct. 2020 [7] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202010091614.8BB0EB64@keescook/ Co-developed-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos Signed-off-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10f91a367ec4fcdea7fc3f086de3f5f13a4a7436.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- kernel/seccomp.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 8ad7a293255a..fe35f4f38949 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -143,6 +143,34 @@ struct notification { struct list_head notifications; }; +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE +/** + * struct action_cache - per-filter cache of seccomp actions per + * arch/syscall pair + * + * @allow_native: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the + * filter will always allow the syscall, for the + * native architecture. + * @allow_compat: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the + * filter will always allow the syscall, for the + * compat architecture. + */ +struct action_cache { + DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_native, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR); +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT + DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_compat, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR); +#endif +}; +#else +struct action_cache { }; + +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter, + const struct seccomp_data *sd) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ + /** * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs * @@ -298,6 +326,52 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) return 0; } +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(const void *bitmap, + size_t bitmap_size, + int syscall_nr) +{ + if (unlikely(syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= bitmap_size)) + return false; + syscall_nr = array_index_nospec(syscall_nr, bitmap_size); + + return test_bit(syscall_nr, bitmap); +} + +/** + * seccomp_cache_check_allow - lookup seccomp cache + * @sfilter: The seccomp filter + * @sd: The seccomp data to lookup the cache with + * + * Returns true if the seccomp_data is cached and allowed. + */ +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter, + const struct seccomp_data *sd) +{ + int syscall_nr = sd->nr; + const struct action_cache *cache = &sfilter->cache; + +#ifndef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT + /* A native-only architecture doesn't need to check sd->arch. */ + return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, + syscall_nr); +#else + if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE)) + return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, + syscall_nr); + if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT)) + return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_compat, + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR, + syscall_nr); +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */ + + WARN_ON_ONCE(true); + return false; +} +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ + /** * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters @@ -320,6 +394,9 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, if (WARN_ON(f == NULL)) return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS; + if (seccomp_cache_check_allow(f, sd)) + return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; + /* * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA). -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8e01b51a31a1e08e2c3e8fcc0ef6790441be2f61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 10:47:43 -0500 Subject: seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow SECCOMP_CACHE will only operate on syscalls that do not access any syscall arguments or instruction pointer. To facilitate this we need a static analyser to know whether a filter will return allow regardless of syscall arguments for a given architecture number / syscall number pair. This is implemented here with a pseudo-emulator, and stored in a per-filter bitmap. In order to build this bitmap at filter attach time, each filter is emulated for every syscall (under each possible architecture), and checked for any accesses of struct seccomp_data that are not the "arch" nor "nr" (syscall) members. If only "arch" and "nr" are examined, and the program returns allow, then we can be sure that the filter must return allow independent from syscall arguments. Nearly all seccomp filters are built from these cBPF instructions: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K BPF_JMP | BPF_JA BPF_RET | BPF_K BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K Each of these instructions are emulated. Any weirdness or loading from a syscall argument will cause the emulator to bail. The emulation is also halted if it reaches a return. In that case, if it returns an SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the syscall is marked as good. Emulator structure and comments are from Kees [1] and Jann [2]. Emulation is done at attach time. If a filter depends on more filters, and if the dependee does not guarantee to allow the syscall, then we skip the emulation of this syscall. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200923232923.3142503-5-keescook@chromium.org/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1p=dR_2ikKq=xVxkoGg0fYpTBpkhJSv1w-6BG=76PAvw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Co-developed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/71c7be2db5ee08905f41c3be5c1ad6e2601ce88f.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- kernel/seccomp.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 155 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index fe35f4f38949..d8cf468dbe1e 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilte { return false; } + +static inline void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter) +{ +} #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ /** @@ -187,6 +191,7 @@ static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilte * this filter after reaching 0. The @users count is always smaller * or equal to @refs. Hence, reaching 0 for @users does not mean * the filter can be freed. + * @cache: cache of arch/syscall mappings to actions * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate @@ -208,6 +213,7 @@ struct seccomp_filter { refcount_t refs; refcount_t users; bool log; + struct action_cache cache; struct seccomp_filter *prev; struct bpf_prog *prog; struct notification *notif; @@ -621,7 +627,12 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) { struct seccomp_filter *sfilter; int ret; - const bool save_orig = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE); + const bool save_orig = +#if defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || defined(SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE) + true; +#else + false; +#endif if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -687,6 +698,148 @@ out: return filter; } +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE +/** + * seccomp_is_const_allow - check if filter is constant allow with given data + * @fprog: The BPF programs + * @sd: The seccomp data to check against, only syscall number and arch + * number are considered constant. + */ +static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog, + struct seccomp_data *sd) +{ + unsigned int reg_value = 0; + unsigned int pc; + bool op_res; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fprog)) + return false; + + for (pc = 0; pc < fprog->len; pc++) { + struct sock_filter *insn = &fprog->filter[pc]; + u16 code = insn->code; + u32 k = insn->k; + + switch (code) { + case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS: + switch (k) { + case offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr): + reg_value = sd->nr; + break; + case offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch): + reg_value = sd->arch; + break; + default: + /* can't optimize (non-constant value load) */ + return false; + } + break; + case BPF_RET | BPF_K: + /* reached return with constant values only, check allow */ + return k == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; + case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA: + pc += insn->k; + break; + case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K: + case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K: + case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K: + case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K: + switch (BPF_OP(code)) { + case BPF_JEQ: + op_res = reg_value == k; + break; + case BPF_JGE: + op_res = reg_value >= k; + break; + case BPF_JGT: + op_res = reg_value > k; + break; + case BPF_JSET: + op_res = !!(reg_value & k); + break; + default: + /* can't optimize (unknown jump) */ + return false; + } + + pc += op_res ? insn->jt : insn->jf; + break; + case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K: + reg_value &= k; + break; + default: + /* can't optimize (unknown insn) */ + return false; + } + } + + /* ran off the end of the filter?! */ + WARN_ON(1); + return false; +} + +static void seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter, + void *bitmap, const void *bitmap_prev, + size_t bitmap_size, int arch) +{ + struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog = sfilter->prog->orig_prog; + struct seccomp_data sd; + int nr; + + if (bitmap_prev) { + /* The new filter must be as restrictive as the last. */ + bitmap_copy(bitmap, bitmap_prev, bitmap_size); + } else { + /* Before any filters, all syscalls are always allowed. */ + bitmap_fill(bitmap, bitmap_size); + } + + for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) { + /* No bitmap change: not a cacheable action. */ + if (!test_bit(nr, bitmap)) + continue; + + sd.nr = nr; + sd.arch = arch; + + /* No bitmap change: continue to always allow. */ + if (seccomp_is_const_allow(fprog, &sd)) + continue; + + /* + * Not a cacheable action: always run filters. + * atomic clear_bit() not needed, filter not visible yet. + */ + __clear_bit(nr, bitmap); + } +} + +/** + * seccomp_cache_prepare - emulate the filter to find cachable syscalls + * @sfilter: The seccomp filter + * + * Returns 0 if successful or -errno if error occurred. + */ +static void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter) +{ + struct action_cache *cache = &sfilter->cache; + const struct action_cache *cache_prev = + sfilter->prev ? &sfilter->prev->cache : NULL; + + seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(sfilter, cache->allow_native, + cache_prev ? cache_prev->allow_native : NULL, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE); + +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT + seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(sfilter, cache->allow_compat, + cache_prev ? cache_prev->allow_compat : NULL, + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR, + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT); +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */ +} +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ + /** * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter * @flags: flags to change filter behavior @@ -736,6 +889,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags, * task reference. */ filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter; + seccomp_cache_prepare(filter); current->seccomp.filter = filter; atomic_inc(¤t->seccomp.filter_count); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 25db91209a910a0ccf8b093743088d0f4bf5659f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 10:47:44 -0500 Subject: x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking Provide seccomp internals with the details to calculate which syscall table the running kernel is expecting to deal with. This allows for efficient architecture pinning and paves the way for constant-action bitmaps. Co-developed-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/da58c3733d95c4f2115dd94225dfbe2573ba4d87.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h index 2bd1338de236..fef16e398161 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -16,6 +16,26 @@ #define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32 __NR_ia32_sigreturn #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "x86_64" +# ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT AUDIT_ARCH_I386 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR IA32_NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME "ia32" +# endif +/* + * x32 will have __X32_SYSCALL_BIT set in syscall number. We don't support + * caching them and they are treated as out of range syscalls, which will + * always pass through the BPF filter. + */ +#else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_I386 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "ia32" +#endif + #include #endif /* _ASM_X86_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 192cf32243ce39af65bd095625aec374b38c03df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 10:47:45 -0500 Subject: selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit As part of the seccomp benchmarking, include the expectations with regard to the timing behavior of the constant action bitmaps, and report inconsistencies better. Example output with constant action bitmaps on x86: $ sudo ./seccomp_benchmark 100000000 Current BPF sysctl settings: net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1 net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 0 Benchmarking 200000000 syscalls... 129.359381409 - 0.008724424 = 129350656985 (129.4s) getpid native: 646 ns 264.385890006 - 129.360453229 = 135025436777 (135.0s) getpid RET_ALLOW 1 filter (bitmap): 675 ns 399.400511893 - 264.387045901 = 135013465992 (135.0s) getpid RET_ALLOW 2 filters (bitmap): 675 ns 545.872866260 - 399.401718327 = 146471147933 (146.5s) getpid RET_ALLOW 3 filters (full): 732 ns 696.337101319 - 545.874097681 = 150463003638 (150.5s) getpid RET_ALLOW 4 filters (full): 752 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 1 bitmapped filter: 29 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 2 bitmapped filters: 29 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 3 full filters: 86 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 4 full filters: 106 ns Estimated seccomp entry overhead: 29 ns Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead (last 2 diff): 20 ns Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead (filters / 4): 19 ns Expectations: native ≤ 1 bitmap (646 ≤ 675): ✔️ native ≤ 1 filter (646 ≤ 732): ✔️ per-filter (last 2 diff) ≈ per-filter (filters / 4) (20 ≈ 19): ✔️ 1 bitmapped ≈ 2 bitmapped (29 ≈ 29): ✔️ entry ≈ 1 bitmapped (29 ≈ 29): ✔️ entry ≈ 2 bitmapped (29 ≈ 29): ✔️ native + entry + (per filter * 4) ≈ 4 filters total (755 ≈ 752): ✔️ [YiFei: Changed commit message to show stats for this patch series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b61df3db85c5f7f1b9202722c45e7b39df73ef2.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- .../testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_benchmark.c | 151 ++++++++++++++++++--- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings | 2 +- 2 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_benchmark.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_benchmark.c index 91f5a89cadac..fcc806585266 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_benchmark.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_benchmark.c @@ -4,12 +4,16 @@ */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -70,18 +74,74 @@ unsigned long long calibrate(void) return samples * seconds; } +bool approx(int i_one, int i_two) +{ + double one = i_one, one_bump = one * 0.01; + double two = i_two, two_bump = two * 0.01; + + one_bump = one + MAX(one_bump, 2.0); + two_bump = two + MAX(two_bump, 2.0); + + /* Equal to, or within 1% or 2 digits */ + if (one == two || + (one > two && one <= two_bump) || + (two > one && two <= one_bump)) + return true; + return false; +} + +bool le(int i_one, int i_two) +{ + if (i_one <= i_two) + return true; + return false; +} + +long compare(const char *name_one, const char *name_eval, const char *name_two, + unsigned long long one, bool (*eval)(int, int), unsigned long long two) +{ + bool good; + + printf("\t%s %s %s (%lld %s %lld): ", name_one, name_eval, name_two, + (long long)one, name_eval, (long long)two); + if (one > INT_MAX) { + printf("Miscalculation! Measurement went negative: %lld\n", (long long)one); + return 1; + } + if (two > INT_MAX) { + printf("Miscalculation! Measurement went negative: %lld\n", (long long)two); + return 1; + } + + good = eval(one, two); + printf("%s\n", good ? "✔️" : "❌"); + + return good ? 0 : 1; +} + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + struct sock_filter bitmap_filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + }; + struct sock_fprog bitmap_prog = { + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(bitmap_filter), + .filter = bitmap_filter, + }; struct sock_filter filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[0])), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), }; struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter), .filter = filter, }; - long ret; - unsigned long long samples; - unsigned long long native, filter1, filter2; + + long ret, bits; + unsigned long long samples, calc; + unsigned long long native, filter1, filter2, bitmap1, bitmap2; + unsigned long long entry, per_filter1, per_filter2; printf("Current BPF sysctl settings:\n"); system("sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_enable"); @@ -101,35 +161,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); assert(ret == 0); - /* One filter */ - ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog); + /* One filter resulting in a bitmap */ + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &bitmap_prog); assert(ret == 0); - filter1 = timing(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, samples) / samples; - printf("getpid RET_ALLOW 1 filter: %llu ns\n", filter1); + bitmap1 = timing(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, samples) / samples; + printf("getpid RET_ALLOW 1 filter (bitmap): %llu ns\n", bitmap1); + + /* Second filter resulting in a bitmap */ + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &bitmap_prog); + assert(ret == 0); - if (filter1 == native) - printf("No overhead measured!? Try running again with more samples.\n"); + bitmap2 = timing(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, samples) / samples; + printf("getpid RET_ALLOW 2 filters (bitmap): %llu ns\n", bitmap2); - /* Two filters */ + /* Third filter, can no longer be converted to bitmap */ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog); assert(ret == 0); - filter2 = timing(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, samples) / samples; - printf("getpid RET_ALLOW 2 filters: %llu ns\n", filter2); - - /* Calculations */ - printf("Estimated total seccomp overhead for 1 filter: %llu ns\n", - filter1 - native); + filter1 = timing(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, samples) / samples; + printf("getpid RET_ALLOW 3 filters (full): %llu ns\n", filter1); - printf("Estimated total seccomp overhead for 2 filters: %llu ns\n", - filter2 - native); + /* Fourth filter, can not be converted to bitmap because of filter 3 */ + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &bitmap_prog); + assert(ret == 0); - printf("Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead: %llu ns\n", - filter2 - filter1); + filter2 = timing(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, samples) / samples; + printf("getpid RET_ALLOW 4 filters (full): %llu ns\n", filter2); + + /* Estimations */ +#define ESTIMATE(fmt, var, what) do { \ + var = (what); \ + printf("Estimated " fmt ": %llu ns\n", var); \ + if (var > INT_MAX) \ + goto more_samples; \ + } while (0) + + ESTIMATE("total seccomp overhead for 1 bitmapped filter", calc, + bitmap1 - native); + ESTIMATE("total seccomp overhead for 2 bitmapped filters", calc, + bitmap2 - native); + ESTIMATE("total seccomp overhead for 3 full filters", calc, + filter1 - native); + ESTIMATE("total seccomp overhead for 4 full filters", calc, + filter2 - native); + ESTIMATE("seccomp entry overhead", entry, + bitmap1 - native - (bitmap2 - bitmap1)); + ESTIMATE("seccomp per-filter overhead (last 2 diff)", per_filter1, + filter2 - filter1); + ESTIMATE("seccomp per-filter overhead (filters / 4)", per_filter2, + (filter2 - native - entry) / 4); + + printf("Expectations:\n"); + ret |= compare("native", "≤", "1 bitmap", native, le, bitmap1); + bits = compare("native", "≤", "1 filter", native, le, filter1); + if (bits) + goto more_samples; + + ret |= compare("per-filter (last 2 diff)", "≈", "per-filter (filters / 4)", + per_filter1, approx, per_filter2); + + bits = compare("1 bitmapped", "≈", "2 bitmapped", + bitmap1 - native, approx, bitmap2 - native); + if (bits) { + printf("Skipping constant action bitmap expectations: they appear unsupported.\n"); + goto out; + } - printf("Estimated seccomp entry overhead: %llu ns\n", - filter1 - native - (filter2 - filter1)); + ret |= compare("entry", "≈", "1 bitmapped", entry, approx, bitmap1 - native); + ret |= compare("entry", "≈", "2 bitmapped", entry, approx, bitmap2 - native); + ret |= compare("native + entry + (per filter * 4)", "≈", "4 filters total", + entry + (per_filter1 * 4) + native, approx, filter2); + if (ret == 0) + goto out; +more_samples: + printf("Saw unexpected benchmark result. Try running again with more samples?\n"); +out: return 0; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings index ba4d85f74cd6..6091b45d226b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings @@ -1 +1 @@ -timeout=90 +timeout=120 -- cgit v1.2.3 From ffde703470b03b1000017ed35c4f90a90caa22cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 12:23:19 -0700 Subject: arm64: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for arm64. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h index c36387170936..30256233788b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -19,4 +19,13 @@ #include +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "aarch64" +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT AUDIT_ARCH_ARM +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR __NR_compat_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME "arm" +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 424c9102fa7b2a5c15afe47fd14278c849f4eefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 12:26:58 -0700 Subject: arm: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for arm. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild index 383635b68763..4a0848aef207 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ generic-y += extable.h generic-y += flat.h generic-y += local64.h generic-y += parport.h -generic-y += seccomp.h generated-y += mach-types.h generated-y += unistd-nr.h diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9ad0f37d2ba --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include + +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_ARM +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "arm" + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6e9ae6f98809e0d123ff4d769ba2e6f652119138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:47 -0600 Subject: csky: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for csky. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f9219026d4803b22f3e57e3768b4e42e004ef236.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/csky/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/csky/include/asm/seccomp.h | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/csky/include/asm/seccomp.h diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/csky/include/asm/Kbuild index 64876e59e2ef..93372255984d 100644 --- a/arch/csky/include/asm/Kbuild +++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/Kbuild @@ -4,6 +4,5 @@ generic-y += gpio.h generic-y += kvm_para.h generic-y += local64.h generic-y += qrwlock.h -generic-y += seccomp.h generic-y += user.h generic-y += vmlinux.lds.h diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d33e758126fb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include + +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_CSKY +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "csky" + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6aa7923c8737d1f8fd2a06154155d68dec646464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:48 -0600 Subject: parisc: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for parisc. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Acked-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9bb86c546eda753adf5270425e7353202dbce87c.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/parisc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/parisc/include/asm/seccomp.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/parisc/include/asm/seccomp.h diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/parisc/include/asm/Kbuild index e3ee5c0bfe80..f16c4db80116 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/Kbuild +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/Kbuild @@ -5,5 +5,4 @@ generated-y += syscall_table_c32.h generic-y += kvm_para.h generic-y += local64.h generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h -generic-y += seccomp.h generic-y += user.h diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b058b2220322 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC64 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "parisc64" +# ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME "parisc" +# endif +#else /* !CONFIG_64BIT */ +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "parisc" +#endif + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From e7bcb4622ddf4473da6c03fa8423919a568c57dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:49 -0600 Subject: powerpc: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for powerpc. __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ is used here instead of CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN to keep it consistent with asm/syscall.h. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0b64925362671cdaa26d01bfe50b3ba5e164adfd.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/seccomp.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/seccomp.h index 51209f6071c5..ac2033f134f0 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -8,4 +8,27 @@ #include +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ +#define __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE __AUDIT_ARCH_LE +#define __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE_NAME "le" +#else +#define __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE 0 +#define __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE_NAME +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE (AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 | __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE) +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "ppc64" __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE_NAME +# ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT (AUDIT_ARCH_PPC | __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE) +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME "ppc" __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE_NAME +# endif +#else /* !CONFIG_PPC64 */ +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE (AUDIT_ARCH_PPC | __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE) +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "ppc" __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE_NAME +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 673a11a7e4152b101bad6851c4e4c34c7c6d6dde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:50 -0600 Subject: riscv: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for riscv. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58ef925d00505cbb77478fa6bd2b48ab2d902460.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h index bf7744ee3b3d..c7ee6a3507be 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -7,4 +7,14 @@ #include +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "riscv64" +#else /* !CONFIG_64BIT */ +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV32 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "riscv32" +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From c09058eda2654c37fd7ac28c2004c3aae8b988e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:51 -0600 Subject: s390: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for s390. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Acked-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a381b10aa2c5b1e583642f3cd46ced842d9d4ce5.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/s390/include/asm/seccomp.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/seccomp.h index 795bbe0d7ca6..71d46f0ba97b 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -16,4 +16,13 @@ #include +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_S390X +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "s390x" +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT AUDIT_ARCH_S390 +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR NR_syscalls +# define SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME "s390" +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_S390_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4c18bc054bffe415bec9e0edaa9ff1a84c1a6973 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:52 -0600 Subject: sh: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for sh. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/61ae084cd4783b9b50860d9dedb4a348cf1b7b6f.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/sh/include/asm/seccomp.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/seccomp.h index 54111e4d32b8..d4578395fd66 100644 --- a/arch/sh/include/asm/seccomp.h +++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -8,4 +8,14 @@ #define __NR_seccomp_exit __NR_exit #define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn __NR_rt_sigreturn +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN +#define __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE __AUDIT_ARCH_LE +#else +#define __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE 0 +#endif + +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE (AUDIT_ARCH_SH | __SECCOMP_ARCH_LE) +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "sh" + #endif /* __ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 445247b02342a05b7d528bba6d85d2d418875b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:53 -0600 Subject: xtensa: Enable seccomp architecture tracking To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these for xtensa. Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/79669648ba167d668ea6ffb4884250abcd5ed254.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/xtensa/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/xtensa/include/asm/seccomp.h | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/xtensa/include/asm/seccomp.h diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/Kbuild index c59c42a1221a..9718e9593564 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/Kbuild +++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/Kbuild @@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h generic-y += param.h generic-y += qrwlock.h generic-y += qspinlock.h -generic-y += seccomp.h generic-y += user.h diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f1cb6b0a9e1f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include + +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_XTENSA +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "xtensa" + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0d8315dddd2899f519fe1ca3d4d5cdaf44ea421e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YiFei Zhu Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 07:33:54 -0600 Subject: seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls. This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be in the format of: where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: x86_64 0 ALLOW x86_64 1 ALLOW x86_64 2 ALLOW x86_64 3 ALLOW [...] x86_64 132 ALLOW x86_64 133 ALLOW x86_64 134 FILTER x86_64 135 FILTER x86_64 136 FILTER x86_64 137 ALLOW x86_64 138 ALLOW x86_64 139 FILTER x86_64 140 ALLOW x86_64 141 ALLOW [...] This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Suggested-by: Jann Horn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/94e663fa53136f5a11f432c661794d1ee7060779.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu --- arch/Kconfig | 17 ++++++++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 6 +++++ include/linux/seccomp.h | 7 ++++++ kernel/seccomp.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 56b6ccc0e32d..35c9463b7d10 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -486,6 +486,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1 results in the system call being skipped immediately. - seccomp syscall wired up + - if !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR, have SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME defined. If + COMPAT is supported, have the SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT* defines too. config SECCOMP prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode" @@ -514,6 +517,20 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details. +config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache" + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER && !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR + depends on PROC_FS + help + This enables the /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor + seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading + the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + + This option is for debugging only. Enabling presents the risk that + an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic. + + If unsure, say N. + config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK bool help diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index b362523a9829..8a7d682ba881 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3263,6 +3263,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3592,6 +3595,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif }; static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index 02aef2844c38..76963ec4641a 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -121,4 +121,11 @@ static inline long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task, return -EINVAL; } #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG +struct seq_file; + +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); +#endif #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index d8cf468dbe1e..76f524e320b1 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -553,6 +553,9 @@ void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; + /* We are effectively holding the siglock by not having any sighand. */ + WARN_ON(tsk->sighand != NULL); + /* Detach task from its filter tree. */ tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL; __seccomp_filter_release(orig); @@ -2335,3 +2338,59 @@ static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void) device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init) #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG +/* Currently CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG implies SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ +static void proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(struct seq_file *m, const char *name, + const void *bitmap, size_t bitmap_size) +{ + int nr; + + for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) { + bool cached = test_bit(nr, bitmap); + char *status = cached ? "ALLOW" : "FILTER"; + + seq_printf(m, "%s %d %s\n", name, nr, status); + } +} + +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *f; + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * We don't want some sandboxed process to know what their seccomp + * filters consist of. + */ + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + + if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) + return -ESRCH; + + f = READ_ONCE(task->seccomp.filter); + if (!f) { + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + return 0; + } + + /* prevent filter from being freed while we are printing it */ + __get_seccomp_filter(f); + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + + proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME, + f->cache.allow_native, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR); + +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT + proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME, + f->cache.allow_compat, + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR); +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */ + + __put_seccomp_filter(f); + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From fab686eb0307121e7a2890b6d6c57edd2457863d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 18:05:45 +0100 Subject: seccomp: Remove bogus __user annotations Buffers that are passed to read_actions_logged() and write_actions_logged() are in kernel memory; the sysctl core takes care of copying from/to userspace. Fixes: 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler") Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120170545.1419332-1-jannh@google.com --- kernel/seccomp.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 76f524e320b1..0e0e369d2fcb 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -2202,7 +2202,7 @@ static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names) return true; } -static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, +static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; @@ -2220,7 +2220,7 @@ static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, return proc_dostring(&table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, +static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged) { char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2c07343abd8932200a45ff7b10950e71081e9e77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 17:26:43 +0100 Subject: selftests/seccomp: Update kernel config MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit seccomp_bpf.c uses unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), which requires CONFIG_PID_NS to be set. Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Shuah Khan Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Acked-by: Tycho Andersen Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202162643.249276-1-mic@digikod.net --- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/config | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/config b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/config index 64c19d8eba79..ad431a5178fb 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/config +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/config @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +CONFIG_PID_NS=y CONFIG_SECCOMP=y CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y CONFIG_USER_NS=y -- cgit v1.2.3