From 53e4efa470d5fc6a96662d2d3322cfc925818517 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Marshall Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 16:20:36 -0400 Subject: orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access Arnd Bergmann sent a patch to fsdevel, he says: "orangefs_statfs() copies two consecutive fields of the superblock into the statfs structure, which triggers a warning from the string fortification helpers" Jan Kara suggested an alternate way to do the patch to make it more readable. I ran both ideas through xfstests and both seem fine. This patch is based on Jan Kara's suggestion. Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall --- fs/orangefs/super.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/orangefs/super.c b/fs/orangefs/super.c index 34849b4a3243..907765673765 100644 --- a/fs/orangefs/super.c +++ b/fs/orangefs/super.c @@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ static int orangefs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) (long)new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.files_avail); buf->f_type = sb->s_magic; - memcpy(&buf->f_fsid, &ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id, sizeof(buf->f_fsid)); + buf->f_fsid.val[0] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id; + buf->f_fsid.val[1] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->id; buf->f_bsize = new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.block_size; buf->f_namelen = ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX; -- cgit v1.2.3