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authorGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>2024-02-21 20:14:05 +0300
committerGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>2024-02-28 00:55:34 +0300
commite86e6638d1171c2201ffff16d2c6a6fd975f8383 (patch)
treeb5cdab6dae43797c6f40bcc7d0a0a77e30d5612e
parent8b6bb995d3819218498bdbee4465bffff1497a31 (diff)
downloadlinux-e86e6638d1171c2201ffff16d2c6a6fd975f8383.tar.xz
fscrypt: Drop d_revalidate for valid dentries during lookup
Unencrypted and encrypted-dentries where the key is available don't need to be revalidated by fscrypt, since they don't go stale from under VFS and the key cannot be removed for the encrypted case without evicting the dentry. Disable their d_revalidate hook on the first lookup, to avoid repeated revalidation later. This is done in preparation to always configuring d_op through sb->s_d_op. The only part detail is that, since the filesystem might have other features that require revalidation, we only apply this optimization if the d_revalidate handler is fscrypt_d_revalidate itself. Finally, we need to clean the dentry->flags even for unencrypted dentries, so the ->d_lock might be acquired even for them. In order to avoid doing it for filesystems that don't care about fscrypt at all, we peek ->d_flags without the lock at first, and only acquire it if we actually need to write the flag. Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240221171412.10710-4-krisman@suse.de Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fscrypt.h22
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
index c76f859cf019..78af02b35bd9 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
@@ -264,10 +264,29 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_is_nokey_name(const struct dentry *dentry)
static inline void fscrypt_prepare_dentry(struct dentry *dentry,
bool is_nokey_name)
{
+ /*
+ * This code tries to only take ->d_lock when necessary to write
+ * to ->d_flags. We shouldn't be peeking on d_flags for
+ * DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE unlocked, but in the unlikely case
+ * there is a race, the worst it can happen is that we fail to
+ * unset DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE and pay the cost of an extra
+ * d_revalidate.
+ */
if (is_nokey_name) {
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
+ } else if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE &&
+ dentry->d_op->d_revalidate == fscrypt_d_revalidate) {
+ /*
+ * Unencrypted dentries and encrypted dentries where the
+ * key is available are always valid from fscrypt
+ * perspective. Avoid the cost of calling
+ * fscrypt_d_revalidate unnecessarily.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
+ dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE;
+ spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
}
@@ -997,6 +1016,9 @@ static inline int fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir,
fname->usr_fname = &dentry->d_name;
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)dentry->d_name.name;
fname->disk_name.len = dentry->d_name.len;
+
+ fscrypt_prepare_dentry(dentry, false);
+
return 0;
}