diff options
author | Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> | 2024-03-11 18:57:05 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2024-04-08 20:27:05 +0300 |
commit | ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef (patch) | |
tree | cd708b3c092d7c6809a516cde3f3719c4d8aca06 /Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln | |
parent | be482ff9500999f56093738f9219bbabc729d163 (diff) | |
download | linux-ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef.tar.xz |
x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob
Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).
Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:
auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
VMexit.
off - Turn off BHI mitigation.
The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 45 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index cce768afec6b..7cb99b09827c 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically, the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of Enhanced IBRS. -Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via -unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable -unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines). -For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use -retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines). +Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged +eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF. +For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or +use the BHB clearing sequence. Attack scenarios ---------------- @@ -430,6 +429,21 @@ The possible values in this file are: 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB =========================== ======================================================= + - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status: + +.. list-table:: + + * - BHI: Not affected + - System is not affected + * - BHI: Retpoline + - System is protected by retpoline + * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S + - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S + * - BHI: SW loop + - System is protected by software clearing sequence + * - BHI: Syscall hardening + - Syscalls are hardened against BHI + Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will report vulnerability. @@ -484,7 +498,11 @@ Spectre variant 2 Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against - Spectre v2 variant attacks. + some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of + indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are + isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated + between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against + BHI attacks. On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables @@ -638,6 +656,21 @@ kernel command line. spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations cannot be disabled. + spectre_bhi= + + [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection + (BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI + regardless of this setting. This setting affects the deployment + of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. + + on + unconditionally enable. + off + unconditionally disable. + auto + enable if hardware mitigation + control(BHI_DIS_S) is available. + For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Mitigation selection guide |