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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-23 05:16:41 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-23 05:16:41 +0300
commitc0a3a64e723324ae6dda53214061a71de63808c3 (patch)
treef148333ecf690df602faaf389fb484d4561c6bc4 /Documentation
parent69c902f597c4bec92013a526268620fb6255c24a (diff)
parent6849243bf4c6155151b294e9f0e0dc9540d6f083 (diff)
downloadlinux-c0a3a64e723324ae6dda53214061a71de63808c3.tar.xz
Merge tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook: "Major additions: - sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions (tyhicks) - new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl (tyhicks) - SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls (tyhicks) - SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action - self-tests for new behaviors" [ This is the seccomp part of the security pull request during the merge window that was nixed due to unrelated problems - Linus ] * tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: samples: Unrename SECCOMP_RET_KILL selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS action seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD seccomp: Action to log before allowing seccomp: Filter flag to log all actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW seccomp: Selftest for detection of filter flag support seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available seccomp: Sysctl to display available actions seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests selftests/seccomp: Add simple seccomp overhead benchmark selftests/seccomp: Add tests for basic ptrace actions
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/networking/filter.txt2
-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt1
-rw-r--r--Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst52
3 files changed, 52 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/filter.txt b/Documentation/networking/filter.txt
index 789b74dbe1d9..87814859cfc2 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/filter.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/filter.txt
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ Examples for low-level BPF:
jeq #14, good /* __NR_rt_sigprocmask */
jeq #13, good /* __NR_rt_sigaction */
jeq #35, good /* __NR_nanosleep */
- bad: ret #0 /* SECCOMP_RET_KILL */
+ bad: ret #0 /* SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD */
good: ret #0x7fff0000 /* SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW */
The above example code can be placed into a file (here called "foo"), and
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index ce61d1fe08ca..694968c7523c 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- reboot-cmd [ SPARC only ]
- rtsig-max
- rtsig-nr
+- seccomp/ ==> Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
- sem
- sem_next_id [ sysv ipc ]
- sg-big-buff [ generic SCSI device (sg) ]
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
index f71eb5ef1f2d..099c412951d6 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
@@ -87,11 +87,16 @@ Return values
A seccomp filter may return any of the following values. If multiple
filters exist, the return value for the evaluation of a given system
call will always use the highest precedent value. (For example,
-``SECCOMP_RET_KILL`` will always take precedence.)
+``SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS`` will always take precedence.)
In precedence order, they are:
-``SECCOMP_RET_KILL``:
+``SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS``:
+ Results in the entire process exiting immediately without executing
+ the system call. The exit status of the task (``status & 0x7f``)
+ will be ``SIGSYS``, not ``SIGKILL``.
+
+``SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD``:
Results in the task exiting immediately without executing the
system call. The exit status of the task (``status & 0x7f``) will
be ``SIGSYS``, not ``SIGKILL``.
@@ -141,6 +146,15 @@ In precedence order, they are:
allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without
extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)
+``SECCOMP_RET_LOG``:
+ Results in the system call being executed after it is logged. This
+ should be used by application developers to learn which syscalls their
+ application needs without having to iterate through multiple test and
+ development cycles to build the list.
+
+ This action will only be logged if "log" is present in the
+ actions_logged sysctl string.
+
``SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW``:
Results in the system call being executed.
@@ -169,7 +183,41 @@ The ``samples/seccomp/`` directory contains both an x86-specific example
and a more generic example of a higher level macro interface for BPF
program generation.
+Sysctls
+=======
+Seccomp's sysctl files can be found in the ``/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/``
+directory. Here's a description of each file in that directory:
+
+``actions_avail``:
+ A read-only ordered list of seccomp return values (refer to the
+ ``SECCOMP_RET_*`` macros above) in string form. The ordering, from
+ left-to-right, is the least permissive return value to the most
+ permissive return value.
+
+ The list represents the set of seccomp return values supported
+ by the kernel. A userspace program may use this list to
+ determine if the actions found in the ``seccomp.h``, when the
+ program was built, differs from the set of actions actually
+ supported in the current running kernel.
+
+``actions_logged``:
+ A read-write ordered list of seccomp return values (refer to the
+ ``SECCOMP_RET_*`` macros above) that are allowed to be logged. Writes
+ to the file do not need to be in ordered form but reads from the file
+ will be ordered in the same way as the actions_avail sysctl.
+
+ It is important to note that the value of ``actions_logged`` does not
+ prevent certain actions from being logged when the audit subsystem is
+ configured to audit a task. If the action is not found in
+ ``actions_logged`` list, the final decision on whether to audit the
+ action for that task is ultimately left up to the audit subsystem to
+ decide for all seccomp return values other than ``SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW``.
+
+ The ``allow`` string is not accepted in the ``actions_logged`` sysctl
+ as it is not possible to log ``SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW`` actions. Attempting
+ to write ``allow`` to the sysctl will result in an EINVAL being
+ returned.
Adding architecture support
===========================