diff options
| author | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> | 2022-06-15 00:16:05 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-06-27 11:34:00 +0300 |
| commit | b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce (patch) | |
| tree | 52439ac589efbe3e3c881eba84cddb489e205c37 /arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | |
| parent | d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 (diff) | |
| download | linux-b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce.tar.xz | |
x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.
There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 887420844066..e309e7156038 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -698,7 +698,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(__stack_chk_guard) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -707,7 +706,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */ popfl |