diff options
author | Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> | 2024-02-14 05:22:56 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> | 2024-02-20 03:31:59 +0300 |
commit | 43fb862de8f628c5db5e96831c915b9aebf62d33 (patch) | |
tree | 58d54fe10d9b573bd9d977e3455bcb79ae06796a /arch/x86/entry | |
parent | 706a189dcf74d3b3f955e9384785e726ed6c7c80 (diff) | |
download | linux-43fb862de8f628c5db5e96831c915b9aebf62d33.tar.xz |
KVM/VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation
During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.
Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.
Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
having MMIO access.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-6-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions