diff options
| author | Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> | 2022-05-10 21:08:49 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> | 2022-07-07 20:13:02 +0300 |
| commit | 8123073c4335fcd18ea5e049b85220f122ac1ca3 (patch) | |
| tree | 35842d349cfdc9e895e8e0f94af83596df253ab8 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | |
| parent | 3a5351415228d06c988a1e610e71d3889f707ac9 (diff) | |
| download | linux-8123073c4335fcd18ea5e049b85220f122ac1ca3.tar.xz | |
x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc()
Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be
used in the implementation for support of adding pages to initialized
enclaves, which requires to allocate new enclave pages.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/57ae71b4ea17998467670232e12d6617b95c6811.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 32 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 2df27dd8b30d..bb8cdb2ad0d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -169,38 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, - unsigned long offset, - u64 secinfo_flags) -{ - struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; - unsigned long prot; - - encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!encl_page) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; - encl_page->encl = encl; - - prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); - - /* - * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO - * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided - * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. - */ - if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) - prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - - /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ - encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); - - return encl_page; -} - static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) { u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; |