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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-06-27 02:32:47 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-06-27 02:32:47 +0300 |
| commit | 5dfe7a7e52ccdf60dfd11ccbe509e4365ea721ca (patch) | |
| tree | 04d8248a95f1789db43578cfd91dfd19e28654ff /arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | |
| parent | 36db314440502c1a3a283ba5a16cb5075c19f3d9 (diff) | |
| parent | 94142c9d1bdf1c18027a42758ceb6bdd59a92012 (diff) | |
| download | linux-5dfe7a7e52ccdf60dfd11ccbe509e4365ea721ca.tar.xz | |
Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 tdx updates from Dave Hansen:
- Fix a race window where load_unaligned_zeropad() could cause a fatal
shutdown during TDX private<=>shared conversion
The race has never been observed in practice but might allow
load_unaligned_zeropad() to catch a TDX page in the middle of its
conversion process which would lead to a fatal and unrecoverable
guest shutdown.
- Annotate sites where VM "exit reasons" are reused as hypercall
numbers.
* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm: Fix enc_status_change_finish_noop()
x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()
x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
x86/tdx: Wrap exit reason with hcall_func()
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index 4855e5f92970..54bbd5163e8d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) #endif } -static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) +static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { /* * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure @@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool */ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc) snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages); + + return true; } /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */ |