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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-08-09 02:57:47 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-08-09 02:57:47 +0400
commit8065be8d032f38da25b54bf077a05a30d9ce9f2a (patch)
tree32a7baf4b40e0240ab4b9dd6f2bbe6129929bb66 /arch/x86
parent27d438c56009e5ae632de36fe70985d1aab5e344 (diff)
parentecc265fe9e09e32a3573b2ba26e79b2099eb8bbb (diff)
downloadlinux-8065be8d032f38da25b54bf077a05a30d9ce9f2a.tar.xz
Merge branch 'akpm' (second patchbomb from Andrew Morton)
Merge more incoming from Andrew Morton: "Two new syscalls: memfd_create in "shm: add memfd_create() syscall" kexec_file_load in "kexec: implementation of new syscall kexec_file_load" And: - Most (all?) of the rest of MM - Lots of the usual misc bits - fs/autofs4 - drivers/rtc - fs/nilfs - procfs - fork.c, exec.c - more in lib/ - rapidio - Janitorial work in filesystems: fs/ufs, fs/reiserfs, fs/adfs, fs/cramfs, fs/romfs, fs/qnx6. - initrd/initramfs work - "file sealing" and the memfd_create() syscall, in tmpfs - add pci_zalloc_consistent, use it in lots of places - MAINTAINERS maintenance - kexec feature work" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org: (193 commits) MAINTAINERS: update nomadik patterns MAINTAINERS: update usb/gadget patterns MAINTAINERS: update DMA BUFFER SHARING patterns kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage kexec: support kexec/kdump on EFI systems kexec: support for kexec on panic using new system call kexec-bzImage64: support for loading bzImage using 64bit entry kexec: load and relocate purgatory at kernel load time purgatory: core purgatory functionality purgatory/sha256: provide implementation of sha256 in purgaotory context kexec: implementation of new syscall kexec_file_load kexec: new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration kexec: make kexec_segment user buffer pointer a union resource: provide new functions to walk through resources kexec: use common function for kimage_normal_alloc() and kimage_crash_alloc() kexec: move segment verification code in a separate function kexec: rename unusebale_pages to unusable_pages kernel: build bin2c based on config option CONFIG_BUILD_BIN2C bin2c: move bin2c in scripts/basic shm: wait for pins to be released when sealing ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kbuild4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Makefile8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/Kbuild3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kexec-bzimage64.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h45
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/scatterlist.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/crash.c563
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c553
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c239
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu_audit.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/entry64.S101
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c72
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/setup-x86_64.S58
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c283
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h22
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/stack.S19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/purgatory/string.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/asm/elf.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/mem_64.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c19
32 files changed, 2069 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kbuild b/arch/x86/Kbuild
index e5287d8517aa..61b6d51866f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kbuild
+++ b/arch/x86/Kbuild
@@ -16,3 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += ia32/
obj-y += platform/
obj-y += net/
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += purgatory/
+endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index bf2405053af5..4aafd322e21e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ config X86
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select HAVE_BPF_JIT if X86_64
select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+ select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select CLKEVT_I8253
select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
select GENERIC_IOMAP
@@ -1581,6 +1582,9 @@ source kernel/Kconfig.hz
config KEXEC
bool "kexec system call"
+ select BUILD_BIN2C
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
---help---
kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your
current kernel, and to start another kernel. It is like a reboot
@@ -1595,6 +1599,28 @@ config KEXEC
interface is strongly in flux, so no good recommendation can be
made.
+config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+ bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+ depends on KEXEC
+ ---help---
+ This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+ kexec_file_load() syscall. If kernel is signature can not be
+ verified, kexec_file_load() will fail.
+
+ This option enforces signature verification at generic level.
+ One needs to enable signature verification for type of kernel
+ image being loaded to make sure it works. For example, enable
+ bzImage signature verification option to be able to load and
+ verify signatures of bzImage. Otherwise kernel loading will fail.
+
+config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
+ bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support"
+ depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+ depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ ---help---
+ Enable bzImage signature verification support.
+
config CRASH_DUMP
bool "kernel crash dumps"
depends on X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index c65fd9650467..c1aa36887843 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -183,6 +183,14 @@ archscripts: scripts_basic
archheaders:
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/syscalls all
+archprepare:
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_KEXEC),y)
+# Build only for 64bit. No loaders for 32bit yet.
+ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
+ $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/purgatory arch/x86/purgatory/kexec-purgatory.c
+ endif
+endif
+
###
# Kernel objects
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/x86/include/asm/Kbuild
index 3ca9762e1649..3bf000fab0ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/Kbuild
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/Kbuild
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ genhdr-y += unistd_64.h
genhdr-y += unistd_x32.h
generic-y += clkdev.h
-generic-y += early_ioremap.h
generic-y += cputime.h
+generic-y += early_ioremap.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
+generic-y += scatterlist.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f498411f2500
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CRASH_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CRASH_H
+
+int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image);
+int crash_copy_backup_region(struct kimage *image);
+int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image,
+ struct boot_params *params);
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CRASH_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec-bzimage64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec-bzimage64.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1b5d194e31d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec-bzimage64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_KEXEC_BZIMAGE64_H
+#define _ASM_KEXEC_BZIMAGE64_H
+
+extern struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops;
+
+#endif /* _ASM_KEXE_BZIMAGE64_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index 17483a492f18..d2434c1cad05 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
+struct kimage;
/*
* KEXEC_SOURCE_MEMORY_LIMIT maximum page get_free_page can return.
@@ -61,6 +64,10 @@
# define KEXEC_ARCH KEXEC_ARCH_X86_64
#endif
+/* Memory to backup during crash kdump */
+#define KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_START (0UL)
+#define KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END (640 * 1024UL) /* 640K */
+
/*
* CPU does not save ss and sp on stack if execution is already
* running in kernel mode at the time of NMI occurrence. This code
@@ -160,6 +167,44 @@ struct kimage_arch {
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
+ /* Details of backup region */
+ unsigned long backup_src_start;
+ unsigned long backup_src_sz;
+
+ /* Physical address of backup segment */
+ unsigned long backup_load_addr;
+
+ /* Core ELF header buffer */
+ void *elf_headers;
+ unsigned long elf_headers_sz;
+ unsigned long elf_load_addr;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/*
+ * Number of elements and order of elements in this structure should match
+ * with the ones in arch/x86/purgatory/entry64.S. If you make a change here
+ * make an appropriate change in purgatory too.
+ */
+struct kexec_entry64_regs {
+ uint64_t rax;
+ uint64_t rcx;
+ uint64_t rdx;
+ uint64_t rbx;
+ uint64_t rsp;
+ uint64_t rbp;
+ uint64_t rsi;
+ uint64_t rdi;
+ uint64_t r8;
+ uint64_t r9;
+ uint64_t r10;
+ uint64_t r11;
+ uint64_t r12;
+ uint64_t r13;
+ uint64_t r14;
+ uint64_t r15;
+ uint64_t rip;
};
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
index 775873d3be55..802dde30c928 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ extern bool __virt_addr_valid(unsigned long kaddr);
#include <asm-generic/memory_model.h>
#include <asm-generic/getorder.h>
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
#define HAVE_ARCH_HUGETLB_UNMAPPED_AREA
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
index 0f1ddee6a0ce..f408caf73430 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
@@ -39,4 +39,6 @@ void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/scatterlist.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/scatterlist.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 4240878b9d76..000000000000
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/scatterlist.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _ASM_X86_SCATTERLIST_H
-#define _ASM_X86_SCATTERLIST_H
-
-#include <asm-generic/scatterlist.h>
-
-#define ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
-
-#endif /* _ASM_X86_SCATTERLIST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index bde3993624f1..b5ea75c4a4b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -118,4 +118,5 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o
obj-y += vsmp_64.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec-bzimage64.o
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
index 9c8f7394c612..c7035073dfc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static ssize_t store_cache_disable(struct _cpuid4_info *this_leaf,
cpu = cpumask_first(to_cpumask(this_leaf->shared_cpu_map));
- if (strict_strtoul(buf, 10, &val) < 0)
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 10, &val) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = amd_set_l3_disable_slot(this_leaf->base.nb, cpu, slot, val);
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ store_subcaches(struct _cpuid4_info *this_leaf, const char *buf, size_t count,
if (!this_leaf->base.nb || !amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING))
return -EINVAL;
- if (strict_strtoul(buf, 16, &val) < 0)
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 16, &val) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (amd_set_subcaches(cpu, val))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 4fc57975acc1..bd9ccda8087f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -2136,7 +2136,7 @@ static ssize_t set_bank(struct device *s, struct device_attribute *attr,
{
u64 new;
- if (strict_strtoull(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
attr_to_bank(attr)->ctl = new;
@@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ static ssize_t set_ignore_ce(struct device *s,
{
u64 new;
- if (strict_strtoull(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (mca_cfg.ignore_ce ^ !!new) {
@@ -2198,7 +2198,7 @@ static ssize_t set_cmci_disabled(struct device *s,
{
u64 new;
- if (strict_strtoull(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (mca_cfg.cmci_disabled ^ !!new) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
index 603df4f74640..1e49f8f41276 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ store_interrupt_enable(struct threshold_block *b, const char *buf, size_t size)
if (!b->interrupt_capable)
return -EINVAL;
- if (strict_strtoul(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
b->interrupt_enable = !!new;
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ store_threshold_limit(struct threshold_block *b, const char *buf, size_t size)
struct thresh_restart tr;
unsigned long new;
- if (strict_strtoul(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (new > THRESHOLD_MAX)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index 507de8066594..0553a34fa0df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -4,9 +4,14 @@
* Created by: Hariprasad Nellitheertha (hari@in.ibm.com)
*
* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2004. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) Red Hat Inc., 2014. All rights reserved.
+ * Authors:
+ * Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
*
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec: " fmt
+
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
@@ -16,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/hardirq.h>
@@ -28,6 +34,45 @@
#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/virtext.h>
+/* Alignment required for elf header segment */
+#define ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN 4096
+
+/* This primarily represents number of split ranges due to exclusion */
+#define CRASH_MAX_RANGES 16
+
+struct crash_mem_range {
+ u64 start, end;
+};
+
+struct crash_mem {
+ unsigned int nr_ranges;
+ struct crash_mem_range ranges[CRASH_MAX_RANGES];
+};
+
+/* Misc data about ram ranges needed to prepare elf headers */
+struct crash_elf_data {
+ struct kimage *image;
+ /*
+ * Total number of ram ranges we have after various adjustments for
+ * GART, crash reserved region etc.
+ */
+ unsigned int max_nr_ranges;
+ unsigned long gart_start, gart_end;
+
+ /* Pointer to elf header */
+ void *ehdr;
+ /* Pointer to next phdr */
+ void *bufp;
+ struct crash_mem mem;
+};
+
+/* Used while preparing memory map entries for second kernel */
+struct crash_memmap_data {
+ struct boot_params *params;
+ /* Type of memory */
+ unsigned int type;
+};
+
int in_crash_kexec;
/*
@@ -39,6 +84,7 @@ int in_crash_kexec;
*/
crash_vmclear_fn __rcu *crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss = NULL;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss);
+unsigned long crash_zero_bytes;
static inline void cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(void)
{
@@ -135,3 +181,520 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
#endif
crash_save_cpu(regs, safe_smp_processor_id());
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+static int get_nr_ram_ranges_callback(unsigned long start_pfn,
+ unsigned long nr_pfn, void *arg)
+{
+ int *nr_ranges = arg;
+
+ (*nr_ranges)++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_gart_ranges_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
+{
+ struct crash_elf_data *ced = arg;
+
+ ced->gart_start = start;
+ ced->gart_end = end;
+
+ /* Not expecting more than 1 gart aperture */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Gather all the required information to prepare elf headers for ram regions */
+static void fill_up_crash_elf_data(struct crash_elf_data *ced,
+ struct kimage *image)
+{
+ unsigned int nr_ranges = 0;
+
+ ced->image = image;
+
+ walk_system_ram_range(0, -1, &nr_ranges,
+ get_nr_ram_ranges_callback);
+
+ ced->max_nr_ranges = nr_ranges;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't create ELF headers for GART aperture as an attempt
+ * to dump this memory in second kernel leads to hang/crash.
+ * If gart aperture is present, one needs to exclude that region
+ * and that could lead to need of extra phdr.
+ */
+ walk_iomem_res("GART", IORESOURCE_MEM, 0, -1,
+ ced, get_gart_ranges_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have gart region, excluding that could potentially split
+ * a memory range, resulting in extra header. Account for that.
+ */
+ if (ced->gart_end)
+ ced->max_nr_ranges++;
+
+ /* Exclusion of crash region could split memory ranges */
+ ced->max_nr_ranges++;
+
+ /* If crashk_low_res is not 0, another range split possible */
+ if (crashk_low_res.end != 0)
+ ced->max_nr_ranges++;
+}
+
+static int exclude_mem_range(struct crash_mem *mem,
+ unsigned long long mstart, unsigned long long mend)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned long long start, end;
+ struct crash_mem_range temp_range = {0, 0};
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mem->nr_ranges; i++) {
+ start = mem->ranges[i].start;
+ end = mem->ranges[i].end;
+
+ if (mstart > end || mend < start)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Truncate any area outside of range */
+ if (mstart < start)
+ mstart = start;
+ if (mend > end)
+ mend = end;
+
+ /* Found completely overlapping range */
+ if (mstart == start && mend == end) {
+ mem->ranges[i].start = 0;
+ mem->ranges[i].end = 0;
+ if (i < mem->nr_ranges - 1) {
+ /* Shift rest of the ranges to left */
+ for (j = i; j < mem->nr_ranges - 1; j++) {
+ mem->ranges[j].start =
+ mem->ranges[j+1].start;
+ mem->ranges[j].end =
+ mem->ranges[j+1].end;
+ }
+ }
+ mem->nr_ranges--;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (mstart > start && mend < end) {
+ /* Split original range */
+ mem->ranges[i].end = mstart - 1;
+ temp_range.start = mend + 1;
+ temp_range.end = end;
+ } else if (mstart != start)
+ mem->ranges[i].end = mstart - 1;
+ else
+ mem->ranges[i].start = mend + 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* If a split happend, add the split to array */
+ if (!temp_range.end)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Split happened */
+ if (i == CRASH_MAX_RANGES - 1) {
+ pr_err("Too many crash ranges after split\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Location where new range should go */
+ j = i + 1;
+ if (j < mem->nr_ranges) {
+ /* Move over all ranges one slot towards the end */
+ for (i = mem->nr_ranges - 1; i >= j; i--)
+ mem->ranges[i + 1] = mem->ranges[i];
+ }
+
+ mem->ranges[j].start = temp_range.start;
+ mem->ranges[j].end = temp_range.end;
+ mem->nr_ranges++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look for any unwanted ranges between mstart, mend and remove them. This
+ * might lead to split and split ranges are put in ced->mem.ranges[] array
+ */
+static int elf_header_exclude_ranges(struct crash_elf_data *ced,
+ unsigned long long mstart, unsigned long long mend)
+{
+ struct crash_mem *cmem = &ced->mem;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ memset(cmem->ranges, 0, sizeof(cmem->ranges));
+
+ cmem->ranges[0].start = mstart;
+ cmem->ranges[0].end = mend;
+ cmem->nr_ranges = 1;
+
+ /* Exclude crashkernel region */
+ ret = exclude_mem_range(cmem, crashk_res.start, crashk_res.end);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = exclude_mem_range(cmem, crashk_low_res.start, crashk_low_res.end);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Exclude GART region */
+ if (ced->gart_end) {
+ ret = exclude_mem_range(cmem, ced->gart_start, ced->gart_end);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
+{
+ struct crash_elf_data *ced = arg;
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr;
+ unsigned long mstart, mend;
+ struct kimage *image = ced->image;
+ struct crash_mem *cmem;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ ehdr = ced->ehdr;
+
+ /* Exclude unwanted mem ranges */
+ ret = elf_header_exclude_ranges(ced, start, end);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Go through all the ranges in ced->mem.ranges[] and prepare phdr */
+ cmem = &ced->mem;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cmem->nr_ranges; i++) {
+ mstart = cmem->ranges[i].start;
+ mend = cmem->ranges[i].end;
+
+ phdr = ced->bufp;
+ ced->bufp += sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
+
+ phdr->p_type = PT_LOAD;
+ phdr->p_flags = PF_R|PF_W|PF_X;
+ phdr->p_offset = mstart;
+
+ /*
+ * If a range matches backup region, adjust offset to backup
+ * segment.
+ */
+ if (mstart == image->arch.backup_src_start &&
+ (mend - mstart + 1) == image->arch.backup_src_sz)
+ phdr->p_offset = image->arch.backup_load_addr;
+
+ phdr->p_paddr = mstart;
+ phdr->p_vaddr = (unsigned long long) __va(mstart);
+ phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = mend - mstart + 1;
+ phdr->p_align = 0;
+ ehdr->e_phnum++;
+ pr_debug("Crash PT_LOAD elf header. phdr=%p vaddr=0x%llx, paddr=0x%llx, sz=0x%llx e_phnum=%d p_offset=0x%llx\n",
+ phdr, phdr->p_vaddr, phdr->p_paddr, phdr->p_filesz,
+ ehdr->e_phnum, phdr->p_offset);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int prepare_elf64_headers(struct crash_elf_data *ced,
+ void **addr, unsigned long *sz)
+{
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr;
+ unsigned long nr_cpus = num_possible_cpus(), nr_phdr, elf_sz;
+ unsigned char *buf, *bufp;
+ unsigned int cpu;
+ unsigned long long notes_addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* extra phdr for vmcoreinfo elf note */
+ nr_phdr = nr_cpus + 1;
+ nr_phdr += ced->max_nr_ranges;
+
+ /*
+ * kexec-tools creates an extra PT_LOAD phdr for kernel text mapping
+ * area on x86_64 (ffffffff80000000 - ffffffffa0000000).
+ * I think this is required by tools like gdb. So same physical
+ * memory will be mapped in two elf headers. One will contain kernel
+ * text virtual addresses and other will have __va(physical) addresses.
+ */
+
+ nr_phdr++;
+ elf_sz = sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr) + nr_phdr * sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
+ elf_sz = ALIGN(elf_sz, ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN);
+
+ buf = vzalloc(elf_sz);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bufp = buf;
+ ehdr = (Elf64_Ehdr *)bufp;
+ bufp += sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr);
+ memcpy(ehdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG);
+ ehdr->e_ident[EI_CLASS] = ELFCLASS64;
+ ehdr->e_ident[EI_DATA] = ELFDATA2LSB;
+ ehdr->e_ident[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT;
+ ehdr->e_ident[EI_OSABI] = ELF_OSABI;
+ memset(ehdr->e_ident + EI_PAD, 0, EI_NIDENT - EI_PAD);
+ ehdr->e_type = ET_CORE;
+ ehdr->e_machine = ELF_ARCH;
+ ehdr->e_version = EV_CURRENT;
+ ehdr->e_phoff = sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr);
+ ehdr->e_ehsize = sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr);
+ ehdr->e_phentsize = sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
+
+ /* Prepare one phdr of type PT_NOTE for each present cpu */
+ for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
+ phdr = (Elf64_Phdr *)bufp;
+ bufp += sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
+ phdr->p_type = PT_NOTE;
+ notes_addr = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(per_cpu_ptr(crash_notes, cpu));
+ phdr->p_offset = phdr->p_paddr = notes_addr;
+ phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = sizeof(note_buf_t);
+ (ehdr->e_phnum)++;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare one PT_NOTE header for vmcoreinfo */
+ phdr = (Elf64_Phdr *)bufp;
+ bufp += sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
+ phdr->p_type = PT_NOTE;
+ phdr->p_offset = phdr->p_paddr = paddr_vmcoreinfo_note();
+ phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = sizeof(vmcoreinfo_note);
+ (ehdr->e_phnum)++;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ /* Prepare PT_LOAD type program header for kernel text region */
+ phdr = (Elf64_Phdr *)bufp;
+ bufp += sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
+ phdr->p_type = PT_LOAD;
+ phdr->p_flags = PF_R|PF_W|PF_X;
+ phdr->p_vaddr = (Elf64_Addr)_text;
+ phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = _end - _text;
+ phdr->p_offset = phdr->p_paddr = __pa_symbol(_text);
+ (ehdr->e_phnum)++;
+#endif
+
+ /* Prepare PT_LOAD headers for system ram chunks. */
+ ced->ehdr = ehdr;
+ ced->bufp = bufp;
+ ret = walk_system_ram_res(0, -1, ced,
+ prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ *addr = buf;
+ *sz = elf_sz;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Prepare elf headers. Return addr and size */
+static int prepare_elf_headers(struct kimage *image, void **addr,
+ unsigned long *sz)
+{
+ struct crash_elf_data *ced;
+ int ret;
+
+ ced = kzalloc(sizeof(*ced), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ced)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fill_up_crash_elf_data(ced, image);
+
+ /* By default prepare 64bit headers */
+ ret = prepare_elf64_headers(ced, addr, sz);
+ kfree(ced);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int add_e820_entry(struct boot_params *params, struct e820entry *entry)
+{
+ unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
+
+ nr_e820_entries = params->e820_entries;
+ if (nr_e820_entries >= E820MAX)
+ return 1;
+
+ memcpy(&params->e820_map[nr_e820_entries], entry,
+ sizeof(struct e820entry));
+ params->e820_entries++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int memmap_entry_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
+{
+ struct crash_memmap_data *cmd = arg;
+ struct boot_params *params = cmd->params;
+ struct e820entry ei;
+
+ ei.addr = start;
+ ei.size = end - start + 1;
+ ei.type = cmd->type;
+ add_e820_entry(params, &ei);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int memmap_exclude_ranges(struct kimage *image, struct crash_mem *cmem,
+ unsigned long long mstart,
+ unsigned long long mend)
+{
+ unsigned long start, end;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ cmem->ranges[0].start = mstart;
+ cmem->ranges[0].end = mend;
+ cmem->nr_ranges = 1;
+
+ /* Exclude Backup region */
+ start = image->arch.backup_load_addr;
+ end = start + image->arch.backup_src_sz - 1;
+ ret = exclude_mem_range(cmem, start, end);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Exclude elf header region */
+ start = image->arch.elf_load_addr;
+ end = start + image->arch.elf_headers_sz - 1;
+ return exclude_mem_range(cmem, start, end);
+}
+
+/* Prepare memory map for crash dump kernel */
+int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct e820entry ei;
+ struct crash_memmap_data cmd;
+ struct crash_mem *cmem;
+
+ cmem = vzalloc(sizeof(struct crash_mem));
+ if (!cmem)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(struct crash_memmap_data));
+ cmd.params = params;
+
+ /* Add first 640K segment */
+ ei.addr = image->arch.backup_src_start;
+ ei.size = image->arch.backup_src_sz;
+ ei.type = E820_RAM;
+ add_e820_entry(params, &ei);
+
+ /* Add ACPI tables */
+ cmd.type = E820_ACPI;
+ flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
+ walk_iomem_res("ACPI Tables", flags, 0, -1, &cmd,
+ memmap_entry_callback);
+
+ /* Add ACPI Non-volatile Storage */
+ cmd.type = E820_NVS;
+ walk_iomem_res("ACPI Non-volatile Storage", flags, 0, -1, &cmd,
+ memmap_entry_callback);
+
+ /* Add crashk_low_res region */
+ if (crashk_low_res.end) {
+ ei.addr = crashk_low_res.start;
+ ei.size = crashk_low_res.end - crashk_low_res.start + 1;
+ ei.type = E820_RAM;
+ add_e820_entry(params, &ei);
+ }
+
+ /* Exclude some ranges from crashk_res and add rest to memmap */
+ ret = memmap_exclude_ranges(image, cmem, crashk_res.start,
+ crashk_res.end);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cmem->nr_ranges; i++) {
+ ei.size = cmem->ranges[i].end - cmem->ranges[i].start + 1;
+
+ /* If entry is less than a page, skip it */
+ if (ei.size < PAGE_SIZE)
+ continue;
+ ei.addr = cmem->ranges[i].start;
+ ei.type = E820_RAM;
+ add_e820_entry(params, &ei);
+ }
+
+out:
+ vfree(cmem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int determine_backup_region(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
+{
+ struct kimage *image = arg;
+
+ image->arch.backup_src_start = start;
+ image->arch.backup_src_sz = end - start + 1;
+
+ /* Expecting only one range for backup region */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image)
+{
+ unsigned long src_start, src_sz, elf_sz;
+ void *elf_addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Determine and load a segment for backup area. First 640K RAM
+ * region is backup source
+ */
+
+ ret = walk_system_ram_res(KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_START, KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END,
+ image, determine_backup_region);
+
+ /* Zero or postive return values are ok */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ src_start = image->arch.backup_src_start;
+ src_sz = image->arch.backup_src_sz;
+
+ /* Add backup segment. */
+ if (src_sz) {
+ /*
+ * Ideally there is no source for backup segment. This is
+ * copied in purgatory after crash. Just add a zero filled
+ * segment for now to make sure checksum logic works fine.
+ */
+ ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, (char *)&crash_zero_bytes,
+ sizeof(crash_zero_bytes), src_sz,
+ PAGE_SIZE, 0, -1, 0,
+ &image->arch.backup_load_addr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ pr_debug("Loaded backup region at 0x%lx backup_start=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+ image->arch.backup_load_addr, src_start, src_sz);
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare elf headers and add a segment */
+ ret = prepare_elf_headers(image, &elf_addr, &elf_sz);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ image->arch.elf_headers = elf_addr;
+ image->arch.elf_headers_sz = elf_sz;
+
+ ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, (char *)elf_addr, elf_sz, elf_sz,
+ ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN, 0, -1, 0,
+ &image->arch.elf_load_addr);
+ if (ret) {
+ vfree((void *)image->arch.elf_headers);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ pr_debug("Loaded ELF headers at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+ image->arch.elf_load_addr, elf_sz, elf_sz);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9642b9b33655
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+/*
+ * Kexec bzImage loader
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ * Authors:
+ * Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec-bzImage64: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/crash.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#define MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN 30 /* elfcorehdr=0x<64bit-value> */
+
+/*
+ * Defines lowest physical address for various segments. Not sure where
+ * exactly these limits came from. Current bzimage64 loader in kexec-tools
+ * uses these so I am retaining it. It can be changed over time as we gain
+ * more insight.
+ */
+#define MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR 0x3000
+#define MIN_BOOTPARAM_ADDR 0x3000
+#define MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR 0x100000
+#define MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR 0x1000000
+
+/*
+ * This is a place holder for all boot loader specific data structure which
+ * gets allocated in one call but gets freed much later during cleanup
+ * time. Right now there is only one field but it can grow as need be.
+ */
+struct bzimage64_data {
+ /*
+ * Temporary buffer to hold bootparams buffer. This should be
+ * freed once the bootparam segment has been loaded.
+ */
+ void *bootparams_buf;
+};
+
+static int setup_initrd(struct boot_params *params,
+ unsigned long initrd_load_addr, unsigned long initrd_len)
+{
+ params->hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_load_addr & 0xffffffffUL;
+ params->hdr.ramdisk_size = initrd_len & 0xffffffffUL;
+
+ params->ext_ramdisk_image = initrd_load_addr >> 32;
+ params->ext_ramdisk_size = initrd_len >> 32;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int setup_cmdline(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
+ unsigned long bootparams_load_addr,
+ unsigned long cmdline_offset, char *cmdline,
+ unsigned long cmdline_len)
+{
+ char *cmdline_ptr = ((char *)params) + cmdline_offset;
+ unsigned long cmdline_ptr_phys, len;
+ uint32_t cmdline_low_32, cmdline_ext_32;
+
+ memcpy(cmdline_ptr, cmdline, cmdline_len);
+ if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
+ len = sprintf(cmdline_ptr + cmdline_len - 1,
+ " elfcorehdr=0x%lx", image->arch.elf_load_addr);
+ cmdline_len += len;
+ }
+ cmdline_ptr[cmdline_len - 1] = '\0';
+
+ pr_debug("Final command line is: %s\n", cmdline_ptr);
+ cmdline_ptr_phys = bootparams_load_addr + cmdline_offset;
+ cmdline_low_32 = cmdline_ptr_phys & 0xffffffffUL;
+ cmdline_ext_32 = cmdline_ptr_phys >> 32;
+
+ params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr = cmdline_low_32;
+ if (cmdline_ext_32)
+ params->ext_cmd_line_ptr = cmdline_ext_32;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int setup_e820_entries(struct boot_params *params)
+{
+ unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
+
+ nr_e820_entries = e820_saved.nr_map;
+
+ /* TODO: Pass entries more than E820MAX in bootparams setup data */
+ if (nr_e820_entries > E820MAX)
+ nr_e820_entries = E820MAX;
+
+ params->e820_entries = nr_e820_entries;
+ memcpy(&params->e820_map, &e820_saved.map,
+ nr_e820_entries * sizeof(struct e820entry));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+static int setup_efi_info_memmap(struct boot_params *params,
+ unsigned long params_load_addr,
+ unsigned int efi_map_offset,
+ unsigned int efi_map_sz)
+{
+ void *efi_map = (void *)params + efi_map_offset;
+ unsigned long efi_map_phys_addr = params_load_addr + efi_map_offset;
+ struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
+
+ if (!efi_map_sz)
+ return 0;
+
+ efi_runtime_map_copy(efi_map, efi_map_sz);
+
+ ei->efi_memmap = efi_map_phys_addr & 0xffffffff;
+ ei->efi_memmap_hi = efi_map_phys_addr >> 32;
+ ei->efi_memmap_size = efi_map_sz;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_add_efi_setup_data(struct boot_params *params,
+ unsigned long params_load_addr,
+ unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
+{
+ unsigned long setup_data_phys;
+ struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + efi_setup_data_offset;
+ struct efi_setup_data *esd = (void *)sd + sizeof(struct setup_data);
+
+ esd->fw_vendor = efi.fw_vendor;
+ esd->runtime = efi.runtime;
+ esd->tables = efi.config_table;
+ esd->smbios = efi.smbios;
+
+ sd->type = SETUP_EFI;
+ sd->len = sizeof(struct efi_setup_data);
+
+ /* Add setup data */
+ setup_data_phys = params_load_addr + efi_setup_data_offset;
+ sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data;
+ params->hdr.setup_data = setup_data_phys;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
+ unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
+ unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
+{
+ struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
+ struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
+
+ if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI
+ * and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass
+ * acpi_rsdp=<addr> on kernel command line to make second kernel boot
+ * without efi.
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
+ return 0;
+
+ ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
+ ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
+ ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
+
+ ei->efi_memdesc_version = current_ei->efi_memdesc_version;
+ ei->efi_memdesc_size = efi_get_runtime_map_desc_size();
+
+ setup_efi_info_memmap(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset,
+ efi_map_sz);
+ prepare_add_efi_setup_data(params, params_load_addr,
+ efi_setup_data_offset);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_EFI */
+
+static int
+setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
+ unsigned long params_load_addr,
+ unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
+ unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
+{
+ unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
+ unsigned long long mem_k, start, end;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+
+ /* Get subarch from existing bootparams */
+ params->hdr.hardware_subarch = boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch;
+
+ /* Copying screen_info will do? */
+ memcpy(&params->screen_info, &boot_params.screen_info,
+ sizeof(struct screen_info));
+
+ /* Fill in memsize later */
+ params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0;
+ params->alt_mem_k = 0;
+
+ /* Default APM info */
+ memset(&params->apm_bios_info, 0, sizeof(params->apm_bios_info));
+
+ /* Default drive info */
+ memset(&params->hd0_info, 0, sizeof(params->hd0_info));
+ memset(&params->hd1_info, 0, sizeof(params->hd1_info));
+
+ /* Default sysdesc table */
+ params->sys_desc_table.length = 0;
+
+ if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
+ ret = crash_setup_memmap_entries(image, params);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ } else
+ setup_e820_entries(params);
+
+ nr_e820_entries = params->e820_entries;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_e820_entries; i++) {
+ if (params->e820_map[i].type != E820_RAM)
+ continue;
+ start = params->e820_map[i].addr;
+ end = params->e820_map[i].addr + params->e820_map[i].size - 1;
+
+ if ((start <= 0x100000) && end > 0x100000) {
+ mem_k = (end >> 10) - (0x100000 >> 10);
+ params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = mem_k;
+ params->alt_mem_k = mem_k;
+ if (mem_k > 0xfc00)
+ params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0xfc00; /* 64M*/
+ if (mem_k > 0xffffffff)
+ params->alt_mem_k = 0xffffffff;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ /* Setup EFI state */
+ setup_efi_state(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz,
+ efi_setup_data_offset);
+#endif
+
+ /* Setup EDD info */
+ memcpy(params->eddbuf, boot_params.eddbuf,
+ EDDMAXNR * sizeof(struct edd_info));
+ params->eddbuf_entries = boot_params.eddbuf_entries;
+
+ memcpy(params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer, boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer,
+ EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX * sizeof(unsigned int));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int bzImage64_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
+{
+ int ret = -ENOEXEC;
+ struct setup_header *header;
+
+ /* kernel should be atleast two sectors long */
+ if (len < 2 * 512) {
+ pr_err("File is too short to be a bzImage\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ header = (struct setup_header *)(buf + offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
+ if (memcmp((char *)&header->header, "HdrS", 4) != 0) {
+ pr_err("Not a bzImage\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (header->boot_flag != 0xAA55) {
+ pr_err("No x86 boot sector present\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (header->version < 0x020C) {
+ pr_err("Must be at least protocol version 2.12\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!(header->loadflags & LOADED_HIGH)) {
+ pr_err("zImage not a bzImage\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!(header->xloadflags & XLF_KERNEL_64)) {
+ pr_err("Not a bzImage64. XLF_KERNEL_64 is not set.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!(header->xloadflags & XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G)) {
+ pr_err("XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G is not set.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Can't handle 32bit EFI as it does not allow loading kernel
+ * above 4G. This should be handled by 32bit bzImage loader
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES) && !efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) {
+ pr_debug("EFI is 32 bit. Can't load kernel above 4G.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* I've got a bzImage */
+ pr_debug("It's a relocatable bzImage64\n");
+ ret = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
+ unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
+ unsigned long initrd_len, char *cmdline,
+ unsigned long cmdline_len)
+{
+
+ struct setup_header *header;
+ int setup_sects, kern16_size, ret = 0;
+ unsigned long setup_header_size, params_cmdline_sz, params_misc_sz;
+ struct boot_params *params;
+ unsigned long bootparam_load_addr, kernel_load_addr, initrd_load_addr;
+ unsigned long purgatory_load_addr;
+ unsigned long kernel_bufsz, kernel_memsz, kernel_align;
+ char *kernel_buf;
+ struct bzimage64_data *ldata;
+ struct kexec_entry64_regs regs64;
+ void *stack;
+ unsigned int setup_hdr_offset = offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr);
+ unsigned int efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, efi_setup_data_offset;
+
+ header = (struct setup_header *)(kernel + setup_hdr_offset);
+ setup_sects = header->setup_sects;
+ if (setup_sects == 0)
+ setup_sects = 4;
+
+ kern16_size = (setup_sects + 1) * 512;
+ if (kernel_len < kern16_size) {
+ pr_err("bzImage truncated\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
+ }
+
+ if (cmdline_len > header->cmdline_size) {
+ pr_err("Kernel command line too long\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In case of crash dump, we will append elfcorehdr=<addr> to
+ * command line. Make sure it does not overflow
+ */
+ if (cmdline_len + MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN > header->cmdline_size) {
+ pr_debug("Appending elfcorehdr=<addr> to command line exceeds maximum allowed length\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and load backup region */
+ if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
+ ret = crash_load_segments(image);
+ if (ret)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Load purgatory. For 64bit entry point, purgatory code can be
+ * anywhere.
+ */
+ ret = kexec_load_purgatory(image, MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR, ULONG_MAX, 1,
+ &purgatory_load_addr);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("Loading purgatory failed\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("Loaded purgatory at 0x%lx\n", purgatory_load_addr);
+
+
+ /*
+ * Load Bootparams and cmdline and space for efi stuff.
+ *
+ * Allocate memory together for multiple data structures so
+ * that they all can go in single area/segment and we don't
+ * have to create separate segment for each. Keeps things
+ * little bit simple
+ */
+ efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size();
+ efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16);
+ params_cmdline_sz = sizeof(struct boot_params) + cmdline_len +
+ MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN;
+ params_cmdline_sz = ALIGN(params_cmdline_sz, 16);
+ params_misc_sz = params_cmdline_sz + efi_map_sz +
+ sizeof(struct setup_data) +
+ sizeof(struct efi_setup_data);
+
+ params = kzalloc(params_misc_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!params)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ efi_map_offset = params_cmdline_sz;
+ efi_setup_data_offset = efi_map_offset + efi_map_sz;
+
+ /* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.txt */
+ setup_header_size = 0x0202 + kernel[0x0201] - setup_hdr_offset;
+
+ /* Is there a limit on setup header size? */
+ memcpy(&params->hdr, (kernel + setup_hdr_offset), setup_header_size);
+
+ ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, (char *)params, params_misc_sz,
+ params_misc_sz, 16, MIN_BOOTPARAM_ADDR,
+ ULONG_MAX, 1, &bootparam_load_addr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_params;
+ pr_debug("Loaded boot_param, command line and misc at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+ bootparam_load_addr, params_misc_sz, params_misc_sz);
+
+ /* Load kernel */
+ kernel_buf = kernel + kern16_size;
+ kernel_bufsz = kernel_len - kern16_size;
+ kernel_memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
+ kernel_align = header->kernel_alignment;
+
+ ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, kernel_buf,
+ kernel_bufsz, kernel_memsz, kernel_align,
+ MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR, ULONG_MAX, 1,
+ &kernel_load_addr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_params;
+
+ pr_debug("Loaded 64bit kernel at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+ kernel_load_addr, kernel_memsz, kernel_memsz);
+
+ /* Load initrd high */
+ if (initrd) {
+ ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, initrd, initrd_len, initrd_len,
+ PAGE_SIZE, MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR,
+ ULONG_MAX, 1, &initrd_load_addr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_params;
+
+ pr_debug("Loaded initrd at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+ initrd_load_addr, initrd_len, initrd_len);
+
+ setup_initrd(params, initrd_load_addr, initrd_len);
+ }
+
+ setup_cmdline(image, params, bootparam_load_addr,
+ sizeof(struct boot_params), cmdline, cmdline_len);
+
+ /* bootloader info. Do we need a separate ID for kexec kernel loader? */
+ params->hdr.type_of_loader = 0x0D << 4;
+ params->hdr.loadflags = 0;
+
+ /* Setup purgatory regs for entry */
+ ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "entry64_regs", &regs64,
+ sizeof(regs64), 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_params;
+
+ regs64.rbx = 0; /* Bootstrap Processor */
+ regs64.rsi = bootparam_load_addr;
+ regs64.rip = kernel_load_addr + 0x200;
+ stack = kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(image, "stack_end");
+ if (IS_ERR(stack)) {
+ pr_err("Could not find address of symbol stack_end\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_params;
+ }
+
+ regs64.rsp = (unsigned long)stack;
+ ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "entry64_regs", &regs64,
+ sizeof(regs64), 0);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_params;
+
+ ret = setup_boot_parameters(image, params, bootparam_load_addr,
+ efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz,
+ efi_setup_data_offset);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_params;
+
+ /* Allocate loader specific data */
+ ldata = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bzimage64_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ldata) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_params;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Store pointer to params so that it could be freed after loading
+ * params segment has been loaded and contents have been copied
+ * somewhere else.
+ */
+ ldata->bootparams_buf = params;
+ return ldata;
+
+out_free_params:
+ kfree(params);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+/* This cleanup function is called after various segments have been loaded */
+int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
+{
+ struct bzimage64_data *ldata = loader_data;
+
+ if (!ldata)
+ return 0;
+
+ kfree(ldata->bootparams_buf);
+ ldata->bootparams_buf = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
+int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+ system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (!trusted)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
+ .probe = bzImage64_probe,
+ .load = bzImage64_load,
+ .cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
+ .verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
+#endif
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 679cef0791cd..8b04018e5d1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
* Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec: " fmt
+
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
@@ -21,6 +23,11 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
+
+static struct kexec_file_ops *kexec_file_loaders[] = {
+ &kexec_bzImage64_ops,
+};
static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image)
{
@@ -171,6 +178,38 @@ static void load_segments(void)
);
}
+/* Update purgatory as needed after various image segments have been prepared */
+static int arch_update_purgatory(struct kimage *image)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!image->file_mode)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Setup copying of backup region */
+ if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
+ ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "backup_dest",
+ &image->arch.backup_load_addr,
+ sizeof(image->arch.backup_load_addr), 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "backup_src",
+ &image->arch.backup_src_start,
+ sizeof(image->arch.backup_src_start), 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "backup_sz",
+ &image->arch.backup_src_sz,
+ sizeof(image->arch.backup_src_sz), 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
{
unsigned long start_pgtable;
@@ -184,6 +223,11 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
if (result)
return result;
+ /* update purgatory as needed */
+ result = arch_update_purgatory(image);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -283,3 +327,198 @@ void arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void)
(unsigned long)&_text - __START_KERNEL);
}
+/* arch-dependent functionality related to kexec file-based syscall */
+
+int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+ unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+ int i, ret = -ENOEXEC;
+ struct kexec_file_ops *fops;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kexec_file_loaders); i++) {
+ fops = kexec_file_loaders[i];
+ if (!fops || !fops->probe)
+ continue;
+
+ ret = fops->probe(buf, buf_len);
+ if (!ret) {
+ image->fops = fops;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
+{
+ vfree(image->arch.elf_headers);
+ image->arch.elf_headers = NULL;
+
+ if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
+
+ return image->fops->load(image, image->kernel_buf,
+ image->kernel_buf_len, image->initrd_buf,
+ image->initrd_buf_len, image->cmdline_buf,
+ image->cmdline_buf_len);
+}
+
+int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
+{
+ if (!image->fops || !image->fops->cleanup)
+ return 0;
+
+ return image->fops->cleanup(image->image_loader_data);
+}
+
+int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *kernel,
+ unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+ if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+ pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ return image->fops->verify_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply purgatory relocations.
+ *
+ * ehdr: Pointer to elf headers
+ * sechdrs: Pointer to section headers.
+ * relsec: section index of SHT_RELA section.
+ *
+ * TODO: Some of the code belongs to generic code. Move that in kexec.c.
+ */
+int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(const Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr,
+ Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs, unsigned int relsec)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ Elf64_Rela *rel;
+ Elf64_Sym *sym;
+ void *location;
+ Elf64_Shdr *section, *symtabsec;
+ unsigned long address, sec_base, value;
+ const char *strtab, *name, *shstrtab;
+
+ /*
+ * ->sh_offset has been modified to keep the pointer to section
+ * contents in memory
+ */
+ rel = (void *)sechdrs[relsec].sh_offset;
+
+ /* Section to which relocations apply */
+ section = &sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info];
+
+ pr_debug("Applying relocate section %u to %u\n", relsec,
+ sechdrs[relsec].sh_info);
+
+ /* Associated symbol table */
+ symtabsec = &sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_link];
+
+ /* String table */
+ if (symtabsec->sh_link >= ehdr->e_shnum) {
+ /* Invalid strtab section number */
+ pr_err("Invalid string table section index %d\n",
+ symtabsec->sh_link);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+
+ strtab = (char *)sechdrs[symtabsec->sh_link].sh_offset;
+
+ /* section header string table */
+ shstrtab = (char *)sechdrs[ehdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sechdrs[relsec].sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) {
+
+ /*
+ * rel[i].r_offset contains byte offset from beginning
+ * of section to the storage unit affected.
+ *
+ * This is location to update (->sh_offset). This is temporary
+ * buffer where section is currently loaded. This will finally
+ * be loaded to a different address later, pointed to by
+ * ->sh_addr. kexec takes care of moving it
+ * (kexec_load_segment()).
+ */
+ location = (void *)(section->sh_offset + rel[i].r_offset);
+
+ /* Final address of the location */
+ address = section->sh_addr + rel[i].r_offset;
+
+ /*
+ * rel[i].r_info contains information about symbol table index
+ * w.r.t which relocation must be made and type of relocation
+ * to apply. ELF64_R_SYM() and ELF64_R_TYPE() macros get
+ * these respectively.
+ */
+ sym = (Elf64_Sym *)symtabsec->sh_offset +
+ ELF64_R_SYM(rel[i].r_info);
+
+ if (sym->st_name)
+ name = strtab + sym->st_name;
+ else
+ name = shstrtab + sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_name;
+
+ pr_debug("Symbol: %s info: %02x shndx: %02x value=%llx size: %llx\n",
+ name, sym->st_info, sym->st_shndx, sym->st_value,
+ sym->st_size);
+
+ if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) {
+ pr_err("Undefined symbol: %s\n", name);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+
+ if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_COMMON) {
+ pr_err("symbol '%s' in common section\n", name);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+
+ if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_ABS)
+ sec_base = 0;
+ else if (sym->st_shndx >= ehdr->e_shnum) {
+ pr_err("Invalid section %d for symbol %s\n",
+ sym->st_shndx, name);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ } else
+ sec_base = sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_addr;
+
+ value = sym->st_value;
+ value += sec_base;
+ value += rel[i].r_addend;
+
+ switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info)) {
+ case R_X86_64_NONE:
+ break;
+ case R_X86_64_64:
+ *(u64 *)location = value;
+ break;
+ case R_X86_64_32:
+ *(u32 *)location = value;
+ if (value != *(u32 *)location)
+ goto overflow;
+ break;
+ case R_X86_64_32S:
+ *(s32 *)location = value;
+ if ((s64)value != *(s32 *)location)
+ goto overflow;
+ break;
+ case R_X86_64_PC32:
+ value -= (u64)address;
+ *(u32 *)location = value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("Unknown rela relocation: %llu\n",
+ ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info));
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+overflow:
+ pr_err("Overflow in relocation type %d value 0x%lx\n",
+ (int)ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info), value);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu_audit.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu_audit.c
index 1185fe7a7f47..9ade5cfb5a4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu_audit.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu_audit.c
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int mmu_audit_set(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
int ret;
unsigned long enable;
- ret = strict_strtoul(val, 10, &enable);
+ ret = kstrtoul(val, 10, &enable);
if (ret < 0)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c b/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c
index ed161c6e278b..3968d67d366b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c
@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@ static ssize_t ptc_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user,
return count;
}
- if (strict_strtol(optstr, 10, &input_arg) < 0) {
+ if (kstrtol(optstr, 10, &input_arg) < 0) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s is invalid\n", optstr);
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7fde9ee438a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+purgatory-y := purgatory.o stack.o setup-x86_$(BITS).o sha256.o entry64.o string.o
+
+targets += $(purgatory-y)
+PURGATORY_OBJS = $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(purgatory-y))
+
+LDFLAGS_purgatory.ro := -e purgatory_start -r --no-undefined -nostdlib -z nodefaultlib
+targets += purgatory.ro
+
+# Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That
+# in turn leaves some undefined symbols like __fentry__ in purgatory and not
+# sure how to relocate those. Like kexec-tools, use custom flags.
+
+KBUILD_CFLAGS := -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -fno-builtin -ffreestanding -c -MD -Os -mcmodel=large
+
+$(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(PURGATORY_OBJS) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,ld)
+
+targets += kexec-purgatory.c
+
+quiet_cmd_bin2c = BIN2C $@
+ cmd_bin2c = cat $(obj)/purgatory.ro | $(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c kexec_purgatory > $(obj)/kexec-purgatory.c
+
+$(obj)/kexec-purgatory.c: $(obj)/purgatory.ro FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,bin2c)
+
+
+# No loaders for 32bits yet.
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
+ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec-purgatory.o
+endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/entry64.S b/arch/x86/purgatory/entry64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1a4291d3568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/entry64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2003,2004 Eric Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com)
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+
+ * Author(s): Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This code has been taken from kexec-tools.
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+ .text
+ .balign 16
+ .code64
+ .globl entry64, entry64_regs
+
+
+entry64:
+ /* Setup a gdt that should be preserved */
+ lgdt gdt(%rip)
+
+ /* load the data segments */
+ movl $0x18, %eax /* data segment */
+ movl %eax, %ds
+ movl %eax, %es
+ movl %eax, %ss
+ movl %eax, %fs
+ movl %eax, %gs
+
+ /* Setup new stack */
+ leaq stack_init(%rip), %rsp
+ pushq $0x10 /* CS */
+ leaq new_cs_exit(%rip), %rax
+ pushq %rax
+ lretq
+new_cs_exit:
+
+ /* Load the registers */
+ movq rax(%rip), %rax
+ movq rbx(%rip), %rbx
+ movq rcx(%rip), %rcx
+ movq rdx(%rip), %rdx
+ movq rsi(%rip), %rsi
+ movq rdi(%rip), %rdi
+ movq rsp(%rip), %rsp
+ movq rbp(%rip), %rbp
+ movq r8(%rip), %r8
+ movq r9(%rip), %r9
+ movq r10(%rip), %r10
+ movq r11(%rip), %r11
+ movq r12(%rip), %r12
+ movq r13(%rip), %r13
+ movq r14(%rip), %r14
+ movq r15(%rip), %r15
+
+ /* Jump to the new code... */
+ jmpq *rip(%rip)
+
+ .section ".rodata"
+ .balign 4
+entry64_regs:
+rax: .quad 0x0
+rcx: .quad 0x0
+rdx: .quad 0x0
+rbx: .quad 0x0
+rsp: .quad 0x0
+rbp: .quad 0x0
+rsi: .quad 0x0
+rdi: .quad 0x0
+r8: .quad 0x0
+r9: .quad 0x0
+r10: .quad 0x0
+r11: .quad 0x0
+r12: .quad 0x0
+r13: .quad 0x0
+r14: .quad 0x0
+r15: .quad 0x0
+rip: .quad 0x0
+ .size entry64_regs, . - entry64_regs
+
+ /* GDT */
+ .section ".rodata"
+ .balign 16
+gdt:
+ /* 0x00 unusable segment
+ * 0x08 unused
+ * so use them as gdt ptr
+ */
+ .word gdt_end - gdt - 1
+ .quad gdt
+ .word 0, 0, 0
+
+ /* 0x10 4GB flat code segment */
+ .word 0xFFFF, 0x0000, 0x9A00, 0x00AF
+
+ /* 0x18 4GB flat data segment */
+ .word 0xFFFF, 0x0000, 0x9200, 0x00CF
+gdt_end:
+stack: .quad 0, 0
+stack_init:
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..25e068ba3382
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * purgatory: Runs between two kernels
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "sha256.h"
+#include "../boot/string.h"
+
+struct sha_region {
+ unsigned long start;
+ unsigned long len;
+};
+
+unsigned long backup_dest = 0;
+unsigned long backup_src = 0;
+unsigned long backup_sz = 0;
+
+u8 sha256_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+struct sha_region sha_regions[16] = {};
+
+/*
+ * On x86, second kernel requries first 640K of memory to boot. Copy
+ * first 640K to a backup region in reserved memory range so that second
+ * kernel can use first 640K.
+ */
+static int copy_backup_region(void)
+{
+ if (backup_dest)
+ memcpy((void *)backup_dest, (void *)backup_src, backup_sz);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int verify_sha256_digest(void)
+{
+ struct sha_region *ptr, *end;
+ u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct sha256_state sctx;
+
+ sha256_init(&sctx);
+ end = &sha_regions[sizeof(sha_regions)/sizeof(sha_regions[0])];
+ for (ptr = sha_regions; ptr < end; ptr++)
+ sha256_update(&sctx, (uint8_t *)(ptr->start), ptr->len);
+
+ sha256_final(&sctx, digest);
+
+ if (memcmp(digest, sha256_digest, sizeof(digest)))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void purgatory(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = verify_sha256_digest();
+ if (ret) {
+ /* loop forever */
+ for (;;)
+ ;
+ }
+ copy_backup_region();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/setup-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/purgatory/setup-x86_64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fe3c91ba1bd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/setup-x86_64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * purgatory: setup code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003,2004 Eric Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com)
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ *
+ * This code has been taken from kexec-tools.
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+ .text
+ .globl purgatory_start
+ .balign 16
+purgatory_start:
+ .code64
+
+ /* Load a gdt so I know what the segment registers are */
+ lgdt gdt(%rip)
+
+ /* load the data segments */
+ movl $0x18, %eax /* data segment */
+ movl %eax, %ds
+ movl %eax, %es
+ movl %eax, %ss
+ movl %eax, %fs
+ movl %eax, %gs
+
+ /* Setup a stack */
+ leaq lstack_end(%rip), %rsp
+
+ /* Call the C code */
+ call purgatory
+ jmp entry64
+
+ .section ".rodata"
+ .balign 16
+gdt: /* 0x00 unusable segment
+ * 0x08 unused
+ * so use them as the gdt ptr
+ */
+ .word gdt_end - gdt - 1
+ .quad gdt
+ .word 0, 0, 0
+
+ /* 0x10 4GB flat code segment */
+ .word 0xFFFF, 0x0000, 0x9A00, 0x00AF
+
+ /* 0x18 4GB flat data segment */
+ .word 0xFFFF, 0x0000, 0x9200, 0x00CF
+gdt_end:
+
+ .bss
+ .balign 4096
+lstack:
+ .skip 4096
+lstack_end:
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..548ca675a14a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * SHA-256, as specified in
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf
+ *
+ * SHA-256 code by Jean-Luc Cooke <jlcooke@certainkey.com>.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) Jean-Luc Cooke <jlcooke@certainkey.com>
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk>
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include "sha256.h"
+#include "../boot/string.h"
+
+static inline u32 Ch(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
+{
+ return z ^ (x & (y ^ z));
+}
+
+static inline u32 Maj(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
+{
+ return (x & y) | (z & (x | y));
+}
+
+#define e0(x) (ror32(x, 2) ^ ror32(x, 13) ^ ror32(x, 22))
+#define e1(x) (ror32(x, 6) ^ ror32(x, 11) ^ ror32(x, 25))
+#define s0(x) (ror32(x, 7) ^ ror32(x, 18) ^ (x >> 3))
+#define s1(x) (ror32(x, 17) ^ ror32(x, 19) ^ (x >> 10))
+
+static inline void LOAD_OP(int I, u32 *W, const u8 *input)
+{
+ W[I] = __be32_to_cpu(((__be32 *)(input))[I]);
+}
+
+static inline void BLEND_OP(int I, u32 *W)
+{
+ W[I] = s1(W[I-2]) + W[I-7] + s0(W[I-15]) + W[I-16];
+}
+
+static void sha256_transform(u32 *state, const u8 *input)
+{
+ u32 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t1, t2;
+ u32 W[64];
+ int i;
+
+ /* load the input */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ LOAD_OP(i, W, input);
+
+ /* now blend */
+ for (i = 16; i < 64; i++)
+ BLEND_OP(i, W);
+
+ /* load the state into our registers */
+ a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3];
+ e = state[4]; f = state[5]; g = state[6]; h = state[7];
+
+ /* now iterate */
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0x428a2f98 + W[0];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0x71374491 + W[1];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0xb5c0fbcf + W[2];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0xe9b5dba5 + W[3];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0x3956c25b + W[4];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0x59f111f1 + W[5];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0x923f82a4 + W[6];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0xab1c5ed5 + W[7];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1 + t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0xd807aa98 + W[8];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0x12835b01 + W[9];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0x243185be + W[10];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0x550c7dc3 + W[11];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0x72be5d74 + W[12];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0x80deb1fe + W[13];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0x9bdc06a7 + W[14];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1 + t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0xc19bf174 + W[15];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0xe49b69c1 + W[16];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1+t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0xefbe4786 + W[17];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1+t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0x0fc19dc6 + W[18];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1+t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0x240ca1cc + W[19];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1+t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0x2de92c6f + W[20];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1+t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0x4a7484aa + W[21];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1+t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0x5cb0a9dc + W[22];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1+t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0x76f988da + W[23];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0x983e5152 + W[24];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1+t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0xa831c66d + W[25];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1+t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0xb00327c8 + W[26];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1+t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0xbf597fc7 + W[27];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1+t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0xc6e00bf3 + W[28];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1+t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0xd5a79147 + W[29];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1+t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0x06ca6351 + W[30];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1+t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0x14292967 + W[31];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0x27b70a85 + W[32];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1+t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0x2e1b2138 + W[33];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1+t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0x4d2c6dfc + W[34];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1+t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0x53380d13 + W[35];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1+t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0x650a7354 + W[36];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1+t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0x766a0abb + W[37];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1+t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0x81c2c92e + W[38];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1+t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0x92722c85 + W[39];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0xa2bfe8a1 + W[40];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1+t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0xa81a664b + W[41];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1+t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0xc24b8b70 + W[42];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1+t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0xc76c51a3 + W[43];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1+t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0xd192e819 + W[44];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1+t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0xd6990624 + W[45];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1+t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0xf40e3585 + W[46];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1+t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0x106aa070 + W[47];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0x19a4c116 + W[48];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1+t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0x1e376c08 + W[49];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1+t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0x2748774c + W[50];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1+t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0x34b0bcb5 + W[51];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1+t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0x391c0cb3 + W[52];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1+t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0x4ed8aa4a + W[53];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1+t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0x5b9cca4f + W[54];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1+t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0x682e6ff3 + W[55];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + 0x748f82ee + W[56];
+ t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); d += t1; h = t1+t2;
+ t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + 0x78a5636f + W[57];
+ t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); c += t1; g = t1+t2;
+ t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + 0x84c87814 + W[58];
+ t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); b += t1; f = t1+t2;
+ t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + 0x8cc70208 + W[59];
+ t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); a += t1; e = t1+t2;
+ t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + 0x90befffa + W[60];
+ t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); h += t1; d = t1+t2;
+ t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + 0xa4506ceb + W[61];
+ t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); g += t1; c = t1+t2;
+ t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + 0xbef9a3f7 + W[62];
+ t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); f += t1; b = t1+t2;
+ t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + 0xc67178f2 + W[63];
+ t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); e += t1; a = t1+t2;
+
+ state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d;
+ state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h;
+
+ /* clear any sensitive info... */
+ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = t1 = t2 = 0;
+ memset(W, 0, 64 * sizeof(u32));
+}
+
+int sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx)
+{
+ sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
+ sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
+ sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
+ sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
+ sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
+ sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
+ sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
+ sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+ unsigned int partial, done;
+ const u8 *src;
+
+ partial = sctx->count & 0x3f;
+ sctx->count += len;
+ done = 0;
+ src = data;
+
+ if ((partial + len) > 63) {
+ if (partial) {
+ done = -partial;
+ memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, done + 64);
+ src = sctx->buf;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ sha256_transform(sctx->state, src);
+ done += 64;
+ src = data + done;
+ } while (done + 63 < len);
+
+ partial = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, src, len - done);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
+{
+ __be32 *dst = (__be32 *)out;
+ __be64 bits;
+ unsigned int index, pad_len;
+ int i;
+ static const u8 padding[64] = { 0x80, };
+
+ /* Save number of bits */
+ bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
+
+ /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */
+ index = sctx->count & 0x3f;
+ pad_len = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((64+56) - index);
+ sha256_update(sctx, padding, pad_len);
+
+ /* Append length (before padding) */
+ sha256_update(sctx, (const u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
+
+ /* Store state in digest */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ dst[i] = cpu_to_be32(sctx->state[i]);
+
+ /* Zeroize sensitive information. */
+ memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx));
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bd15a4127735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SHA256_H
+#define SHA256_H
+
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+
+extern int sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx);
+extern int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *input,
+ unsigned int length);
+extern int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *hash);
+
+#endif /* SHA256_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/stack.S b/arch/x86/purgatory/stack.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3cefba1fefc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/stack.S
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * purgatory: stack
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+ /* A stack for the loaded kernel.
+ * Seperate and in the data section so it can be prepopulated.
+ */
+ .data
+ .balign 4096
+ .globl stack, stack_end
+
+stack:
+ .skip 4096
+stack_end:
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/string.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/string.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d886b1fa36f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/string.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/*
+ * Simple string functions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "../boot/string.c"
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index d1b4a119d4a5..028b78168d85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -362,3 +362,4 @@
353 i386 renameat2 sys_renameat2
354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp
355 i386 getrandom sys_getrandom
+356 i386 memfd_create sys_memfd_create
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 252c804bb1aa..35dd922727b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@
316 common renameat2 sys_renameat2
317 common seccomp sys_seccomp
318 common getrandom sys_getrandom
+319 common memfd_create sys_memfd_create
+320 common kexec_file_load sys_kexec_file_load
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/um/asm/elf.h
index 0feee2fd5077..25a1022dd793 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/asm/elf.h
@@ -216,6 +216,5 @@ extern long elf_aux_hwcap;
#define ELF_HWCAP (elf_aux_hwcap)
#define SET_PERSONALITY(ex) do ; while(0)
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/mem_64.c b/arch/x86/um/mem_64.c
index c6492e75797b..f8fecaddcc0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/mem_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/mem_64.c
@@ -9,18 +9,3 @@ const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
return NULL;
}
-
-struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c b/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
index e4f7781ee162..e904c270573b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
@@ -115,23 +115,6 @@ static __init int ia32_binfmt_init(void)
return 0;
}
__initcall(ia32_binfmt_init);
-#endif
-
-#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
-
-struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */