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authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>2024-04-11 08:40:48 +0300
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2024-04-11 11:30:33 +0300
commit5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a (patch)
treee81864ff7a59b1a389fd57280ddbcc0ddf2f3c84 /arch
parent1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898 (diff)
downloadlinux-5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a.tar.xz
x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't have a HW or SW mitigation enabled. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 08dfb94fcb3a..9eeb60f5fbb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2818,10 +2818,10 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
return "; BHI: Retpoline";
- else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
- return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
+ return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop";
- return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)";
+ return "; BHI: Vulnerable";
}
static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)