summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/drivers/hv
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>2020-12-09 10:08:24 +0300
committerWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>2021-02-05 12:55:42 +0300
commitfe8c1b18a27de4d6ca5d99b3ffb3125dc69a5b76 (patch)
treedd42a4e48da160d4dc2c8a6636350dcfc59117e5 /drivers/hv
parent9c400d3548c39378327268fb18112b229f91b220 (diff)
downloadlinux-fe8c1b18a27de4d6ca5d99b3ffb3125dc69a5b76.tar.xz
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Copy the hv_message in vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
Since the message is in memory shared with the host, an erroneous or a malicious Hyper-V could 'corrupt' the message while vmbus_on_msg_dpc() or individual message handlers are executing. To prevent it, copy the message into private memory. Reported-by: Juan Vazquez <juvazq@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209070827.29335-4-parri.andrea@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/hv')
-rw-r--r--drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c19
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index 9749cbce33d4..4b0f2065a4bd 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)
{
struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu = (void *)data;
void *page_addr = hv_cpu->synic_message_page;
- struct hv_message *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr +
+ struct hv_message msg_copy, *msg = (struct hv_message *)page_addr +
VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT;
struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr;
enum vmbus_channel_message_type msgtype;
const struct vmbus_channel_message_table_entry *entry;
struct onmessage_work_context *ctx;
- u32 message_type = msg->header.message_type;
__u8 payload_size;
+ u32 message_type;
/*
* 'enum vmbus_channel_message_type' is supposed to always be 'u32' as
@@ -1070,11 +1070,20 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(enum vmbus_channel_message_type) != sizeof(u32));
+ /*
+ * Since the message is in memory shared with the host, an erroneous or
+ * malicious Hyper-V could modify the message while vmbus_on_msg_dpc()
+ * or individual message handlers are executing; to prevent this, copy
+ * the message into private memory.
+ */
+ memcpy(&msg_copy, msg, sizeof(struct hv_message));
+
+ message_type = msg_copy.header.message_type;
if (message_type == HVMSG_NONE)
/* no msg */
return;
- hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg->u.payload;
+ hdr = (struct vmbus_channel_message_header *)msg_copy.u.payload;
msgtype = hdr->msgtype;
trace_vmbus_on_msg_dpc(hdr);
@@ -1084,7 +1093,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)
goto msg_handled;
}
- payload_size = msg->header.payload_size;
+ payload_size = msg_copy.header.payload_size;
if (payload_size > HV_MESSAGE_PAYLOAD_BYTE_COUNT) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "payload size is too large (%d)\n", payload_size);
goto msg_handled;
@@ -1106,7 +1115,7 @@ void vmbus_on_msg_dpc(unsigned long data)
return;
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, vmbus_onmessage_work);
- memcpy(&ctx->msg, msg, sizeof(msg->header) + payload_size);
+ memcpy(&ctx->msg, &msg_copy, sizeof(msg->header) + payload_size);
/*
* The host can generate a rescind message while we