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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2019-11-20 01:24:47 +0300
committerEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2019-12-31 19:33:49 +0300
commit93edd392cad7485097c2e9068c764ae30083bb05 (patch)
treee9f3def450e91bcec0424fe85389bfe66b5c1dfb /fs/crypto
parentfd6988496e79a6a4bdb514a4655d2920209eb85d (diff)
downloadlinux-93edd392cad7485097c2e9068c764ae30083bb05.tar.xz
fscrypt: support passing a keyring key to FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
Extend the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl to allow the raw key to be specified by a Linux keyring key, rather than specified directly. This is useful because fscrypt keys belong to a particular filesystem instance, so they are destroyed when that filesystem is unmounted. Usually this is desired. But in some cases, userspace may need to unmount and re-mount the filesystem while keeping the keys, e.g. during a system update. This requires keeping the keys somewhere else too. The keys could be kept in memory in a userspace daemon. But depending on the security architecture and assumptions, it can be preferable to keep them only in kernel memory, where they are unreadable by userspace. We also can't solve this by going back to the original fscrypt API (where for each file, the master key was looked up in the process's keyring hierarchy) because that caused lots of problems of its own. Therefore, add the ability for FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY to accept a Linux keyring key. This solves the problem by allowing userspace to (if needed) save the keys securely in a Linux keyring for re-provisioning, while still using the new fscrypt key management ioctls. This is analogous to how dm-crypt accepts a Linux keyring key, but the key is then stored internally in the dm-crypt data structures rather than being looked up again each time the dm-crypt device is accessed. Use a custom key type "fscrypt-provisioning" rather than one of the existing key types such as "logon". This is strongly desired because it enforces that these keys are only usable for a particular purpose: for fscrypt as input to a particular KDF. Otherwise, the keys could also be passed to any kernel API that accepts a "logon" key with any service prefix, e.g. dm-crypt, UBIFS, or (recently proposed) AF_ALG. This would risk leaking information about the raw key despite it ostensibly being unreadable. Of course, this mistake has already been made for multiple kernel APIs; but since this is a new API, let's do it right. This patch has been tested using an xfstest which I wrote to test it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119222447.226853-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyring.c132
1 files changed, 124 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index 40cca351273f..098ff2e0f0bb 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -465,6 +465,109 @@ out_unlock:
return err;
}
+static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload = prep->data;
+
+ if (prep->datalen < sizeof(*payload) + FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
+ prep->datalen > sizeof(*payload) + FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (payload->type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
+ payload->type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (payload->__reserved)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ prep->payload.data[0] = kmemdup(payload, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!prep->payload.data[0])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ prep->quotalen = prep->datalen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse(
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct key *key,
+ struct seq_file *m)
+{
+ seq_puts(m, key->description);
+ if (key_is_positive(key)) {
+ const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload =
+ key->payload.data[0];
+
+ seq_printf(m, ": %u [%u]", key->datalen, payload->type);
+ }
+}
+
+static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_provisioning = {
+ .name = "fscrypt-provisioning",
+ .preparse = fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
+ .describe = fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe,
+ .destroy = fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the raw key from the Linux keyring key specified by 'key_id', and
+ * store it into 'secret'.
+ *
+ * The key must be of type "fscrypt-provisioning" and must have the field
+ * fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload::type set to 'type', indicating that it's
+ * only usable with fscrypt with the particular KDF version identified by
+ * 'type'. We don't use the "logon" key type because there's no way to
+ * completely restrict the use of such keys; they can be used by any kernel API
+ * that accepts "logon" keys and doesn't require a specific service prefix.
+ *
+ * The ability to specify the key via Linux keyring key is intended for cases
+ * where userspace needs to re-add keys after the filesystem is unmounted and
+ * re-mounted. Most users should just provide the raw key directly instead.
+ */
+static int get_keyring_key(u32 key_id, u32 type,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
+{
+ key_ref_t ref;
+ struct key *key;
+ const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload;
+ int err;
+
+ ref = lookup_user_key(key_id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+ if (IS_ERR(ref))
+ return PTR_ERR(ref);
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+
+ if (key->type != &key_type_fscrypt_provisioning)
+ goto bad_key;
+ payload = key->payload.data[0];
+
+ /* Don't allow fscrypt v1 keys to be used as v2 keys and vice versa. */
+ if (payload->type != type)
+ goto bad_key;
+
+ secret->size = key->datalen - sizeof(*payload);
+ memcpy(secret->raw, payload->raw, secret->size);
+ err = 0;
+ goto out_put;
+
+bad_key:
+ err = -EKEYREJECTED;
+out_put:
+ key_ref_put(ref);
+ return err;
+}
+
/*
* Add a master encryption key to the filesystem, causing all files which were
* encrypted with it to appear "unlocked" (decrypted) when accessed.
@@ -503,18 +606,25 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
return -EINVAL;
- if (arg.raw_size < FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
- arg.raw_size > FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
-
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
return -EINVAL;
memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
- secret.size = arg.raw_size;
- err = -EFAULT;
- if (copy_from_user(secret.raw, uarg->raw, secret.size))
- goto out_wipe_secret;
+ if (arg.key_id) {
+ if (arg.raw_size != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ err = get_keyring_key(arg.key_id, arg.key_spec.type, &secret);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_wipe_secret;
+ } else {
+ if (arg.raw_size < FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
+ arg.raw_size > FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ secret.size = arg.raw_size;
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(secret.raw, uarg->raw, secret.size))
+ goto out_wipe_secret;
+ }
switch (arg.key_spec.type) {
case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
@@ -978,8 +1088,14 @@ int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void)
if (err)
goto err_unregister_fscrypt;
+ err = register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_provisioning);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_unregister_fscrypt_user;
+
return 0;
+err_unregister_fscrypt_user:
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_user);
err_unregister_fscrypt:
unregister_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt);
return err;