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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-06-27 23:26:03 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-06-27 23:26:03 +0300
commite22619a29fcdb513b7bc020e84225bb3b5914259 (patch)
tree1d1d72a4c8cebad4f2d2bf738395ca4ececa95ec /include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
parent78c10e556ed904d5bfbd71e9cadd8ce8f25d6982 (diff)
parentb3bddffd35a0b77eee89760eb94cafa18dc431f5 (diff)
downloadlinux-e22619a29fcdb513b7bc020e84225bb3b5914259.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking, allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor). See https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/ This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits) tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add() vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level. ima: update builtin policies ima: extend "mask" policy matching support ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii() Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj() selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS selinux: Remove unused permission definitions selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files. selinux: update netlink socket classes signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds() selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation() ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter ...
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+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group)
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Due to this file being licensed under the GPL there is controversy over
+ * whether this permits you to write a module that #includes this file
+ * without placing your module under the GPL. Please consult a lawyer for
+ * advice before doing this.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+/**
+ * Security hooks for program execution operations.
+ *
+ * @bprm_set_creds:
+ * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
+ * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
+ * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
+ * transitions between security domains).
+ * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
+ * interpreters. The hook can tell whether it has already been called by
+ * checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL. If so, then the hook
+ * may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or
+ * to replace it.
+ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_check_security:
+ * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will
+ * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the
+ * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is
+ * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This
+ * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each
+ * pass set_creds is called first.
+ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_committing_creds:
+ * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
+ * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials
+ * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by
+ * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.
+ * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such
+ * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be
+ * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately
+ * before commit_creds().
+ * @bprm_committed_creds:
+ * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a
+ * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials
+ * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the
+ * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state
+ * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal
+ * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds().
+ * @bprm_secureexec:
+ * Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec"
+ * is required. The flag is passed in the auxiliary table
+ * on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
+ * should enable secure mode.
+ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for filesystem operations.
+ *
+ * @sb_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.
+ * The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ * allocated.
+ * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @sb_free_security:
+ * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.
+ * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ * @sb_statfs:
+ * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
+ * mountpoint.
+ * @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_mount:
+ * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on
+ * the mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name
+ * identifies a device if the file system type requires a device. For a
+ * remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a
+ * loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the
+ * pathname of the object being mounted.
+ * @dev_name contains the name for object being mounted.
+ * @path contains the path for mount point object.
+ * @type contains the filesystem type.
+ * @flags contains the mount flags.
+ * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_copy_data:
+ * Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem,
+ * so that the security module can extract security-specific mount
+ * options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()).
+ * This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security-
+ * specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them.
+ * @type the type of filesystem being mounted.
+ * @orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
+ * @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
+ * Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
+ * @sb_remount:
+ * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes
+ * are being made to those options.
+ * @sb superblock being remounted
+ * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_umount:
+ * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
+ * @mnt contains the mounted file system.
+ * @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_pivotroot:
+ * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
+ * @old_path contains the path for the new location of the
+ * current root (put_old).
+ * @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
+ * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
+ * @sb the superblock to set security mount options for
+ * @opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data
+ * @sb_clone_mnt_opts:
+ * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another
+ * @oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone
+ * @newsb new superblock which needs filled in
+ * @sb_parse_opts_str:
+ * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure
+ * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM
+ * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM
+ * @dentry_init_security:
+ * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
+ * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway.
+ * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
+ * @mode mode used to determine resource type.
+ * @name name of the last path component used to create file
+ * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
+ * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ *
+ *
+ * Security hooks for inode operations.
+ *
+ * @inode_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The
+ * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
+ * allocated.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @inode_free_security:
+ * @inode contains the inode structure.
+ * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to
+ * NULL.
+ * @inode_init_security:
+ * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
+ * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.
+ * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
+ * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
+ * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function
+ * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
+ * being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
+ * If the security module does not use security attributes or does
+ * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
+ * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
+ * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object
+ * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
+ * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
+ * @len will be set to the length of the value.
+ * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
+ * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
+ * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
+ * @inode_create:
+ * Check permission to create a regular file.
+ * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created.
+ * @mode contains the file mode of the file to be created.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_link:
+ * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing
+ * link to the file.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory
+ * of the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_link:
+ * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
+ * to the file.
+ * @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
+ * the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_unlink:
+ * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_unlink:
+ * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_symlink:
+ * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of
+ * the symbolic link.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ * @old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_symlink:
+ * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
+ * the symbolic link.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ * @old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_mkdir:
+ * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ * associated with inode structure @dir.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory
+ * to be created.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ * @mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mkdir:
+ * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ * associated with path structure @path.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory
+ * to be created.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ * @mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_rmdir:
+ * Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory
+ * to be removed.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rmdir:
+ * Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
+ * removed.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_mknod:
+ * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
+ * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation
+ * is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called
+ * and not this hook.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ * @mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ * @dev contains the device number.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mknod:
+ * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
+ * even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ * @mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ * @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
+ * the decoded device number.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_rename:
+ * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ * @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rename:
+ * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ * @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ * @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chmod:
+ * Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure.
+ * @mnt contains the vfsmnt structure.
+ * @mode contains DAC's mode.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chown:
+ * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
+ * @path contains the path structure.
+ * @uid contains new owner's ID.
+ * @gid contains new group's ID.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chroot:
+ * Check for permission to change root directory.
+ * @path contains the path structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_readlink:
+ * Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_follow_link:
+ * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
+ * @inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk
+ * @rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_permission:
+ * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the
+ * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
+ * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.
+ * Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many
+ * other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is
+ * called when the actual read/write operations are performed.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure to check.
+ * @mask contains the permission mask.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_setattr:
+ * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel
+ * call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever
+ * file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod
+ * operations, transferring disk quotas, etc).
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_truncate:
+ * Check permission before truncating a file.
+ * @path contains the path structure for the file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_getattr:
+ * Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
+ * @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_setxattr:
+ * Check permission before setting the extended attributes
+ * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_post_setxattr:
+ * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
+ * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * @inode_getxattr:
+ * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
+ * identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_listxattr:
+ * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute
+ * names for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_removexattr:
+ * Check permission before removing the extended attribute
+ * identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_getsecurity:
+ * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
+ * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that
+ * @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix
+ * has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a
+ * value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on
+ * success.
+ * @inode_setsecurity:
+ * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the
+ * extended attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the
+ * @value in bytes. @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0.
+ * Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the
+ * security. prefix has been removed.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ * @inode_listsecurity:
+ * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels
+ * associated with @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer
+ * is specified by @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request
+ * the size of the buffer required.
+ * Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
+ * @inode_need_killpriv:
+ * Called when an inode has been changed.
+ * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ * Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation.
+ * Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called.
+ * Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called.
+ * @inode_killpriv:
+ * The setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels.
+ * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
+ * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
+ * causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ * @inode_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the node.
+ * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for file operations
+ *
+ * @file_permission:
+ * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is
+ * called by various operations that read or write files. A security
+ * module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these
+ * operations, e.g. to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege
+ * bracketing or policy changes. Notice that this hook is used when the
+ * actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the
+ * inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as
+ * many other operations).
+ * Caveat: Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for
+ * various system call operations that read or write files, it does not
+ * address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files.
+ * Security modules must handle this separately if they need such
+ * revalidation.
+ * @file contains the file structure being accessed.
+ * @mask contains the requested permissions.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.
+ * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
+ * created.
+ * @file contains the file structure to secure.
+ * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @file_free_security:
+ * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
+ * @file contains the file structure being modified.
+ * @file_ioctl:
+ * @file contains the file structure.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to perform.
+ * @arg contains the operational arguments.
+ * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg
+ * sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a
+ * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
+ * should never be used by the security module.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_addr :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
+ * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_file :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_mprotect:
+ * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
+ * @vma contains the memory region to modify.
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_lock:
+ * Check permission before performing file locking operations.
+ * Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
+ * @file contains the file structure.
+ * @cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform
+ * (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK).
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_fcntl:
+ * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd
+ * from being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes
+ * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple
+ * integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should
+ * never be used by the security module.
+ * @file contains the file structure.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * @arg contains the operational arguments.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_set_fowner:
+ * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
+ * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
+ * @file contains the file structure to update.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ * @file_send_sigiotask:
+ * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
+ * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.
+ * Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a
+ * struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information)
+ * can always be obtained:
+ * container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner)
+ * @tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal.
+ * @fown contains the file owner information.
+ * @sig is the signal that will be sent. When 0, kernel sends SIGIO.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_receive:
+ * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process
+ * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
+ * @file contains the file structure being received.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_open
+ * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
+ * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
+ * since inode_permission.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for task operations.
+ *
+ * @task_create:
+ * Check permission before creating a child process. See the clone(2)
+ * manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
+ * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_free:
+ * @task task being freed
+ * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
+ * from interrupt context.)
+ * @cred_alloc_blank:
+ * @cred points to the credentials.
+ * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
+ * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
+ * @cred_free:
+ * @cred points to the credentials.
+ * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
+ * @cred_prepare:
+ * @new points to the new credentials.
+ * @old points to the original credentials.
+ * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
+ * @cred_transfer:
+ * @new points to the new credentials.
+ * @old points to the original credentials.
+ * Transfer data from original creds to new creds
+ * @kernel_act_as:
+ * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
+ * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_create_files_as:
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as
+ * the objective context of the specified inode.
+ * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
+ * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
+ * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_fw_from_file:
+ * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
+ * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
+ * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
+ * @size length of the firmware contents.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_module_request:
+ * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
+ * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_module_from_file:
+ * Load a kernel module from userspace.
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
+ * this argument will be NULL.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_fix_setuid:
+ * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
+ * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter
+ * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If
+ * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications
+ * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred.
+ * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
+ * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ * @task_setpgid:
+ * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
+ * process @p to @pgid.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process being modified.
+ * @pgid contains the new pgid.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getpgid:
+ * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the
+ * process @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getsid:
+ * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process
+ * @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getsecid:
+ * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * @task_setnice:
+ * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
+ * @p contains the task_struct of process.
+ * @nice contains the new nice value.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setioprio
+ * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
+ * @p contains the task_struct of process.
+ * @ioprio contains the new ioprio value
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getioprio
+ * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct of process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setrlimit:
+ * Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current
+ * process for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can
+ * be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource).
+ * @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set.
+ * @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setscheduler:
+ * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
+ * process @p based on @policy and @lp.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * @policy contains the scheduling policy.
+ * @lp contains the scheduling parameters.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getscheduler:
+ * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process
+ * @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_movememory
+ * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_kill:
+ * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL,
+ * the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or
+ * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming
+ * from the kernel and should typically be permitted.
+ * SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in
+ * file_security_ops.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * @info contains the signal information.
+ * @sig contains the signal value.
+ * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_wait:
+ * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
+ * and collect its status information.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_prctl:
+ * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
+ * current process.
+ * @option contains the operation.
+ * @arg2 contains a argument.
+ * @arg3 contains a argument.
+ * @arg4 contains a argument.
+ * @arg5 contains a argument.
+ * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to
+ * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
+ * @task_to_inode:
+ * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
+ * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the task.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
+ *
+ * @netlink_send:
+ * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission
+ * checking can be performed when the message is processed. The security
+ * information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the
+ * netlink_skb_parms structure. Also may be used to provide fine
+ * grained control over message transmission.
+ * @sk associated sock of task sending the message.
+ * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
+ * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
+ * is allowed to be transmitted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
+ *
+ * @unix_stream_connect:
+ * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
+ * between @sock and @other.
+ * @sock contains the sock structure.
+ * @other contains the peer sock structure.
+ * @newsk contains the new sock structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @unix_may_send:
+ * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
+ * @other.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @other contains the peer socket structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
+ * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
+ * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
+ * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
+ * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
+ * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient
+ * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
+ * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
+ * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for socket operations.
+ *
+ * @socket_create:
+ * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
+ * @family contains the requested protocol family.
+ * @type contains the requested communications type.
+ * @protocol contains the requested protocol.
+ * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_create:
+ * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
+ * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the
+ * socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored
+ * in the associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will
+ * allocate and and attach security information to
+ * sock->inode->i_security. This hook may be used to update the
+ * sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't
+ * available when the inode was allocated.
+ * @sock contains the newly created socket structure.
+ * @family contains the requested protocol family.
+ * @type contains the requested communications type.
+ * @protocol contains the requested protocol.
+ * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
+ * @socket_bind:
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is
+ * performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the
+ * @address parameter.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @address contains the address to bind to.
+ * @addrlen contains the length of address.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_connect:
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation
+ * attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @address contains the address of remote endpoint.
+ * @addrlen contains the length of address.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_listen:
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_accept:
+ * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new
+ * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it,
+ * but the accept operation has not actually been performed.
+ * @sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sendmsg:
+ * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @msg contains the message to be transmitted.
+ * @size contains the size of message.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_recvmsg:
+ * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @msg contains the message structure.
+ * @size contains the size of message structure.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getsockname:
+ * Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object
+ * @sock is retrieved.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getpeername:
+ * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object
+ * @sock is retrieved.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getsockopt:
+ * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
+ * @sock.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from.
+ * @optname contains the name of option to retrieve.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_setsockopt:
+ * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket
+ * @sock.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @level contains the protocol level to set options for.
+ * @optname contains the name of the option to set.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_shutdown:
+ * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket
+ * @sock is shut down.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives
+ * are handled.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
+ * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct
+ * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
+ * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
+ * Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
+ * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
+ * @skb contains the incoming network data.
+ * @socket_getpeersec_stream:
+ * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
+ * state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt
+ * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
+ * socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
+ * @sock is the local socket.
+ * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
+ * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
+ * of the security state.
+ * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
+ * by the caller.
+ * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
+ * values.
+ * @socket_getpeersec_dgram:
+ * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
+ * state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via
+ * getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated
+ * the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the
+ * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY
+ * ancillary message type.
+ * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried
+ * @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
+ * @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata
+ * Return 0 on success, error on failure.
+ * @sk_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
+ * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
+ * @sk_free_security:
+ * Deallocate security structure.
+ * @sk_clone_security:
+ * Clone/copy security structure.
+ * @sk_getsecid:
+ * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching
+ * of network authorizations.
+ * @sock_graft:
+ * Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid.
+ * @inet_conn_request:
+ * Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken
+ * from peer sid.
+ * @inet_csk_clone:
+ * Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @inet_conn_established:
+ * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
+ * @secmark_relabel_packet:
+ * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to
+ * the given secid
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
+ * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
+ * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @req_classify_flow:
+ * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @tun_dev_alloc_security:
+ * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN
+ * device.
+ * @security pointer to a security structure pointer.
+ * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ * @tun_dev_free_security:
+ * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN
+ * device.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure
+ * @tun_dev_create:
+ * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
+ * @tun_dev_attach_queue:
+ * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @tun_dev_attach:
+ * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
+ * associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
+ * @sk contains the existing sock structure.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @tun_dev_open:
+ * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
+ * associated with the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
+ *
+ * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security:
+ * @ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy
+ * Database used by the XFRM system.
+ * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
+ * the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
+ * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
+ * @gfp is to specify the context for the allocation
+ * @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
+ * @old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx.
+ * @new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old.
+ * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the
+ * information from the old_ctx structure.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate).
+ * @xfrm_policy_free_security:
+ * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx
+ * Deallocate xp->security.
+ * @xfrm_policy_delete_security:
+ * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx.
+ * Authorize deletion of xp->security.
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ * Database by the XFRM system.
+ * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
+ * the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
+ * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ * context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ * (memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ * Database by the XFRM system.
+ * @polsec contains the policy's security context.
+ * @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the
+ * context.
+ * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ * context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ * (memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_free_security:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state.
+ * Deallocate x->security.
+ * @xfrm_state_delete_security:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state.
+ * Authorize deletion of x->security.
+ * @xfrm_policy_lookup:
+ * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being
+ * checked.
+ * @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
+ * access to the policy xp.
+ * @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
+ * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
+ * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a
+ * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno
+ * on other errors.
+ * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
+ * @x contains the state to match.
+ * @xp contains the policy to check for a match.
+ * @fl contains the flow to check for a match.
+ * Return 1 if there is a match.
+ * @xfrm_decode_session:
+ * @skb points to skb to decode.
+ * @secid points to the flow key secid to set.
+ * @ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid.
+ * Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid.
+ *
+ * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
+ *
+ * @key_alloc:
+ * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does
+ * not have a serial number assigned at this point.
+ * @key points to the key.
+ * @flags is the allocation flags
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ * @key_free:
+ * Notification of destruction; free security data.
+ * @key points to the key.
+ * No return value.
+ * @key_permission:
+ * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a
+ * key.
+ * @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit).
+ * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
+ * evaluate the security data on the key.
+ * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ * @key_getsecurity:
+ * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
+ * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function
+ * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
+ * should free it.
+ * @key points to the key to be queried.
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ *
+ * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
+ *
+ * @ipc_permission:
+ * Check permissions for access to IPC
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
+ * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
+ * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.
+ * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
+ * created.
+ * @msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_msg_free_security:
+ * Deallocate the security structure for this message.
+ * @msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues
+ *
+ * @msg_queue_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the
+ * msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to
+ * NULL when the structure is first created.
+ * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_free_security:
+ * Deallocate security structure for this message queue.
+ * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
+ * @msg_queue_associate:
+ * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the
+ * msgget system call. This hook is only called when returning the
+ * message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a
+ * new message queue is created.
+ * @msq contains the message queue to act upon.
+ * @msqflg contains the operation control flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgctl:
+ * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd
+ * is to be performed on the message queue @msq.
+ * The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO.
+ * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. May be NULL.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgsnd:
+ * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message
+ * queue, @msq.
+ * @msq contains the message queue to send message to.
+ * @msg contains the message to be enqueued.
+ * @msqflg contains operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgrcv:
+ * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message
+ * queue, @msq. The @target task structure contains a pointer to the
+ * process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current
+ * process when inline receives are being performed).
+ * @msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from.
+ * @msg contains the message destination.
+ * @target contains the task structure for recipient process.
+ * @type contains the type of message requested.
+ * @mode contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments
+ *
+ * @shm_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security
+ * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ * first created.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @shm_free_security:
+ * Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shm_associate:
+ * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the
+ * shmget system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared
+ * memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared
+ * memory region is created.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shmflg contains the operation control flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @shm_shmctl:
+ * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by
+ * @cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp.
+ * The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO.
+ * @shp contains shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @shm_shmat:
+ * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
+ * shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process.
+ * The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to.
+ * @shmflg contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V Semaphores
+ *
+ * @sem_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security
+ * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ * first created.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @sem_free_security:
+ * deallocate security struct for this semaphore
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @sem_associate:
+ * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget
+ * system call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore
+ * identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be
+ * created.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @semflg contains the operation control flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sem_semctl:
+ * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
+ * performed on the semaphore @sma. The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for
+ * IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure. May be NULL.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sem_semop
+ * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the
+ * semaphore set @sma. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set
+ * may be modified.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @sops contains the operations to perform.
+ * @nsops contains the number of operations to perform.
+ * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * @binder_set_context_mgr
+ * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
+ * @mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @binder_transaction
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call
+ * to @to.
+ * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ * @binder_transfer_binder
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
+ * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ * @binder_transfer_file
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
+ * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ * @file contains the struct file being transferred.
+ * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ *
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
+ * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
+ * @child process.
+ * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
+ * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
+ * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of
+ * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
+ * attributes would be changed by the execve.
+ * @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process.
+ * @mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ptrace_traceme:
+ * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
+ * current process before allowing the current process to present itself
+ * to the @parent process for tracing.
+ * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @capget:
+ * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
+ * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to
+ * determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets
+ * of the @target process.
+ * @target contains the task_struct structure for target process.
+ * @effective contains the effective capability set.
+ * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
+ * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ * Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
+ * @capset:
+ * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
+ * the current process.
+ * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process.
+ * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process.
+ * @effective contains the effective capability set.
+ * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
+ * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
+ * @capable:
+ * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
+ * credentials.
+ * @cred contains the credentials to use.
+ * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
+ * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
+ * @syslog:
+ * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
+ * logging to the console.
+ * See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values.
+ * @type contains the type of action.
+ * @from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc).
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @settime:
+ * Check permission to change the system time.
+ * struct timespec and timezone are defined in include/linux/time.h
+ * @ts contains new time
+ * @tz contains new timezone
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @vm_enough_memory:
+ * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.
+ * @mm contains the mm struct it is being added to.
+ * @pages contains the number of pages.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * @ismaclabel:
+ * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
+ * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
+ * attribute otherwise returns 0.
+ * @name full extended attribute name to check against
+ * LSM as a MAC label.
+ *
+ * @secid_to_secctx:
+ * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of
+ * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
+ * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
+ * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
+ * secdata.
+ * @secid contains the security ID.
+ * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
+ * context.
+ * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
+ * @secctx_to_secid:
+ * Convert security context to secid.
+ * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ * @secdata contains the security context.
+ *
+ * @release_secctx:
+ * Release the security context.
+ * @secdata contains the security context.
+ * @seclen contains the length of the security context.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Audit
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_init:
+ * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ * @field contains the required Audit action.
+ * Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
+ * @op contains the operator the rule uses.
+ * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
+ * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
+ * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
+ * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_known:
+ * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to
+ * current LSM.
+ * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
+ * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_match:
+ * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
+ * by @audit_rule_known.
+ * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
+ * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
+ * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
+ * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
+ * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_free:
+ * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ * audit_rule_init.
+ * @rule contains the allocated rule
+ *
+ * @inode_notifysecctx:
+ * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
+ * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the
+ * security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes
+ * this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
+ * value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
+ * file's attributes to the client.
+ *
+ * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * @inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_setsecctx:
+ * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
+ * incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
+ * fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
+ * xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes
+ * this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
+ * backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_getsecctx:
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ * context for the given @inode.
+ *
+ * @inode we wish to get the security context of.
+ * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
+ * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ * This is the main security structure.
+ */
+
+union security_list_options {
+ int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
+ int (*binder_transaction)(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to);
+ int (*binder_transfer_binder)(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to);
+ int (*binder_transfer_file)(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to,
+ struct file *file);
+
+ int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child,
+ unsigned int mode);
+ int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent);
+ int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit);
+ int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
+ int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*syslog)(int type);
+ int (*settime)(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
+ int (*vm_enough_memory)(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
+
+ int (*bprm_set_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int (*bprm_check_security)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int (*bprm_secureexec)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void (*bprm_committing_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void (*bprm_committed_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+ int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb);
+ void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
+ int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, char *copy);
+ int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *data);
+ int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
+ int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
+ int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
+ int (*sb_umount)(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+ int (*sb_pivotroot)(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
+ int (*sb_set_mnt_opts)(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
+ int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+ struct super_block *newsb);
+ int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+ int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+ u32 *ctxlen);
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ int (*path_unlink)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*path_mkdir)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode);
+ int (*path_rmdir)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*path_mknod)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode, unsigned int dev);
+ int (*path_truncate)(struct path *path);
+ int (*path_symlink)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name);
+ int (*path_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*path_rename)(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*path_chmod)(struct path *path, umode_t mode);
+ int (*path_chown)(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid);
+ int (*path_chroot)(struct path *path);
+#endif
+
+ int (*inode_alloc_security)(struct inode *inode);
+ void (*inode_free_security)(struct inode *inode);
+ int (*inode_init_security)(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ const char **name, void **value,
+ size_t *len);
+ int (*inode_create)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode);
+ int (*inode_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*inode_unlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_symlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name);
+ int (*inode_mkdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode);
+ int (*inode_rmdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_mknod)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
+ int (*inode_rename)(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*inode_readlink)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_follow_link)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ bool rcu);
+ int (*inode_permission)(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+ int (*inode_setattr)(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
+ int (*inode_getattr)(const struct path *path);
+ int (*inode_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+ void (*inode_post_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size,
+ int flags);
+ int (*inode_getxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+ int (*inode_listxattr)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+ int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ void **buffer, bool alloc);
+ int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size,
+ int flags);
+ int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+
+ int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
+ int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
+ void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
+ int (*file_ioctl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg);
+ int (*mmap_addr)(unsigned long addr);
+ int (*mmap_file)(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+ int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot);
+ int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
+ int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg);
+ void (*file_set_fowner)(struct file *file);
+ int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
+ int (*file_receive)(struct file *file);
+ int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
+
+ int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
+ void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
+ int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
+ void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred);
+ int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+ void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+ int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+ int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
+ int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+ int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags);
+ int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
+ int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
+ void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+ int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
+ int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+ int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_setrlimit)(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+ int (*task_setscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid);
+ int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
+ void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
+
+ int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+
+ int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
+ void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
+
+ int (*msg_queue_alloc_security)(struct msg_queue *msq);
+ void (*msg_queue_free_security)(struct msg_queue *msq);
+ int (*msg_queue_associate)(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg);
+ int (*msg_queue_msgctl)(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd);
+ int (*msg_queue_msgsnd)(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ int msqflg);
+ int (*msg_queue_msgrcv)(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target, long type,
+ int mode);
+
+ int (*shm_alloc_security)(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
+ void (*shm_free_security)(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
+ int (*shm_associate)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg);
+ int (*shm_shmctl)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd);
+ int (*shm_shmat)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+ int shmflg);
+
+ int (*sem_alloc_security)(struct sem_array *sma);
+ void (*sem_free_security)(struct sem_array *sma);
+ int (*sem_associate)(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg);
+ int (*sem_semctl)(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
+ int (*sem_semop)(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+ unsigned nsops, int alter);
+
+ int (*netlink_send)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+ void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
+
+ int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
+ int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size);
+ int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+ void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+
+ int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
+ struct sock *newsk);
+ int (*unix_may_send)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
+
+ int (*socket_create)(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
+ int (*socket_post_create)(struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
+ int protocol, int kern);
+ int (*socket_bind)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen);
+ int (*socket_connect)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen);
+ int (*socket_listen)(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+ int (*socket_accept)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+ int (*socket_sendmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size);
+ int (*socket_recvmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size, int flags);
+ int (*socket_getsockname)(struct socket *sock);
+ int (*socket_getpeername)(struct socket *sock);
+ int (*socket_getsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
+ int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
+ int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
+ int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+ int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
+ void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
+ void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
+ void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
+ void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
+ int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req);
+ void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk,
+ const struct request_sock *req);
+ void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);
+ void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,
+ struct flowi *fl);
+ int (*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void **security);
+ void (*tun_dev_free_security)(void *security);
+ int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
+ int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security);
+ int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security);
+ int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx);
+ void (*xfrm_policy_free_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_state_alloc)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ u32 secid);
+ void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
+ int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid,
+ u8 dir);
+ int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ const struct flowi *fl);
+ int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ int (*key_alloc)(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags);
+ void (*key_free)(struct key *key);
+ int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned perm);
+ int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+struct security_hook_heads {
+ struct list_head binder_set_context_mgr;
+ struct list_head binder_transaction;
+ struct list_head binder_transfer_binder;
+ struct list_head binder_transfer_file;
+ struct list_head ptrace_access_check;
+ struct list_head ptrace_traceme;
+ struct list_head capget;
+ struct list_head capset;
+ struct list_head capable;
+ struct list_head quotactl;
+ struct list_head quota_on;
+ struct list_head syslog;
+ struct list_head settime;
+ struct list_head vm_enough_memory;
+ struct list_head bprm_set_creds;
+ struct list_head bprm_check_security;
+ struct list_head bprm_secureexec;
+ struct list_head bprm_committing_creds;
+ struct list_head bprm_committed_creds;
+ struct list_head sb_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head sb_free_security;
+ struct list_head sb_copy_data;
+ struct list_head sb_remount;
+ struct list_head sb_kern_mount;
+ struct list_head sb_show_options;
+ struct list_head sb_statfs;
+ struct list_head sb_mount;
+ struct list_head sb_umount;
+ struct list_head sb_pivotroot;
+ struct list_head sb_set_mnt_opts;
+ struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
+ struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
+ struct list_head dentry_init_security;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ struct list_head path_unlink;
+ struct list_head path_mkdir;
+ struct list_head path_rmdir;
+ struct list_head path_mknod;
+ struct list_head path_truncate;
+ struct list_head path_symlink;
+ struct list_head path_link;
+ struct list_head path_rename;
+ struct list_head path_chmod;
+ struct list_head path_chown;
+ struct list_head path_chroot;
+#endif
+ struct list_head inode_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head inode_free_security;
+ struct list_head inode_init_security;
+ struct list_head inode_create;
+ struct list_head inode_link;
+ struct list_head inode_unlink;
+ struct list_head inode_symlink;
+ struct list_head inode_mkdir;
+ struct list_head inode_rmdir;
+ struct list_head inode_mknod;
+ struct list_head inode_rename;
+ struct list_head inode_readlink;
+ struct list_head inode_follow_link;
+ struct list_head inode_permission;
+ struct list_head inode_setattr;
+ struct list_head inode_getattr;
+ struct list_head inode_setxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_post_setxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_getxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_listxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_removexattr;
+ struct list_head inode_need_killpriv;
+ struct list_head inode_killpriv;
+ struct list_head inode_getsecurity;
+ struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
+ struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
+ struct list_head inode_getsecid;
+ struct list_head file_permission;
+ struct list_head file_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head file_free_security;
+ struct list_head file_ioctl;
+ struct list_head mmap_addr;
+ struct list_head mmap_file;
+ struct list_head file_mprotect;
+ struct list_head file_lock;
+ struct list_head file_fcntl;
+ struct list_head file_set_fowner;
+ struct list_head file_send_sigiotask;
+ struct list_head file_receive;
+ struct list_head file_open;
+ struct list_head task_create;
+ struct list_head task_free;
+ struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
+ struct list_head cred_free;
+ struct list_head cred_prepare;
+ struct list_head cred_transfer;
+ struct list_head kernel_act_as;
+ struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
+ struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+ struct list_head kernel_module_request;
+ struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
+ struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
+ struct list_head task_setpgid;
+ struct list_head task_getpgid;
+ struct list_head task_getsid;
+ struct list_head task_getsecid;
+ struct list_head task_setnice;
+ struct list_head task_setioprio;
+ struct list_head task_getioprio;
+ struct list_head task_setrlimit;
+ struct list_head task_setscheduler;
+ struct list_head task_getscheduler;
+ struct list_head task_movememory;
+ struct list_head task_kill;
+ struct list_head task_wait;
+ struct list_head task_prctl;
+ struct list_head task_to_inode;
+ struct list_head ipc_permission;
+ struct list_head ipc_getsecid;
+ struct list_head msg_msg_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head msg_msg_free_security;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_free_security;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_associate;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_msgctl;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_msgsnd;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_msgrcv;
+ struct list_head shm_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head shm_free_security;
+ struct list_head shm_associate;
+ struct list_head shm_shmctl;
+ struct list_head shm_shmat;
+ struct list_head sem_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head sem_free_security;
+ struct list_head sem_associate;
+ struct list_head sem_semctl;
+ struct list_head sem_semop;
+ struct list_head netlink_send;
+ struct list_head d_instantiate;
+ struct list_head getprocattr;
+ struct list_head setprocattr;
+ struct list_head ismaclabel;
+ struct list_head secid_to_secctx;
+ struct list_head secctx_to_secid;
+ struct list_head release_secctx;
+ struct list_head inode_notifysecctx;
+ struct list_head inode_setsecctx;
+ struct list_head inode_getsecctx;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ struct list_head unix_stream_connect;
+ struct list_head unix_may_send;
+ struct list_head socket_create;
+ struct list_head socket_post_create;
+ struct list_head socket_bind;
+ struct list_head socket_connect;
+ struct list_head socket_listen;
+ struct list_head socket_accept;
+ struct list_head socket_sendmsg;
+ struct list_head socket_recvmsg;
+ struct list_head socket_getsockname;
+ struct list_head socket_getpeername;
+ struct list_head socket_getsockopt;
+ struct list_head socket_setsockopt;
+ struct list_head socket_shutdown;
+ struct list_head socket_sock_rcv_skb;
+ struct list_head socket_getpeersec_stream;
+ struct list_head socket_getpeersec_dgram;
+ struct list_head sk_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head sk_free_security;
+ struct list_head sk_clone_security;
+ struct list_head sk_getsecid;
+ struct list_head sock_graft;
+ struct list_head inet_conn_request;
+ struct list_head inet_csk_clone;
+ struct list_head inet_conn_established;
+ struct list_head secmark_relabel_packet;
+ struct list_head secmark_refcount_inc;
+ struct list_head secmark_refcount_dec;
+ struct list_head req_classify_flow;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_free_security;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_create;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_attach;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_open;
+ struct list_head skb_owned_by;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_clone_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_free_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_delete_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_free_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_delete_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_lookup;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match;
+ struct list_head xfrm_decode_session;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct list_head key_alloc;
+ struct list_head key_free;
+ struct list_head key_permission;
+ struct list_head key_getsecurity;
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct list_head audit_rule_init;
+ struct list_head audit_rule_known;
+ struct list_head audit_rule_match;
+ struct list_head audit_rule_free;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Security module hook list structure.
+ * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
+ */
+struct security_hook_list {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct list_head *head;
+ union security_list_options hook;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes
+ * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes
+ * care of the common case and reduces the amount of
+ * text involved.
+ */
+#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \
+ { .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
+
+extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
+
+static inline void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
+ int count)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+/*
+ * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
+ * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the
+ * module's hook list in a particular way, refusing to disable
+ * the module once a policy is loaded or any number of other
+ * actions better imagined than described.
+ *
+ * The name of the configuration option reflects the only module
+ * that currently uses the mechanism. Any developer who thinks
+ * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as
+ * careful as the SELinux team.
+ */
+static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
+ int count)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ list_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
+
+extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
+extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */