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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-01-21 23:32:08 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-01-21 23:32:08 +0300
commiteae21770b4fed5597623aad0d618190fa60426ff (patch)
tree23c59fb7a33e93a79525e2b10d56df54d40049d1 /kernel
parente9f57ebcba563e0cd532926cab83c92bb4d79360 (diff)
parent9f273c24ec5f4a6f785bb83e931b3808a07b459e (diff)
downloadlinux-eae21770b4fed5597623aad0d618190fa60426ff.tar.xz
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge third patch-bomb from Andrew Morton: "I'm pretty much done for -rc1 now: - the rest of MM, basically - lib/ updates - checkpatch, epoll, hfs, fatfs, ptrace, coredump, exit - cpu_mask simplifications - kexec, rapidio, MAINTAINERS etc, etc. - more dma-mapping cleanups/simplifications from hch" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (109 commits) MAINTAINERS: add/fix git URLs for various subsystems mm: memcontrol: add "sock" to cgroup2 memory.stat mm: memcontrol: basic memory statistics in cgroup2 memory controller mm: memcontrol: do not uncharge old page in page cache replacement Documentation: cgroup: add memory.swap.{current,max} description mm: free swap cache aggressively if memcg swap is full mm: vmscan: do not scan anon pages if memcg swap limit is hit swap.h: move memcg related stuff to the end of the file mm: memcontrol: replace mem_cgroup_lruvec_online with mem_cgroup_online mm: vmscan: pass memcg to get_scan_count() mm: memcontrol: charge swap to cgroup2 mm: memcontrol: clean up alloc, online, offline, free functions mm: memcontrol: flatten struct cg_proto mm: memcontrol: rein in the CONFIG space madness net: drop tcp_memcontrol.c mm: memcontrol: introduce CONFIG_MEMCG_LEGACY_KMEM mm: memcontrol: allow to disable kmem accounting for cgroup2 mm: memcontrol: account "kmem" consumers in cgroup2 memory controller mm: memcontrol: move kmem accounting code to CONFIG_MEMCG mm: memcontrol: separate kmem code from legacy tcp accounting code ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/cpu.c64
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/core.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/exit.c5
-rw-r--r--kernel/futex.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/futex_compat.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/kcmp.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec.c10
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_core.c7
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_file.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_internal.h21
-rw-r--r--kernel/printk/printk.c10
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c49
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c20
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c2
14 files changed, 104 insertions, 96 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 85ff5e26e23b..5b9d39633ce9 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -759,71 +759,33 @@ const DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_all_bits, NR_CPUS) = CPU_BITS_ALL;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_all_bits);
#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_possible_bits, CONFIG_NR_CPUS) __read_mostly
- = CPU_BITS_ALL;
+struct cpumask __cpu_possible_mask __read_mostly
+ = {CPU_BITS_ALL};
#else
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_possible_bits, CONFIG_NR_CPUS) __read_mostly;
+struct cpumask __cpu_possible_mask __read_mostly;
#endif
-const struct cpumask *const cpu_possible_mask = to_cpumask(cpu_possible_bits);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_possible_mask);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cpu_possible_mask);
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_online_bits, CONFIG_NR_CPUS) __read_mostly;
-const struct cpumask *const cpu_online_mask = to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_online_mask);
+struct cpumask __cpu_online_mask __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cpu_online_mask);
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_present_bits, CONFIG_NR_CPUS) __read_mostly;
-const struct cpumask *const cpu_present_mask = to_cpumask(cpu_present_bits);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_present_mask);
+struct cpumask __cpu_present_mask __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cpu_present_mask);
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_active_bits, CONFIG_NR_CPUS) __read_mostly;
-const struct cpumask *const cpu_active_mask = to_cpumask(cpu_active_bits);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_active_mask);
-
-void set_cpu_possible(unsigned int cpu, bool possible)
-{
- if (possible)
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_possible_bits));
- else
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_possible_bits));
-}
-
-void set_cpu_present(unsigned int cpu, bool present)
-{
- if (present)
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_present_bits));
- else
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_present_bits));
-}
-
-void set_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu, bool online)
-{
- if (online) {
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits));
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_active_bits));
- } else {
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits));
- }
-}
-
-void set_cpu_active(unsigned int cpu, bool active)
-{
- if (active)
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_active_bits));
- else
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(cpu_active_bits));
-}
+struct cpumask __cpu_active_mask __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cpu_active_mask);
void init_cpu_present(const struct cpumask *src)
{
- cpumask_copy(to_cpumask(cpu_present_bits), src);
+ cpumask_copy(&__cpu_present_mask, src);
}
void init_cpu_possible(const struct cpumask *src)
{
- cpumask_copy(to_cpumask(cpu_possible_bits), src);
+ cpumask_copy(&__cpu_possible_mask, src);
}
void init_cpu_online(const struct cpumask *src)
{
- cpumask_copy(to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits), src);
+ cpumask_copy(&__cpu_online_mask, src);
}
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index bf8244190d0f..c0957416b32e 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -3376,7 +3376,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
err = -EACCES;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto errout;
return task;
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 07110c6020a0..10e088237fed 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -59,8 +59,6 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
-static void exit_mm(struct task_struct *tsk);
-
static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
{
nr_threads--;
@@ -1120,8 +1118,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
static int *task_stopped_code(struct task_struct *p, bool ptrace)
{
if (ptrace) {
- if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(p) &&
- !(p->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING))
+ if (task_is_traced(p) && !(p->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING))
return &p->exit_code;
} else {
if (p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index c6f514573b28..0773f2b23b10 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2884,7 +2884,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
}
ret = -EPERM;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
index 55c8c9349cfe..4ae3232e7a28 100644
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
}
ret = -EPERM;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->compat_robust_list;
diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c
index 0aa69ea1d8fd..3a47fa998fe0 100644
--- a/kernel/kcmp.c
+++ b/kernel/kcmp.c
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
&task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (ret)
goto err;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
- !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
+ !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto err_unlock;
}
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index d873b64fbddc..ee70aef5cd81 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -63,16 +63,16 @@ static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
if (ret)
goto out_free_image;
- ret = sanity_check_segment_list(image);
- if (ret)
- goto out_free_image;
-
- /* Enable the special crash kernel control page allocation policy. */
if (kexec_on_panic) {
+ /* Enable special crash kernel control page alloc policy. */
image->control_page = crashk_res.start;
image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH;
}
+ ret = sanity_check_segment_list(image);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_image;
+
/*
* Find a location for the control code buffer, and add it
* the vector of segments so that it's pages will also be
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
index c823f3001e12..8dc659144869 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
@@ -310,12 +310,9 @@ static void kimage_free_pages(struct page *page)
void kimage_free_page_list(struct list_head *list)
{
- struct list_head *pos, *next;
+ struct page *page, *next;
- list_for_each_safe(pos, next, list) {
- struct page *page;
-
- page = list_entry(pos, struct page, lru);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(page, next, list, lru) {
list_del(&page->lru);
kimage_free_pages(page);
}
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index b70ada0028d2..007b791f676d 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
return -EINVAL;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
+#endif
/* Apply relocations of type RELA */
int __weak
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_internal.h b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
index e4392a698ad4..0a52315d9c62 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_internal.h
+++ b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
@@ -15,6 +15,27 @@ int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
extern struct mutex kexec_mutex;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
+struct kexec_sha_region {
+ unsigned long start;
+ unsigned long len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Keeps track of buffer parameters as provided by caller for requesting
+ * memory placement of buffer.
+ */
+struct kexec_buf {
+ struct kimage *image;
+ char *buffer;
+ unsigned long bufsz;
+ unsigned long mem;
+ unsigned long memsz;
+ unsigned long buf_align;
+ unsigned long buf_min;
+ unsigned long buf_max;
+ bool top_down; /* allocate from top of memory hole */
+};
+
void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
#else /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
static inline void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) { }
diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c
index e79439134978..c963ba534a78 100644
--- a/kernel/printk/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c
@@ -233,7 +233,11 @@ struct printk_log {
u8 facility; /* syslog facility */
u8 flags:5; /* internal record flags */
u8 level:3; /* syslog level */
-};
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+__packed __aligned(4)
+#endif
+;
/*
* The logbuf_lock protects kmsg buffer, indices, counters. This can be taken
@@ -274,11 +278,7 @@ static u32 clear_idx;
#define LOG_FACILITY(v) ((v) >> 3 & 0xff)
/* record buffer */
-#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
-#define LOG_ALIGN 4
-#else
#define LOG_ALIGN __alignof__(struct printk_log)
-#endif
#define __LOG_BUF_LEN (1 << CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT)
static char __log_buf[__LOG_BUF_LEN] __aligned(LOG_ALIGN);
static char *log_buf = __log_buf;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index b760bae64cf1..2341efe7fe02 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+ int dumpable = 0;
+ kuid_t caller_uid;
+ kgid_t caller_gid;
+
+ if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) == !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)) {
+ WARN(1, "denying ptrace access check without PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
/* May we inspect the given task?
* This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
@@ -228,18 +236,33 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
- int dumpable = 0;
+
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) {
+ caller_uid = cred->fsuid;
+ caller_gid = cred->fsgid;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Using the euid would make more sense here, but something
+ * in userland might rely on the old behavior, and this
+ * shouldn't be a security problem since
+ * PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS implies that the caller explicitly
+ * used a syscall that requests access to another process
+ * (and not a filesystem syscall to procfs).
+ */
+ caller_uid = cred->uid;
+ caller_gid = cred->gid;
+ }
tcred = __task_cred(task);
- if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
- uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
- uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
- gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
- gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
- gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
+ if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
+ uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
+ uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid) &&
+ gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
+ gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
+ gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
@@ -306,7 +329,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
goto out;
task_lock(task);
- retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
task_unlock(task);
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
@@ -364,8 +387,14 @@ unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out:
if (!retval) {
- wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT,
- TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+ /*
+ * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING
+ * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will
+ * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in
+ * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee;
+ * and until then nobody can ptrace this task.
+ */
+ wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE);
proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH);
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 6af9212ab5aa..78947de6f969 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1853,11 +1853,13 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL;
}
- if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1)
+ if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- if (error)
- goto out;
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* We don't validate if these members are pointing to
@@ -1894,10 +1896,8 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data
if (prctl_map.auxv_size)
memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv));
- error = 0;
-out:
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- return error;
+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
@@ -1963,7 +1963,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
error = -EINVAL;
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code;
@@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
error = 0;
out:
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return error;
}
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index c810f8afdb7f..91420362e0b3 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ extern int no_unaligned_warning;
#define SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN 0
#define SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT 1
-static int sysctl_writes_strict = SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN;
+static int sysctl_writes_strict = SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT;
static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);