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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 20:17:23 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 20:17:23 +0300 |
commit | 7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch) | |
tree | 65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /scripts/mod/modpost.c | |
parent | f022814633e1c600507b3a99691b4d624c2813f0 (diff) | |
parent | 3986f65d4f408ce9d0a361e3226a3246a5fb701c (diff) | |
download | linux-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra:
"Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen),
which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge
Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must
target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation
is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets
not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next
sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides,
as described above, speculation limits itself"
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
* tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR
x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0
x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0
kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes
x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy
x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions
objtool: Validate IBT assumptions
objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding
objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation
x86: Annotate idtentry_df()
x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h
x86: Annotate call_on_stack()
objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE
x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn
exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code
objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto
...
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/mod/modpost.c')
-rw-r--r-- | scripts/mod/modpost.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 8a7937452991..d10f93aac1c8 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -1996,9 +1996,9 @@ static char *remove_dot(char *s) if (m && (s[n + m] == '.' || s[n + m] == 0)) s[n] = 0; - /* strip trailing .lto */ - if (strends(s, ".lto")) - s[strlen(s) - 4] = '\0'; + /* strip trailing .prelink */ + if (strends(s, ".prelink")) + s[strlen(s) - 8] = '\0'; } return s; } @@ -2022,9 +2022,9 @@ static void read_symbols(const char *modname) /* strip trailing .o */ tmp = NOFAIL(strdup(modname)); tmp[strlen(tmp) - 2] = '\0'; - /* strip trailing .lto */ - if (strends(tmp, ".lto")) - tmp[strlen(tmp) - 4] = '\0'; + /* strip trailing .prelink */ + if (strends(tmp, ".prelink")) + tmp[strlen(tmp) - 8] = '\0'; mod = new_module(tmp); free(tmp); } |