summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/capability.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-02-25 22:28:04 +0400
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-07-25 22:47:45 +0400
commit13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05 (patch)
treeee922f8fbd1dd96c0aee0fd6274d94271f55217c /security/capability.c
parent7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad (diff)
downloadlinux-13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05.tar.xz
security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c6
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index e76373de3129..a74fde6a7468 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}
+static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return 0;
@@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);