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authorJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-12-17 22:26:46 +0300
committerJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-12-17 22:26:46 +0300
commit5580b4a1a8ca85c53bd5b94c5d302e47dca3e5cb (patch)
tree69597129504be73e8826be9984e05d073a5c47b5 /security/integrity/integrity.h
parent8bd8ea195f6d135a8d85201116314eb5237ad7e7 (diff)
parenteed9de3b4f47114f440980203ca27c5fab70f529 (diff)
downloadlinux-5580b4a1a8ca85c53bd5b94c5d302e47dca3e5cb.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity
From Mimi: In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image.  This pull request adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag.  An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here.)
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/integrity.h')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h23
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index e60473b13a8d..3517d2852a07 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2
-#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 3
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM 3
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 4
extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
@@ -153,6 +154,8 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
+int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm);
#else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@@ -166,6 +169,14 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id,
+ const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ key_perm_t perm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
@@ -222,3 +233,13 @@ integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
}
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, const void *data,
+ size_t len);
+#else
+static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
+#endif