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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-05-24 23:50:39 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-05-24 23:50:39 +0300
commit0350785b0a092c99c5ddd2ace0260dbe7b3f919f (patch)
tree3b9189b609f05d097f3ea9cb42c1a523308d53cb /security/integrity
parent7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7 (diff)
parent048ae41bb0806cde340f4e5d5030398037ab0be8 (diff)
downloadlinux-0350785b0a092c99c5ddd2ace0260dbe7b3f919f.tar.xz
Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file digest based signatures, both based on policy. In addition, are two bug fixes: - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple Macs with T2 chips. - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot command line ordering issue. The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup" * tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler evm: Clean up some variables evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0' efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs fsverity: update the documentation ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm.h3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig14
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c47
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c114
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c82
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c94
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h27
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c33
16 files changed, 395 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index c8c8a4a4e7a0..8a82a6c7f48a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
digestlen);
- case 2:
+ case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
+ case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
digestlen);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 0d44f41d16f8..f8b8c5004fc7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ extern int evm_initialized;
extern int evm_hmac_attrs;
-extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
-extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 0450d79afdc8..a733aff02006 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
-struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 7d87772f0ce6..cc88f02c7562 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
- return 0;
+ return INTEGRITY_PASS;
return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index f3a9cc201c8c..7249f16257c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -69,10 +69,9 @@ choice
hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list
template permits both larger hash digests and longer
- pathnames.
+ pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced
+ by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line.
- config IMA_TEMPLATE
- bool "ima"
config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
bool "ima-ng (default)"
config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
@@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
string
depends on IMA
- default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
@@ -102,19 +100,19 @@ choice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
bool "SHA256"
- depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
bool "SHA512"
- depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
bool "WP512"
- depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
bool "SM3"
- depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y
endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c6805af46211..c1e76282b5ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -200,6 +201,32 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
allowed_algos);
}
+static int ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ enum hash_algo verity_alg;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data
+ * hash containing 0's.
+ */
+ ret = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, &verity_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Unlike in the case of actually calculating the file hash, in
+ * the fsverity case regardless of the hash algorithm, return
+ * the verity digest to be included in the measurement list. A
+ * mismatch between the verity algorithm and the xattr signature
+ * algorithm, if one exists, will be detected later.
+ */
+ hash->hdr.algo = verity_alg;
+ hash->hdr.length = hash_digest_size[verity_alg];
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
*
@@ -242,16 +269,30 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*/
i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
hash.hdr.algo = algo;
+ hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
- if (buf)
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
+ result = ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash);
+ switch (result) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -ENODATA:
+ audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
+ break;
+ default:
+ audit_cause = "invalid-verity-digest";
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (buf) {
result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
- else
+ } else {
result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+ }
- if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+ if (result == -ENOMEM)
goto out;
length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..cdb84dccd24e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -183,13 +185,18 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return ima_hash_algo;
switch (xattr_value->type) {
+ case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
+ sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+ if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+ sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ return ima_hash_algo;
+ return sig->hash_algo;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
|| sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
- break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
/* first byte contains algorithm id */
ret = xattr_value->data[0];
@@ -226,6 +233,40 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
}
/*
+ * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
+ * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
+ * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
+ * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
+ * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
+ *
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
+ *
+ * Signing the ima_file_id struct is currently only supported for
+ * IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG type xattrs.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
+ enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct ima_file_id file_id = {
+ .hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, .hash_algorithm = algo};
+ unsigned int unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_digest_size[algo];
+
+ if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, hash_digest_size[algo]);
+
+ hash->algo = algo;
+ hash->length = hash_digest_size[algo];
+
+ return ima_calc_buffer_hash(&file_id, sizeof(file_id) - unused, hash);
+}
+
+/*
* xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
*
* Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents.
@@ -236,7 +277,10 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
{
+ struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
+ int mask;
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
@@ -246,7 +290,10 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) {
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
- *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ *cause = "verity-signature-required";
+ else
+ *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
@@ -274,6 +321,20 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+ mask = IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
+ if ((iint->flags & mask) == mask) {
+ *cause = "verity-signature-required";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+ if (sig->version >= 3) {
+ *cause = "invalid-signature-version";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value,
xattr_len,
@@ -297,6 +358,44 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
break;
+ case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ if (!(iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) {
+ *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+ if (sig->version != 3) {
+ *cause = "invalid-signature-version";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = calc_file_id_hash(IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, iint->ima_hash->algo,
+ iint->ima_hash->digest, &hash.hdr);
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "sigv3-hashing-error";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+ (const char *)xattr_value,
+ xattr_len, hash.digest,
+ hash.hdr.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "invalid-verity-signature";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ *status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
+
+ break;
default:
*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
*cause = "unknown-ima-data";
@@ -396,8 +495,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
- cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ?
- "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash";
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ cause = "verity-signature-required";
+ else
+ cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ } else {
+ cause = "missing-hash";
+ }
+
status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3d3f8c5c502b..040b03ddc1c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
- if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
+ if (rc == -ENOMEM)
goto out_locked;
if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
- struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
+ struct file *file;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index eea6e92500b8..73917413365b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1023,6 +1023,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_fgroup_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_gid_lt, Opt_egid_lt,
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
+ Opt_digest_type,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
Opt_label, Opt_err
@@ -1065,6 +1066,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_egid_lt, "egid<%s"},
{Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
{Opt_fgroup_lt, "fgroup<%s"},
+ {Opt_digest_type, "digest_type=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_flag, "appraise_flag=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_algos, "appraise_algos=%s"},
@@ -1172,6 +1174,21 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
#undef MSG
}
+/*
+ * Warn if the template does not contain the given field.
+ */
+static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc *template,
+ const char *field, const char *msg)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, field))
+ return;
+
+ pr_notice_once("%s", msg);
+}
+
static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
/* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
@@ -1214,7 +1231,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
IMA_FSNAME | IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
- IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+ IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+ IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED))
return false;
break;
@@ -1292,6 +1310,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
!(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
return false;
+ /*
+ * Unlike for regular IMA 'appraise' policy rules where security.ima
+ * xattr may contain either a file hash or signature, the security.ima
+ * xattr for fsverity must contain a file signature (sigv3). Ensure
+ * that 'appraise' rules for fsverity require file signatures by
+ * checking the IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flag is set.
+ */
+ if (entry->action == APPRAISE &&
+ (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) &&
+ !(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
+ return false;
+
return true;
}
@@ -1707,16 +1737,39 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
+ case Opt_digest_type:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "digest_type", args[0].from);
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "verity")) == 0)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
case Opt_appraise_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
- if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
- entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
- else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
- strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
- entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+
+ if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) {
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ } else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
+ /* Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now */
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+ strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
- else
+ } else {
result = -EINVAL;
+ }
break;
case Opt_appraise_flag:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
@@ -1797,6 +1850,15 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
check_template_modsig(template_desc);
}
+ /* d-ngv2 template field recommended for unsigned fs-verity digests */
+ if (!result && entry->action == MEASURE &&
+ entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
+ template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template :
+ ima_template_desc_current();
+ check_template_field(template_desc, "d-ngv2",
+ "verity rules should include d-ngv2");
+ }
+
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -2149,11 +2211,15 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (entry->template)
seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
- if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=sigv3 ");
+ else if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
else
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
}
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ seq_puts(m, "digest_type=verity ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index db1ad6d7a57f..c25079faa208 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+ {.name = "ima-ngv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng"},
+ {.name = "ima-sigv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
{.name = "evm-sig",
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+ {.field_id = "d-ngv2", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init,
+ .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ngv2},
{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 7155d17a3b75..c877f01a5471 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -24,11 +24,24 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
enum data_formats {
DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+ DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
DATA_FMT_STRING,
DATA_FMT_HEX,
DATA_FMT_UINT
};
+enum digest_type {
+ DIGEST_TYPE_IMA,
+ DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY,
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST
+};
+
+#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 7 /* including NUL */
+static const char * const digest_type_name[DIGEST_TYPE__LAST] = {
+ [DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima",
+ [DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY] = "verity"
+};
+
static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
@@ -72,8 +85,9 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
u32 buflen = field_data->len;
switch (datafmt) {
+ case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
- buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':');
+ buf_ptr = strrchr(field_data->data, ':');
if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
@@ -178,6 +192,14 @@ void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
field_data);
}
+void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+ ima_show_template_field_data(m, show,
+ DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
+ field_data);
+}
+
void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
@@ -265,26 +287,35 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
}
static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
- u8 hash_algo,
+ u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
/*
* digest formats:
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
- * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
- * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
- * SHA1 or MD5
+ * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: <hash algo> + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+ * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
+ * <digest type> + ':' + <hash algo> + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+ *
+ * where 'DATA_FMT_DIGEST' is the original digest format ('d')
+ * with a hash size limitation of 20 bytes,
+ * where <digest type> is either "ima" or "verity",
+ * where <hash algo> is the hash_algo_name[] string.
*/
- u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ u8 buffer[DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 +
+ IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
u32 offset = 0;
- if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+ if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+ fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
+ offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%s:",
+ digest_type_name[digest_type],
+ hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+ } else if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
- offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%s",
- hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
- buffer[offset] = ':';
- offset += 2;
+ offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:",
+ hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
}
if (digest)
@@ -359,7 +390,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
- HASH_ALGO__LAST, field_data);
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
+ field_data);
}
/*
@@ -368,8 +400,32 @@ out:
int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
- u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = ima_hash_algo;
+ u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+
+ if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
+ goto out;
+
+ cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+ cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
+
+ hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
+out:
+ return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
+ field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
+ * prefixed with both the digest type and hash algorithm.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+ u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = ima_hash_algo;
u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+ u8 digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_IMA;
if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
goto out;
@@ -378,9 +434,12 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
+ if (event_data->iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
- hash_algo, field_data);
+ digest_type, hash_algo,
+ field_data);
}
/*
@@ -415,7 +474,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
}
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
- hash_algo, field_data);
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
+ field_data);
}
static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -475,7 +535,9 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
- if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+ if (!xattr_value ||
+ (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+ xattr_value->type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG))
return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);
return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index c71f1de95753..9f7c335f304f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 3510e413ea17..7167a6e99bdc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
+#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
+ IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_LAST
};
@@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ struct evm_xattr {
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;
-#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
+#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE
struct ima_digest_data {
u8 algo;
@@ -121,7 +123,14 @@ struct ima_max_digest_data {
} __packed;
/*
- * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ * signature header format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ *
+ * The signature_v2_hdr struct includes a signature format version
+ * to simplify defining new signature formats.
+ *
+ * signature format:
+ * version 2: regular file data hash based signature
+ * version 3: struct ima_file_id data based signature
*/
struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t type; /* xattr type */
@@ -132,6 +141,20 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t sig[]; /* signature payload */
} __packed;
+/*
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed, by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data,
+ * containing either the fsverity_descriptor struct digest or, in the
+ * future, the regular IMA file hash.
+ *
+ * (The hash of the ima_file_id structure is only of the portion used.)
+ */
+struct ima_file_id {
+ __u8 hash_type; /* xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type] */
+ __u8 hash_algorithm; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
+ __u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+} __packed;
+
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index a2464f3e66cc..8a1124e4d769 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
{
if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
return add_to_platform_keyring;
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
}
/*
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
else
return add_to_platform_keyring;
}
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
}
/*
@@ -81,5 +81,5 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
return uefi_blacklist_binary;
if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
return uefi_revocation_list_x509;
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 284558f30411..212d894a8c0c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -35,3 +35,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
#endif
+
+#ifndef UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT
+#define UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT(vendor, product) \
+ .matches = { \
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, vendor), \
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, product), \
+ },
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 5f45c3c07dbd..093894a640dc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -13,6 +14,31 @@
#include "keyring_handler.h"
/*
+ * On T2 Macs reading the db and dbx efi variables to load UEFI Secure Boot
+ * certificates causes occurrence of a page fault in Apple's firmware and
+ * a crash disabling EFI runtime services. The following quirk skips reading
+ * these variables.
+ */
+static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = {
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,2") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,3") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,4") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,2") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,3") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,4") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacMini8,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") },
+ { }
+};
+
+/*
* Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
* it does.
*
@@ -138,6 +164,13 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0;
efi_status_t status;
int rc = 0;
+ const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
+
+ dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
+ if (dmi_id) {
+ pr_err("Reading UEFI Secure Boot Certs is not supported on T2 Macs.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
return false;