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authorMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2014-11-05 15:48:36 +0300
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2015-06-16 15:18:43 +0300
commit139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 (patch)
treeb042f562de014a0376ac13b1452f1d9fbd003eb9 /security/integrity
parent45b26133b97871896b8c5241d59f4ff7839db7b2 (diff)
downloadlinux-139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7.tar.xz
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures files with the specified uid or suid. Changelog: - fixed checkpatch.pl warnings - fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c27
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f2421f7fa3c8..525301cf7d90 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
#define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
+#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -194,6 +195,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
return false;
+ if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+ if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
+ && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
+ && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
+ return false;
+ } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
+ return false;
+ }
+
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
@@ -373,7 +384,8 @@ enum {
Opt_audit,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
- Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
+ Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
+ Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
};
@@ -394,6 +406,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+ {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
@@ -566,6 +579,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_uid:
ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+ case Opt_euid:
+ if (token == Opt_euid)
+ ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -574,11 +590,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
- entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
- if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+ entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+ (uid_t) lnum);
+ if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
+ (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
result = -EINVAL;
else
- entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+ entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
+ ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
}
break;
case Opt_fowner: