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authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2018-12-12 18:10:55 +0300
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2019-01-11 04:32:53 +0300
commit3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e (patch)
tree64f75c4103e27e02a5edf203bf5f8a1a420ab1e8 /security/selinux/avc.c
parentbfeffd155283772bbe78c6a05dec7c0128ee500c (diff)
downloadlinux-3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e.tar.xz
selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
commit 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe") results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on the subsequent ref walk. Fix this by not updating the cache when performing a non-blocking permission check. This only affects search and symlink read checks during rcu walk. Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe") Reported-by: BMK <bmktuwien@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/avc.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c23
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 635e5c1e3e48..5de18a6d5c3f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ out:
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
* @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
+ * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_NONBLOCKING, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
@@ -856,6 +857,23 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
struct hlist_head *head;
spinlock_t *lock;
+ /*
+ * If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk,
+ * then we must not add permissions to a cache entry
+ * because we cannot safely audit the denial. Otherwise,
+ * during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we
+ * will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry
+ * and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in
+ * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
+ *
+ * See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
+ * logic in selinux_inode_follow_link and selinux_inode_permission
+ * for the VFS MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag, which is transliterated into
+ * AVC_NONBLOCKING for avc_has_perm_noaudit().
+ */
+ if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
+ return 0;
+
node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
if (!node) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1115,7 +1133,7 @@ decision:
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
- * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
+ * @flags: AVC_STRICT, AVC_NONBLOCKING, or 0
* @avd: access vector decisions
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
@@ -1199,7 +1217,8 @@ int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
struct av_decision avd;
int rc, rc2;
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
&avd);
rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,