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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-09-23 21:21:04 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-09-23 21:21:04 +0300
commit5825a95fe92566ada2292a65de030850b5cff1da (patch)
tree8e210a297844f6e07e0acb6ee793036a2c692976 /security
parent3c6a6910a81eae3566bb5fef6ea0f624382595e6 (diff)
parent15322a0d90b6fd62ae8f22e5b87f735c3fdfeff7 (diff)
downloadlinux-5825a95fe92566ada2292a65de030850b5cff1da.tar.xz
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify, fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks. - The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for good. - Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry for it. - Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection. - A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc) * tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: lsm: remove current_security() selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c49
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h20
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c31
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netnode.c30
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netport.c24
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c402
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c48
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h19
12 files changed, 346 insertions, 296 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 250ee2d76406..25ee5c75551f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -870,6 +870,12 @@ int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path
return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
}
+int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
+ unsigned int obj_type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
+}
+
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 74dd46de01b6..9625b99e677f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@
#include <linux/kernfs.h>
#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/fanotify.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -3275,6 +3277,50 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
return -EACCES;
}
+static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
+ unsigned int obj_type)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u32 perm;
+
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = *path;
+
+ /*
+ * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
+ * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
+ */
+ switch (obj_type) {
+ case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
+ perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
+ break;
+ case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
+ perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
+ ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+ case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
+ perm = FILE__WATCH;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
+ if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
+ perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
+
+ /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
+ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
+ perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
+
+ return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
+}
+
/*
* Copy the inode security context value to the user.
*
@@ -3403,7 +3449,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
struct kernfs_node *kn)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
int rc;
char *context;
@@ -6818,6 +6864,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 201f7e588a29..32e9b03be3dd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
"rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
- "open", "execmod"
+ "open", "execmod", "watch", "watch_mount", "watch_sb", \
+ "watch_with_perm", "watch_reads"
#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
"listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "filesystem",
{ "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
"relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
- "quotaget", NULL } },
+ "quotaget", "watch", NULL } },
{ "file",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
"execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 91c5395dd20c..586b7abd0aa7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -37,16 +37,6 @@ struct task_security_struct {
u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */
};
-/*
- * get the subjective security ID of the current task
- */
-static inline u32 current_sid(void)
-{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-
- return tsec->sid;
-}
-
enum label_initialized {
LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
@@ -185,4 +175,14 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+
+ return tsec->sid;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index 9cb83eeee1d9..e40fecd73752 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
*/
static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
struct sel_netif *netif;
- struct sel_netif *new = NULL;
+ struct sel_netif *new;
struct net_device *dev;
/* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't
@@ -151,32 +151,27 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
if (netif != NULL) {
*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
- ret = 0;
goto out;
}
- new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (new == NULL) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
- if (ret != 0)
- goto out;
- new->nsec.ns = ns;
- new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
- ret = sel_netif_insert(new);
+
+ ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, sid);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
- *sid = new->nsec.sid;
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (new) {
+ new->nsec.ns = ns;
+ new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
+ new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+ if (sel_netif_insert(new))
+ kfree(new);
+ }
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
dev_put(dev);
- if (unlikely(ret)) {
+ if (unlikely(ret))
pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n",
__func__, ifindex);
- kfree(new);
- }
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index cae1fcaffd1a..9ab84efa46c7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
*/
static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
{
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ int ret;
struct sel_netnode *node;
- struct sel_netnode *new = NULL;
+ struct sel_netnode *new;
spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
@@ -200,38 +200,36 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
return 0;
}
+
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (new == NULL)
- goto out;
switch (family) {
case PF_INET:
ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET,
addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
- new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
+ if (new)
+ new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
break;
case PF_INET6:
ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET6,
addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
- new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
+ if (new)
+ new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
break;
default:
BUG();
ret = -EINVAL;
}
- if (ret != 0)
- goto out;
-
- new->nsec.family = family;
- new->nsec.sid = *sid;
- sel_netnode_insert(new);
+ if (ret == 0 && new) {
+ new->nsec.family = family;
+ new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+ sel_netnode_insert(new);
+ } else
+ kfree(new);
-out:
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
- if (unlikely(ret)) {
+ if (unlikely(ret))
pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network node label\n",
__func__);
- kfree(new);
- }
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index 364b6d5b8968..3f8b2c0458c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -137,9 +137,9 @@ static void sel_netport_insert(struct sel_netport *port)
*/
static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
{
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ int ret;
struct sel_netport *port;
- struct sel_netport *new = NULL;
+ struct sel_netport *new;
spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
@@ -148,25 +148,23 @@ static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
return 0;
}
- new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (new == NULL)
- goto out;
+
ret = security_port_sid(&selinux_state, protocol, pnum, sid);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
-
- new->psec.port = pnum;
- new->psec.protocol = protocol;
- new->psec.sid = *sid;
- sel_netport_insert(new);
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (new) {
+ new->psec.port = pnum;
+ new->psec.protocol = protocol;
+ new->psec.sid = *sid;
+ sel_netport_insert(new);
+ }
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
- if (unlikely(ret)) {
+ if (unlikely(ret))
pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network port label\n",
__func__);
- kfree(new);
- }
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index f8efaa9f647c..1260f5fb766e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -177,6 +177,195 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
}
/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ comdatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
+{
+ if (expr) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
+ if (expr->type_names) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
+ kfree(expr->type_names);
+ }
+ kfree(expr);
+ }
+}
+
+static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ cladatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
+ constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+
+ constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+ kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ role = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ levdatum = datum;
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ kfree(levdatum->level);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+ common_destroy,
+ cls_destroy,
+ role_destroy,
+ type_destroy,
+ user_destroy,
+ cond_destroy_bool,
+ sens_destroy,
+ cat_destroy,
+};
+
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+
+ kfree(ft->name);
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ cond_resched();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct mls_range *rt = datum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
+ kfree(datum);
+ cond_resched();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
+{
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+
+ context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+ context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+ if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
+ i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+ kfree(c->u.name);
+ kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
* Initialize the role table.
*/
static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
@@ -250,6 +439,7 @@ static int filenametr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
{
const struct range_trans *key = k;
+
return (key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
(key->target_class << 5)) & (h->size - 1);
}
@@ -272,8 +462,6 @@ static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
return v;
}
-static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
-
/*
* Initialize a policy database structure.
*/
@@ -301,7 +489,8 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
if (rc)
goto out;
- p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
+ p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp,
+ (1 << 10));
if (!p->filename_trans) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -399,7 +588,7 @@ static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
|| typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][typdatum->value - 1] = key;
- p->type_val_to_struct_array[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
+ p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
}
return 0;
@@ -477,9 +666,9 @@ static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
struct hashtab_info info;
hashtab_stat(h, &info);
- pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
- "longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel,
- info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n",
+ hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size,
+ info.max_chain_len);
}
static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
@@ -541,10 +730,10 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
return -ENOMEM;
- p->type_val_to_struct_array = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
- sizeof(*p->type_val_to_struct_array),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->type_val_to_struct_array)
+ p->type_val_to_struct = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->type_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->type_val_to_struct)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = cond_init_bool_indexes(p);
@@ -568,193 +757,6 @@ out:
}
/*
- * The following *_destroy functions are used to
- * free any memory allocated for each kind of
- * symbol data in the policy database.
- */
-
-static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- kfree(key);
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct common_datum *comdatum;
-
- kfree(key);
- if (datum) {
- comdatum = datum;
- hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
- hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
- }
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
-{
- if (expr) {
- ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
- if (expr->type_names) {
- ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
- ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
- kfree(expr->type_names);
- }
- kfree(expr);
- }
-}
-
-static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct class_datum *cladatum;
- struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
- struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
-
- kfree(key);
- if (datum) {
- cladatum = datum;
- hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
- hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
- constraint = cladatum->constraints;
- while (constraint) {
- e = constraint->expr;
- while (e) {
- etmp = e;
- e = e->next;
- constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
- }
- ctemp = constraint;
- constraint = constraint->next;
- kfree(ctemp);
- }
-
- constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
- while (constraint) {
- e = constraint->expr;
- while (e) {
- etmp = e;
- e = e->next;
- constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
- }
- ctemp = constraint;
- constraint = constraint->next;
- kfree(ctemp);
- }
- kfree(cladatum->comkey);
- }
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct role_datum *role;
-
- kfree(key);
- if (datum) {
- role = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
- ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
- }
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- kfree(key);
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct user_datum *usrdatum;
-
- kfree(key);
- if (datum) {
- usrdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
- }
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct level_datum *levdatum;
-
- kfree(key);
- if (datum) {
- levdatum = datum;
- if (levdatum->level)
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
- kfree(levdatum->level);
- }
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- kfree(key);
- kfree(datum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
-{
- common_destroy,
- cls_destroy,
- role_destroy,
- type_destroy,
- user_destroy,
- cond_destroy_bool,
- sens_destroy,
- cat_destroy,
-};
-
-static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct filename_trans *ft = key;
- kfree(ft->name);
- kfree(key);
- kfree(datum);
- cond_resched();
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct mls_range *rt = datum;
- kfree(key);
- ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
- ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
- kfree(datum);
- cond_resched();
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
-{
- if (!c)
- return;
-
- context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
- context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
- if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
- i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
- kfree(c->u.name);
- kfree(c);
-}
-
-/*
* Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
*/
void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
@@ -777,7 +779,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
- kvfree(p->type_val_to_struct_array);
+ kvfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
@@ -1722,7 +1724,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
return -EINVAL;
}
- upper = p->type_val_to_struct_array[upper->bounds - 1];
+ upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
BUG_ON(!upper);
if (upper->attribute) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index fcc6366b447f..162d0e79b85b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ struct policydb {
struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
- struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct_array;
+ struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
struct avtab te_avtab;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index d61563a3695e..3a29e7c24ba9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -542,13 +542,13 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
struct type_datum *target;
u32 masked = 0;
- source = policydb->type_val_to_struct_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ source = policydb->type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
BUG_ON(!source);
if (!source->bounds)
return;
- target = policydb->type_val_to_struct_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ target = policydb->type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
BUG_ON(!target);
memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
index = new_context->type;
while (true) {
- type = policydb->type_val_to_struct_array[index - 1];
+ type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
BUG_ON(!type);
/* not bounded anymore */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 1f0a6eaa2d6a..7d49994e8d5f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "sidtab.h"
@@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
+ /* max count is SIDTAB_MAX so valid index is always < SIDTAB_MAX */
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++)
- atomic_set(&s->rcache[i], -1);
+ s->rcache[i] = SIDTAB_MAX;
for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
s->isids[i].set = 0;
- atomic_set(&s->count, 0);
-
+ s->count = 0;
s->convert = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
@@ -130,14 +130,12 @@ static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)
static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
{
- u32 count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+ /* read entries only after reading count */
+ u32 count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
if (index >= count)
return NULL;
- /* read entries after reading count */
- smp_rmb();
-
return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
}
@@ -210,10 +208,10 @@ static int sidtab_find_context(union sidtab_entry_inner entry,
static void sidtab_rcache_update(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, u32 pos)
{
while (pos > 0) {
- atomic_set(&s->rcache[pos], atomic_read(&s->rcache[pos - 1]));
+ WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[pos], READ_ONCE(s->rcache[pos - 1]));
--pos;
}
- atomic_set(&s->rcache[0], (int)index);
+ WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[0], index);
}
static void sidtab_rcache_push(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
@@ -227,14 +225,14 @@ static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++) {
- int v = atomic_read(&s->rcache[i]);
+ u32 v = READ_ONCE(s->rcache[i]);
- if (v < 0)
+ if (v >= SIDTAB_MAX)
continue;
- if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, (u32)v, 0), context)) {
- sidtab_rcache_update(s, (u32)v, i);
- *index = (u32)v;
+ if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, v, 0), context)) {
+ sidtab_rcache_update(s, v, i);
+ *index = v;
return 0;
}
}
@@ -245,8 +243,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
u32 *index)
{
unsigned long flags;
- u32 count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
- u32 count_locked, level, pos;
+ u32 count, count_locked, level, pos;
struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
struct context *dst, *dst_convert;
int rc;
@@ -255,11 +252,10 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
+ /* read entries only after reading count */
+ count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
- /* read entries after reading count */
- smp_rmb();
-
pos = 0;
rc = sidtab_find_context(s->roots[level], &pos, count, level,
context, index);
@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
convert = s->convert;
- count_locked = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+ count_locked = s->count;
level = sidtab_level_from_count(count_locked);
/* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */
@@ -320,7 +316,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
}
/* at this point we know the insert won't fail */
- atomic_set(&convert->target->count, count + 1);
+ convert->target->count = count + 1;
}
if (context->len)
@@ -331,9 +327,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
*index = count;
/* write entries before writing new count */
- smp_wmb();
-
- atomic_set(&s->count, count + 1);
+ smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
rc = 0;
out_unlock:
@@ -423,7 +417,7 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
return -EBUSY;
}
- count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+ count = s->count;
level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
/* allocate last leaf in the new sidtab (to avoid race with
@@ -436,7 +430,7 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
}
/* set count in case no new entries are added during conversion */
- atomic_set(&params->target->count, count);
+ params->target->count = count;
/* enable live convert of new entries */
s->convert = params;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index bbd5c0d1f3bd..1f4763141aa1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ union sidtab_entry_inner {
#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry_leaf))
-#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 31 /* limited to INT_MAX due to atomic_t range */
-#define SIDTAB_MAX (((u32)1 << SIDTAB_MAX_BITS) - 1)
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32
+#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX
/* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL \
DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
@@ -69,13 +69,22 @@ struct sidtab_convert_params {
#define SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE 3
struct sidtab {
+ /*
+ * lock-free read access only for as many items as a prior read of
+ * 'count'
+ */
union sidtab_entry_inner roots[SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
- atomic_t count;
+ /*
+ * access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE(); only increment under
+ * spinlock
+ */
+ u32 count;
+ /* access only under spinlock */
struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
spinlock_t lock;
- /* reverse lookup cache */
- atomic_t rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
+ /* reverse lookup cache - access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() */
+ u32 rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
/* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];