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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-06-28 03:32:34 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-06-28 03:32:34 +0300
commitb4c7f2e6ef40f545054a902e4708ed908d562318 (patch)
tree82ad82b80202a45488d8c0bdd44e924d1d0b7f83 /security
parent21953eb16c2a6ebc039126d63acf84b286a58a02 (diff)
parent95526d13038c2bbddd567a4d8e39fac42484e182 (diff)
downloadlinux-b4c7f2e6ef40f545054a902e4708ed908d562318.tar.xz
Merge tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: "An i_version change, one bug fix, and three kernel doc fixes: - instead of IMA detecting file change by directly accesssing i_version, it now calls vfs_getattr_nosec(). - fix a race condition when inserting a new node in the iint rb-tree" * tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Fix build warnings evm: Fix build warnings evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr() integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get() IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c12
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c3
7 files changed, 32 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 033804f5a5f2..0dae649f3740 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
/**
* evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
* @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
- * @size: length of the key data
+ * @keylen: length of the key data
*
* This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
* without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cf24c5255583..c9b6e2a43478 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -318,7 +318,6 @@ int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name)
/**
* evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values
* @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs
- * @inode: inode of the read xattrs
* @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to
* @buffer_size: size of buffer
* @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values
@@ -390,6 +389,7 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
* @xattr_name: requested xattr
* @xattr_value: requested xattr value
* @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ * @iint: inode integrity metadata
*
* Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
* security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
@@ -795,7 +795,9 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
/**
* evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes
*
* Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
* except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index c73858e8c6d5..a462df827de2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -43,12 +43,10 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
else if (inode > iint->inode)
n = n->rb_right;
else
- break;
+ return iint;
}
- if (!n)
- return NULL;
- return iint;
+ return NULL;
}
/*
@@ -113,10 +111,15 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
parent = *p;
test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
rb_node);
- if (inode < test_iint->inode)
+ if (inode < test_iint->inode) {
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
- else
+ } else if (inode > test_iint->inode) {
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+ } else {
+ write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
+ return test_iint;
+ }
}
iint->inode = inode;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index ce541b0ee1d3..452e80b541e5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -246,10 +245,11 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct kstat stat;
int result = 0;
int length;
void *tmpbuf;
- u64 i_version;
+ u64 i_version = 0;
/*
* Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
@@ -268,7 +268,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
* to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to
* assume the file changed.
*/
- i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
+ result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
+ AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
+ if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
+ i_version = stat.change_cookie;
hash.hdr.algo = algo;
hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index d66a0a36415e..365db0e43d7c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -164,11 +163,16 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+ struct kstat stat;
+
update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
&iint->atomic_flags);
- if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
- !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
- (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
+ if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) ||
+ vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
+ STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
+ AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
+ !(stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ||
+ stat.change_cookie != iint->version) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
if (update)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index fb25723c65bc..3e7bee30080f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
/**
* ima_collect_modsig - Calculate the file hash without the appended signature.
+ * @modsig: parsed module signature
+ * @buf: data to verify the signature on
+ * @size: data size
*
* Since the modsig is part of the file contents, the hash used in its signature
* isn't the same one ordinarily calculated by IMA. Therefore PKCS7 code
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3ca8b7348c2e..c9b3bd8f1bb9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -1915,7 +1916,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
/**
* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
- * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
+ * @rule: ima measurement policy rule
*
* Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
* Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure