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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-03-11 03:32:04 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-03-11 03:32:04 +0300
commitc3665a6be5de16cf6670a00003642114c44d8a70 (patch)
tree118ea5fd3cca09eeac0d7dc550915d0e338e4dfe /security
parent12ad143e1b803e541e48b8ba40f550250259ecdd (diff)
parent2e884fc9759d8816630d3c30694721a39b7396e0 (diff)
downloadlinux-c3665a6be5de16cf6670a00003642114c44d8a70.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "Mimi Zohar says: 'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for verifying the PE kernel image signature. Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated. The remaining patches are cleanup'" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr' encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c35
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c4
5 files changed, 40 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index f45d6edecf99..e19c2eb72c51 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
+ set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
}
return err;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 43e2dc3a60d0..c37d08118af5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
- crypto_shash_update(desc, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid.b[0],
- sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
+ crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 5ecaa3d6fe0b..b6d9f14bc234 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -563,7 +563,6 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
{
int error;
struct list_head *pos, *q;
- struct xattr_list *xattr;
evm_init_config();
@@ -580,11 +579,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
error:
if (error != 0) {
if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
- list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) {
- xattr = list_entry(pos, struct xattr_list,
- list);
+ list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames)
list_del(pos);
- }
}
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 4ffac4f5c647..357edd140c09 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -397,6 +397,33 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
/**
+ * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
+ * @file : newly created tmpfile
+ *
+ * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
+ * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
+ * tmpfiles are in policy.
+ */
+void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ int must_appraise;
+
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
+ if (!must_appraise)
+ return;
+
+ /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
+ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
+
+ /* needed for writing the security xattrs */
+ set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+}
+
+/**
* ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
* @dentry: newly created dentry
*
@@ -413,9 +440,13 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
if (!must_appraise)
return;
+ /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
- if (iint)
- iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
+
+ /* needed for re-opening empty files */
+ iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 389a298274d3..347108f660a1 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ static int blksize;
static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
enum {
- Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
+ Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_err
};
enum {
- Opt_error = -1, Opt_default, Opt_ecryptfs, Opt_enc32
+ Opt_default, Opt_ecryptfs, Opt_enc32, Opt_error
};
static const match_table_t key_format_tokens = {