diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 252 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 1286 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 19 |
18 files changed, 1679 insertions, 81 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c index c9bf2c219841..f0d0c044731c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ struct agp_bridge_driver alpha_core_agp_driver = { struct agp_bridge_data *alpha_bridge; -int __init +static int __init alpha_core_agp_setup(void) { alpha_agp_info *agp = alpha_mv.agp_info(); diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c index a3bbdd6e60fc..f5c71a617a99 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_show(struct device *dev, if (IS_ERR(rng)) return PTR_ERR(rng); - ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", rng ? rng->name : "none"); + ret = sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rng ? rng->name : "none"); put_rng(rng); return ret; diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c index 07ec000e4cd7..94ee18a1120a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void mxc_rnga_cleanup(struct hwrng *rng) __raw_writel(ctrl & ~RNGA_CONTROL_GO, mxc_rng->mem + RNGA_CONTROL); } -static int __init mxc_rnga_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +static int mxc_rnga_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { int err; struct mxc_rng *mxc_rng; @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ err_ioremap: return err; } -static void __exit mxc_rnga_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +static void mxc_rnga_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct mxc_rng *mxc_rng = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); @@ -197,10 +197,11 @@ static struct platform_driver mxc_rnga_driver = { .name = "mxc_rnga", .of_match_table = mxc_rnga_of_match, }, - .remove_new = __exit_p(mxc_rnga_remove), + .probe = mxc_rnga_probe, + .remove_new = mxc_rnga_remove, }; -module_platform_driver_probe(mxc_rnga_driver, mxc_rnga_probe); +module_platform_driver(mxc_rnga_driver); MODULE_AUTHOR("Freescale Semiconductor, Inc."); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("H/W RNGA driver for i.MX"); diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c index 379bc245c520..0e903d6e22e3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c @@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) if (err && i > RNG_NB_RECOVER_TRIES) { dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv, "Couldn't recover from seed error\n"); - return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; + retval = -ENOTRECOVERABLE; + goto exit_rpm; } continue; @@ -238,7 +239,8 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) if (err && i > RNG_NB_RECOVER_TRIES) { dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv, "Couldn't recover from seed error"); - return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; + retval = -ENOTRECOVERABLE; + goto exit_rpm; } continue; @@ -250,6 +252,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) max -= sizeof(u32); } +exit_rpm: pm_runtime_mark_last_busy((struct device *) priv->rng.priv); pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend((struct device *) priv->rng.priv); @@ -353,13 +356,15 @@ static int stm32_rng_init(struct hwrng *rng) err = readl_relaxed_poll_timeout_atomic(priv->base + RNG_SR, reg, reg & RNG_SR_DRDY, 10, 100000); - if (err | (reg & ~RNG_SR_DRDY)) { + if (err || (reg & ~RNG_SR_DRDY)) { clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); dev_err((struct device *)priv->rng.priv, "%s: timeout:%x SR: %x!\n", __func__, err, reg); return -EINVAL; } + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); + return 0; } @@ -384,6 +389,11 @@ static int __maybe_unused stm32_rng_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) static int __maybe_unused stm32_rng_suspend(struct device *dev) { struct stm32_rng_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + int err; + + err = clk_prepare_enable(priv->clk); + if (err) + return err; if (priv->data->has_cond_reset) { priv->pm_conf.nscr = readl_relaxed(priv->base + RNG_NSCR); @@ -465,6 +475,8 @@ static int __maybe_unused stm32_rng_resume(struct device *dev) writel_relaxed(reg, priv->base + RNG_CR); } + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); + return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { - static struct execute_work set_ready; + static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready); unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; @@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ - if (static_key_initialized) - execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); + if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq) + queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready); atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); @@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void) /* * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels - * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where - * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. + * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static + * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized. */ if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY) crng_set_ready(NULL); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 927088b2c3d3..e63a6a17793c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -27,6 +27,20 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM if TCG_TPM +config TCG_TPM2_HMAC + bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus" + default y + select CRYPTO_ECDH + select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 + help + Setting this causes us to deploy a scheme which uses request + and response HMACs in addition to encryption for + communicating with the TPM to prevent or detect bus snooping + and interposer attacks (see tpm-security.rst). Saying Y + here adds some encryption overhead to all kernel to TPM + transactions. + config HW_RANDOM_TPM bool "TPM HW Random Number Generator support" depends on TCG_TPM && HW_RANDOM && !(TCG_TPM=y && HW_RANDOM=m) @@ -149,6 +163,7 @@ config TCG_NSC config TCG_ATMEL tristate "Atmel TPM Interface" depends on PPC64 || HAS_IOPORT_MAP + depends on HAS_IOPORT help If you have a TPM security chip from Atmel say Yes and it will be accessible from within Linux. To compile this driver @@ -156,7 +171,7 @@ config TCG_ATMEL config TCG_INFINEON tristate "Infineon Technologies TPM Interface" - depends on PNP + depends on PNP || COMPILE_TEST help If you have a TPM security chip from Infineon Technologies (either SLD 9630 TT 1.1 or SLB 9635 TT 1.2) say Yes and it diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 0222b1ddb310..4c695b0388f3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ tpm-y += tpm-sysfs.o tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o +tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c index bd757d836c5c..69533d0bfb51 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c @@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len; - ret = -EIO; virt = acpi_os_map_iomem(start, len); if (!virt) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: Failed to map ACPI memory\n", __func__); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..647c6ca92ac3 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Handling of TPM command and other buffers. + */ + +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> + +/** + * tpm_buf_init() - Allocate and initialize a TPM command + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS + * @ordinal: A command ordinal + * + * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM + */ +int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf->data) + return -ENOMEM; + + tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init); + +/** + * tpm_buf_reset() - Initialize a TPM command + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS + * @ordinal: A command ordinal + */ +void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + WARN_ON(tag != TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND && tag != TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS && + tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS && tag != 0); + + buf->flags = 0; + buf->length = sizeof(*head); + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); + head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); + buf->handles = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset); + +/** + * tpm_buf_init_sized() - Allocate and initialize a sized (TPM2B) buffer + * @buf: A @tpm_buf + * + * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM + */ +int tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf->data) + return -ENOMEM; + + tpm_buf_reset_sized(buf); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init_sized); + +/** + * tpm_buf_reset_sized() - Initialize a sized buffer + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + */ +void tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B; + buf->length = 2; + buf->data[0] = 0; + buf->data[1] = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset_sized); + +void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + free_page((unsigned long)buf->data); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy); + +/** + * tpm_buf_length() - Return the number of bytes consumed by the data + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * + * Return: The number of bytes consumed by the buffer + */ +u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + return buf->length; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); + +/** + * tpm_buf_append() - Append data to an initialized buffer + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * @new_data: A data blob + * @new_length: Size of the appended data + */ +void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length) +{ + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + return; + + if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + return; + } + + memcpy(&buf->data[buf->length], new_data, new_length); + buf->length += new_length; + + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) + ((__be16 *)buf->data)[0] = cpu_to_be16(buf->length - 2); + else + ((struct tpm_header *)buf->data)->length = cpu_to_be32(buf->length); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append); + +void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) +{ + tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u8); + +void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) +{ + __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *)&value2, 2); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u16); + +void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) +{ + __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *)&value2, 4); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32); + +/** + * tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * @count: the number of bytes to read + * @output: the output buffer + */ +static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void *output) +{ + off_t next_offset; + + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + return; + + next_offset = *offset + count; + if (next_offset > buf->length) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + return; + } + + memcpy(output, &buf->data[*offset], count); + *offset = next_offset; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_read_u8() - Read 8-bit word from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * + * Return: next 8-bit word + */ +u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset) +{ + u8 value; + + tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value); + + return value; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u8); + +/** + * tpm_buf_read_u16() - Read 16-bit word from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * + * Return: next 16-bit word + */ +u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset) +{ + u16 value; + + tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value); + + return be16_to_cpu(value); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u16); + +/** + * tpm_buf_read_u32() - Read 32-bit word from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * + * Return: next 32-bit word + */ +u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset) +{ + u32 value; + + tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value); + + return be32_to_cpu(value); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u32); + +static u16 tpm_buf_tag(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + return be16_to_cpu(head->tag); +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_parameters - return the TPM response parameters area of the tpm_buf + * @buf: tpm_buf to use + * + * Where the parameters are located depends on the tag of a TPM + * command (it's immediately after the header for TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS + * or 4 bytes after for TPM_ST_SESSIONS). Evaluate this and return a + * pointer to the first byte of the parameters area. + * + * @return: pointer to parameters area + */ +u8 *tpm_buf_parameters(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + int offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + if (tpm_buf_tag(buf) == TPM2_ST_SESSIONS) + offset += 4; + + return &buf->data[offset]; +} diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 42b1062e33cd..854546000c92 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) { int rc = -EIO; + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE) + return rc; + get_device(&chip->dev); down_read(&chip->ops_sem); @@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); kfree(chip->allocated_banks); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + kfree(chip->auth); +#endif kfree(chip); } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 757336324c90..5da134f12c9a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, if (len < min_rsp_body_length + TPM_HEADER_SIZE) return -EFAULT; + buf->length = len; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_transmit_cmd); @@ -342,31 +343,6 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend); -/** - * tpm_send - send a TPM command - * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip - * @cmd: a TPM command buffer - * @buflen: the length of the TPM command buffer - * - * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() - */ -int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); - if (!chip) - return -ENODEV; - - buf.data = cmd; - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to a send a command"); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send); - int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) { int rc; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c index 54c71473aa29..94231f052ea7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c @@ -309,6 +309,21 @@ static ssize_t tpm_version_major_show(struct device *dev, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tpm_version_major); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); + int size = TPM2_NAME_SIZE; + + bin2hex(buf, chip->null_key_name, size); + size *= 2; + buf[size++] = '\n'; + return size; +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(null_name); +#endif + static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_pubek.attr, &dev_attr_pcrs.attr, @@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = { static struct attribute *tpm2_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_tpm_version_major.attr, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + &dev_attr_null_name.attr, +#endif NULL }; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 61445f1dc46d..6b8b9956ba69 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -312,9 +312,23 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, void *buf, size_t *bufsiz); int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip); +int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf, + unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset); +int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, + unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle); void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm_dev_common_init(void); void tpm_dev_common_exit(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip); +#else +static inline int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 93545be190a5..0cdf892ec2a7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -216,13 +216,6 @@ out: return rc; } -struct tpm2_null_auth_area { - __be32 handle; - __be16 nonce_size; - u8 attributes; - __be16 auth_size; -} __packed; - /** * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value * @@ -236,24 +229,22 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests) { struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; int rc; int i; - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); + rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip); if (rc) return rc; - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx); + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } - auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); - auth_area.nonce_size = 0; - auth_area.attributes = 0; - auth_area.auth_size = 0; + tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area, - sizeof(auth_area)); tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks); for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) { @@ -262,7 +253,9 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -299,25 +292,35 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA) return -EINVAL; - err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0); + err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip); if (err) return err; + err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0); + if (err) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return err; + } + do { - tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT + | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), "attempting get random"); + err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, err); if (err) { if (err > 0) err = -EIO; goto out; } - out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *) - &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)tpm_buf_parameters(&buf); recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes); if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + @@ -334,9 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) } while (retries-- && total < max); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return total ? total : -EIO; out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); return err; } @@ -759,6 +765,11 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = 0; } + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = tpm2_sessions_init(chip); + out: /* * Infineon TPM in field upgrade mode will return no data for the number diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ea8860661876 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -0,0 +1,1286 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + * + * Cryptographic helper routines for handling TPM2 sessions for + * authorization HMAC and request response encryption. + * + * The idea is to ensure that every TPM command is HMAC protected by a + * session, meaning in-flight tampering would be detected and in + * addition all sensitive inputs and responses should be encrypted. + * + * The basic way this works is to use a TPM feature called salted + * sessions where a random secret used in session construction is + * encrypted to the public part of a known TPM key. The problem is we + * have no known keys, so initially a primary Elliptic Curve key is + * derived from the NULL seed (we use EC because most TPMs generate + * these keys much faster than RSA ones). The curve used is NIST_P256 + * because that's now mandated to be present in 'TCG TPM v2.0 + * Provisioning Guidance' + * + * Threat problems: the initial TPM2_CreatePrimary is not (and cannot + * be) session protected, so a clever Man in the Middle could return a + * public key they control to this command and from there intercept + * and decode all subsequent session based transactions. The kernel + * cannot mitigate this threat but, after boot, userspace can get + * proof this has not happened by asking the TPM to certify the NULL + * key. This certification would chain back to the TPM Endorsement + * Certificate and prove the NULL seed primary had not been tampered + * with and thus all sessions must have been cryptographically secure. + * To assist with this, the initial NULL seed public key name is made + * available in a sysfs file. + * + * Use of these functions: + * + * The design is all the crypto, hash and hmac gunk is confined in this + * file and never needs to be seen even by the kernel internal user. To + * the user there's an init function tpm2_sessions_init() that needs to + * be called once per TPM which generates the NULL seed primary key. + * + * These are the usage functions: + * + * tpm2_start_auth_session() which allocates the opaque auth structure + * and gets a session from the TPM. This must be called before + * any of the following functions. The session is protected by a + * session_key which is derived from a random salt value + * encrypted to the NULL seed. + * tpm2_end_auth_session() kills the session and frees the resources. + * Under normal operation this function is done by + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on + * error legs where the latter is not executed. + * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer. This must be + * used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding + * handles because handles have to be processed specially when + * calculating the HMAC. In particular, for NV, volatile and + * permanent objects you now need to provide the name. + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() which appends the hmac session to the + * buf in the same way tpm_buf_append_auth does(). + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() This calculates the correct hash and + * places it in the buffer. It must be called after the complete + * command buffer is finalized so it can fill in the correct HMAC + * based on the parameters. + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() which checks the session response in + * the buffer and calculates what it should be. If there's a + * mismatch it will log a warning and return an error. If + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() did not specify + * TPM_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION then the session will be closed (if it + * hasn't been consumed) and the auth structure freed. + */ + +#include "tpm.h" +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <crypto/kpp.h> +#include <crypto/ecdh.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hmac.h> + +/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */ +#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3 + +static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, + u32 *handle, u8 *name); + +/* + * This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like + * session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is + * designed to be opaque to anything outside. + */ +struct tpm2_auth { + u32 handle; + /* + * This has two meanings: before tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() + * it marks the offset in the buffer of the start of the + * sessions (i.e. after all the handles). Once the buffer has + * been filled it markes the session number of our auth + * session so we can find it again in the response buffer. + * + * The two cases are distinguished because the first offset + * must always be greater than TPM_HEADER_SIZE and the second + * must be less than or equal to 5. + */ + u32 session; + /* + * the size here is variable and set by the size of our_nonce + * which must be between 16 and the name hash length. we set + * the maximum sha256 size for the greatest protection + */ + u8 our_nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 tpm_nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + /* + * the salt is only used across the session command/response + * after that it can be used as a scratch area + */ + union { + u8 salt[EC_PT_SZ]; + /* scratch for key + IV */ + u8 scratch[AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + }; + /* + * the session key and passphrase are the same size as the + * name digest (sha256 again). The session key is constant + * for the use of the session and the passphrase can change + * with every invocation. + * + * Note: these fields must be adjacent and in this order + * because several HMAC/KDF schemes use the combination of the + * session_key and passphrase. + */ + u8 session_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 passphrase[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int passphrase_len; + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx; + /* saved session attributes: */ + u8 attrs; + __be32 ordinal; + + /* + * memory for three authorization handles. We know them by + * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which + * we must compute and remember + */ + u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES]; + u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +}; + +/* + * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) + */ +static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +{ + static u8 size_map[] = { + [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, + [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, + }; + u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + return size_map[alg] + 2; +} + +/* + * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume + * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key + * on every operation, so we weld the hmac init and final functions in + * here to give it the same usage characteristics as a regular hash + */ +static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len) +{ + u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int i; + + sha256_init(sctx); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) { + if (i < key_len) + pad[i] = key[i]; + else + pad[i] = 0; + pad[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VALUE; + } + sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad)); +} + +static void tpm2_hmac_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len, + u8 *out) +{ + u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) { + if (i < key_len) + pad[i] = key[i]; + else + pad[i] = 0; + pad[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VALUE; + } + + /* collect the final hash; use out as temporary storage */ + sha256_final(sctx, out); + + sha256_init(sctx); + sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad)); + sha256_update(sctx, out, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + sha256_final(sctx, out); +} + +/* + * assume hash sha256 and nonces u, v of size SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE but + * otherwise standard tpm2_KDFa. Note output is in bytes not bits. + */ +static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u, + u8 *v, u32 bytes, u8 *out) +{ + u32 counter = 1; + const __be32 bits = cpu_to_be32(bytes * 8); + + while (bytes > 0) { + struct sha256_state sctx; + __be32 c = cpu_to_be32(counter); + + tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, key, key_len); + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c)); + sha256_update(&sctx, label, strlen(label)+1); + sha256_update(&sctx, u, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + sha256_update(&sctx, v, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits)); + tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, key, key_len, out); + + bytes -= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + counter++; + out += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + } +} + +/* + * Somewhat of a bastardization of the real KDFe. We're assuming + * we're working with known point sizes for the input parameters and + * the hash algorithm is fixed at sha256. Because we know that the + * point size is 32 bytes like the hash size, there's no need to loop + * in this KDF. + */ +static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, + u8 *out) +{ + struct sha256_state sctx; + /* + * this should be an iterative counter, but because we know + * we're only taking 32 bytes for the point using a sha256 + * hash which is also 32 bytes, there's only one loop + */ + __be32 c = cpu_to_be32(1); + + sha256_init(&sctx); + /* counter (BE) */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c)); + /* secret value */ + sha256_update(&sctx, z, EC_PT_SZ); + /* string including trailing zero */ + sha256_update(&sctx, str, strlen(str)+1); + sha256_update(&sctx, pt_u, EC_PT_SZ); + sha256_update(&sctx, pt_v, EC_PT_SZ); + sha256_final(&sctx, out); +} + +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + struct crypto_kpp *kpp; + struct kpp_request *req; + struct scatterlist s[2], d[1]; + struct ecdh p = {0}; + u8 encoded_key[EC_PT_SZ], *x, *y; + unsigned int buf_len; + + /* secret is two sized points */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, (EC_PT_SZ + 2)*2); + /* + * we cheat here and append uninitialized data to form + * the points. All we care about is getting the two + * co-ordinate pointers, which will be used to overwrite + * the uninitialized data + */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, EC_PT_SZ); + x = &buf->data[tpm_buf_length(buf)]; + tpm_buf_append(buf, encoded_key, EC_PT_SZ); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, EC_PT_SZ); + y = &buf->data[tpm_buf_length(buf)]; + tpm_buf_append(buf, encoded_key, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_table(s, 2); + sg_set_buf(&s[0], x, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_set_buf(&s[1], y, EC_PT_SZ); + + kpp = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(kpp)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "crypto ecdh allocation failed\n"); + return; + } + + buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p); + if (sizeof(encoded_key) < buf_len) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "salt buffer too small needs %d\n", + buf_len); + goto out; + } + crypto_ecdh_encode_key(encoded_key, buf_len, &p); + /* this generates a random private key */ + crypto_kpp_set_secret(kpp, encoded_key, buf_len); + + /* salt is now the public point of this private key */ + req = kpp_request_alloc(kpp, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + goto out; + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0); + kpp_request_set_output(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); + crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req); + /* + * we're not done: now we have to compute the shared secret + * which is our private key multiplied by the tpm_key public + * point, we actually only take the x point and discard the y + * point and feed it through KDFe to get the final secret salt + */ + sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); + kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); + sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); + crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); + kpp_request_free(req); + + /* + * pass the shared secret through KDFe for salt. Note salt + * area is used both for input shared secret and output salt. + * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it + * writes the salt + */ + tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, + chip->auth->salt); + + out: + crypto_free_kpp(kpp); +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 len; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 + && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + +/** + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * + * This command must not be called until all of the parameters have + * been appended to @buf otherwise the computed HMAC will be + * incorrect. + * + * This function computes and fills in the session HMAC using the + * session key and, if TPM2_SA_DECRYPT was specified, computes the + * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command + * buffer with it. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + u32 cc, handles, val; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int i; + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_p; + u8 *hmac = NULL; + u32 attrs; + u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sha256_state sctx; + + /* save the command code in BE format */ + auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; + + cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal); + + i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); + if (i < 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); + return; + } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; + + handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); + + /* + * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes. This + * would happen if someone added a handle via + * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name() + */ + for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) { + u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + + if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", + i); + return; + } + } + /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + /* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */ + offset_p = offset_s + val; + for (i = 1; offset_s < offset_p; i++) { + u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + u16 len; + u8 a; + + /* nonce (already in auth) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + offset_s += len; + + a = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s); + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + if (handle == auth->handle && auth->attrs == a) { + hmac = &buf->data[offset_s]; + /* + * save our session number so we know which + * session in the response belongs to us + */ + auth->session = i; + } + + offset_s += len; + } + if (offset_s != offset_p) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); + return; + } + if (!hmac) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); + return; + } + + /* encrypt before HMAC */ + if (auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_DECRYPT) { + u16 len; + + /* need key and IV */ + tpm2_KDFa(auth->session_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + + auth->passphrase_len, "CFB", auth->our_nonce, + auth->tpm_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + auth->scratch); + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p); + aes_expandkey(&auth->aes_ctx, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES); + aescfb_encrypt(&auth->aes_ctx, &buf->data[offset_p], + &buf->data[offset_p], len, + auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES); + /* reset p to beginning of parameters for HMAC */ + offset_p -= 2; + } + + sha256_init(&sctx); + /* ordinal is already BE */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal)); + /* add the handle names */ + for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) { + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]); + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], + name_size(auth->name[i])); + } else { + __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); + + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4); + } + } + if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf)) + sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s], + tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s); + sha256_final(&sctx, cphash); + + /* now calculate the hmac */ + tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len); + sha256_update(&sctx, cphash, sizeof(cphash)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1); + tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len, hmac); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); + +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int slot; + + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +/** + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: the original command buffer (which now contains the response) + * @rc: the return code from tpm_transmit_cmd + * + * If @rc is non zero, @buf may not contain an actual return, so @rc + * is passed through as the return and the session cleaned up and + * de-allocated if required (this is required if + * TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION was not specified as a session flag). + * + * If @rc is zero, the response HMAC is computed against the returned + * @buf and matched to the TPM one in the session area. If there is a + * mismatch, an error is logged and -EINVAL returned. + * + * The reason for this is that the command issue and HMAC check + * sequence should look like: + * + * rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(...); + * rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + * if (rc) + * ... + * + * Which is easily layered into the current contrl flow. + * + * Returns: 0 on success or an error. + */ +int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + int rc) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + off_t offset_s, offset_p; + u8 rphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 attrs; + struct sha256_state sctx; + u16 tag = be16_to_cpu(head->tag); + u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); + int parm_len, len, i, handles; + + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); + goto out; + } + + if (rc != 0) + /* pass non success rc through and close the session */ + goto out; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if (tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC response check has no sessions tag\n"); + goto out; + } + + i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); + if (i < 0) + goto out; + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; + handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE) & 1; + + /* point to area beyond handles */ + offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + handles * 4; + parm_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + offset_p = offset_s; + offset_s += parm_len; + /* skip over any sessions before ours */ + for (i = 0; i < auth->session - 1; i++) { + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + offset_s += len + 1; + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + offset_s += len; + } + /* TPM nonce */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + if (offset_s + len > tpm_buf_length(buf)) + goto out; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) + goto out; + memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset_s], len); + offset_s += len; + attrs = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s); + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + if (offset_s + len != tpm_buf_length(buf)) + goto out; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) + goto out; + /* + * offset_s points to the HMAC. now calculate comparison, beginning + * with rphash + */ + sha256_init(&sctx); + /* yes, I know this is now zero, but it's what the standard says */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->return_code, + sizeof(head->return_code)); + /* ordinal is already BE */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&auth->ordinal, sizeof(auth->ordinal)); + sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_p], parm_len); + sha256_final(&sctx, rphash); + + /* now calculate the hmac */ + tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len); + sha256_update(&sctx, rphash, sizeof(rphash)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1); + /* we're done with the rphash, so put our idea of the hmac there */ + tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len, rphash); + if (memcmp(rphash, &buf->data[offset_s], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) == 0) { + rc = 0; + } else { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC check failed\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* now do response decryption */ + if (auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT) { + /* need key and IV */ + tpm2_KDFa(auth->session_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + + auth->passphrase_len, "CFB", auth->tpm_nonce, + auth->our_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + auth->scratch); + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p); + aes_expandkey(&auth->aes_ctx, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES); + aescfb_decrypt(&auth->aes_ctx, &buf->data[offset_p], + &buf->data[offset_p], len, + auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES); + } + + out: + if ((auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION) == 0) { + if (rc) + /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + } else { + /* reset for next use */ + auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + } + + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); + +/** + * tpm2_end_auth_session() - kill the allocated auth session + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * + * ends the session started by tpm2_start_auth_session and frees all + * the resources. Under normal conditions, + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() will correctly end the session if + * required, so this function is only for use in error legs that will + * bypass the normal invocation of tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(). + */ +void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); + +static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, + struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* should have handle plus nonce */ + if (tot_len != 4 + 2 + sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)) + return -EINVAL; + + auth->handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset); + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset], sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); + /* now compute the session key from the nonces */ + tpm2_KDFa(auth->salt, sizeof(auth->salt), "ATH", auth->tpm_nonce, + auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->session_key), + auth->session_key); + + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) +{ + int rc; + unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ + u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + + rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, + null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) + return rc; + + /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); + /* check the null name against what we know */ + tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); + if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) + /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ + return rc; + /* + * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so + * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM + * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be + * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so + * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. + */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_start_auth_session() - create a HMAC authentication session with the TPM + * @chip: the TPM chip structure to create the session with + * + * This function loads the NULL seed from its saved context and starts + * an authentication session on the null seed, fills in the + * @chip->auth structure to contain all the session details necessary + * for performing the HMAC, encrypt and decrypt operations and + * returns. The NULL seed is flushed before this function returns. + * + * Return: zero on success or actual error encountered. + */ +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int rc; + u32 null_key; + + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); + if (rc) + goto out; + + auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* salt key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); + /* bind key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + /* nonce caller */ + get_random_bytes(auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + + /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); + + /* symmetric encryption parameters */ + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_AES); + /* bits for symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, AES_KEY_BITS); + /* symmetric algorithm mode (must be CFB) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_CFB); + /* hash algorithm for session */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc) + goto out; + + out: + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); + +/** + * tpm2_parse_create_primary() - parse the data returned from TPM_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY + * + * @chip: The TPM the primary was created under + * @buf: The response buffer from the chip + * @handle: pointer to be filled in with the return handle of the primary + * @hierarchy: The hierarchy the primary was created for + * @name: pointer to be filled in with the primary key name + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -errno - A system error + * * TPM_RC - A TPM error + */ +static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 *handle, u32 hierarchy, u8 *name) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset_r = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_t; + u16 len = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 total_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val, param_len, keyhandle; + + keyhandle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r); + if (handle) + *handle = keyhandle; + else + tpm2_flush_context(chip, keyhandle); + + param_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r); + /* + * param_len doesn't include the header, but all the other + * lengths and offsets do, so add it to parm len to make + * the comparisons easier + */ + param_len += TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + if (param_len + 8 > total_len) + return -EINVAL; + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_t = offset_r; + if (name) { + /* + * now we have the public area, compute the name of + * the object + */ + put_unaligned_be16(TPM_ALG_SHA256, name); + sha256(&buf->data[offset_r], len, name + 2); + } + + /* validate the public key */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + + /* key type (must be what we asked for) */ + if (val != TPM_ALG_ECC) + return -EINVAL; + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + + /* name algorithm */ + if (val != TPM_ALG_SHA256) + return -EINVAL; + val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_t); + + /* object properties */ + if (val != TPM2_OA_TMPL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* auth policy (empty) */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* symmetric key parameters */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_AES) + return -EINVAL; + + /* symmetric key length */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != AES_KEY_BITS) + return -EINVAL; + + /* symmetric encryption scheme */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_CFB) + return -EINVAL; + + /* signing scheme */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* ECC Curve */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256) + return -EINVAL; + + /* KDF Scheme */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* extract public key (x and y points) */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != EC_PT_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_x, &buf->data[offset_t], val); + offset_t += val; + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != EC_PT_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_y, &buf->data[offset_t], val); + offset_t += val; + + /* original length of the whole TPM2B */ + offset_r += len; + + /* should have exactly consumed the TPM2B public structure */ + if (offset_t != offset_r) + return -EINVAL; + if (offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* creation data (skip) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_r += len; + if (offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* creation digest (must be sha256) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_r += len; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE || offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* TPMT_TK_CREATION follows */ + /* tag, must be TPM_ST_CREATION (0x8021) */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + if (val != TPM2_ST_CREATION || offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* hierarchy */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r); + if (val != hierarchy || offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* the ticket digest HMAC (might not be sha256) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_r += len; + if (offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * finally we have the name, which is a sha256 digest plus a 2 + * byte algorithm type + */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + if (offset_r + len != param_len + 8) + return -EINVAL; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (memcmp(chip->null_key_name, &buf->data[offset_r], + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2) != 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL Seed name comparison failed\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * tpm2_create_primary() - create a primary key using a fixed P-256 template + * + * @chip: the TPM chip to create under + * @hierarchy: The hierarchy handle to create under + * @handle: The returned volatile handle on success + * @name: The name of the returned key + * + * For platforms that might not have a persistent primary, this can be + * used to create one quickly on the fly (it uses Elliptic Curve not + * RSA, so even slow TPMs can create one fast). The template uses the + * TCG mandated H one for non-endorsement ECC primaries, i.e. P-256 + * elliptic curve (the only current one all TPM2s are required to + * have) a sha256 name hash and no policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -errno - A system error + * * TPM_RC - A TPM error + */ +static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, + u32 *handle, u8 *name) +{ + int rc; + struct tpm_buf buf; + struct tpm_buf template; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&template); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + + /* + * create the template. Note: in order for userspace to + * verify the security of the system, it will have to create + * and certify this NULL primary, meaning all the template + * parameters will have to be identical, so conform exactly to + * the TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance for the SRK ECC + * key H template (H has zero size unique points) + */ + + /* key type */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_ECC); + + /* name algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + + /* object properties */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&template, TPM2_OA_TMPL); + + /* sauth policy (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0); + + /* BEGIN parameters: key specific; for ECC*/ + + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_AES); + + /* bits for symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, AES_KEY_BITS); + + /* algorithm mode (must be CFB) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_CFB); + + /* scheme (NULL means any scheme) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL); + + /* ECC Curve ID */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256); + + /* KDF Scheme */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL); + + /* unique: key specific; for ECC it is two zero size points */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0); + + /* END parameters */ + + /* primary handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, hierarchy); + tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + + /* sensitive create size is 4 for two empty buffers */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4); + + /* sensitive create auth data (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* sensitive create sensitive data (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* the public template */ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, template.data, template.length); + tpm_buf_destroy(&template); + + /* outside info (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* creation PCR (none) */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, + "attempting to create NULL primary"); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_create_primary(chip, &buf, handle, hierarchy, + name); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} + +static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + u32 null_key; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &null_key, + chip->null_key_name); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null key context */ + + rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, null_key, chip->null_key_context, + sizeof(chip->null_key_context), &offset); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_sessions_init() - start of day initialization for the sessions code + * @chip: TPM chip + * + * Derive and context save the null primary and allocate memory in the + * struct tpm_chip for the authorizations. + */ +int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip); + if (rc) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc); + + chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!chip->auth) + return -ENOMEM; + + return rc; +} diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c index 363afdd4d1d3..4892d491da8d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c @@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space) kfree(space->session_buf); } -static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, - unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle) +int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, + unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle) { struct tpm_buf tbuf; struct tpm2_context *ctx; @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, *handle = 0; tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf); return -ENOENT; + } else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf); + return -EINVAL; } else if (rc > 0) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n", __func__, rc); @@ -119,8 +122,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, return 0; } -static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf, - unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset) +int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf, + unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset) { struct tpm_buf tbuf; unsigned int body_size; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c index 9c924a1440a9..2d2ae37153ba 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c @@ -51,34 +51,40 @@ static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev; static inline void tpm_data_out(unsigned char data, unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) outb(data, tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); else +#endif writeb(data, tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); } static inline unsigned char tpm_data_in(unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) return inb(tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); - else - return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); +#endif + return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); } static inline void tpm_config_out(unsigned char data, unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) outb(data, tpm_dev.config_port + offset); else +#endif writeb(data, tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset); } static inline unsigned char tpm_config_in(unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) return inb(tpm_dev.config_port + offset); - else - return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset); +#endif + return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset); } /* TPM header definitions */ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c index 714070ebb6e7..176cd8dbf1db 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c @@ -1057,11 +1057,6 @@ static void tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool value) clkrun_val &= ~LPC_CLKRUN_EN; iowrite32(clkrun_val, data->ilb_base_addr + LPC_CNTRL_OFFSET); - /* - * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make - * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command. - */ - outb(0xCC, 0x80); } else { data->clkrun_enabled--; if (data->clkrun_enabled) @@ -1072,13 +1067,15 @@ static void tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool value) /* Enable LPC CLKRUN# */ clkrun_val |= LPC_CLKRUN_EN; iowrite32(clkrun_val, data->ilb_base_addr + LPC_CNTRL_OFFSET); - - /* - * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make - * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command. - */ - outb(0xCC, 0x80); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT + /* + * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make + * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command. + */ + outb(0xCC, 0x80); +#endif } static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_tis = { |