diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c | 34 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c index 66ebccb5a6ff..5b8ac9b6cef8 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c @@ -126,6 +126,37 @@ xfs_cleanup_inode( xfs_remove(XFS_I(dir), &teardown, XFS_I(inode)); } +/* + * Check to see if we are likely to need an extended attribute to be added to + * the inode we are about to allocate. This allows the attribute fork to be + * created during the inode allocation, reducing the number of transactions we + * need to do in this fast path. + * + * The security checks are optimistic, but not guaranteed. The two LSMs that + * require xattrs to be added here (selinux and smack) are also the only two + * LSMs that add a sb->s_security structure to the superblock. Hence if security + * is enabled and sb->s_security is set, we have a pretty good idea that we are + * going to be asked to add a security xattr immediately after allocating the + * xfs inode and instantiating the VFS inode. + */ +static inline bool +xfs_create_need_xattr( + struct inode *dir, + struct posix_acl *default_acl, + struct posix_acl *acl) +{ + if (acl) + return true; + if (default_acl) + return true; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY) + if (dir->i_sb->s_security) + return true; +#endif + return false; +} + + STATIC int xfs_generic_create( struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, @@ -163,7 +194,8 @@ xfs_generic_create( if (!tmpfile) { error = xfs_create(mnt_userns, XFS_I(dir), &name, mode, rdev, - &ip); + xfs_create_need_xattr(dir, default_acl, acl), + &ip); } else { error = xfs_create_tmpfile(mnt_userns, XFS_I(dir), mode, &ip); } |