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-rw-r--r--kernel/irq/msi.c27
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/irq/msi.c b/kernel/irq/msi.c
index 955267bbc2be..dfb5d40abac9 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/msi.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/msi.c
@@ -1623,3 +1623,30 @@ struct msi_domain_info *msi_get_domain_info(struct irq_domain *domain)
{
return (struct msi_domain_info *)domain->host_data;
}
+
+/**
+ * msi_device_has_isolated_msi - True if the device has isolated MSI
+ * @dev: The device to check
+ *
+ * Isolated MSI means that HW modeled by an irq_domain on the path from the
+ * initiating device to the CPU will validate that the MSI message specifies an
+ * interrupt number that the device is authorized to trigger. This must block
+ * devices from triggering interrupts they are not authorized to trigger.
+ * Currently authorization means the MSI vector is one assigned to the device.
+ *
+ * This is interesting for securing VFIO use cases where a rouge MSI (eg created
+ * by abusing a normal PCI MemWr DMA) must not allow the VFIO userspace to
+ * impact outside its security domain, eg userspace triggering interrupts on
+ * kernel drivers, a VM triggering interrupts on the hypervisor, or a VM
+ * triggering interrupts on another VM.
+ */
+bool msi_device_has_isolated_msi(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct irq_domain *domain = dev_get_msi_domain(dev);
+
+ for (; domain; domain = domain->parent)
+ if (domain->flags & IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_MSI_REMAP)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(msi_device_has_isolated_msi);