3 files changed, 12 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 397fea5b3fa6..2e6fb6e2ffd2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -749,13 +749,14 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+static int evm_attr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 
-	if ((!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) || uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
-	    (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) || gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid)) &&
+	if (!i_uid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
+	    !i_gid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
 	    (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -769,7 +770,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
  */
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		      struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -795,7 +797,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
-	    !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr))
+	    !evm_attr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, attr))
 		return 0;
 
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index 13753136f03f..419dc405c831 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
 /*
  * Restore the measurement list from the previous kernel.
  */
-void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void)
+void __init ima_load_kexec_buffer(void)
 {
 	void *kexec_buffer = NULL;
 	size_t kexec_buffer_size = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 73917413365b..a8802b8da946 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -2247,6 +2247,10 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 	if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
 		return false;
 
+	if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+	    && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
+		return false;
+
 	func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();