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It's quite a lot of well isolated code, so it seems like a good
candidate to move it out of libbpf.c to reduce its size.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-24-andrii@kernel.org
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Add feat_supported() helper that accepts feature cache instead of
bpf_object. This allows low-level code in bpf.c to not know or care
about higher-level concept of bpf_object, yet it will be able to utilize
custom feature checking in cases where BPF token might influence the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-23-andrii@kernel.org
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Split a list of supported feature detectors with their corresponding
callbacks from actual cached supported/missing values. This will allow
to have more flexible per-token or per-object feature detectors in
subsequent refactorings.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-22-andrii@kernel.org
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Use both hex-based and string-based way to specify delegate mount
options for BPF FS.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-21-andrii@kernel.org
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Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names. Utilize BTF information of `enum bpf_cmd`, `enum bpf_map_type`,
`enum bpf_prog_type`, and `enum bpf_attach_type` types to find supported
symbolic names (ignoring __MAX_xxx guard values and stripping repetitive
prefixes like BPF_ for cmd and attach types, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ for maps, and
BPF_PROG_TYPE_ for prog types). The case doesn't matter, but it is
normalized to lower case in mount option output. So "PROG_LOAD",
"prog_load", and "MAP_create" are all valid values to specify for
delegate_cmds options, "array" is among supported for map types, etc.
Besides supporting string values, we also support multiple values
specified at the same time, using colon (':') separator.
There are corresponding changes on bpf_show_options side to use known
values to print them in human-readable format, falling back to hex mask
printing, if there are any unrecognized bits. This shouldn't be
necessary when enum BTF information is present, but in general we should
always be able to fall back to this even if kernel was built without BTF.
As mentioned, emitted symbolic names are normalized to be all lower case.
Example below shows various ways to specify delegate_cmds options
through mount command and how mount options are printed back:
12/14 14:39:07.604
vmuser@archvm:~/local/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf
$ mount | rg token
$ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token
$ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \
-o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \
-o delegate_progs=kprobe \
-o delegate_attachs=xdp
$ mount | grep token
bpffs on /sys/fs/bpf/token type bpf (rw,relatime,delegate_cmds=map_create:prog_load,delegate_progs=kprobe,delegate_attachs=xdp)
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-20-andrii@kernel.org
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It's quite confusing in practice when it's possible to successfully
create a BPF token from BPF FS that didn't have any of delegate_xxx
mount options set up. While it's not wrong, it's actually more
meaningful to reject BPF_TOKEN_CREATE with specific error code (-ENOENT)
to let user-space know that no token delegation is setup up.
So, instead of creating empty BPF token that will be always ignored
because it doesn't have any of the allow_xxx bits set, reject it with
-ENOENT. If we ever need empty BPF token to be possible, we can support
that with extra flag passed into BPF_TOKEN_CREATE.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-19-andrii@kernel.org
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Utilize newly added bpf_token_create/bpf_token_free LSM hooks to
allocate struct bpf_security_struct for each BPF token object in
SELinux. This just follows similar pattern for BPF prog and map.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-18-andrii@kernel.org
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Add a selftest that attempts to conceptually replicate intended BPF
token use cases inside user namespaced container.
Child process is forked. It is then put into its own userns and mountns.
Child creates BPF FS context object. This ensures child userns is
captured as the owning userns for this instance of BPF FS. Given setting
delegation mount options is privileged operation, we ensure that child
cannot set them.
This context is passed back to privileged parent process through Unix
socket, where parent sets up delegation options, creates, and mounts it
as a detached mount. This mount FD is passed back to the child to be
used for BPF token creation, which allows otherwise privileged BPF
operations to succeed inside userns.
We validate that all of token-enabled privileged commands (BPF_BTF_LOAD,
BPF_MAP_CREATE, and BPF_PROG_LOAD) work as intended. They should only
succeed inside the userns if a) BPF token is provided with proper
allowed sets of commands and types; and b) namespaces CAP_BPF and other
privileges are set. Lacking a) or b) should lead to -EPERM failures.
Based on suggested workflow by Christian Brauner ([0]).
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-17-andrii@kernel.org
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Wire through token_fd into bpf_prog_load().
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-16-andrii@kernel.org
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Allow user to specify token_fd for bpf_btf_load() API that wraps
kernel's BPF_BTF_LOAD command. This allows loading BTF from unprivileged
process as long as it has BPF token allowing BPF_BTF_LOAD command, which
can be created and delegated by privileged process.
Wire through new btf_flags as well, so that user can provide
BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag, if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-15-andrii@kernel.org
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Add ability to provide token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command through
bpf_map_create() API.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-14-andrii@kernel.org
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Add low-level wrapper API for BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command in bpf() syscall.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-13-andrii@kernel.org
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Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.
Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
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Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc
hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also
bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs.
Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it
currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which
seems to be a sweet spot.
But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free
LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few
LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully
allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF
map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we
need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
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Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing
bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead
of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF
program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided
arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much
information as we can basically provide.
The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is
passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after
a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were
allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF
verification step.
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for
consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and
signatures.
Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be
used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other
LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one
*even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run
the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when
combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their
relative ordering.
Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to
sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable
context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no
issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us
to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM
hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it
should not be an issue anymore.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
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Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable()
in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make
decisions about privileges.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-9-andrii@kernel.org
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Instead of performing unconditional system-wide bpf_capable() and
perfmon_capable() calls inside bpf_base_func_proto() function (and other
similar ones) to determine eligibility of a given BPF helper for a given
program, use previously recorded BPF token during BPF_PROG_LOAD command
handling to inform the decision.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-8-andrii@kernel.org
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Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types,
derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we
perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org
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Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading
through delegated BPF token. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag has to be specified
when passing BPF token FD. Given BPF_BTF_LOAD command didn't have flags
field before, we also add btf_flags field.
BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF
token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel
proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-6-andrii@kernel.org
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Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-5-andrii@kernel.org
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Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is
currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init
user namespace anyways.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-4-andrii@kernel.org
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Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
and what sort of operations are allowed under BPF token. As such, we get
4 new mount options, each is a bit mask
- `delegate_cmds` allow to specify which bpf() syscall commands are
allowed with BPF token derived from this BPF FS instance;
- if BPF_MAP_CREATE command is allowed, `delegate_maps` specifies
a set of allowable BPF map types that could be created with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_progs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program types that could be loaded with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_attachs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program attach types that could be loaded with
BPF token; delegate_progs and delegate_attachs are meant to be used
together, as full BPF program type is, in general, determined
through both program type and program attach type.
Currently, these mount options accept the following forms of values:
- a special value "any", that enables all possible values of a given
bit set;
- numeric value (decimal or hexadecimal, determined by kernel
automatically) that specifies a bit mask value directly;
- all the values for a given mount option are combined, if specified
multiple times. E.g., `mount -t bpf nodev /path/to/mount -o
delegate_maps=0x1 -o delegate_maps=0x2` will result in a combined 0x3
mask.
Ideally, more convenient (for humans) symbolic form derived from
corresponding UAPI enums would be accepted (e.g., `-o
delegate_progs=kprobe|tracepoint`) and I intend to implement this, but
it requires a bunch of UAPI header churn, so I postponed it until this
feature lands upstream or at least there is a definite consensus that
this feature is acceptable and is going to make it, just to minimize
amount of wasted effort and not increase amount of non-essential code to
be reviewed.
Attentive reader will notice that BPF FS is now marked as
FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which theoretically makes it mountable inside non-init
user namespace as long as the process has sufficient *namespaced*
capabilities within that user namespace. But in reality we still
restrict BPF FS to be mountable only by processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN *in
init userns* (extra check in bpf_fill_super()). FS_USERNS_MOUNT is added
to allow creating BPF FS context object (i.e., fsopen("bpf")) from
inside unprivileged process inside non-init userns, to capture that
userns as the owning userns. It will still be required to pass this
context object back to privileged process to instantiate and mount it.
This manipulation is important, because capturing non-init userns as the
owning userns of BPF FS instance (super block) allows to use that userns
to constraint BPF token to that userns later on (see next patch). So
creating BPF FS with delegation inside unprivileged userns will restrict
derived BPF token objects to only "work" inside that intended userns,
making it scoped to a intended "container". Also, setting these
delegation options requires capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so unprivileged
process cannot set this up without involvement of a privileged process.
There is a set of selftests at the end of the patch set that simulates
this sequence of steps and validates that everything works as intended.
But careful review is requested to make sure there are no missed gaps in
the implementation and testing.
This somewhat subtle set of aspects is the result of previous
discussions ([0]) about various user namespace implications and
interactions with BPF token functionality and is necessary to contain
BPF token inside intended user namespace.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-3-andrii@kernel.org
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Within BPF syscall handling code CAP_NET_ADMIN checks stand out a bit
compared to CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON checks. For the latter, CAP_BPF or
CAP_PERFMON are checked first, but if they are not set, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
takes over and grants whatever part of BPF syscall is required.
Similar kind of checks that involve CAP_NET_ADMIN are not so consistent.
One out of four uses does follow CAP_BPF/CAP_PERFMON model: during
BPF_PROG_LOAD, if the type of BPF program is "network-related" either
CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to proceed.
But in three other cases CAP_NET_ADMIN is required even if CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is set:
- when creating DEVMAP/XDKMAP/CPU_MAP maps;
- when attaching CGROUP_SKB programs;
- when handling BPF_PROG_QUERY command.
This patch is changing the latter three cases to follow BPF_PROG_LOAD
model, that is allowing to proceed under either CAP_NET_ADMIN or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This also makes it cleaner in subsequent BPF token patches to switch
wholesomely to a generic bpf_token_capable(int cap) check, that always
falls back to CAP_SYS_ADMIN if requested capability is missing.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-2-andrii@kernel.org
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The commit 9e926acda0c2 ("libbpf: Find correct module BTFs for struct_ops maps and progs.")
sets a newly added field (value_type_btf_obj_fd) to -1 in libbpf when
the caller of the libbpf's bpf_map_create did not define this field by
passing a NULL "opts" or passing in a "opts" that does not cover this
new field. OPT_HAS(opts, field) is used to decide if the field is
defined or not:
((opts) && opts->sz >= offsetofend(typeof(*(opts)), field))
Once OPTS_HAS decided the field is not defined, that field should
be set to 0. For this particular new field (value_type_btf_obj_fd),
its corresponding map_flags "BPF_F_VTYPE_BTF_OBJ_FD" is not set.
Thus, the kernel does not treat it as an fd field.
Fixes: 9e926acda0c2 ("libbpf: Find correct module BTFs for struct_ops maps and progs.")
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124224418.2905133-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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After the previous patch that speeded up the test (by avoiding neigh
discovery in IPv6), the BPF CI occasionally hits this error:
rcv tstamp unexpected pkt rcv tstamp: actual 0 == expected 0
The test complains about the cmsg returned from the recvmsg() does not
have the rcv timestamp. Setting skb->tstamp or not is
controlled by a kernel static key "netstamp_needed_key". The static
key is enabled whenever this is at least one sk with the SOCK_TIMESTAMP
set.
The test_redirect_dtime does use setsockopt() to turn on
the SOCK_TIMESTAMP for the reading sk. In the kernel
net_enable_timestamp() has a delay to enable the "netstamp_needed_key"
when CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL is set. This potential delay is the likely reason
for packet missing rcv timestamp occasionally.
This patch is to create udp sockets with SOCK_TIMESTAMP set.
It sends and receives some packets until the received packet
has a rcv timestamp. It currently retries at most 5 times with 1s
in between. This should be enough to wait for the "netstamp_needed_key".
It then holds on to the socket and only closes it at the end of the test.
This guarantees that the test has the "netstamp_needed_key" key turned
on from the beginning.
To simplify the udp sockets setup, they are sending/receiving packets
in the same netns (ns_dst is used) and communicate over the "lo" dev.
Hence, the patch enables the "lo" dev in the ns_dst.
Fixes: c803475fd8dd ("bpf: selftests: test skb->tstamp in redirect_neigh")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240120060518.3604920-2-martin.lau@linux.dev
|
|
BPF CI has been reporting the tc_redirect_dtime test failing
from time to time:
test_inet_dtime:PASS:setns src 0 nsec
(network_helpers.c:253: errno: No route to host) Failed to connect to server
close_netns:PASS:setns 0 nsec
test_inet_dtime:FAIL:connect_to_fd unexpected connect_to_fd: actual -1 < expected 0
test_tcp_clear_dtime:PASS:tcp ip6 clear dtime ingress_fwdns_p100 0 nsec
The connect_to_fd failure (EHOSTUNREACH) is from the
test_tcp_clear_dtime() test and it is the very first IPv6 traffic
after setting up all the links, addresses, and routes.
The symptom is this first connect() is always slow. In my setup, it
could take ~3s.
After some tracing and tcpdump, the slowness is mostly spent in
the neighbor solicitation in the "ns_fwd" namespace while
the "ns_src" and "ns_dst" are fine.
I forced the kernel to drop the neighbor solicitation messages.
I can then reproduce EHOSTUNREACH. What actually happen could be:
- the neighbor advertisement came back a little slow.
- the "ns_fwd" namespace concluded a neighbor discovery failure
and triggered the ndisc_error_report() => ip6_link_failure() =>
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0)
- the client's connect() reports EHOSTUNREACH after receiving
the ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH message.
The neigh table of both "ns_src" and "ns_dst" namespace has already
been manually populated but not the "ns_fwd" namespace. This patch
fixes it by manually populating the neigh table also in the "ns_fwd"
namespace.
Although the namespace configuration part had been existed before
the tc_redirect_dtime test, still Fixes-tagging the patch when
the tc_redirect_dtime test was added since it is the only test
hitting it so far.
Fixes: c803475fd8dd ("bpf: selftests: test skb->tstamp in redirect_neigh")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240120060518.3604920-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
|
|
Past commit ([0]) removed the last vestiges of struct bpf_field_reloc,
it's called struct bpf_core_relo now.
[0] 28b93c64499a ("libbpf: Clean up and improve CO-RE reloc logging")
Signed-off-by: Dima Tisnek <dimaqq@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240121060126.15650-1-dimaqq@gmail.com
|
|
Tiezhu Yang says:
====================
Skip callback tests if jit is disabled in test_verifier
Thanks very much for the feedbacks from Eduard, John, Jiri, Daniel,
Hou Tao, Song Liu and Andrii.
v7:
-- Add an explicit flag F_NEEDS_JIT_ENABLED for checking,
thanks Andrii.
v6:
-- Copy insn_is_pseudo_func() into testing_helpers,
thanks Andrii.
v5:
-- Reuse is_ldimm64_insn() and insn_is_pseudo_func(),
thanks Song Liu.
v4:
-- Move the not-allowed-checking into "if (expected_ret ...)"
block, thanks Hou Tao.
-- Do some small changes to avoid checkpatch warning
about "line length exceeds 100 columns".
v3:
-- Rebase on the latest bpf-next tree.
-- Address the review comments by Hou Tao,
remove the second argument "0" of open(),
check only once whether jit is disabled,
check fd_prog, saved_errno and jit_disabled to skip.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123090351.2207-1-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
|
|
If CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set and bpf_jit_enable is 0, there
exist 6 failed tests.
[root@linux bpf]# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
[root@linux bpf]# echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
[root@linux bpf]# ./test_verifier | grep FAIL
#106/p inline simple bpf_loop call FAIL
#107/p don't inline bpf_loop call, flags non-zero FAIL
#108/p don't inline bpf_loop call, callback non-constant FAIL
#109/p bpf_loop_inline and a dead func FAIL
#110/p bpf_loop_inline stack locations for loop vars FAIL
#111/p inline bpf_loop call in a big program FAIL
Summary: 768 PASSED, 15 SKIPPED, 6 FAILED
The test log shows that callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs,
interpreter doesn't support them yet, thus these tests should be skipped
if jit is disabled.
Add an explicit flag F_NEEDS_JIT_ENABLED to those tests to mark that they
require JIT enabled in bpf_loop_inline.c, check the flag and jit_disabled
at the beginning of do_test_single() to handle this case.
With this patch:
[root@linux bpf]# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
[root@linux bpf]# echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
[root@linux bpf]# ./test_verifier | grep FAIL
Summary: 768 PASSED, 21 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240123090351.2207-3-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
|
|
Currently, is_jit_enabled() is only used in test_progs, move it into
testing_helpers so that it can be used in test_verifier. While at it,
remove the second argument "0" of open() as Hou Tao suggested.
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240123090351.2207-2-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
|
|
Kui-Feng Lee says:
====================
Given the current constraints of the current implementation,
struct_ops cannot be registered dynamically. This presents a
significant limitation for modules like coming fuse-bpf, which seeks
to implement a new struct_ops type. To address this issue, a new API
is introduced that allows the registration of new struct_ops types
from modules.
Previously, struct_ops types were defined in bpf_struct_ops_types.h
and collected as a static array. The new API lets callers add new
struct_ops types dynamically. The static array has been removed and
replaced by the per-btf struct_ops_tab.
The struct_ops subsystem relies on BTF to determine the layout of
values in a struct_ops map and identify the subsystem that the
struct_ops map registers to. However, the kernel BTF does not include
the type information of struct_ops types defined by a module. The
struct_ops subsystem requires knowledge of the corresponding module
for a given struct_ops map and the utilization of BTF information from
that module. We empower libbpf to determine the correct module for
accessing the BTF information and pass an identity (FD) of the module
btf to the kernel. The kernel looks up type information and registered
struct_ops types directly from the given btf.
If a module exits while one or more struct_ops maps still refer to a
struct_ops type defined by the module, it can lead to unforeseen
complications. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that a module
remains intact as long as any struct_ops map is still linked to a
struct_ops type defined by the module. To achieve this, every
struct_ops map holds a reference to the module while being registered.
Changes from v16:
- Fix unnecessary bpf_struct_ops_link_create() removing/adding.
- Rename REGISTER_BPF_STRUCT_OPS() to register_bpf_struct_ops().
- Implement bpf_map_struct_ops_info_fill() for !CONFIG_BPF_JIT.
Changes from v15:
- Fix the misleading commit message of part 4.
- Introduce BPF_F_VTYPE_BTF_OBJ_FD flag to struct bpf_attr to tell
if value_type_btf_obj_fd is set or not.
- Introduce links_cnt to struct bpf_struct_ops_map to avoid accessing
struct bpf_struct_ops_desc in bpf_struct_ops_map_put_progs() after
calling module_put() against the owner module of the struct_ops
type. (Part 9)
Changes from v14:
- Rebase. Add cif_stub required by
the commit 2cd3e3772e413 ("x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_struct_ops CFI")
- Remove creating struct_ops map without bpf_testmod.ko from the
test.
- Check the name of btf returned by bpf_map_info by getting the name
with bpf_btf_get_info_by_fd().
- Change value_type_btf_obj_fd to a signed type to allow the 0 fd.
Changes from v13:
- Change the test case to use bpf_map_create() to create a struct_ops
map while testmod.ko is unloaded.
- Move bpf_struct_ops_find*() to btf.c.
- Use btf_is_module() to replace btf != btf_vmlinux.
Changes from v12:
- Rebase to for-next to fix conflictions.
Changes from v11:
- bpf_struct_ops_maps hold only the refcnt to the module, but not
btf. (patch 1)
- Fix warning messages. (patch 1, 9 and 10)
- Remove unnecessary conditional compiling of CONFIG_BPF_JIT.
(patch 4, 9 and 10)
- Fix the commit log of the patch 7 to explain how a btf is pass from
the user space and how the kernel handle it.
- bpf_struct_ops_maps hold the module defining it's type, but not
btf. A map will hold the module through its life-span from
allocating to being free. (patch 8)
- Change selftests and tracing __bpf_struct_ops_map_free() to wait
for the release of the bpf_testmod module.
- Include btf_obj_id in bpf_map_info. (patch 14)
Changes from v10:
- Guard btf.c from CONFIG_BPF_JIT=n. This patchset has introduced
symbols from bpf_struct_ops.c which is only built when
CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y.
- Fix the warning of unused errout_free label by moving code that is
leaked to patch 8 to patch 7.
Changes from v9:
- Remove the call_rcu_tasks_trace() changes from kern_sync_rcu().
- Trace btf_put() in the test case to ensure the release of kmod's
btf, or the consequent tests may fail for using kmod's unloaded old
btf instead the new one created after loading again. The kmod's btf
may live for awhile after unloading the kmod, for a map being freed
asynchronized is still holding the btf.
- Split "add struct_ops_tab to btf" into tow patches by adding
"make struct_ops_map support btfs other than btf_vmlinux".
- Flip the order of "pass attached BTF to the bpf_struct_ops
subsystem" and "hold module for bpf_struct_ops_map" to make it more
reasonable.
- Fix the compile errors of a missing header file.
Changes from v8:
- Rename bpf_struct_ops_init_one() to bpf_struct_ops_desc_init().
- Move code that using BTF_ID_LIST to the newly added patch 2.
- Move code that lookup struct_ops types from a given module to the
newly added patch 5.
- Store the pointers of btf at st_maps.
- Add test cases for the cases of modules being unload.
- Call bpf_struct_ops_init() in btf_add_struct_ops() to fix an
inconsistent issue.
Changes from v7:
- Fix check_struct_ops_btf_id() to use attach btf if there is instead
of btf_vmlinux.
Changes from v6:
- Change returned error code to -EINVAL for the case of
bpf_try_get_module().
- Return an error code from bpf_struct_ops_init().
- Fix the dependency issue of testing_helpers.c and
rcu_tasks_trace_gp.skel.h.
Changes from v5:
- As the 2nd patch, we introduce "bpf_struct_ops_desc". This change
involves moving certain members of "bpf_struct_ops" to
"bpf_struct_ops_desc", which becomes a part of
"btf_struct_ops_tab". This ensures that these members remain
accessible even when the owner module of a "bpf_struct_ops" is
unloaded.
- Correct the order of arguments when calling
in the 3rd patch.
- Remove the owner argument from bpf_struct_ops_init_one(). Instead,
callers should fill in st_ops->owner.
- Make sure to hold the owner module when calling
bpf_struct_ops_find() and bpf_struct_ops_find_value() in the 6th
patch.
- Merge the functions register_bpf_struct_ops_btf() and
register_bpf_struct_ops() into a single function and relocate it to
btf.c for better organization and clarity.
- Undo the name modifications made to find_kernel_btf_id() and
find_ksym_btf_id() in the 8th patch.
Changes from v4:
- Fix the dependency between testing_helpers.o and
rcu_tasks_trace_gp.skel.h.
Changes from v3:
- Fix according to the feedback for v3.
- Change of the order of arguments to make btf as the first
argument.
- Use btf_try_get_module() instead of try_get_module() since the
module pointed by st_ops->owner can gone while some one is still
holding its btf.
- Move variables defined by BPF_STRUCT_OPS_COMMON_VALUE to struct
bpf_struct_ops_common_value to validation easier.
- Register the struct_ops type defined by bpf_testmod in its init
function.
- Rename field name to 'value_type_btf_obj_fd' to make it explicit.
- Fix leaking of btf objects on error.
- st_maps hold their modules to keep modules alive and prevent they
from unloading.
- bpf_map of libbpf keeps mod_btf_fd instead of a pointer to module_btf.
- Do call_rcu_tasks_trace() in kern_sync_rcu() to ensure the
bpf_testmod is unloaded properly. It uses rcu_tasks_trace_gp to
trigger call_rcu_tasks_trace() in the kernel.
- Merge and reorder patches in a reasonable order.
Changes from v2:
- Remove struct_ops array, and add a per-btf (module) struct_ops_tab
to collect registered struct_ops types.
- Validate value_type by checking member names and types.
---
v16: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240118014930.1992551-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v15: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231220222654.1435895-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v14: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231217081132.1025020-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v13: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231209002709.535966-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v12: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231207013950.1689269-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v11: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231106201252.1568931-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231103232202.3664407-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231101204519.677870-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231030192810.382942-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231027211702.1374597-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231022050335.2579051-11-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231017162306.176586-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231013224304.187218-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230920155923.151136-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230913061449.1918219-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
====================
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Create a new struct_ops type called bpf_testmod_ops within the bpf_testmod
module. When a struct_ops object is registered, the bpf_testmod module will
invoke test_2 from the module.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-15-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
The module requires the use of btf_ctx_access() to invoke
bpf_tracing_btf_ctx_access() from a module. This function is valuable for
implementing validation functions that ensure proper access to ctx.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-14-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Locate the module BTFs for struct_ops maps and progs and pass them to the
kernel. This ensures that the kernel correctly resolves type IDs from the
appropriate module BTFs.
For the map of a struct_ops object, the FD of the module BTF is set to
bpf_map to keep a reference to the module BTF. The FD is passed to the
kernel as value_type_btf_obj_fd when the struct_ops object is loaded.
For a bpf_struct_ops prog, attach_btf_obj_fd of bpf_prog is the FD of a
module BTF in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-13-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Replace the static list of struct_ops types with per-btf struct_ops_tab to
enable dynamic registration.
Both bpf_dummy_ops and bpf_tcp_ca now utilize the registration function
instead of being listed in bpf_struct_ops_types.h.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-12-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
A value_type should consist of three components: refcnt, state, and data.
refcnt and state has been move to struct bpf_struct_ops_common_value to
make it easier to check the value type.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-11-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
To ensure that a module remains accessible whenever a struct_ops object of
a struct_ops type provided by the module is still in use.
struct bpf_struct_ops_map doesn't hold a refcnt to btf anymore since a
module will hold a refcnt to it's btf already. But, struct_ops programs are
different. They hold their associated btf, not the module since they need
only btf to assure their types (signatures).
However, verifier holds the refcnt of the associated module of a struct_ops
type temporarily when verify a struct_ops prog. Verifier needs the help
from the verifier operators (struct bpf_verifier_ops) provided by the owner
module to verify data access of a prog, provide information, and generate
code.
This patch also add a count of links (links_cnt) to bpf_struct_ops_map. It
avoids bpf_struct_ops_map_put_progs() from accessing btf after calling
module_put() in bpf_struct_ops_map_free().
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-10-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Pass the fd of a btf from the userspace to the bpf() syscall, and then
convert the fd into a btf. The btf is generated from the module that
defines the target BPF struct_ops type.
In order to inform the kernel about the module that defines the target
struct_ops type, the userspace program needs to provide a btf fd for the
respective module's btf. This btf contains essential information on the
types defined within the module, including the target struct_ops type.
A btf fd must be provided to the kernel for struct_ops maps and for the bpf
programs attached to those maps.
In the case of the bpf programs, the attach_btf_obj_fd parameter is passed
as part of the bpf_attr and is converted into a btf. This btf is then
stored in the prog->aux->attach_btf field. Here, it just let the verifier
access attach_btf directly.
In the case of struct_ops maps, a btf fd is passed as value_type_btf_obj_fd
of bpf_attr. The bpf_struct_ops_map_alloc() function converts the fd to a
btf and stores it as st_map->btf. A flag BPF_F_VTYPE_BTF_OBJ_FD is added
for map_flags to indicate that the value of value_type_btf_obj_fd is set.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-9-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
This is a preparation for searching for struct_ops types from a specified
module. BTF is always btf_vmlinux now. This patch passes a pointer of BTF
to bpf_struct_ops_find_value() and bpf_struct_ops_find(). Once the new
registration API of struct_ops types is used, other BTFs besides
btf_vmlinux can also be passed to them.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-8-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Include btf object id (btf_obj_id) in bpf_map_info so that tools (ex:
bpftools struct_ops dump) know the correct btf from the kernel to look up
type information of struct_ops types.
Since struct_ops types can be defined and registered in a module. The
type information of a struct_ops type are defined in the btf of the
module defining it. The userspace tools need to know which btf is for
the module defining a struct_ops type.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-7-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Once new struct_ops can be registered from modules, btf_vmlinux is no
longer the only btf that struct_ops_map would face. st_map should remember
what btf it should use to get type information.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-6-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Maintain a registry of registered struct_ops types in the per-btf (module)
struct_ops_tab. This registry allows for easy lookup of struct_ops types
that are registered by a specific module.
It is a preparation work for supporting kernel module struct_ops in a
latter patch. Each struct_ops will be registered under its own kernel
module btf and will be stored in the newly added btf->struct_ops_tab. The
bpf verifier and bpf syscall (e.g. prog and map cmd) can find the
struct_ops and its btf type/size/id... information from
btf->struct_ops_tab.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-5-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Move some of members of bpf_struct_ops to bpf_struct_ops_desc. type_id is
unavailabe in bpf_struct_ops anymore. Modules should get it from the btf
received by kmod's init function.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-4-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Get ready to remove bpf_struct_ops_init() in the future. By using
BTF_ID_LIST, it is possible to gather type information while building
instead of runtime.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-3-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Move the majority of the code to bpf_struct_ops_init_one(), which can then
be utilized for the initialization of newly registered dynamically
allocated struct_ops types in the following patches.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-2-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
|
Jiri Olsa says:
====================
bpf: Add cookies retrieval for perf/kprobe multi links
hi,
this patchset adds support to retrieve cookies from existing tracing
links that still did not support it plus changes to bpftool to display
them. It's leftover we discussed some time ago [1].
thanks,
jirka
v2 changes:
- added review/ack tags
- fixed memory leak [Quentin]
- align the uapi fields properly [Yafang Shao]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CALOAHbAZ6=A9j3VFCLoAC_WhgQKU7injMf06=cM2sU4Hi4Sx+Q@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com>
---
====================
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Displaying cookies for kprobe multi link, in plain mode:
# bpftool link
...
1397: kprobe_multi prog 47532
kretprobe.multi func_cnt 3
addr cookie func [module]
ffffffff82b370c0 3 bpf_fentry_test1
ffffffff82b39780 1 bpf_fentry_test2
ffffffff82b397a0 2 bpf_fentry_test3
And in json mode:
# bpftool link -j | jq
...
{
"id": 1397,
"type": "kprobe_multi",
"prog_id": 47532,
"retprobe": true,
"func_cnt": 3,
"missed": 0,
"funcs": [
{
"addr": 18446744071607382208,
"func": "bpf_fentry_test1",
"module": null,
"cookie": 3
},
{
"addr": 18446744071607392128,
"func": "bpf_fentry_test2",
"module": null,
"cookie": 1
},
{
"addr": 18446744071607392160,
"func": "bpf_fentry_test3",
"module": null,
"cookie": 2
}
]
}
Cookie is attached to specific address, and because we sort addresses
before printing, we need to sort cookies the same way, hence adding
the struct addr_cookie to keep and sort them together.
Also adding missing dd.sym_count check to show_kprobe_multi_json.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-9-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Displaying cookie for perf event link probes, in plain mode:
# bpftool link
17: perf_event prog 90
kprobe ffffffff82b1c2b0 bpf_fentry_test1 cookie 3735928559
18: perf_event prog 90
kretprobe ffffffff82b1c2b0 bpf_fentry_test1 cookie 3735928559
20: perf_event prog 92
tracepoint sched_switch cookie 3735928559
21: perf_event prog 93
event software:page-faults cookie 3735928559
22: perf_event prog 91
uprobe /proc/self/exe+0xd703c cookie 3735928559
And in json mode:
# bpftool link -j | jq
{
"id": 30,
"type": "perf_event",
"prog_id": 160,
"retprobe": false,
"addr": 18446744071607272112,
"func": "bpf_fentry_test1",
"offset": 0,
"missed": 0,
"cookie": 3735928559
}
{
"id": 33,
"type": "perf_event",
"prog_id": 162,
"tracepoint": "sched_switch",
"cookie": 3735928559
}
{
"id": 34,
"type": "perf_event",
"prog_id": 163,
"event_type": "software",
"event_config": "page-faults",
"cookie": 3735928559
}
{
"id": 35,
"type": "perf_event",
"prog_id": 161,
"retprobe": false,
"file": "/proc/self/exe",
"offset": 880700,
"cookie": 3735928559
}
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-8-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Adding fill_link_info test for perf event and testing we
get its values back through the bpf_link_info interface.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-7-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Now that we get cookies for perf_event probes, adding tests
for cookie for kprobe/uprobe/tracepoint.
The perf_event test needs to be added completely and is coming
in following change.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-6-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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