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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner:
"The restartable sequences syscall (finally):
After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by
the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of
restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus.
It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with
support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests
It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully
comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no
point to drag it out for yet another cycle"
* 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore
rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests
rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test
rseq/selftests: Provide basic test
rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library
selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS
powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call
powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences
x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call
x86: Add support for restartable sequences
arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call
arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
arm: Add restartable sequences support
rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h
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Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig.
If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu
is automatically hidden. If STRONG is not supported, it will fall
back to REGULAR. If REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled.
This means, AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of
Kconfig, hence removed.
I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols. The use of
'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config
would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to
disable as many features as possible.
X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports those
options, but generates broken code. I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR
to test this. I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh
to make it work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- improve fixdep to coalesce consecutive slashes in dep-files
- fix some issues of the maintainer string generation in deb-pkg script
- remove unused CONFIG_HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX and clean-up
several tools and linker scripts
- clean-up modpost
- allow to enable the dead code/data elimination for PowerPC in EXPERT
mode
- improve two coccinelle scripts for better performance
- pass endianness and machine size flags to sparse for all architecture
- misc fixes
* tag 'kbuild-v4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (25 commits)
kbuild: add machine size to CHECKFLAGS
kbuild: add endianness flag to CHEKCFLAGS
kbuild: $(CHECK) doesnt need NOSTDINC_FLAGS twice
scripts: Fixed printf format mismatch
scripts/tags.sh: use `find` for $ALLSOURCE_ARCHS generation
coccinelle: deref_null: improve performance
coccinelle: mini_lock: improve performance
powerpc: Allow LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION to be selected
kbuild: Allow LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION to be selectable if enabled
kbuild: LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION no -ffunction-sections/-fdata-sections for module build
kbuild: Fix asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h for LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
modpost: constify *modname function argument where possible
modpost: remove redundant is_vmlinux() test
modpost: use strstarts() helper more widely
modpost: pass struct elf_info pointer to get_modinfo()
checkpatch: remove VMLINUX_SYMBOL() check
vmlinux.lds.h: remove no-op macro VMLINUX_SYMBOL()
kbuild: remove CONFIG_HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX
export.h: remove code for prefixing symbols with underscore
depmod.sh: remove symbol prefix support
...
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Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace
memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two
purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the
current CPU number value from user-space.
* Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics)
Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on
per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations.
The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started
by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of
critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a
few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other
architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path.
Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases.
Test hardware:
arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core
x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading
The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread.
* Per-CPU statistic counter increment
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0
x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7
* LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer
per-cpu buffer
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1
x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2
* liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8
x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9
* jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq
Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on
rseq 2016 implementation):
The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and
the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%.
* Reading the current CPU number
Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is
running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the
cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done
by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the
current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler
updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory
area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from
memory.
Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and
user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read
the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over
alternative approaches:
- 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc
- 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso
executing a "lsl" instruction,
- 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction,
- Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline
assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable
sequences.
- The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared
between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the
case for the lsl-based x86 vdso.
On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment
selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs
similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is
not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already
using the gs segment selector for other purposes.
Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number:
ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l)
Machine model: Cubietruck
- Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns
- getcpu system call: 234.9 ns
x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz:
- Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns
- Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns
- "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns
- getcpu system call: 53.9 ns
- Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset)
Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to
expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the
scheduler:
Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @
2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy
saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1
kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig,
restartable sequences series applied.
* CONFIG_RSEQ=n
avg.: 41.37 s
std.dev.: 0.36 s
* CONFIG_RSEQ=y
avg.: 40.46 s
std.dev.: 0.33 s
- Size
On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is
567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/
[2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timers and timekeeping updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Core infrastucture work for Y2038 to address the COMPAT interfaces:
+ Add a new Y2038 safe __kernel_timespec and use it in the core
code
+ Introduce config switches which allow to control the various
compat mechanisms
+ Use the new config switch in the posix timer code to control the
32bit compat syscall implementation.
- Prevent bogus selection of CPU local clocksources which causes an
endless reselection loop
- Remove the extra kthread in the clocksource code which has no value
and just adds another level of indirection
- The usual bunch of trivial updates, cleanups and fixlets all over the
place
- More SPDX conversions
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
clocksource/drivers/mxs_timer: Switch to SPDX identifier
clocksource/drivers/timer-imx-tpm: Switch to SPDX identifier
clocksource/drivers/timer-imx-gpt: Switch to SPDX identifier
clocksource/drivers/timer-imx-gpt: Remove outdated file path
clocksource/drivers/arc_timer: Add comments about locking while read GFRC
clocksource/drivers/mips-gic-timer: Add pr_fmt and reword pr_* messages
clocksource/drivers/sprd: Fix Kconfig dependency
clocksource: Move inline keyword to the beginning of function declarations
timer_list: Remove unused function pointer typedef
timers: Adjust a kernel-doc comment
tick: Prefer a lower rating device only if it's CPU local device
clocksource: Remove kthread
time: Change nanosleep to safe __kernel_* types
time: Change types to new y2038 safe __kernel_* types
time: Fix get_timespec64() for y2038 safe compat interfaces
time: Add new y2038 safe __kernel_timespec
posix-timers: Make compat syscalls depend on CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
time: Introduce CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
time: Introduce CONFIG_64BIT_TIME in architectures
compat: Enable compat_get/put_timespec64 always
...
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Pull dma-mapping updates from Christoph Hellwig:
- replace the force_dma flag with a dma_configure bus method. (Nipun
Gupta, although one patch is іncorrectly attributed to me due to a
git rebase bug)
- use GFP_DMA32 more agressively in dma-direct. (Takashi Iwai)
- remove PCI_DMA_BUS_IS_PHYS and rely on the dma-mapping API to do the
right thing for bounce buffering.
- move dma-debug initialization to common code, and apply a few
cleanups to the dma-debug code.
- cleanup the Kconfig mess around swiotlb selection
- swiotlb comment fixup (Yisheng Xie)
- a trivial swiotlb fix. (Dan Carpenter)
- support swiotlb on RISC-V. (based on a patch from Palmer Dabbelt)
- add a new generic dma-noncoherent dma_map_ops implementation and use
it for arc, c6x and nds32.
- improve scatterlist validity checking in dma-debug. (Robin Murphy)
- add a struct device quirk to limit the dma-mask to 32-bit due to
bridge/system issues, and switch x86 to use it instead of a local
hack for VIA bridges.
- handle devices without a dma_mask more gracefully in the dma-direct
code.
* tag 'dma-mapping-4.18' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: (48 commits)
dma-direct: don't crash on device without dma_mask
nds32: use generic dma_noncoherent_ops
nds32: implement the unmap_sg DMA operation
nds32: consolidate DMA cache maintainance routines
x86/pci-dma: switch the VIA 32-bit DMA quirk to use the struct device flag
x86/pci-dma: remove the explicit nodac and allowdac option
x86/pci-dma: remove the experimental forcesac boot option
Documentation/x86: remove a stray reference to pci-nommu.c
core, dma-direct: add a flag 32-bit dma limits
dma-mapping: remove unused gfp_t parameter to arch_dma_alloc_attrs
dma-debug: check scatterlist segments
c6x: use generic dma_noncoherent_ops
arc: use generic dma_noncoherent_ops
arc: fix arc_dma_{map,unmap}_page
arc: fix arc_dma_sync_sg_for_{cpu,device}
arc: simplify arc_dma_sync_single_for_{cpu,device}
dma-mapping: provide a generic dma-noncoherent implementation
dma-mapping: simplify Kconfig dependencies
riscv: add swiotlb support
riscv: only enable ZONE_DMA32 for 64-bit
...
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Architectures that are capable can select
HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION to enable selection of that
option (as an EXPERT kernel option).
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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CONFIG_HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX was selected by BLACKFIN, METAG.
They were removed by commit 4ba66a976072 ("arch: remove blackfin port"),
commit bb6fb6dfcc17 ("metag: Remove arch/metag/"), respectively.
No more architecture enables CONFIG_HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX.
Clean up the rest of scripts, and remove the Kconfig entry.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
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Currently STRUCTLEAK inserts initialization out of live scope of variables
from KASAN point of view. This leads to KASAN false positive reports.
Prohibit this combination for now.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180419172451.104700-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennisszhou@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There is no arch specific code required for dma-debug, so there is no
need to opt into the support either.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
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Compat functions are now used to support 32 bit time_t in
compat mode on 64 bit architectures and in native mode on
32 bit architectures.
Introduce COMPAT_32BIT_TIME to conditionally compile these
functions.
Note that turning off 32 bit time_t support requires more
changes on architecture side. For instance, architecure
syscall tables need to be updated to drop support for 32 bit
time_t syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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There are a total of 53 system calls (aside from ioctl) that pass a time_t
or derived data structure as an argument, and in order to extend time_t
to 64-bit, we have to replace them with new system calls and keep providing
backwards compatibility.
To avoid adding completely new and untested code for this purpose, we
introduce a new CONFIG_64BIT_TIME symbol. Every architecture that supports
new 64 bit time_t syscalls enables this config.
After this is done for all architectures, the CONFIG_64BIT_TIME symbol
will be deleted.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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This removes the old `ld -r` incremental link option, which has not
been selected by any architecture since June 2017.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Nearly all modern compilers support a stack-protector option, and nearly
all modern distributions enable the kernel stack-protector, so enabling
this by default in kernel builds would make sense. However, Kconfig does
not have knowledge of available compiler features, so it isn't safe to
force on, as this would unconditionally break builds for the compilers or
architectures that don't have support. Instead, this introduces a new
option, CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO, which attempts to discover the best
possible stack-protector available, and will allow builds to proceed even
if the compiler doesn't support any stack-protector.
This option is made the default so that kernels built with modern
compilers will be protected-by-default against stack buffer overflows,
avoiding things like the recent BlueBorne attack. Selection of a specific
stack-protector option remains available, including disabling it.
Additionally, tiny.config is adjusted to use CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE, since
that's the option with the least code size (and it used to be the default,
so we have to explicitly choose it there now).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510076320-69931-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Various portions of the kernel, especially per-architecture pieces,
need to know if the compiler is building with the stack protector.
This was done in the arch/Kconfig with 'select', but this doesn't
allow a way to do auto-detected compiler support. In preparation for
creating an on-if-available default, move the logic for the definition of
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR into the Makefile.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510076320-69931-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
"Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.
To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
control.
Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
...
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Significantly shrink the core networking routing structures. Result
of http://vger.kernel.org/~davem/seoul2017_netdev_keynote.pdf
2) Add netdevsim driver for testing various offloads, from Jakub
Kicinski.
3) Support cross-chip FDB operations in DSA, from Vivien Didelot.
4) Add a 2nd listener hash table for TCP, similar to what was done for
UDP. From Martin KaFai Lau.
5) Add eBPF based queue selection to tun, from Jason Wang.
6) Lockless qdisc support, from John Fastabend.
7) SCTP stream interleave support, from Xin Long.
8) Smoother TCP receive autotuning, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Lots of erspan tunneling enhancements, from William Tu.
10) Add true function call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
11) Add explicit support for GRO HW offloading, from Michael Chan.
12) Support extack generation in more netlink subsystems. From Alexander
Aring, Quentin Monnet, and Jakub Kicinski.
13) Add 1000BaseX, flow control, and EEE support to mvneta driver. From
Russell King.
14) Add flow table abstraction to netfilter, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
15) Many improvements and simplifications to the NFP driver bpf JIT,
from Jakub Kicinski.
16) Support for ipv6 non-equal cost multipath routing, from Ido
Schimmel.
17) Add resource abstration to devlink, from Arkadi Sharshevsky.
18) Packet scheduler classifier shared filter block support, from Jiri
Pirko.
19) Avoid locking in act_csum, from Davide Caratti.
20) devinet_ioctl() simplifications from Al viro.
21) More TCP bpf improvements from Lawrence Brakmo.
22) Add support for onlink ipv6 route flag, similar to ipv4, from David
Ahern.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1925 commits)
tls: Add support for encryption using async offload accelerator
ip6mr: fix stale iterator
net/sched: kconfig: Remove blank help texts
openvswitch: meter: Use 64-bit arithmetic instead of 32-bit
tcp_nv: fix potential integer overflow in tcpnv_acked
r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization.
qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06
rtnetlink: enable IFLA_IF_NETNSID for RTM_NEWLINK
ipmr: Fix ptrdiff_t print formatting
ibmvnic: Wait for device response when changing MAC
qlcnic: fix deadlock bug
tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect
ipv4: Get the address of interface correctly.
net_sched: gen_estimator: fix lockdep splat
net: macb: Handle HRESP error
net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Fix copy-paste bug in flow steering refactoring
ipv6: addrconf: break critical section in addrconf_verify_rtnl()
ipv6: change route cache aging logic
i40e/i40evf: Update DESC_NEEDED value to reflect larger value
bnxt_en: cleanup DIM work on device shutdown
...
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Pull dma mapping updates from Christoph Hellwig:
"Except for a runtime warning fix from Christian this is all about
consolidation of the generic no-IOMMU code, a well as the glue code
for swiotlb.
All the code is based on the x86 implementation with hooks to allow
all architectures that aren't cache coherent to use it.
The x86 conversion itself has been deferred because the x86
maintainers were a little busy in the last months"
* tag 'dma-mapping-4.16' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: (57 commits)
MAINTAINERS: add the iommu list for swiotlb and xen-swiotlb
arm64: use swiotlb_alloc and swiotlb_free
arm64: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32
mips: use swiotlb_{alloc,free}
mips/netlogic: remove swiotlb support
tile: use generic swiotlb_ops
tile: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32
unicore32: use generic swiotlb_ops
ia64: remove an ifdef around the content of pci-dma.c
ia64: clean up swiotlb support
ia64: use generic swiotlb_ops
ia64: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32
swiotlb: remove various exports
swiotlb: refactor coherent buffer allocation
swiotlb: refactor coherent buffer freeing
swiotlb: wire up ->dma_supported in swiotlb_dma_ops
swiotlb: add common swiotlb_map_ops
swiotlb: rename swiotlb_free to swiotlb_exit
x86: rename swiotlb_dma_ops
powerpc: rename swiotlb_dma_ops
...
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While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to
userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always
copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)).
The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and
may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct
at the end of task_struct.
cache object allocation:
kernel/fork.c:
alloc_task_struct_node(...):
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...);
dup_task_struct(...):
...
tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node);
copy_process(...):
...
dup_task_struct(...)
_do_fork(...):
...
copy_process(...)
example usage trace:
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:
__fpu__restore_sig(...):
...
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
...
__copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size);
fpu__restore_sig(...):
...
return __fpu__restore_sig(...);
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:
restore_sigcontext(...):
...
fpu__restore_sig(...)
This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture
declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct.
If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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Since error-injection framework is not limited to be used
by kprobes, nor bpf. Other kernel subsystems can use it
freely for checking safeness of error-injection, e.g.
livepatch, ftrace etc.
So this separate error-injection framework from kprobes.
Some differences has been made:
- "kprobe" word is removed from any APIs/structures.
- BPF_ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() is renamed to
ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() since it is not limited for BPF too.
- CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION is the config item of this
feature. It is automatically enabled if the arch supports
error injection feature for kprobe or ftrace etc.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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phys_to_dma, dma_to_phys and dma_capable are helpers published by
architecture code for use of swiotlb and xen-swiotlb only. Drivers are
not supposed to use these directly, but use the DMA API instead.
Move these to a new asm/dma-direct.h helper, included by a
linux/dma-direct.h wrapper that provides the default linear mapping
unless the architecture wants to override it.
In the MIPS case the existing dma-coherent.h is reused for now as
untangling it will take a bit of work.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
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Construct the init thread stack in the linker script rather than doing it
by means of a union so that ia64's init_task.c can be got rid of.
The following symbols are then made available from INIT_TASK_DATA() linker
script macro:
init_thread_union
init_stack
INIT_TASK_DATA() also expands the region to THREAD_SIZE to accommodate the
size of the init stack. init_thread_union is given its own section so that
it can be placed into the stack space in the right order. I'm assuming
that the ia64 ordering is correct and that the task_struct is first and the
thread_info second.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> (arm64)
Tested-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
|
Error injection is sloppy and very ad-hoc. BPF could fill this niche
perfectly with it's kprobe functionality. We could make sure errors are
only triggered in specific call chains that we care about with very
specific situations. Accomplish this with the bpf_override_funciton
helper. This will modify the probe'd callers return value to the
specified value and set the PC to an override function that simply
returns, bypassing the originally probed function. This gives us a nice
clean way to implement systematic error injection for all of our code
paths.
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Conflicts:
tools/perf/arch/arm/annotate/instructions.c
tools/perf/arch/arm64/annotate/instructions.c
tools/perf/arch/powerpc/annotate/instructions.c
tools/perf/arch/s390/annotate/instructions.c
tools/perf/arch/x86/tests/intel-cqm.c
tools/perf/ui/tui/progress.c
tools/perf/util/zlib.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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We want to wait for all potentially preempted kprobes trampoline
execution to have completed. This guarantees that any freed
trampoline memory is not in use by any task in the system anymore.
synchronize_rcu_tasks() gives such a guarantee, so use it.
Also, this guarantees to wait for all potentially preempted tasks
on the instructions which will be replaced with a jump.
Since this becomes a problem only when CONFIG_PREEMPT=y, enable
CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y for synchronize_rcu_tasks() in that case.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naveen N . Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul E . McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150845661962.5443.17724352636247312231.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
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The new flag PCI_DEV_FLAGS_NO_RELAXED_ORDERING has been added
to indicate that Relaxed Ordering Attributes (RO) should not
be used for Transaction Layer Packets (TLP) targeted toward
these affected Root Port, it will clear the bit4 in the PCIe
Device Control register, so the PCIe device drivers could
query PCIe configuration space to determine if it can send
TLPs to Root Port with the Relaxed Ordering Attributes set.
With this new flag we don't need the config ARCH_WANT_RELAX_ORDER
to control the Relaxed Ordering Attributes for the ixgbe drivers
just like the commit 1a8b6d76dc5b ("net:add one common config...") did,
so revert this commit.
Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc plugins update from Kees Cook:
"This finishes the porting work on randstruct, and introduces a new
option to structleak, both noted below:
- For the randstruct plugin, enable automatic randomization of
structures that are entirely function pointers (along with a couple
designated initializer fixes).
- For the structleak plugin, provide an option to perform zeroing
initialization of all otherwise uninitialized stack variables that
are passed by reference (Ard Biesheuvel)"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: structleak: add option to init all vars used as byref args
randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection
drivers/net/wan/z85230.c: Use designated initializers
drm/amd/powerplay: rv: Use designated initializers
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This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.
This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.
Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
rendered unexploitable:
http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/
http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016
This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
(i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
conditions to remain universally silent.
On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
(which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).
On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
overflow-only race condition.
As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
.text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
error reporting routine.
Example assembly comparison:
refcount_inc() before:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
refcount_inc() after:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3
...
.text.unlikely:
ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad)
These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
(refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):
2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
cycles protections
atomic_t 82249267387 none
refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero
refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero
This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
code to be a refcount-only protection.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
|
|
In the Linux kernel, struct type variables are rarely passed by-value,
and so functions that initialize such variables typically take an input
reference to the variable rather than returning a value that can
subsequently be used in an assignment.
If the initalization function is not part of the same compilation unit,
the lack of an assignment operation defeats any analysis the compiler
can perform as to whether the variable may be used before having been
initialized. This means we may end up passing on such variables
uninitialized, resulting in potential information leaks.
So extend the existing structleak GCC plugin so it will [optionally]
apply to all struct type variables that have their address taken at any
point, rather than only to variables of struct types that have a __user
annotation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
This enables the automatic structure selection logic in the randstruct
GCC plugin. The selection logic randomizes all structures that contain
only function pointers, unless marked with __no_randomize_layout.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.
This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.
Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
the source buffer.
* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.
* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.
Kees said:
"This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"
[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Split SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR from LOCKUP_DETECTOR, and split
HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF from HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR.
LOCKUP_DETECTOR implies the general boot, sysctl, and programming
interfaces for the lockup detectors.
An architecture that wants to use a hard lockup detector must define
HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF or HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH.
Alternatively an arch can define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, which provides the
minimum arch_touch_nmi_watchdog, and it otherwise does its own thing and
does not implement the LOCKUP_DETECTOR interfaces.
sparc is unusual in that it has started to implement some of the
interfaces, but not fully yet. It should probably be converted to a full
HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH.
[npiggin@gmail.com: fix]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617223522.66c0ad88@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-4-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild thin archives updates from Masahiro Yamada:
"Thin archives migration by Nicholas Piggin.
THIN_ARCHIVES has been available for a while as an optional feature
only for PowerPC architecture, but we do not need two different
intermediate-artifact schemes.
Using thin archives instead of conventional incremental linking has
various advantages:
- save disk space for builds
- speed-up building a little
- fix some link issues (for example, allyesconfig on ARM) due to more
flexibility for the final linking
- work better with dead code elimination we are planning
As discussed before, this migration has been done unconditionally so
that any problems caused by this will show up with "git bisect".
With testing with 0-day and linux-next, some architectures actually
showed up problems, but they were trivial and all fixed now"
* tag 'kbuild-thinar-v4.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
tile: remove unneeded extra-y in Makefile
kbuild: thin archives make default for all archs
x86/um: thin archives build fix
tile: thin archives fix linking
ia64: thin archives fix linking
sh: thin archives fix linking
kbuild: handle libs-y archives separately from built-in.o archives
kbuild: thin archives use P option to ar
kbuild: thin archives final link close --whole-archives option
ia64: remove unneeded extra-y in Makefile.gate
tile: fix dependency and .*.cmd inclusion for incremental build
sparc64: Use indirect calls in hamming weight stubs
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull GCC plugin updates from Kees Cook:
"The big part is the randstruct plugin infrastructure.
This is the first of two expected pull requests for randstruct since
there are dependencies in other trees that would be easier to merge
once those have landed. Notably, the IPC allocation refactoring in
-mm, and many trivial merge conflicts across several trees when
applying the __randomize_layout annotation.
As a result, it seemed like I should send this now since it is
relatively self-contained, and once the rest of the trees have landed,
send the annotation patches. I'm expecting the final phase of
randstruct (automatic struct selection) will land for v4.14, but if
its other tree dependencies actually make it for v4.13, I can send
that merge request too.
Summary:
- typo fix in Kconfig (Jean Delvare)
- randstruct infrastructure"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
ARM: Prepare for randomized task_struct
randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloading
randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading
randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast
randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin
Fix English in description of GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
compiler: Add __designated_init annotation
gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6
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Make thin archives build the default, but keep the config option
to allow exemptions if any breakage can't be quickly solved.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Many subsystems will not use refcount_t unless there is a way to build the
kernel so that there is no regression in speed compared to atomic_t. This
adds CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL to enable the full refcount_t implementation
which has the validation but is slightly slower. When not enabled,
refcount_t uses the basic unchecked atomic_t routines, which results in
no code changes compared to just using atomic_t directly.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621200026.GA115679@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code
in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures
at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to
know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for
"in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other
build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for
distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for
third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now
all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker.
In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to
cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This
comes at the cost of reduced randomization.
Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout,
which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to
randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable
the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization
that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with
bisection.
Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated
initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation
even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require
the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for
automatically chosen structures are marked as well.)
The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are:
- disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch)
- add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking
- clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings
- add whitelisting infrastructure
- support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott)
- raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7
Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Fixes: c61f13eaa1ee ("gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization")
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes are:
- Debloat RCU headers
- Parallelize SRCU callback handling (plus overlapping patches)
- Improve the performance of Tree SRCU on a CPU-hotplug stress test
- Documentation updates
- Miscellaneous fixes"
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (74 commits)
rcu: Open-code the rcu_cblist_n_lazy_cbs() function
rcu: Open-code the rcu_cblist_n_cbs() function
rcu: Open-code the rcu_cblist_empty() function
rcu: Separately compile large rcu_segcblist functions
srcu: Debloat the <linux/rcu_segcblist.h> header
srcu: Adjust default auto-expediting holdoff
srcu: Specify auto-expedite holdoff time
srcu: Expedite first synchronize_srcu() when idle
srcu: Expedited grace periods with reduced memory contention
srcu: Make rcutorture writer stalls print SRCU GP state
srcu: Exact tracking of srcu_data structures containing callbacks
srcu: Make SRCU be built by default
srcu: Fix Kconfig botch when SRCU not selected
rcu: Make non-preemptive schedule be Tasks RCU quiescent state
srcu: Expedite srcu_schedule_cbs_snp() callback invocation
srcu: Parallelize callback handling
kvm: Move srcu_struct fields to end of struct kvm
rcu: Fix typo in PER_RCU_NODE_PERIOD header comment
rcu: Use true/false in assignment to bool
rcu: Use bool value directly
...
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Patch series "kexec/fadump: remove dependency with CONFIG_KEXEC and
reuse crashkernel parameter for fadump", v4.
Traditionally, kdump is used to save vmcore in case of a crash. Some
architectures like powerpc can save vmcore using architecture specific
support instead of kexec/kdump mechanism. Such architecture specific
support also needs to reserve memory, to be used by dump capture kernel.
crashkernel parameter can be a reused, for memory reservation, by such
architecture specific infrastructure.
This patchset removes dependency with CONFIG_KEXEC for crashkernel
parameter and vmcoreinfo related code as it can be reused without kexec
support. Also, crashkernel parameter is reused instead of
fadump_reserve_mem to reserve memory for fadump.
The first patch moves crashkernel parameter parsing and vmcoreinfo
related code under CONFIG_CRASH_CORE instead of CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE. The
second patch reuses the definitions of append_elf_note() & final_note()
functions under CONFIG_CRASH_CORE in IA64 arch code. The third patch
removes dependency on CONFIG_KEXEC for firmware-assisted dump (fadump)
in powerpc. The next patch reuses crashkernel parameter for reserving
memory for fadump, instead of the fadump_reserve_mem parameter. This
has the advantage of using all syntaxes crashkernel parameter supports,
for fadump as well. The last patch updates fadump kernel documentation
about use of crashkernel parameter.
This patch (of 5):
Traditionally, kdump is used to save vmcore in case of a crash. Some
architectures like powerpc can save vmcore using architecture specific
support instead of kexec/kdump mechanism. Such architecture specific
support also needs to reserve memory, to be used by dump capture kernel.
crashkernel parameter can be a reused, for memory reservation, by such
architecture specific infrastructure.
But currently, code related to vmcoreinfo and parsing of crashkernel
parameter is built under CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE. This patch introduces
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE and moves the above mentioned code under this config,
allowing code reuse without dependency on CONFIG_KEXEC. There is no
functional change with this patch.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149035338104.6881.4550894432615189948.stgit@hbathini.in.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/livepatching
Pull livepatch updates from Jiri Kosina:
- a per-task consistency model is being added for architectures that
support reliable stack dumping (extending this, currently rather
trivial set, is currently in the works).
This extends the nature of the types of patches that can be applied
by live patching infrastructure. The code stems from the design
proposal made [1] back in November 2014. It's a hybrid of SUSE's
kGraft and RH's kpatch, combining advantages of both: it uses
kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined
with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of
fallback options which make it quite flexible.
Most of the heavy lifting done by Josh Poimboeuf with help from
Miroslav Benes and Petr Mladek
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz
- module load time patch optimization from Zhou Chengming
- a few assorted small fixes
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/livepatching:
livepatch: add missing printk newlines
livepatch: Cancel transition a safe way for immediate patches
livepatch: Reduce the time of finding module symbols
livepatch: make klp_mutex proper part of API
livepatch: allow removal of a disabled patch
livepatch: add /proc/<pid>/patch_state
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model
livepatch: store function sizes
livepatch: use kstrtobool() in enabled_store()
livepatch: move patching functions into patch.c
livepatch: remove unnecessary object loaded check
livepatch: separate enabled and patched states
livepatch/s390: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/s390: reorganize TIF thread flag bits
livepatch/powerpc: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/x86: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch: create temporary klp_update_patch_state() stub
x86/entry: define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags explicitly
stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces
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The definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() is currently smp_mb()
for CONFIG_PPC and a no-op otherwise. It would be better to instead
provide an architecture-selectable Kconfig option, and select the
strength of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() based on that option. This
commit therefore creates ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE, has PPC select it,
and bases the definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() on this new
ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE Kconfig option.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
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mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space
for allocation.
The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during
exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR
randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random
bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications.
Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat
(32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based
on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space
(4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an
invalid address.
To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address
base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be
used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit
applications.
As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit
syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before
this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task
is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder
is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either
'current' or inactive.
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection
of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers
from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception
(e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered
unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers.
It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as:
- corrupted stack data
- stack grows the wrong way
- stack walk doesn't reach the bottom
- user didn't provide a large enough entries array
Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done().
Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can
determine at build time whether the function is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the x86 changes
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt:
an user||a user
an userspace||a userspace
I also added "userspace" to the list since it is a common word in Linux.
I found some instances for "an userfaultfd", but I did not add it to the
list. I felt it is endless to find words that start with "user" such as
"userland" etc., so must draw a line somewhere.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-4-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The current transparent hugepage code only supports PMDs. This patch
adds support for transparent use of PUDs with DAX. It does not include
support for anonymous pages. x86 support code also added.
Most of this patch simply parallels the work that was done for huge
PMDs. The only major difference is how the new ->pud_entry method in
mm_walk works. The ->pmd_entry method replaces the ->pte_entry method,
whereas the ->pud_entry method works along with either ->pmd_entry or
->pte_entry. The pagewalk code takes care of locking the PUD before
calling ->pud_walk, so handlers do not need to worry whether the PUD is
stable.
[dave.jiang@intel.com: fix SMP x86 32bit build for native_pud_clear()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148719066814.31111.3239231168815337012.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
[dave.jiang@intel.com: native_pud_clear missing on i386 build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148640375195.69754.3315433724330910314.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148545059381.17912.8602162635537598445.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Kapshuk <alexander.kapshuk@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Nilesh Choudhury <nilesh.choudhury@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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