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The current way we deal with PtrAuth is a bit heavy handed:
- We forcefully save the host's keys on each vcpu_load()
- Handling the PtrAuth trap forces us to go all the way back
to the exit handling code to just set the HCR bits
Overall, this is pretty cumbersome. A better approach would be
to handle it the same way we deal with the FPSIMD registers:
- On vcpu_load() disable PtrAuth for the guest
- On first use, save the host's keys, enable PtrAuth in the
guest
Crucially, this can happen as a fixup, which is done very early
on exit. We can then reenter the guest immediately without
leaving the hypervisor role.
Another thing is that it simplify the rest of the host handling:
exiting all the way to the host means that the only possible
outcome for this trap is to inject an UNDEF.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When using the PtrAuth feature in a guest, we need to save the host's
keys before allowing the guest to program them. For that, we dump
them in a per-CPU data structure (the so called host context).
But both call sites that do this are in preemptible context,
which may end up in disaster should the vcpu thread get preempted
before reentering the guest.
Instead, save the keys eagerly on each vcpu_load(). This has an
increased overhead, but is at least safe.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Now that the 32bit KVM/arm host is a distant memory, let's move the
whole of the KVM/arm64 code into the arm64 tree.
As they said in the song: Welcome Home (Sanitarium).
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200513104034.74741-1-maz@kernel.org
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We currently intertwine the KVM PSCI implementation with the general
dispatch of hypercall handling, which makes perfect sense because PSCI
is the only category of hypercalls we support.
However, as we are about to support additional hypercalls, factor out
this functionality into a separate hypercall handler file.
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
[steven.price@arm.com: rebased]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org
licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 503 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.811534538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
in the kernel and present in the CPU implementation so only VHE code
paths are modified.
When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again. However the host key save is
optimized and implemented inside ptrauth instruction/register access
trap.
Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
framework in the host.
Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of
authentication to be present in a cpu.
This switch of key is done from guest enter/exit assembly as preparation
for the upcoming in-kernel pointer authentication support. Hence, these
key switching routines are not implemented in C code as they may cause
pointer authentication key signing error in some situations.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
[Only VHE, key switch in full assembly, vcpu_has_ptrauth checks
, save host key in ptrauth exception trap]
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
[maz: various fixups]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- selftests improvements
- large PUD support for HugeTLB
- single-stepping fixes
- improved tracing
- various timer and vGIC fixes
x86:
- Processor Tracing virtualization
- STIBP support
- some correctness fixes
- refactorings and splitting of vmx.c
- use the Hyper-V range TLB flush hypercall
- reduce order of vcpu struct
- WBNOINVD support
- do not use -ftrace for __noclone functions
- nested guest support for PAUSE filtering on AMD
- more Hyper-V enlightenments (direct mode for synthetic timers)
PPC:
- nested VFIO
s390:
- bugfixes only this time"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
KVM: x86: Add CPUID support for new instruction WBNOINVD
kvm: selftests: ucall: fix exit mmio address guessing
Revert "compiler-gcc: disable -ftracer for __noclone functions"
KVM: VMX: Move VM-Enter + VM-Exit handling to non-inline sub-routines
KVM: VMX: Explicitly reference RCX as the vmx_vcpu pointer in asm blobs
KVM: x86: Use jmp to invoke kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup
MAINTAINERS: Add arch/x86/kvm sub-directories to existing KVM/x86 entry
KVM/x86: Use SVM assembly instruction mnemonics instead of .byte streams
KVM/MMU: Flush tlb directly in the kvm_zap_gfn_range()
KVM/MMU: Flush tlb directly in kvm_set_pte_rmapp()
KVM/MMU: Move tlb flush in kvm_set_pte_rmapp() to kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte()
KVM: Make kvm_set_spte_hva() return int
KVM: Replace old tlb flush function with new one to flush a specified range.
KVM/MMU: Add tlb flush with range helper function
KVM/VMX: Add hv tlb range flush support
x86/hyper-v: Add HvFlushGuestAddressList hypercall support
KVM: Add tlb_remote_flush_with_range callback in kvm_x86_ops
KVM: x86: Disable Intel PT when VMXON in L1 guest
KVM: x86: Set intercept for Intel PT MSRs read/write
KVM: x86: Implement Intel PT MSRs read/write emulation
...
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When we emulate a guest instruction, we don't advance the hardware
singlestep state machine, and thus the guest will receive a software
step exception after a next instruction which is not emulated by the
host.
We bodge around this in an ad-hoc fashion. Sometimes we explicitly check
whether userspace requested a single step, and fake a debug exception
from within the kernel. Other times, we advance the HW singlestep state
rely on the HW to generate the exception for us. Thus, the observed step
behaviour differs for host and guest.
Let's make this simpler and consistent by always advancing the HW
singlestep state machine when we skip an instruction. Thus we can rely
on the hardware to generate the singlestep exception for us, and never
need to explicitly check for an active-pending step, nor do we need to
fake a debug exception from the guest.
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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In subsequent patches we're going to expose ptrauth to the host kernel
and userspace, but things are a bit trickier for guest kernels. For the
time being, let's hide ptrauth from KVM guests.
Regardless of how well-behaved the guest kernel is, guest userspace
could attempt to use ptrauth instructions, triggering a trap to EL2,
resulting in noise from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(). So let's write up a
handler for the PAC trap, which silently injects an UNDEF into the
guest, as if the feature were really missing.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure
we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode
than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the
SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this
safely back to the user.
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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The new SMC Calling Convention (v1.1) allows for a reduced overhead
when calling into the firmware, and provides a new feature discovery
mechanism.
Make it visible to KVM guests.
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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As we're about to update the PSCI support, and because I'm lazy,
let's move the PSCI include file to include/kvm so that both
ARM architectures can find it.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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When handling an SMC trap, the "preferred return address" is set
to that of the SMC, and not the next PC (which is a departure from
the behaviour of an SMC that isn't trapped).
Increment PC in the handler, as the guest is otherwise forever
stuck...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: acfb3b883f6d ("arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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KVM doesn't follow the SMCCC when it comes to unimplemented calls,
and inject an UNDEF instead of returning an error. Since firmware
calls are now used for security mitigation, they are becoming more
common, and the undef is counter productive.
Instead, let's follow the SMCCC which states that -1 must be returned
to the caller when getting an unknown function number.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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We expect to have firmware-first handling of RAS SErrors, with errors
notified via an APEI method. For systems without firmware-first, add
some minimal handling to KVM.
There are two ways KVM can take an SError due to a guest, either may be a
RAS error: we exit the guest due to an SError routed to EL2 by HCR_EL2.AMO,
or we take an SError from EL2 when we unmask PSTATE.A from __guest_exit.
The current SError from EL2 code unmasks SError and tries to fence any
pending SError into a single instruction window. It then leaves SError
unmasked.
With the v8.2 RAS Extensions we may take an SError for a 'corrected'
error, but KVM is only able to handle SError from EL2 if they occur
during this single instruction window...
The RAS Extensions give us a new instruction to synchronise and
consume SErrors. The RAS Extensions document (ARM DDI0587),
'2.4.1 ESB and Unrecoverable errors' describes ESB as synchronising
SError interrupts generated by 'instructions, translation table walks,
hardware updates to the translation tables, and instruction fetches on
the same PE'. This makes ESB equivalent to KVMs existing
'dsb, mrs-daifclr, isb' sequence.
Use the alternatives to synchronise and consume any SError using ESB
instead of unmasking and taking the SError. Set ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT
in the exit_code so that we can restart the vcpu if it turns out this
SError has no impact on the vcpu.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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We expect to have firmware-first handling of RAS SErrors, with errors
notified via an APEI method. For systems without firmware-first, add
some minimal handling to KVM.
There are two ways KVM can take an SError due to a guest, either may be a
RAS error: we exit the guest due to an SError routed to EL2 by HCR_EL2.AMO,
or we take an SError from EL2 when we unmask PSTATE.A from __guest_exit.
For SError that interrupt a guest and are routed to EL2 the existing
behaviour is to inject an impdef SError into the guest.
Add code to handle RAS SError based on the ESR. For uncontained and
uncategorized errors arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror() will panic(), these
errors compromise the host too. All other error types are contained:
For the fatal errors the vCPU can't make progress, so we inject a virtual
SError. We ignore contained errors where we can make progress as if
we're lucky, we may not hit them again.
If only some of the CPUs support RAS the guest will see the cpufeature
sanitised version of the id registers, but we may still take RAS SError
on this CPU. Move the SError handling out of handle_exit() into a new
handler that runs before we can be preempted. This allows us to use
this_cpu_has_cap(), via arm64_is_ras_serror().
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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When an SError arrives during single-step both the SError and debug
exceptions may be pending when the step is completed, and the
architecture doesn't define the ordering of the two. This means that we
can observe en SError even though we've just completed a step, without
receiving a debug exception. In that case the DBG_SPSR_SS bit will have
flipped as the instruction executed. After handling the abort in
handle_exit() we test to see if the bit is clear and we were
single-stepping before deciding if we need to exit to user space.
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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If we are using guest debug to single-step the guest, we need to ensure
that we exit after emulating the instruction. This only affects
instructions completely emulated by the kernel. For instructions
emulated in userspace, we need to exit and return to complete the
emulation.
The kvm_arm_handle_step_debug() helper sets up the necessary exit
state if needed.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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When trapping forbidden attempts by a guest to use SVE, we want the
guest to see a trap consistent with SVE not being implemented.
This patch injects an undefined instruction exception into the
guest in response to such an exception.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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This implements the kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() for ARM, and adjusts
the calls to kvm_vcpu_on_spin().
Signed-off-by: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If a vcpu exits due to request a user mode spinlock, then
the spinlock-holder may be preempted in user mode or kernel mode.
(Note that not all architectures trap spin loops in user mode,
only AMD x86 and ARM/ARM64 currently do).
But if a vcpu exits in kernel mode, then the holder must be
preempted in kernel mode, so we should choose a vcpu in kernel mode
as a more likely candidate for the lock holder.
This introduces kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() to decide whether the
vcpu is in kernel-mode when it's preempted. kvm_vcpu_on_spin's
new argument says the same of the spinning VCPU.
Signed-off-by: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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arm/arm64 already has one VCPU request used when setting pause,
but it doesn't properly check requests in VCPU RUN. Check it
and also make sure we set vcpu->mode at the appropriate time
(before the check) and with the appropriate barriers. See
Documentation/virtual/kvm/vcpu-requests.rst. Also make sure we
don't leave any vcpu requests we don't intend to handle later
set in the request bitmap. If we don't clear them, then
kvm_request_pending() may return true when it shouldn't.
Using VCPU requests properly fixes a small race where pause
could get set just as a VCPU was entering guest mode.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
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Currently we BUG() if we see an ESR_EL2.EC value we don't recognise. As
configurable disables/enables are added to the architecture (controlled
by RES1/RES0 bits respectively), with associated synchronous exceptions,
it may be possible for a guest to trigger exceptions with classes that
we don't recognise.
While we can't service these exceptions in a manner useful to the guest,
we can avoid bringing down the host. Per ARM DDI 0487A.k_iss10775, page
D7-1937, EC values within the range 0x00 - 0x2c are reserved for future
use with synchronous exceptions, and EC values within the range 0x2d -
0x3f may be used for either synchronous or asynchronous exceptions.
The patch makes KVM handle any unknown EC by injecting an UNDEFINED
exception into the guest, with a corresponding (ratelimited) warning in
the host dmesg. We could later improve on this with with a new (opt-in)
exit to the host userspace.
Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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The arm64 kernel assumes that FP/ASIMD units are always present
and accesses the FP/ASIMD specific registers unconditionally. This
could cause problems when they are absent. This patch adds the
support for kernel handling systems without FP/ASIMD by skipping the
register access within the kernel. For kvm, we trap the accesses
to FP/ASIMD and inject an undefined instruction exception to the VM.
The callers of the exported kernel_neon_begin_partial() should
make sure that the FP/ASIMD is supported.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: add comment on the ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD conflict and the new location]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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If we have caught an SError whilst exiting, we've tagged the
exit code with the pending information. In that case, let's
re-inject the error into the guest, after having adjusted
the PC if required.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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If we've exited the guest because it has triggered an asynchronous
abort from EL1, a possible course of action is to let it know it
screwed up by giving it a Virtual Abort to chew on.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Now that we have a helper to extract the EC from an ESR_ELx value, make
use of this in the arm64 KVM code for simplicity and consistency. There
should be no functional changes as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Dave P Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Cc: Huang Shijie <shijie.huang@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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A later patch implements kvm_arch_hardware_disable(), to remove kvm
from el2, and re-instate the hyp-stub.
This can happen while guests are running, particularly when kvm_reboot()
calls kvm_arch_hardware_disable() on each cpu. This can interrupt a guest,
remove kvm, then allow the guest to be scheduled again. This causes
kvm_call_hyp() to be run against the hyp-stub.
Change the hyp-stub to return a new exception type when this happens,
and add code to kvm's handle_exit() to tell userspace we failed to
enter the guest.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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Having the system register numbers as #defines has been a pain
since day one, as the ordering is pretty fragile, and moving
things around leads to renumbering and epic conflict resolutions.
Now that we're mostly acessing the sysreg file in C, an enum is
a much better type to use, and we can clean things up a bit.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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It would add guest exit statistics to debugfs, this can be helpful
while measuring KVM performance.
[ Renamed some of the field names - Christoffer ]
Signed-off-by: Amit Singh Tomar <amittomer25@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Using oldstyle vcpu_reg() accessor is proven to be inappropriate and
unsafe on ARM64. This patch converts the rest of use cases to new
accessors and completely removes vcpu_reg() on ARM64.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Fedin <p.fedin@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Finally advertise the KVM capability for SET_GUEST_DEBUG. Once arm
support is added this check can be moved to the common
kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() code.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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This adds support for single-stepping the guest. To do this we need to
manipulate the guests PSTATE.SS and MDSCR_EL1.SS bits to trigger
stepping. We take care to preserve MDSCR_EL1 and trap access to it to
ensure we don't affect the apparent state of the guest.
As we have to enable trapping of all software debug exceptions we
suppress the ability of the guest to single-step itself. If we didn't we
would have to deal with the exception arriving while the guest was in
kernelspace when the guest is expecting to single-step userspace. This
is something we don't want to unwind in the kernel. Once the host is no
longer debugging the guest its ability to single-step userspace is
restored.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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This adds support for SW breakpoints inserted by userspace.
We do this by trapping all guest software debug exceptions to the
hypervisor (MDCR_EL2.TDE). The exit handler sets an exit reason of
KVM_EXIT_DEBUG with the kvm_debug_exit_arch structure holding the
exception syndrome information.
It will be up to userspace to extract the PC (via GET_ONE_REG) and
determine if the debug event was for a breakpoint it inserted. If not
userspace will need to re-inject the correct exception restart the
hypervisor to deliver the debug exception to the guest.
Any other guest software debug exception (e.g. single step or HW
assisted breakpoints) will cause an error and the VM to be killed. This
is addressed by later patches which add support for the other debug
types.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-next
KVM/ARM changes for v3.20 including GICv3 emulation, dirty page logging, added
trace symbols, and adding an explicit VGIC init device control IOCTL.
Conflicts:
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
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To aid the developer when something triggers an unexpected exception,
decode the ESR_ELx.EC field when logging an ESR_ELx value using the
newly introduced esr_get_class_string. This doesn't tell the developer
the specifics of the exception encoded in the remaining IL and ISS bits,
but it can be helpful to distinguish between exception classes (e.g.
SError and a data abort) without having to manually decode the field,
which can be tiresome.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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Now that we have common ESR_ELx macros, make use of them in the arm64
KVM code. The addition of <asm/esr.h> to the include path highlighted
badly ordered (i.e. not alphabetical) include lists; these are changed
to alphabetical order.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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arm64 uses its own copy of exit handler (arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c).
Currently this file doesn't hook up with any trace points. As a result
users might not see certain events (e.g. HVC & WFI) while using ftrace
with arm64 KVM. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new trace file
and defining two trace events (one of which is shared by wfi and wfe)
for arm64. The new trace points are then linked with related functions
in handle_exit.c.
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The architecture specifies that when the processor wakes up from a WFE
or WFI instruction, the instruction is considered complete, however we
currrently return to EL1 (or EL0) at the WFI/WFE instruction itself.
While most guests may not be affected by this because their local
exception handler performs an exception returning setting the event bit
or with an interrupt pending, some guests like UEFI will get wedged due
this little mishap.
Simply skip the instruction when we have completed the emulation.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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As we're about to trap a bunch of CP14 registers, let's rework
the CP15 handling so it can be generalized and work with multiple
tables.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Currently, the kvm_psci_call() returns 'true' or 'false' based on whether
the PSCI function call was handled successfully or not. This does not help
us emulate system-level PSCI functions where the actual emulation work will
be done by user space (QEMU or KVMTOOL). Examples of such system-level PSCI
functions are: PSCI v0.2 SYSTEM_OFF and SYSTEM_RESET.
This patch updates kvm_psci_call() to return three types of values:
1) > 0 (success)
2) = 0 (success but exit to user space)
3) < 0 (errors)
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar <pranavkumar@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"First round of KVM updates for 3.14; PPC parts will come next week.
Nothing major here, just bugfixes all over the place. The most
interesting part is the ARM guys' virtualized interrupt controller
overhaul, which lets userspace get/set the state and thus enables
migration of ARM VMs"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (67 commits)
kvm: make KVM_MMU_AUDIT help text more readable
KVM: s390: Fix memory access error detection
KVM: nVMX: Update guest activity state field on L2 exits
KVM: nVMX: Fix nested_run_pending on activity state HLT
KVM: nVMX: Clean up handling of VMX-related MSRs
KVM: nVMX: Add tracepoints for nested_vmexit and nested_vmexit_inject
KVM: nVMX: Pass vmexit parameters to nested_vmx_vmexit
KVM: nVMX: Leave VMX mode on clearing of feature control MSR
KVM: VMX: Fix DR6 update on #DB exception
KVM: SVM: Fix reading of DR6
KVM: x86: Sync DR7 on KVM_SET_DEBUGREGS
add support for Hyper-V reference time counter
KVM: remove useless write to vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp
KVM: x86: fix tsc catchup issue with tsc scaling
KVM: x86: limit PIT timer frequency
KVM: x86: handle invalid root_hpa everywhere
kvm: Provide kvm_vcpu_eligible_for_directed_yield() stub
kvm: vfio: silence GCC warning
KVM: ARM: Remove duplicate include
arm/arm64: KVM: relax the requirements of VMA alignment for THP
...
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The SMC-based PSCI emulation for Guest is going to be very different
from the in-kernel HVC-based PSCI emulation hence for now just inject
undefined exception when Guest executes SMC instruction.
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar <pranavkumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Correct spelling typo in various part of kernel
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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On an (even slightly) oversubscribed system, spinlocks are quickly
becoming a bottleneck, as some vcpus are spinning, waiting for a
lock to be released, while the vcpu holding the lock may not be
running at all.
The solution is to trap blocking WFEs and tell KVM that we're
now spinning. This ensures that other vpus will get a scheduling
boost, allowing the lock to be released more quickly. Also, using
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_CPU_RELAX_INTERCEPT slightly improves the performance
when the VM is severely overcommited.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Provide the necessary infrastructure to trap coprocessor accesses that
occur when running 32bit guests.
Also wire SMC and HVC trapped in 32bit mode while were at it.
Reviewed-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Wire the PSCI backend into the exit handling code.
Reviewed-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Handle the exit of a VM, decoding the exit reason from HYP mode
and calling the corresponding handler.
Reviewed-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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